

## Studies in Early Greek Philosophy

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# Studies in Early Greek Philosophy

*A Collection of Papers and One Review*

*By*

Jaap Mansfeld



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- 1 J. Mansfeld, 'Detheologization. Aëtian chapters and their Peripatetic background', in *Rhizomata. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science*. Ed. by Bodnár, István / Corcilius, Klaus / Gregoric, Pavel / Ierodiakonou, Katerina. Bd. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter 2013, 330–362. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 2 J. Mansfeld, 'Insight by Hindsight. Intentional Unclarity in Presocratic Proems', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (BICS)* 40 (1995), 225–232. Chichester UK: John Wiley and Sons. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
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- 5 J. Mansfeld, 'Anaximenes' Soul'. Translated from 'De ziel van Anaximenes', *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 69 (FS Pieter van der Horst), 187–194. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 6 J. Mansfeld, 'Minima Parmenidea. Exegetical notes on B1.22–23a, B2.1–5, B6.3, and B8.38–41 DK', *Mnemosyne. A Journal of Classical Studies* 58 (2005), 554–560. Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 7 J. Mansfeld, 'Parmenides from Right to Left', *Études platoniciennes* 12 (2015), <http://etudesplatoniciennes.revues.org/699>. Paris: Société d'Études Platoniciennes. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
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- 10 J. Mansfeld, 'Alcmaeon and Plato on Soul', *Études platoniciennes* 11 (2014), <http://etudesplatoniciennes.revues.org/508>. Paris: Société d'Études Platoniciennes. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 11 J. Mansfeld, 'The Body Politic. Aëtius on Alcmaeon on *isonomia* and *monarchia*', in Harte, V. / Lane, M. eds., *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy*, FS Malcolm Schofield, Cambridge 2013, 78–95. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 12 J. Mansfeld, 'Aristotle on Anaxagoras in Relation to Empedocles in *Metaphysics A*', *Philologus. Zeitschrift für antike Literatur und ihre Rezeption*. Ed. by Ehlers, Widu-Wolfgang and Seidensticker, Bernd. 155 (2011), 361–366. Berlin: Akademie Verlag / Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 13 J. Mansfeld, '»Das verteilte Lastschiff«. Philolaus 44B12 DK', *Mnemosyne. A Journal of Classical Studies* 69 (2016), 298–299. Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 14 J. Mansfeld, 'Democritus on Poetry. Fragments 68B18 and B21 DK', original title 'Democritus, Fragments 68B18 and 21 DK', *Mnemosyne. A Journal of Classical Studies* 57 (2004), 484–488. Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 15 J. Mansfeld, 'Out of Touch. Philoponus as a Source for Democritus', in Brancacci, A. and Morel, P.-M. eds., *Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul*. *Philosophia Antiqua* Vol. 102, Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill 2007, 277–292. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 16 J. Mansfeld, 'The Presocratic Philosophers. A Discussion of a New Handbook', review article in *Mnemosyne. A Journal of Classical Studies* 68 (2014), 331–343. Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 17 J. Mansfeld, 'Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Persons', in Kerferd, G.B. ed., *The Sophists and their Legacy*. Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy Held in Cooperation with Projektgruppe Altertumswissenschaften der Thyssenstiftung at Bad Homburg 26th August–1st September 1979. *Hermes Einzelschriften* 44, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 38–53. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.
- 18 J. Mansfeld, 'Aristotle on Socrates' Contributions to Philosophy', in Alesse, F., Aronadio, F., Dalfino, M.C., Simeoni, L. and Spinelli, E. eds., *Anthropine sophia: Studi di filologia e storiografia filosofica in memoria di Gabriele Giannantoni*. *Elenchos*, Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico 50. Napoli: Bibliopolis 2008, 337–350. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.



- 19 J. Mansfeld, 'Hermann Diels (1848–1922)', in Primavesi, O. and Luchner, K. eds., *The Presocratics from the Latin Middle Ages to Hermann Diels*. Philosophie der Antike Bd. 26. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2011, 389–420. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.



# Introduction

This volume of studies contains a selection of for the most part recent papers dealing with early Greek thought. They are supplemented by a recent review article. I have tried to offer solutions to some of the interpretative problems that I have encountered, by looking at the ancient sources first, and by taking ancient traditions of presentation, interpretation, and reception into account. Excursions in the history of scholarship, or the study of modern traditions of reception and presentation, which come second, are not only interesting per se, but may also help to diagnose an interpretative problem of which the *primum movens* has been forgotten. These approaches are complementary.

The following are brief summaries of the contents of the selected papers:

Chapter 1, *Detheologization. Aëtian Chapters and Their Peripatetic Background*, is concerned with the much reduced presence of the ancient *theologoi* and of doxai concerned with the divine, in the doxographical tradition best represented by the Aëtian *Placita*, even though this approach already begins in Aristotle himself. The ancient poets still listed in several of Aristotle's dialectical overviews, and the early theologies, both Greek and Oriental, listed by Eudemus have almost entirely been eliminated later. This state of affairs provides a noteworthy contrast with modern and contemporary attempts to interpret some of the early thinkers from the point of view of the history of religion, examples of which are given in Chapters 3 and 19.

Chapter 2, *Insight by Hindsight. Intentional Unclearly in Presocratic Proems*, deals with a literary issue. The enigmatic surveys of the contents of a poem or treatise in its proem can only be understood fully when the work as a whole has been read and understood.

Chapter 3, *Bothering the Infinite: Anaximander in the Nineteenth Century and Beyond*, is an excursion in the history of the interpretation of Anaximander's famous 'fragment'. Interpretations are often enough based in part on notions deriving not from the source, or passage, that is studied, but from elsewhere. In order to interpret the difficult fragment of an early Greek philosopher, for instance, one has to paraphrase, or even partly to replace, its obfuscating narrative with another narrative that is easier to understand. Unavoidably such a secondary narrative, no matter how coherent, will be an aggregate. The dramatic and religiously inspired reading concerned with crimes against the Infinite and their punishment, dominant in the nineteenth century, was gradually replaced by a secular interpretation concerned with the rule of law in a stable universe. The earlier view, however, never vanished entirely.

Chapter 4, *Anaximander's Fragment: Another Attempt*. Rejecting both the alternatives discussed in Chapter 3, I argue for the interpretation of Anaximander's world as an unstable, dissipative, not everlastingly balanced system. The inconsistency found by scholars in Theophrastus'/Simplicius' text disappears when it is seen that the elemental forces of nature do not change into each other. They are in the Infinite in time as well as in space. To some extent preference is given to Aristotle's evidence over the doxographical vulgate habitually derived from Theophrastus, though the Theophrastean passage containing the verbatim quotation remains the primary witness.

Chapter 5, *Anaximenes' Soul*. The so-called fragment of Anaximenes at Aëtius *Placita* 1.3 is an instantiation of the widespread technique of updating by means of interpretation. The explicit argument from analogy between the human soul and the guiding principle of the cosmos cannot be early. It points at a Stoic background, as does the use of *pneuma* as equivalent for the early term *aēr* ('air'). The refutation of Anaximenes' thesis uses an Aristotelian argument that has been made to fit a Stoicized doctrine.

Chapter 6, *Minima Parmenidea. Exegetical Notes on 28B1.22–23a, B2.1–5, B6.3, and B8.38–41 DK*. A philological discussion of vexed and vexing problems of interpretation, namely of the meaning of the handshake in B1, of the subject of 'Is' in B2, of the problem of the third way in B6, and of the reference of 'changing place and colour' in B8.

Chapter 7, *Parmenides from Right to Left*. The second part of the great Poem, whatever its relation to the first part may be thought to be, is meant as a serious account of the world and the human being from a physical point of view. Parmenides devotes considerable attention to human physiology in an entirely original way, by appealing to the behaviour and effects of his two physical elements when explaining subjects such as sex differentiation in the womb, aspects of heredity, and sleep and old age. Unlike his general cosmology and account of the origin of mankind, this *topos*, or part of philosophy, is not anticipated in his Presocratic predecessors.

Chapter 8, *Parmenides on Sense Perception in Theophrastus and Elsewhere*. The account at *De sensibus* 3–4 shows (1) that Theophrastus did not find evidence for a detailed theory of sense perception in Parmenides, and (2) that he did not include 28B7 in his overview. The later tradition followed by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius (and numerous modern scholars) concluded from 28B7 that Parmenides rejected the evidence of the senses in favour of that of reason (*logos*). But *logos* in Parmenides means 'argument', and *glōssa* is not the organ of taste but of speech. If Theophrastus had accepted the evidence of 28B7, he would have discussed Parmenides' triad of purported senses between Plato's two and Empedocles' five.

Chapter 9, *Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul. With an Afterthought on the Afterlife*. A discussion of the reception in Antiquity of Heraclitus' views on the human soul in its cosmic context. These views were updated by later thinkers, and their extensive evidence on the matter is scrutinized in detail. A World-Soul and various forms of immortality came to be attributed to his doctrine, while soul stuff was said to be inhaled from the environment. An appendix considers the quite general opinion that Heraclitus posited some sort of afterlife for human souls. It is argued that fragments held to support this interpretation are better construed in a different way.

Chapter 10, *Alcmaeon and Plato on Soul*. The doctrine of soul as 'self-moving' is an original position of Plato and has not been derived from Alcmaeon, as has been generally supposed.

Chapter 11, *The Body Politic: Aëtius on Alcmaeon on Isonomia and Monarchia*. The occurrence of political terms in the context of a medical doctrine, attributed in a sentence of the doxographer Aëtius to Alcmaeon, who probably is to be dated to around 440 BCE, is an instance of the broader application of political terms. The use of these metaphors has generally been explained as the result of direct influence upon Alcmaeon's thought of the terminology connected with the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes at Athens, in 508/7 BC, and/or his reception of the notion of cosmic equilibrium attributed to Anaximander. But this analogy is false: humans are mortal and Anaximander's cosmic balance is not everlasting, see Chapter 4 above. I submit that the Aëtian metaphors are a reflection of the reception of the famous discussion regarding the best political constitution in the historian Herodotus.

Chapter 12, *Aristotle on Anaxagoras in Relation to Empedocles in Metaphysics A*. Comparison of Aristotle's dating of Empedocles and Anaxagoras in *Metaphysics* A ch. 3, and of his systematic order of treatment of these two philosophers in *Met.* A ch. 8, with his dating and treatment of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus in the discussion of earthquakes at *Meteor.* 2.7 shows that ὕστερος at *Met.* A.3 984a13 means 'more advanced'. This is because Anaxagoras, when treated *more Aristotelico*, turns out to be closer to Plato than Empedocles. Therefore he may be discussed after Empedocles in *Met.* A ch. 8, though in a chronological perspective he is earlier.

Chapter 13, »Das verteuflerte Lastschiff«: *Philolaus 44B12 DK*. A philological *Miszelle*: for the corrupt δ τὰς σφαίρας ὅλκας read (τ)ὸ τὰς σφαίρας ὅλ{κ}ας.

Chapter 14, *Democritus on Poetry. Fragments 68B18 and B21 DK*. Another philological *Miszelle*. Democritus 68B18 DK, as cited by Clement of Alexandria, is a generalized reformulation or paraphrase of B21 DK, known from its quotation by Dio Chrysostomus at the beginning of his *On Homer*.

Chapter 15, *Out of Touch: Philoponus as a Source for Democritus*. Passages from Philoponus' commentaries are insufficient evidence to support the assumption that according to Democritus the atoms never touch each other. The testimonia conveniently printed in our fragment collections or otherwise available should not be put on the same level, as if they had the same quality and were equally reliable. Philoponus is an unsafe witness.

Chapter 16, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Discussion of a New Handbook*. Discussion of the various approaches to the interpretation and presentation of Presocratic thought in the recent *Frühgriechische Philosophie* volumes of the Ueberweg *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*. The information provided is excellent and the level of discussion high. But original attempts at interpretation should perhaps be toned down a little in a work that claims to present, and mostly succeeds, in presenting the *status quaestionis* of the research in its field. The work does not include the Sophists, which are dealt with in another Ueberweg volume.

Chapter 17, *Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Persons*. Reading Protagoras' *homo mensura* rule in the light of his statement regarding knowledge of the gods shows that it is not restricted to the here and now, or to sense perception, as is often believed, but pertains to personal experience and the development of the human person in interaction with others and with the world.

Chapter 18, *Aristotle on Socrates' Contributions to Philosophy*. More information about the history of dialectic and logic beyond what he wrote in the logical treatises is found in Aristotle's physical and ethical treatises, and also in the *Metaphysics*. The potted *placita* at the beginning of the *Magna Moralia*, offering an overview of the development of the definition of virtue, are unique in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* and not by Aristotle himself. They are based on what is found dispersed elsewhere in the *Corpus*.

Chapter 19, *Hermann Diels (1848–1922)*. Diels put the study of the Presocratics on a new footing, both by reconstructing the tradition of their transmission and by his editions of their remains. These works still to a large extent dominate the scene today. Though first and foremost an editor of texts, Diels also held views concerned with the relation between religious and rational thought that influenced his interpretation. I attempt to follow (not slavishly) his career as a student of the Presocratics, though to do justice to the richness and importance of his contributions one would at least need a full-length monograph. Contents: 1, Four Reviews; 2, Physicorum historia; 3, Editing Fragments; 4, The *Parmenides* and the *Herakleitos*: Mysticism, Rationalism, Pessimism; 5, Anaximander the Mystical Rationalist; 6, Empedocles, from Reason to Religion; 7, Changing the Chapter Sequence.



The majority of these papers have been set anew according to the Brill style sheet. For permission to reprint them I am most grateful to the publishers of the various volumes and journals in which they originally appeared. I have cited these original publications in the Acknowledgements. Warm thanks are due to the members of the Board of *Philosophia Antiqua* and to Jennifer Pavelko and Meghan Connolly of Brill for encouragement and support, and in particular to David Runia for help and encouragement over the years. The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies of Utrecht University must be thanked for logistical and other support provided during my emeritute. Last but not least, my former assistants Ivo Geradts and Johannes Rustenburg of TAT Zetwerk, *Typographica Academica Traiectina*, whose cutting-edge expertise has proved indispensable in typesetting the volumes of the *Aëtiana*, are to be thanked again for scanning an early article and for reorganizing my typescripts. References have now been listed at the end of those papers which originally included them in the footnotes. Upgrading has been minimal. Small errors and infelicities have been corrected when noticed. The overlap between Chapters 3 and 19 has been reduced by abridgement of Section 5 of Chapter 19, but enough has been left to allow for independent perusal of either chapter. The textual appendix of Chapter 3, a doublet of that of Chapter 4, has been dropped in favour of the latter.

*Jaap Mansfeld*

Bilthoven, April 13 2018

# Detheologization

## *Aëtian Chapters and Their Peripatetic Background*<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The doxographical tradition is a body of doctrine with pronounced ‘secular’ features. I shall look at individual Aëtian chapters where the secularization is comparable with that in Aristotle (or Theophrastus), or has gone even further. The chapters chosen for this exercise can be linked with passages in Aristotle dealing with the same themes. What happened is that the ancient poets, or *theologoi*, listed in several of Aristotle’s dialectical overviews have almost entirely been eliminated. Apart from a few isolated passages Aëtius confines discussion of the divine to his chapters on principles and theology. I shall also look briefly at the abstracts in Damascius from Eudemus’ discussion of early theologies, both Greek and Oriental, and compare them with a passage in Aristotle and a chapter of the *Placita*.

### Keywords

Nonreligious – *antilogia* – *endoxa* – poets – *theologoi* – *memigmenoi* – *sophoi* – Presocratics – Aristotle – *genesis phthora alloiôsis* – *Meteorologica* – saltiness and origin of the sea – Theophrastus – Alexander of Aphrodisias – Eudemus – Babylonians – Zoroastrianism – Orphics – Speusippus – the Good – Thales – Homer – retheologization

### 1

David Runia has written that ‘[r]ight from its origin in the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus the doxographical tradition was a body of doctrine

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1 Thanks are due to the corona in Budapest for critical remarks, to Gábor Betegh for the suggestion to include Eudemus fr. 150 Wehrli and for his editorial remarks, and as always to David T. Runia for helpful notes on style and contents. Also to André Laks for allowing me to read in advance (Budapest, September 2009) his paper Laks (2009), and to the author and Mme Véronique Boudon-Millot, editor of the *Revue des Études Grecques*, for sending me a copy. Albert de Jong has to be thanked for casting a critical eye on Section 5.



with pronounced ‘secular’ features’. Aëtius’ *Placita* ‘[o]f course contained a few theological chapters, such as ones on ‘who is God’ (as principle) and on providence’, viz. chs. 1.7 and 2.3. Runia admitted that ‘the title of ch. 2.6, Ἀπὸ ποίου πρώτου στοιχείου ἤρξατο κοσμοποιεῖν ὁ θεός, (‘What was the first element from which the god began to form the cosmos?’) is a clear exception’,<sup>2</sup> but suggests that ‘in the tradition prior to A[ëtius] the chapter’s title read Ἀπὸ ποίου πρώτου στοιχείου ἤρξατο κοσμοποιεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα’ (‘What was the first element from which the cosmogony began?’).<sup>3</sup> The god does not occur in the six lemmata of ch. 2.6.<sup>4</sup> The situation is comparable to that in ch. 2.17, which in lemmata 4 to 6 includes *doxai* on the stars’ nourishment, but suppresses ‘the question of whether they are (divine) living beings’.<sup>5</sup> For the rest there is only an isolated instance in the chapter on the indestructibility of the (human) soul, 4.7.5 Diels: Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν ἀφθαρτον· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ θεὸν ἀλλ’ ἔργον τοῦ αἰδίου θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δ’ ἄλογον φθαρτόν (‘Pythagoras, Plato (say that) the rational part is indestructible; for the soul is not a god but the handiwork of the eternal God; but the irrational part is destructible’). The formula ‘the handiwork of the eternal God’ sounds Christian, but here only blends, in a Middle Platonist way, the Demiurge who produces both the World-Soul and human souls in the *Timaeus* with Aristotle’s First God.<sup>6</sup>

One may add that in the introduction at *Plac.* ch. 1.1 (heading: Τί ἐστι φύσις, ‘What is *physis*’), that is to say in the definition and exemplification of *physis* and things physical (φυσικά) ‘according to Aristotle’ which will be the subject |

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2 Runia (1997), 103 with n. 56 = (2010), 268. He no longer argues that a variant found in one ms. of ps.Plutarch may resemble the original heading, see Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 384 with n. 165. Aët. 2.3 just cites the tenets pro and contra, and some compromise positions; for the argument against providence in the *Placita* see below, text to n. 74.

3 Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 389.

4 Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 382 (with quotation of title of 5.22), 383 with n. 164.

5 Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 500–501.

6 Compare, e.g., Pl. *Ti.* 30b4–6, *noûs* in soul in body as ‘the most beautiful and best creation’ (κάλλιστον ... ἀριστόν τε ἔργον) of the Demiurge, Arist. *Met.* Δ.8 1072b28–29, ‘we say that the god is a living being, eternal, the best’ (τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον αἰδίων ἀριστόν), Cic. *Tusc.* 1.65, ‘the mind is, as I say, divine, but as Euripides dares to say, a god’ (*animus qui \*\*\* ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides* [Eur. fr. 1018 Kannicht ~ Men. *Mon.* 588 Jäkel] *dicere audet, deus*), Alc. *Did.* 10 164.34, ‘the first god is eternal’ (ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς αἰδιός ἐστιν), Plu. *An. procr.* 1027a, ‘the soul is not as a whole the handiwork of god—no, it has inborn in itself its portion of evil’ (μὴ πᾶν ἔργον εἶναι θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον ἔχουσιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ μοῖραν), Plat. *Quaest.* 1001c, ‘the soul is not only a creation of the god, but also a part’ (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ [...] οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος), Celsus *ap. Orig.* CC 4.52 ‘the soul is a creation of God, the body has another nature’ (ψυχὴ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον, σώματος δὲ ἄλλῃ φύσις), Tert. *De an.* 24.1, ‘because he believed this to be a god’ (*quia hoc et deum credidit*). For Middle Platonism in the *Placita* see Tarrant (2000), 75–76, Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 51–52, 86, 175.

of the treatise, we are told that what comes about by necessity or by accident or is divine ( $\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ ) does not belong with physics. Yet there are not only chapters about the divine (1.6–7), but also about necessity (1.25–26), fate (1.1.26–27), and chance (1.29). The function of the announcement at ch. 1.1 is to let us know that the exposition will not attribute a decisive role to chance, as the Epicureans do, or to fate and things divine, as the Stoics do.<sup>7</sup> In the specifically theological chapters, much room is reserved for the explanation of the origin of the conception of God (1.6), and for the views of the atheists (1.7.1–10), just as in Cicero and Sextus.<sup>8</sup> As I have stated elsewhere, ‘A[ëtius] for his part does not give God a role in physics’.<sup>9</sup>

In the present paper I shall look at individual Aëtian chapters where the secularization is comparable with that in Aristotle (or Theophrastus),<sup>10</sup> or has gone even further. Several chapters chosen for this exercise can be linked with passages in Aristotle dealing with the same themes. Evidence of lineage is to be found not only in similarity of content and theme, but also in that of form, for we shall for instance encounter examples of the same kind of sorting, contrasting, and opposing of tenets by means of *diaeresis* and *antilogia* (or *diaphonia*, as it came to be called) as in Aristotle and Theophrastus.

We shall see that there is first a movement of detheologizing in the *Placita* compared with earlier sources, followed by (limited) retheologization in Aëtius.

For Aristotle, the views of the ancient poets and *theologoi* belong with the *endoxa*, or *legomena*,<sup>11</sup> perhaps especially so when these views are cited by others such as Hippias<sup>12</sup> or Plato, and they acquire additional importance when it can be shown that they contain echoes of a significant truth, which had

7 For detailed treatment of *Plac.* 1.1 see Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 65–69.

8 Cic. *N.D.* 2.14–15 + 16–44, S.E. *M.* 9.14–48 + 49–194.

9 Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 69.

10 For Aristotle as well as Theophrastus the proper study of the divine belongs with first philosophy, not with physics. See Arist. *Cael.* 1.8 277b10–12, *Phys.* 1.9 192a35–37, *Met.* E.1 1026a19–31 cf. K.7 1064a37–b3, and Theophrastus’ evaluation of Xenophanes at *Phys.Op.* fr. 5 Diels ~ 224 FHS&G, and of Plato at *Phys.Op.* fr. 9 Diels ~ 230 FHS&G. There are no examples of  $\theta\epsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma$ - in the remains of Theophrastus.

11 An example of a ‘theological’ *legomenon* is found Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353b4, see below, App. 2.

12 On Hippias’ anthology of similar passages (cf. below, n. 44 and text thereto) see Snell (1944); Classen (1965), and Patzer (1986); on Hippias, Gorgias, and their influence Mans-

been established rationally in the preceding period of civilization, before the cataclysm (e.g. *Met.* Λ.91074a39–b14).<sup>13</sup> Even as mere *endoxa* they are part of the multiplicity of views that may be considered whenever a problem is discussed *more dialectico*. Such views may be shared (a) by everybody or (b) by the majority of people or (c) by the experts (*sophoi*), and where these experts are concerned they may be shared (a') by all or (b') the majority or (c') the most well-known among them.<sup>14</sup> Aristotle, to the best of my knowledge, never qualifies *theologoi* as *sophoi*,<sup>15</sup> but as they may disagree among themselves they in actual fact appear to belong with his category of experts, as is clear from quite a few dialectical passages where views attributed to them are listed together with those of philosophers.

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The first texts to be compared are Aëtius 1.24 and Arist. *Cael.* 3.1 298b12–299a2, where various positions concerned with coming to be and passing away are listed and, in Aristotle's case, discussed. Stobaeus has the same three lemmata as ps.Plutarch, so one may assume that the chapter is complete. The Aëtian chapter also depends on *GC* 1.1–2 and other Aristotelian passages, but to simplify the argument I shall mostly leave these out. The first Aëtian lemma, moreover, is not paralleled at *GC* 1.1–2 but only at *Cael.* 3.1.<sup>16</sup>

feld (1986). See also Palmer (2000), 184–185, 188–189; Betegh (2002), 347, 349–350; Frede (2004), 32–33 = (2008), 518–520; Palmer (2008), 530, 544–545. Against: Fehling (1994), 119, 129–135.

13 Much has been written on the subject; a useful overview of the Aristotelian passages concerned is at Verdenius (1960), 56–59 with footnotes 64–66. On pre-cataclysmic wisdom see also Palmer (2000), 196–200.

14 Arist. *Top.* 1.1 100b21–23, 10 104a8–12, 14 105a34–b1, 105b18 (Empedocles as exemplary expert).

15 Though one might suggest that his contrast, *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b6, between the *theologoi* and 'those who are wiser in human wisdom' (σοφώτεροι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν—the only instance of the formula ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία in Aristotle) implies that the *theologoi* are wise in superhuman wisdom. Cf. Alex. *ad loc.*, in *Mete.* 66.22, who explicitly states this: οἱ μὲν οὖν θεολόγοι καὶ τὴν θείαν σοφίαν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, cf. below, text to n. 38 (for the full Greek text of *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b16 and in *Mete.* 66.10–67.22 see App. 2 below). Alexander applies the exegetical maxim formulated by, e.g. young Cicero, *Inv.* 2.152, as *ex eo quod scriptum sit ad non scriptum pervenire*, see Mansfeld (1994), 161. For ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία contrasted with a superior form of wisdom cf., e.g., Xen. *M.* 4.7.10, Pl. *Ap.* 20d, 23a, Celsus quoting Heraclitus 22B78 and 79 DK *ap. Orig.* C.C. 6.12.

16 For more detail see Mansfeld (2002). An abstract (partly paraphrase) from *Mete.* 2.1–3 is found at Alex. *Quaest.* 98.17–100.2; this contains no extra information.

The three lemmata of the Aëtian chapter present a neat diaeresis of three different views plus name-labels: (1) The Eleatics ‘(Parmenides, Melissus, Zeno)<sup>17</sup> abolished (ἀνήρουν) coming to be and passing away’; (2) ‘Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Epicurus,<sup>18</sup> and all those who generate a cosmos through the aggregation of bodies composed of fine particles introduce combinations and separations (συγκρίσεις and διακρίσεις), but not comings to be and perishings in the true sense of these words, for these do not come about according to quality from alteration (ἀλλοιωσεις), but according to quantity from aggregation’; (3) ‘Pythagoras and all those who assume that matter is passive (introduce) coming to be and passing away in the true sense; for these come about through the qualitative alteration and turning and dissolution of the elements.’ The order of (1)—(2)—(3) is determined by that of the categories *ousia*, quantity, and quality according to the standard Aristotelian sequence; for the issues themselves compare the so-called question-types concerned with existence, quiddity, and quality.<sup>19</sup>

These three positions are already found in Aristotle’s diaeresis of views on coming to be and passing away in *Cael.* 3.1, though formulated there in a different way and not always with the same name-labels. In Aristotle there is also a fourth position (1a, below). The most radical tenet comes first, for the account is systematic not chronological.<sup>20</sup> These positions are: (1), Parmenides and Melissus, who entirely abolished (ἀνείλιν) coming to be and passing away. This corresponds as to content | and main name-labels with Aët. 1.24.1. In Aristotle we have next (1a), the exactly (‘as if intentionally’) opposite view of Hesiod, and later of those among the others who were the first to discourse on nature (φυσιο-λογήσαντες),<sup>21</sup> viz., ‘that nothing is ungenerated and that of generated entities some perish and some do not’ (those which do not perish, I may add, of course being the immortal gods).<sup>22</sup> This is not found in Aëtius. In Aristotle we then have (2), Heraclitus and many others seem to mean that ‘all things come to be and are in flux, and that only one thing persists underneath, of which these other things are transformations’. As to main content this corresponds with Aët. 1.24.3, where the name-label ‘Heraclitus and others’ has been replaced by

17 Zeno not in Stobaeus’ version.

18 Anaxagoras and Democritus epitomized away by ps.Plutarch.

19 See, e.g., Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 5, 10–12, 168–172, and *passim*, where also references to earlier publications.

20 A disregard for chronology is often de rigueur in Peripatetic dialectic, and doxography. See, e.g., Mansfeld (1989), 324 n. 41 (repr. (2010), 138) = (1990), 3102 n. 182, van der Eijk (1999b), 23–24, Runia (1999), 199 (repr. (2010), 525).

21 Identified by Simp. in *Cael.* 560.20–24 as ‘probably’ Orpheus and Musaeus.

22 Cf. *Met.* Γ.4 1000a8–19.

‘Pythagoras and all those who assume that matter is passive’. (I note that eventually Heraclitus ended up as a follower of Pythagoras, most spectacularly at Hippolytus, *Ref.* 1.4. The prominent presence of Pythagoras (and his Succession) in the *Placita* is due to the influence of Neopythagoreanism). The final view listed by Aristotle, viz. (3), that ‘some people say that all bodies come into being; they put them together from planes and dissolve them (συντιθέντες καὶ διαλύοντες) into planes’, to some extent corresponds with the contents of Aët. 1.24.2. Aristotle’s name-label is the anonymous ‘some people’ (without doubt he thinks of the *Timaeus*), while Aëtius has four name-labels, from Empedocles to Epicurus, and speaks of the ‘combinations and separations’ (συνκρίσεις and διακρίσεις) of particles. Compare the identical formula συντίθεντες καὶ διαλύοντες at *GC* 1.1 314b5–6, where this is said of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus.<sup>23</sup>

The most important difference between the Aëtian chapter and the passage in the *De caelo* is that the view of Hesiod and others like him is absent. The first thing to note is that the tenet attributed by Aristotle to the ancient poet(s) is by no means a quotation. It is an interpretation, usefully summarizing in an abstract manner a particular aspect of the *Theogony* from the point of view of the dialectical diaeresis, and as it seems carefully avoiding the word ‘gods’, so making the tenet more secular. Nevertheless, this tenet is absent from the *Placita* chapter. We have already noticed that it is also absent from the parallel passage at the beginning of the *De generatione et corruptione*. But in this other Aristotelian passage the contrary Eleatic tenet also is lacking, which is preserved (though in a somewhat different form) in the Aëtian chapter. The *status quaestionis* as presented in the introduction to the *De generatione et corruptione* is less ‘theological’ and thus more ‘secular’ than that in the parallel *De caelo* passage. The Aëtian chapter is | ultimately indebted to this, as it seems, progressively secularizing trend in Aristotle himself. Yet the tradition on which it depends did not abandon the overview in the *De caelo*. A definite selection was made from the available dialectical material, and so the Eleatic tenet was preserved, the better to construct the antilogical diaeresis by stating the negative position, the denial of existence, first—just as in ch. 1.7, where the atheists, who deny that God, or gods, exist, are found before those who provide a definition of God and so answer the question of existence in the affirmative. 336

23 The Aëtian chapter is dependent on at least several Aristotelian passages, cf. above, n. 16.

The next passages to be compared are Aëtius 3.16 (for complete text and translation see Appendix 1 below),<sup>24</sup> Theophrastus *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels,<sup>25</sup> and Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b16,<sup>26</sup> where various positions concerned with the origin and saltiness of the sea are listed and, in Aristotle's case, discussed subsequently (also in the two chapters of Book II that follow). We only have the text of ps.Plutarch, because that in the Stobaeus chapter is lost. The very full Aristotelian parallels show that we may without hesitation attribute the chapter to Aëtius.

The heading of the Aëtian chapter is *Περὶ θαλάσσης, πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστὶ πικρά*, 'On the sea, how it came to be and why it is bitter'. Its double theme will be original, for it certainly derives ultimately from Aristotle's announcement at *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–34: *περὶ δὲ θαλάττης, καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἀλμυρὸν τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν ὕδατος πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσεως λέγωμεν*, 'We must speak about the sea, and what is its nature, and for what reason such a large mass of water is salt, and also about its coming to be from the beginning'. Sometimes there are reasons to believe that a *Placita* chapter with more than one theme (which may or may not be formulated in the heading) have been coalesced from two earlier ones by Aëtius,<sup>27</sup> but for the present chapter this can be excluded.

337 Aristotle lists four positions (no names yet):

(1) The 'ancients who concerned themselves with the theologies' (οἱ ... ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας) say the sea has 'springs', for they want there to be principles and 'roots of earth and sea'.<sup>28</sup> Alexander *ad loc.*, in *Mete.*

24 Cited in Greek, translated, and discussed by Bollack (1978), 535–538, after a discussion and partial French translation of *Mete.* 2.1–3 (*ibid.*, 528–535). Cited and translated as a typical *Placita* chapter by Laks (1997), 241 = Laks (2007), 31–32.

25 ~ Thphr. fr. 221 FHS&G, *ap. Alex.*, in *Mete.* 67.3–22 (Diogenes of Apollonia 64A17 DK ~ T 32 Laks; not in Empedocles-ch. DK; Anaxagoras 59A90 DK, 2nd text). For the text see App. 2 below.

26 On the Aristotelian passage (also quoted App. 2 below) cf. Bollack (1978), 528–535 (cf. above, n. 4 and text thereto); Palmer (2000), 192–193 n. 18.

27 In Mansfeld and Runia (2009), for instance, a chapter Aët. 2.17a\*, hypothetical heading ('From where do the stars obtain their nourishment'), has been separated from Aët. 2.17, 'From where do the stars obtain their illumination'.

28 Scholars follow Ideler (1834), 496, in referring to Hes. *Th.* 282 (πηγάς of Okeanos) and 785–792 (where these words do not occur), but the lines Aristotle refers to include *Th.* 738 (where West (1966) aptly quotes *Mete.* 2.1 353a34–b1), line repeated 809 (πηγαί of Pontos), plus *Th.* 727–728, αὐτὰρ ὑπερθε / γῆς ρίζαι πεφύασι καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης. Parallels for the springs of the sea are quoted by Ideler, *loc. cit.* West on *Th.* 728 cites early parallels

67.2–3 correctly explains that the *theologoi* made the sea ‘ungenerated’, ἀγένη-τος, by granting the sea its own springs. A ‘spring’ produces what is in it.

*But:* ‘those who are wiser in human wisdom [i.e., the philosophers of nature] suppose it to have come to be’.

However, Aristotle can hardly mean that the sea is ungenerated in an absolute sense according to Hesiod, or others like him. At *GC* 3.1, as we have seen in Section 3 above,<sup>29</sup> according to the likes of Hesiod ‘nothing is ungenerated’. So what must be meant here is that the sea is ungenerated in a relative sense, that is, it is not generated from something different.

Therefore the main diaeresis, or *antilogia*, therefore is between those who (however implicitly) deny that the sea has come into being from something else, and those who say it has: the question-type of existence. The latter position is represented by three different views (Aristotelian words repeated virtually verbatim in Alexander’s *Commentary* on this passage have been picked out in **bold**—for the full texts in Greek see Appendix 2 below):

(2) ‘They say that at first **the whole region about the earth was wet**, and that as it was dried up **by the sun** the water that evaporated became the cause of **winds and the turnings of sun and moon**, while what was **left is the sea**; consequently they believe that the sea is still **drying up and becoming less**, and that in the end a time will come when it is all dried up.’<sup>30</sup> (transl. Lee, Loeb, modified; he forgot ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου). No explicit explanation of saltiness provided here.

(3) ‘Some again believe that **the sea is**, as it were, the **sweat of the earth** which it **sweats out when the sun heats it**; **which is the reason why it is salt, because sweat is salt**.’ (transl. Lee, Loeb). The explanation of the sea’s genesis is that it is sweated out.

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(4) ‘Others say that **the earth is the cause of its saltiness**: just as **water strained** through ashes becomes salt, so the sea is salt because **earth with this property** is mixed with it’. (transl. Lee, Loeb, slightly modified). Here the origin of the sea itself is no longer an issue.

Aristotelian positions (2) to (4) are paralleled in the *Placita* chapter:<sup>31</sup> Arist. (2) is paralleled at *Plac.* 3.16.1, (3) at 3.16.3, and (4) at 3.16.5. The order of the

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for the roots of the earth, and a late one for those of the sea. Commenting on *Th.* 282 he says that the plural *πηγαί* means ‘waters’, but commenting on *Th.* 738 takes the word more literally. See also Bernabé (2004) apparatus *ad Orph.* 23 F, quoting *Th.* 282, 737–738.

29 Text to nn. 20–21 above.

30 Repeated with more detail *Mete.* 2.2 355a22–25, quoted in Diels (1879) (hereinafter *DG*), cf. below, n. 34; printed as Diogenes 64A9 DK, but not in the Anaximander chapter; also printed by Kahn (1960), 64, by Laks (1983), 202 = Laks (2008), 195.

31 For preliminary text and translation see below, App. 1.

tenets has also remained the same, but after each individual ‘Aristotelian’ tenet a new one has been added.<sup>32</sup> The almost proverbial brevity of the *Placita* lemmata, conveying the same content and adding a name-label and yet using less words than Aristotle who is as brief as ever, becomes very clear when we compare the two texts. We may highlight the parallels between the two passages by picking out in bold what is virtually identical and italicizing what is equivalent:

Aët. 3.16	Arist. <i>Mete.</i> 2.1 353b6–16
16.1 Ἀναξίμανδρος τὴν θάλασσαν φησιν εἶναι τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, ἥς τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος ἀνεξήρανε τὸ πῦρ, τὸ δ' ὑπολειφθέν διὰ τὴν ἑκκαυσιν μετέβαλεν.	(2) 353b6–9 εἶναι γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὑγρὸν ἅπαντα τὸν περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπον, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου ξηραίνόμενον τὸ μὲν διατμίσαν πνεύματα καὶ τροπὰς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης φασὶ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ λειφθέν θάλατταν εἶναι. [...]
16.3 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἰδρώτα τῆς γῆς ἐκκαίνομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον πίλησιν.	(3) 353b11–13 ἔνιοι δ' αὐτῶν θερμαινομένης φασὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τῆς γῆς οἷον ἰδρώτα γίγνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ ἄλμυράν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἰδρῶς ἄλμυρός.
16.5 Μητροδώρος διὰ τὸ διηθεῖσθαι διὰ τῆς γῆς μετελιφέναι τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν πάχους, καθάπερ τὰ διὰ τῆς τέφρας ὑλίζόμενα.	(4) 353b13–16 οἱ δὲ τῆς ἄλμυρότητος αἰτίαν τὴν γῆν εἶναι φασιν· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς τέφρας ἡθοῦμενον ἄλμυρόν γίγνεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ταύτην ἄλμυράν εἶναι μειχθείσης αὐτῇ τοιαύτης γῆς.

339 The whole of the Aristotelian passage passage, from (1) to (4), is paraphrased by Alexander *ad loc.*, in *Mete.* 67.3–22. At the end of his paraphrase of Arist. (2) he adds, 67.11–14:

32 The close parallels between the *Placita* chapter and its Aristotelian source have not been noticed by scholars (cf. below, n. 40 *ad finem*). Bollack (1974), 537–538, argues that all six lemmata of Aët. 3.16 in one way or other derive from Aristotle's account but has failed to notice the quite exact correspondences in three of these six. Lachenaud (1993), 272–273, adverts to Aristotelian parallels not precedents.



ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, Ἀναξίμανδρός τε καὶ Διογένης· Διογένης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀλμυρότητος ταύτην αἰτίαν λέγει, ὅτι ἀνάγοντος τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ γλυκὺ τὸ καταλειπόμενον καὶ ὑπομένον ἀλμυρὸν εἶναι συμβαίνει.

This view was held by Anaximander and Diogenes, as Theophrastus tells us; and Diogenes gives this also as the reason for its saltiness because, when the sun draws up the sweet part, what is left over and remains turns out to be salt.

At the end of his paraphrase of Arist. (3) he adds, 67.16–17: ταύτης τῆς δόξης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γέγονε, ‘this was the view of Empedocles’.<sup>33</sup> At the end of his paraphrase of Arist. (4) he adds, 67.21–22: ταύτης πάλιν τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο Ἀναξαγόρας τε καὶ Μητροδώρος, ‘and this, again, was the view of Anaxagoras and Metrodorus’.

The whole of this paraphrase of Arist. (2)–(4) plus additions, in *Mete.* 67.3–22, became Theophrastus *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels ~ fr. 221 FHS&G. But the value of this ‘fragment’ as independent testimony is limited because of its numerous verbatim echoes of Aristotle’s text.<sup>34</sup> The name-labels will be Theophrastean, just as the doxa of Diogenes concerned with the sea’s saltiness. Note that Theophrastus twice mentions two names for one doxa, connecting an earlier with a later figure (just as Aristotle in *Met.* A.3 984a2–8).

The two new tenets *Plac.* 3.16.2 and 3.16.4 are varieties of those already in Aristotle. We note that according to usual procedure name-labels are present in the *Placita* chapter: Anaximander, Empedocles, and Metrodorus as in Theophrastus as cited by Alexander. No Antiphon in Theophrastus *ap.* Alexander, while the name-label Anaxagoras is coupled with another tenet.<sup>35</sup> Of the additional tenets *Plac.* 3.16.2 and 3.16.4 the first (name-label Anaxagoras) pertains to the exsiccation of the original moisture and resembles the tenet attributed to Anaximander in 3.16.1, while the second (name-label Antiphon) pertains to sweat, just as the tenet of Empedocles in 3.16.3.

33 Empedocles is already identified Arist. *Mete.* 2.3 357a25–27.

34 This was noticed by Diels in his apparatus *ad loc.*, *DG* 494: ‘operae pretium erit Aristotelem exemplar conferre, cuius pleraque paraphrasis esse videntur’; he then quotes *Mete.* 2.2 355a21–25 plus 2.1 353b5–16, in this order. The paraphrastic character is not acknowledged by Sharples (1998), 219, in his commentary on the fragment. On the ‘Art von möglichst treuer erläuternder Paraphrase’ of the *Commentary* on the *Meteorologica* see Moraux (2001), 272–274.

35 Oder (1899), 273 n. 49, suggests that the name-label Anaxagoras is mistaken and proposes Archelaus; Diels, *DG* 495, already referred to ‘Anaxagorae similem memoriam ... de Archelao’ at D.L. 2.17.

340 Now I believe that it is important to note that Alexander not only paraphrases Aristotle's account of the physicists, (2)–(4), but also (and even at some length) that of the *theologoi*, viz. Arist. (1), at *in Mete.* 66.12–67.23.<sup>36</sup> Usener did not include this Alexandrian passage in his fragment 23 of Theophrastus. The reason why is obvious: he believed that the title of Theophrastus' treatise is *Physikôn Doxai*, that is, *Doctrines of Physicists*, so not of *theologoi*. His example was followed by later editors of the fragments of Theophrastus, viz. Wimmer, and Diels (faithful to his *Doktorvater*), and in our time by Fortenbaugh and associates. Wimmer's fragment 29 is the same as Usener's fragment 23, and equally begins with Alexander *in Mete.*, 67.3, οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, 'some of then', scil., of the physicists.<sup>37</sup> Usener had a predecessor in Alexander himself, who at *in Mete.* 67.17 only counted the views of the physicists, that of (Anaxagoras and) Metrodorus being the 'third doxa', τρίτη ... δόξα. For the *theologoi* according to Alexander do not have a doxa, an opinion, but 'claim' to be in possession of 'divine wisdom'.<sup>38</sup> So he plumps for counting only the doxai of the physicists listed in the *Meteorology* chapter.

Of course I do not argue that Alexander's paraphrase of Arist. (1) on the *theologoi* should as of now be included in the Theophrastus fragment. Quite the contrary; I believe that the first part, viz. lines *in Mete.* 67.3–11 (οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ... ξηράν), of the Usener/Diels/FHS&G fragment should be omitted as being merely a paraphrase of Aristotle's text, and that the remainder should for the same reason be reduced to those clauses where name-labels are added to the paraphrase, and where in the first of these additions Theophrastus' name is cited.<sup>39</sup>

36 Bernabé, *Orph.* 23 F (I) and (II), prints Arist. (1) plus the first part of Alexander's corresponding paraphrase, but does not refer to the latter's paraphrastic character. One may point out, moreover, that there is no evidence attributing the sources of the sea to the Orphic poems beyond Alexander's little list of who Aristotle may mean by 'theologians'.

37 Wimmer (1863). Note that in his fr. 11a (~ *Phys.Op.* fr. 11 Usener ~ 11a Diels ~ 241 FHS&G) Wimmer translates the formula ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δόξων as 'in libro de placitis'; correctly, I presume.

38 Cf. above, n. 15.

39 Backward reference to the latter passage Alex. *in Mete.* 73.14–22 (without Theophrastus' name) in the paraphrase of Arist. *Mete.* 2.2 355a22–25 (cf. above, n. 10); again Anaximander and Diogenes. Diels in the *DG* accepts as verbatim (in *Sperrdruck*, spaced letters) the clauses with the name-labels, plus the phrase on the flavours of the earth and the digging of salt and soda, though the latter may well be an Aristotelian reminiscence of Alexander, see Bonitz s.v. ὑτρρον: '(plerumque coni οἱ ἕλεις, cf. h v)'. There are eleven instances of this combination in Aristotle, nine of which are in *Mete.* Book IV, also commented on by Alexander. Already at Pl. *Ti.* 60d–e soda and salt are mentioned next to each other and are said to appear 'when a great amount of water has left the mixture'. The only good parallel

On the other hand, it is of some interest in the context of the present inquiry 341 that the main difference between Aristotle's account and the Aëtius chapter consists in the absence in the latter of the tenet ascribed by Aristotle to the *theologoi*. Whether or not it was also included in an account of the sea's saltiness by Theophrastus is something we cannot know,<sup>40</sup> although the absence of a reference to Homer in his account of Thales<sup>41</sup> may perhaps be cited as being in favour of exclusion. Aristotle did mention the theological tenet because of his respect for the tradition, and his strongly worded criticism suggests that it was worth his while to attack it; perhaps it had been cited by others. What should at any rate be observed is that there is nothing particularly theological or mythical or outrageous about the notion of purported sources of the sea. These sources so to speak become mythological or theological by association, because they are mentioned by a poet, or poets, who wrote about the birth of the immortal gods. The idea that the sea has sources is not more extravagant than the Empedoclean suggestion that it is salty because it has been sweated out by the earth. So the tenet concerned with the sources of the sea can figure as a *physikê doxa* in the context of a dialectical discussion, or at least stand in for such a doxa, and Aristotle's argument against it is merely *ad hominem*. We may note that Lucretius, never in favour of *religio*, cites a variety of this view without compunction (and without reference to any purported origin in the old poets), 1.230–231, *unde mare ingenui fontes [...] suppeditant*, 'whence is the sea supplied by the springs within it'; 6.613, *adde suos fontes*, 'add the sea's own sources'.<sup>42</sup> And so does Seneca, *Nat.* 3.14.3, *mare unum est, ab initio scilicet ita constitutum; habet suas venas quibus impletur atque aestuat*, 'the sea is a unity, established right from the start just as it is now; it has its own sources, by which it is filled and seethes'; 3.3.1 | *ex suo fonte nativa est* (sc. *aqua*), 'water is native 342

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in Theophrastus is the title of a lost work *Περὶ ἁλῶν, νίτρου, στυπτηρίας α'* ('*On Salts, Soda, and Alum*, 1 book') *ap.* D.L. 5.42 (~ fr. 137 no. 25 FHS&G). The lemmata Aët. 3.16.1, 16.3, and 16.5 printed above are actually much closer to Aristotle's text than to the purported Theophrastus fragment.

40 A text on a 3rd cent. BCE papyrus very much resembling the passage in Aristotle and the *Placita* chapter has been attributed to Theophrastus, but it is impossible to say whether it contained a reference to the theological tenet. I discuss the relation of this text (restored by Diels on the basis of Arist. *Mete.* Book II) to the *Placita* tradition elsewhere. This is *PHib* 16, printed by Diels as Democritus 68A99a DK (~ 410 Luria), and by Fortenbaugh and associates as Theophr. Appendix no. 4 FHS&G. It is printed with commentary at Funghi and Sassi (1999), 844–851. See also Sharples (1998), 219–220, who comments on both *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 and *PHib* 16 but does not adduce the *Placita* chapter.

41 See below, n. 91 and text thereto.

42 Bollack (1974), 563, noted that Lucretius simply mentions 'les sources que les «théologiens» donnent à la mer et qu'Aristote considère comme mythiques'.

when it comes from its own spring'. True enough, Aristotle later on, at *Mete.* 2.3 357a25–27, says Empedocles' idea is ridiculous, for it is not 'clear', σαφές (that is, scientific or philosophical), but a metaphor, more suitable in poetry. But he does not say so when setting up the dialectical diaeresis in the first chapter of *Meteorologica* Book 2. Empedocles, after all, is an expert in the sense required by the *Topics* passages cited above.<sup>43</sup>

Physical *doxai*, or quasi-physical *doxai*, of *theologoi* are selected for use in a dialectical discussion when they resemble physical *doxai* proposed by philosophers, or scientists, or physical *doxai* one would be able think of oneself. In Hippias' *Anthology* views (Greek as well as barbarian and in both in poetry and prose) were already collected on account of their similarity to each other; Plato toys with the idea of collecting excerpts from the poets by bringing them together under the same headings; and Aristotle recommends the collecting of statements and *doxai* belonging to a specific genus, such as (a part of) physics, or ethics, under specific headings.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, similarity of scope and/or wording determines what views from the rich store of so-called theological views are to be selected; the direction is from *logos* to *mythos*, so to speak, and not the other way round.

For Aëtius, or the part of the tradition he follows here, the tenet of the *theologoi* was no longer relevant. This seems a bit odd, because in this way the opportunity to formulate a *diaphonia* by starting the diaeresis with a denial of the genesis of the sea from something else was lost. I submit that the secularist mentality of the Aëtius and his doxographical predecessors was responsible for this exclusion, which perhaps was already effected by Theophrastus. That preference was given to the exclusion of a theological *doxa* over the construction of a strong *diaphonia* shows the strength of the secularizing tendency. In *Plac.* ch. 1.24, as we have seen in Section 3 above, the theological tenet (which according to Aristotle is the exact contrary of the Eleatic tenet) could be eliminated without damaging the *antilogia*, or *diaphonia*, because the Eleatic tenet is of course secular, and conflicts strongly enough with the tenets joined with the other name-labels in this earlier chapter.

43 See n. 14 and text thereto.

44 Hippias 86B6 DK, Pl. *Leg.* 7.811a, 811e, Arist. *Top.* 1.14 105a34–b25.

The next *Placita* chapter to be placed in a Peripatetic context is Aët. 1.7, or rather the second part of this chapter, 1.7.11–34 Diels. At a first glance this inquiry is more an attempt at comparativism than at *Quellenforschung*, because the filiation, though no less instructive than in the examples studied so far, is rather more difficult to establish. The texts I wish to compare with this Aëtian chapter are the fourth chapter of the final book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and the remains of a Peripatetic document which is anyhow important in the context of our theme, viz. a fragment of Eudemus of Rhodes.<sup>45</sup>

Damascius has preserved for us the excerpts he made from a work, or part of a work, of Eudemus dealing with the 'theology' (θεολογία) of (in Damascius' order) Orpheus, Homer, Hesiod, Acusilaus, Epimenides, Pherecydes, the Babylonians, the Magoi 'and the whole Aryan race' (πάν τὸ Ἀρεῖον γένος), and the Sidonians.<sup>46</sup>

In a seminal paper Gabór Betegh has demonstrated that Damascius here only quotes what he needs for his own purposes, and that his reception of these early theological accounts is conditioned by his Neoplatonist metaphysics, just as his selections from this material. What is irrelevant to, that is to say cannot be accommodated with the four highest levels of the ontological hierarchy, is left by the wayside.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, 'temporal priority in the [sc. mythico-theological] genealogies is transformed into [sc. Neoplatonist] ontological priority'.<sup>48</sup> Eudemus' exposition is concerned with what Aristotle called the 'theologians', to be distinguished from the physicists.<sup>49</sup> Pace Wehrli, this account according to Betegh cannot have been 'a digression in a systematic work intended to review the *endoxa* on a particular point under discussion, for ... there is no such point for which the material as presented by Eudemus could be relevant'.<sup>50</sup> He therefore believes this account may originally have been 'an opusculum for school use, a data-base, | as it were'.<sup>51</sup> 'It is difficult to see how the material was originally organized in Eudemus, as Damascius could shift the entries'.<sup>52</sup>

45 Because the present investigation is limited to chapters in Aëtius, I shall refrain from considering the Epicurean doxographies in Cic., *N.D.* 1.24–41, and Phld., *Piet.*, PHerc. 1428 cols. 1–15. See the preliminary account at Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 88–89.

46 Eudemus fr. 150 Wehrli *ap.* Damasc. *Princ.* 3.162.19–166.7 Westerink–Combès.

47 Betegh (2002), 339, 345.

48 *Ibid.*, 347.

49 *Ibid.*, 351–354. This firmly attributes Aristotle's distinction to Eudemus.

50 *Ibid.*, 354.

51 *Ibid.*, 355.

52 *Ibid.*, 354 n. 49.

For the most part I gratefully accept this analysis. But I believe Betegh has not dwelt sufficiently on the close relation between Eudemus' account and one of Aristotle's, viz. *Met.* N.4 1091a29–b15.<sup>53</sup> I submit that one of the things Eudemus did was to complete Aristotle's rapid overview by adding much extra material, and by dissenting with Aristotle on at least one occasion.<sup>54</sup>

I only discuss some main points.<sup>55</sup> Aristotle, in this brief passage, distinguishes between four (or perhaps five)<sup>56</sup> groups, or kinds, of authorities in an order that is not only systematic but also, to some extent, chronological: (1) 'ancient' poets and 'contemporary' people like them; (3) 'later' experts (*sophoi*),<sup>57</sup> that is to say people like the physicists Empedocles and Anaxagoras; (2) 'mixed' authorities,<sup>58</sup> who 'use myth only some of the time';<sup>59</sup> and (4) 'some of those who posit unchangeable substances' and argue that the Good and the One are the same, that is, some of the Platonists. The point under discussion is whether the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν) is a principle or element, as held or argued by those belonging to groups (2), (3), and (4), or that it appears only  
 345 subsequently | in the course of the development of things, as held by those belonging to group (1). The names of the ancient poets are not cited by Aristotle, but it is easy enough to identify them, because he lists their principles: Night and Heaven (i.e., Orphic poems, cf. *Orph.* 20 F (IV) Bernabé), Chaos (i.e.,

53 He briefly discusses the passage (up to 1091b10, so omitting the reference to Empedocles and Anaxagoras) *ibid.*, 351–352. At Betegh (2004), 172 with n. 165, he rightly argues that Aristotle points out that the diachronic generations of myth 'clash with the systematic principle', but does not attempt to connect this with Eudemus/Damascius.

54 See Sharples (2002), 112–117 on compression and expansion of Aristotelian expositions in Eudemus, and 123–124 on objections not found in Aristotle; cf. also Baltussen (2002), 130, 134.

55 The passage is discussed by Sassi (2007), 205–206, and by Laks (2009), who studies the Aristotelian passage more in depth than I can do here (or have done on the pages cited below, n. 59). Note that Schibli's text of his Pherecydes F 81 (1990), 171, stops at 1091b12, i.e. fails to include the other Platonists; for a discussion see *ibid.*, 18–19 n. 11. I accept Laks' point (2009), 638 n. 14, that according to Aristotle there is a sort of progression from the early poets to the mixed category, and even believe this holds for the development from the early poets at the beginning to the Platonists at the end of the passage.

56 See below, text to n. 63.

57 Cf. above, n. 14 and text thereto.

58 *Met.* N.4 1091b8–9, οἱ γὰρ μεμιγμένοι αὐτῶν {καὶ} τῷ μὴ μυθικῶς πάντα λέγειν. Tredennick in the Loeb *Metaphysics* translates 'those of them who compromise by not describing everything in mythological language', of which Horky (2009), 75 makes 'those who are not compromised by saying everything mythically'.

59 On compromise positions cf. Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 9 with n. 8, with reference to *Met.* N.4 1091b8; *ibid.*, 141, referring to Arist. *De an.* 1.2 405a1, μίξαντες.

Hesiod, *Th.* 116), and Okeanos (i.e., Homer, *Il.* 14.246).<sup>60</sup> The ancient poets say that those who are first in time, viz. Night etc., do not reign and rule, but that this is Zeus; this is because they believe that the rulers of the world do change (that is to say that there is a succession of rulers). In a similar way some modern thinkers (Aristotle means Speusippus and ‘the’ Pythagoreans)<sup>61</sup> argue that the Good only appears when nature has made some progress. But the ‘mixed’ authorities, identified as ‘Pherecydes and some others’, and the Magoi, make the Best the first creative agent, and so do later experts (ὑστέρων ... σοφῶν), i.e., physicists like Empedocles, who made *philia* an element, and like Anaxagoras, who made *noûs* a principle;<sup>62</sup> and so, of course, do those Platonists who identify the Good and the One as a first principle. There is a primary diaeresis between early *theologoi* plus the mixed class on the one hand and the *sophoi* plus some Platonists on the other as to the presence of ‘theological’ ingredients, but there is also one according to doctrine, viz. the positioning of the Good.

In Eudemos as excerpted by Damascius our third group, consisting of some early philosophers, is lacking. We do not know whether or not Eudemos’ account originally contained them, but if it did so it is not difficult to see why Damascius omitted to include them: he only cared for the theological genealogies that could be interpreted in an ontological way. Furthermore, the right leg of the diaeresis can be represented by the mixed class (Pherecydes etc.) alone.

In one case Aristotle’s list of authorities is puzzling. The Magoi are enumerated between those who do not use myth all the time, and the rationalist *sophoi*. This suggests that at the very least the Magoi, too, do not use myth all the time. This is odd, because Aristotle’s reference is to a variety of Zoroastrianism, that |

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60 See the modern commentaries *ad loc.* At *Met.* A.3 983b30–31 Aristotle cites others (i.e. Hippias, cf. above, n. 12) for *Il.* 14.201 not 246, but his source may have quoted more. The passages at *Met.* A.3 and N.4 appear to be the only ones in the *pragmateiai* where these two lines are referred to; Bonitz s.v. Ὠκεανός fails to distinguish between them. For Eudemos’ Homeric quotation see below, n. 66, for quotations in Stobaeus below, n. 99 and text thereto. For the Orphic ‘Heaven son of Night’ (Οὐρανός Εὐφρονίδης) succeeded by Kronos succeeded by Zeus see *Pap.Derv.* col. xiv.5–6 + xv.5–6 Kouremenos, Parássoglou and Tsantsanoglou / Bernabé ~ *Orph.* 10 F Bernabé (plus addendum Bernabé (2007), 444), and Betegh (2004), e.g. 118, 131. For other Orphic references in Aristotle see below, n. 67.

61 Cf. *Met.* M.7 1072b30–34 ~ Speusippus fr. 34 a Lang; *Met.* N.4 1091a30–b3 ~ fr. 34 f, Lang. Good discussion at Tarán (1981), 339–345.

62 I cannot deal here with how this relates to the discussion at *Met.* A.3 984b11–985a10 (cf. 6 988a14–17) of this element and this principle in relation to the Good—Anaxagoras’ *noûs* *Met.* A.3 984b11–12, τοῦ ... εἶ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων (cf. *De an.* 1.2 404b1–2), Empedocles’ *philia* *Met.* A.3 985a6, τὴν ... φιλίαν αἰτίαν οὖσαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν—, or to the even more explicit remarks at *Met.* Λ.10 1075b1–8. Even less with the relation between the final books of *Metaphysics* with the first.

is, to a religious movement. This is why I said above<sup>63</sup> that perhaps Aristotle distinguishes between five groups, not four. What is possible is that the Magoi Aristotle came to know of had already been subjected to some sort of philosophical exegesis.<sup>64</sup> It is also possible (and not necessarily an alternative) that he was thinking of a similarity between ‘the two principles, the good *daimon* and the evil *daimon*, the one called Zeus and Oromasdês, the other Hades and Areimanios’, of the Magoi, and of *philia* as principle of the good and *neikos* as that of evil in Empedocles.<sup>65</sup> This would bring the Magoi closer to the sophoi.

In Eudemus as excerpted by Damascius our third group, consisting of some early philosophers, and our fourth, consisting of some Platonists, are lacking. We do not know whether or not Eudemus’ account originally contained them, but if it did it is not difficult to see why Damascius omitted to include them: he only cared for the Eudemian theological genealogies that could be interpreted in an ontological way. For Plato (and Pythagoras), whom he interpreted on a much more extensive scale, he had of course his own sources.

As Betegh points out, ‘temporal priority in the genealogies is transformed into ontological priority’. I submit that this is exactly what Aristotle is already trying to do with the views of the early poets in his group (1) and the mixed group (2) in *Met.* N 4, and to an extent even with the *sophoi* of group (3). In Aristotle’s scheme of things, as in that of his immediate pupils, there is no room for a first beginning according to time, but only for a First, or Firsts, according to ontological, causal, or logical priority. The genealogical and chronological accounts of the early poets and of Pherecydes and some others are judged, criticized, and reformulated from the viewpoint of his philosophy of science, or first philosophy. They are made to comply with a standard development from principles to what is deduced from principles and elements, or is produced from them. Conversely, for polemical purposes Speusippus’ ontological sequence is converted into a chronological succession, and put on a par with the genealogical sequences of the ancient poets. The result is a strong contrast (we may call it a | *diaphonia*) between Speusippus at the beginning of the passage and his

63 Text to n. 56.

64 Interest in the Magi is also attested for Eudoxus (fr. 341 Lasserre *ap.* D.L. 1.8) and for Plato’s pupil Hermodorus (frr. 6–6a Isnardi Parente *ap.* D.L. 1.2 and 1.8), and of course for Eudemus. Much was made of this meager information by Jaeger (1948), 131–138, but see the critical arguments of, e.g., Kerschensteiner (1945), and Koster (1949). Spoerri (1957), 214, attempts to stick to the facts. A sober evaluation is found in de Jong (1997), 207–209, 222–224. Horky (2009) argues at length in favour of an important presence of Zoroastrian notions in the Early Academy and Peripatos, but is in my view too speculative.

65 Arist. fr. 6 R<sup>3</sup>, from Book I of *Peri philosophias*, *ap.* D.L. 1.8; for this interpretation of Empedocles see *Met.* A.4 985a4–10 ~ Emp. 31A39 DK.



Platonist colleagues at its end. As a matter of fact this contrast, resulting in a humbling of Speusippus, seems to be the main purpose of this dialectical interlude.

We may also observe that a number of Aristotle's players occur in Eudemus, too, and in virtually the same order. The early poets named are Orpheus with Night, Homer with Okeanos plus Têthus according to Eudemus<sup>66</sup> (should be Night, says Damascius), and Hesiod with Chaos. This corresponds quite well with Night and Heaven, Chaos, and Okeanos in Aristotle. The next group in Eudemus comprises Acusilaus, Epimenides, and Pherecydes; Aristotle here has Pherecydes 'and some others', not further identified. Then we have the Babylonians, the Magoi and other Persians, and the Sidonians. Aristotle only has the Magoi. Elsewhere in the school-writings Aristotle often mentions and cites Homer, and he cites Hesiod, too, though rather less often; there are two further references to passages in the Orphic poems, and to Night; one to a view of Epimenides (named); and one to Pherecydes' death.<sup>67</sup> Acusilaus is never mentioned by Aristotle, Pherecydes' doctrine and the Magoi are found only here in the *pragmateiai*, at *Met.* N.4, and though the Babylonians are occasionally mentioned elsewhere in the other school-writings, they make their appearance there as stargazers, not as theologians.

On either side of Eudemus we have an exposition of early theologies (in Aristotle's case of theologies plus something else) that is concerned with the interpretation of genealogical successions in terms of ontological priority. I believe that it is counter-intuitive to deny Eudemus a similar motive. If we accept that Eudemus, too, is concerned with the relation between principles and what follows from (or after) them,<sup>68</sup> we have found a point under discussion where it is worthwhile to discuss *endoxa*. And Damascius' reinterpretation of his account of the early theologies in the terms of Late Neoplatonist metaphysics turns out to be less willful. Yet I entirely agree with Betegh that the material collected | by Eudemus contains elements that may be relevant (and were meant to be so) to other discussions as well.

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66 Eudemus prefers *Il.* 14.246 to 14.201 cited *Met.* N.4, and is apparently aware of Aristotle's reference at *Met.* A.3 for which see above, n. 60.

67 For Homer, Hesiod, and the Babylonians see Bonitz, s.vv.; Orphic lines are cited (not quoted) *De an.* 1.5 410b27–30 ~ Orph. 421 F (I) Bernabé and GA 2.1 734a18–19 ~ Orph. 404 F Bernabé, Night referred to at *Met.* Λ.6 1071b27 ~ Orph. 20 F (II) Bernabé and Λ.7 1072a19–20 (where the anonymous theologians who create from Night are opposed to the equally anonymous physicists who speak of 'all things together'), and Λ.6 1072a8 ~ Orph. F 20 (III) Bernabé; a view of Epimenides is cited *Rhet.* 3.17 1418a24–26 = Epimenides B3 DK ~ 42 F (I) Bernabé; Pherecydes' death is mentioned *HA* 5.3 557a3.

68 Wehrli (1969), 121, vaguely speaks of 'Archespekulationen' in a systematic context.

In his account of Persian theology, Eudemus corrects Aristotle, or dissents from him. We have seen above that Aristotle's positioning of the Magoi in relation to the distinction between myth and philosophy is puzzling, so some further clarification should be welcome. Now Aristotle is clearly thinking of a variety of Zoroastrianism which starts from Good and Evil as primary principles, while according to the Magoi and Persians in Eudemus' presentation Good and Evil are secondary, because deriving from a prior principle, viz. Time, or Place.<sup>69</sup> The purpose of this modification is obvious, and it makes sense. At a first glance the Magoi according to Aristotle's account belong with Pherecydes and some others as well as with Empedocles and Anaxagoras (and some Platonists), because they hold that the Good is a first principle. According to Eudemus, they belong with the ancient poets, who assume that the Good is posterior to the first principle.<sup>70</sup> So they move over to the other side of the Aristotelian diaeresis of priorities, and because of this revised categorization there can be no uncertainty, presumably, about their connection with myth.

Although it has been refashioned to comply with a later account according to Succession, it is not hard to find precedents in Aristotle and Theophrastus for substantial sections of another *Placita* chapter, viz. Aët. 1.3, the chapter on the principles. In fact this filiation is quite well known.<sup>71</sup> But a similar precedent for the positive theology in the second part of Aët. 1.7, the chapter with the heading 'Who is the God?', is more difficult to find. I have pointed out elsewhere that the presence of separate theological chapters in the *Placita* is due to a post-Peripatetic agenda,<sup>72</sup> which of course does not preclude the presence of a Peripatetic methodology as to the presentation of tenets by means of question-types, categories, diaeresis, and contrast.

The only passage in Aristotle with a sufficient density of theological, or quasi-theological, views, to be a likely candidate for comparison with Aët. 1.7.11–34 Diels is *Met.* N.4, and the only such passage among the remains of his early pupils is the excerpt from Eudemus in Damascius. Both these passages have been discussed above.

69 On these various strands in Zoroastrianism see de Jong (1997), esp. 401–402, 336–337, who argues that they may well be contemporary. Horky (2009), 76–77 has failed to notice the difference.

70 Note that the passage on the Magoi and Aryans is the only one where the terms good and evil do occur in the Eudemus excerpts.

71 See, e.g., Alt (1973), Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 73–86, and below, n. 90.

72 Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 51–52, 69, 99, 100.

The first fact to be registered is that six of the nine names mentioned by Eudemus/Damascius are spectacularly absent not only from Aët. 1.7, but also from the remainder of the *Placita* (to judge from what is extant), viz. the names Acusilaus, Epimenides, Pherecydes, Babylonians, Magoi, and Sidonians. 349

Two of these six names, viz. Pherecydes and the Magoi, as we have seen, were listed not only by Eudemus/Damascius, but also by Aristotle at *Met.* N.4.

On the other hand, three names already alluded to by Aristotle at *Met.* N.4 and also found in Eudemus/Damascius are in fact cited in the *Placita*, too (that is to say in ps.Plutarch; we note that in the majority of cases the parallel in Stobaeus is lacking): Homer five times (three by name), Hesiod twice (once by name), and the Orphic poems once, but for the most part the citations are not intended to present their views per se. What we find is what David Runia has called ‘illustrations’ or ‘elucidations of a given *doxa*’.<sup>73</sup> A Homeric line often quoted by others as well, viz. *Il.* 3.179, on Agamemnon, illustrates the (probably Academic)<sup>74</sup> argument against divine providence at the end of the series of arguments of the atheists that constitutes the first part of Aët. 1.7 (the name Homer is absent). Another line, one not quoted elsewhere, viz. *Il.* 17.547,<sup>75</sup> found in the chapter on the rainbow in both sources, is tacked on to a quotation from Plato at Aët. 3.5.2, with an embedded (and anonymous) quotation of Hesiod *Th.* 265.<sup>76</sup> A reference to ‘Theoclymenus in Homer’ without quotation of the lines *Od.* 20.351–357 (without doubt epitomized away) is found as one of the poetical illustrations of *phantasma* according to Chrysippus at Aët. 4.12.6 (ps.Plutarch only).<sup>77</sup> The often-quoted line *Od.* 17.218, ‘god always sends like to like’ (the name Homer is absent), is embedded as an illustration in the Democritus lemma at Aët. 4.19.3 (= 68 A 128 DK),<sup>78</sup> in the chapter on voice (ps.Plutarch only).

A reference (not a quotation of poetry) to the *dogmata* of the Orphic poems that each heavenly body is a cosmos is embedded in Aët. 2.13.15 (in both | sources)<sup>79</sup> as a parallel for the tenet of Heracleides and the Pythagoreans. This mention comes close to lemmatic status, but the sequence, first Heracleides 350

73 Runia (1992), 122–124. A clear example is the use of poetry (Empedocles) in Aët. 1.30.

74 See Runia (1996), 569–572 (repr. (2010), 366–368).

75 On these two Homeric lines see the apparatus of West (2000) *ad loc.*

76 See Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 219.

77 Cf. Diels *DG* 684, ‘citatur a Chrysippo’.

78 Accompanied, as at Arist. *EE* V2.1 1235a7–8, *EN* VI2.1 1155a33–34, and [Arist.] *MM* 2.11.2, by the proverbial expression ‘crow to crow’ (for which cf. *Rhet.* 1.11 1371b12–17). For tralaticious citations in the *Placita* tradition see Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 205–219.

79 2.13.14\* in the reconstruction in Mansfeld and Runia (2009), Pt. II; for the contents cf. *ibid.*, 464, 325. The reference is Orph. 30 (I) Bernabé.

and the Pythagoreans and then the Orphic poems, suggests that whoever compiled this lemma went back from the former to the latter and so argued (implicitly?) that the poets anticipated the philosophers.

One Hesiodic reference has already been mentioned. The other citation, name-label Hesiod plus quotation of *Th.* 134 (naming four Titans) in Aët. 1.6 (ps.Plutarch only), dedicated to the topic of the origin of the concept of God, illustrates the sixth of seven ways in which this origin is to be explained, viz. at 1.6.14, which is about ‘the fiction of the poets’, τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον. So here we have an explicit and critical reference (however brief) to poetic license in general, which is exemplified by a quotation from an early poet. Though the context is much different from what we find in Aristotle’s references to the early poets, we may recall his remark about the ‘mythical accretions’ (μυθικῶς ... προσήκται) to theological truths at *Met.* Λ.8 1074b3–8. What is found at Aët. 1.6.14 would therefore be acceptable to someone representing a tradition with Peripatetic roots.<sup>80</sup>

This also holds for another passage earlier in the same chapter, viz. the note about the famous tripartite theology, physical, mythical, political,<sup>81</sup> at 1.6.9, where we read: ‘the physical is taught by the philosophers, the mythical by the poets’ (διδάσκεται δὲ τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων, τὸ δὲ μυθικὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν). If we are allowed to see these statements as something the compilers of the *Placita* tradition could accept, they nicely fit with what we have called its ‘secular’ character. In the part of philosophy called physics (see the proem and first chapter of the treatise)<sup>82</sup> there is accordingly no room (or only a quite subordinate place) for tenets to be attributed to, or abstracted from, ‘the poets’ — a position which, as we have noticed above, is far more rigorous that  
 351 that of Aristotle. In other authors the list as a rule begins with the mythical part, the physical coming second. The Aëtian order stresses the particular emphasis of the doxographer.

80 Cf. Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 71, 97, 150, 220, 224.

81 Best known from Varro *ap.* August. *C.D.* 6.5 ~ Var. *Ant.rer.divin.* fr. 7–9 Cardauns; for translation, excellent comments, and references to the learned discussion see Cardauns (1976), 139–144, according to whom ‘die ganze Einteilung aus der griechischen Philosophie stammt’; thus already Pépin (1958/1976), 283–298, who argues, *ibid.*, 300–307 for an origin in the early Stoa. Note that the whole of Aët. 1.6 was printed by von Arnim as *SVF* 2.1006. See also Lehmann (1997), 193–225, arguing against the view that Varro’s sources are Stoic rather than a late Hellenistic vulgate; Cardauns (2001), 54–57, the Greek origin is certain because of the ‘griechischen Termini’. On Aët. 1.6.9 see Cardauns (1976) 140–141, Pépin (1958/1976), 297 (Aëtius, using παραδόντες, presents the doctrine ‘non comme sa découverte personnelle, mais comme l’objet d’une tradition’), Cardauns (1976), 140–141, and Lehmann (1976), 198–199.

82 See above, n. 7 and text thereto.

What is moreover worthy of note is the absence of tenets attributed to Orpheus or Homer or Hesiod or other poets or theologians in the second part of ch. 1.7 (i.e., 1.7.11–34 Diels), about the answers to the question ‘Who is the god?’ formulated in the chapter heading. So we have no echoes of Aristotle’s or Eudemus’ treatment of theological views. This is quite relevant, because we can be confident that the series of lemmata from Thales at the beginning to Epicurus at the end has been fortunately copied out more or less completely by Stobaeus (ps.Plutarch only has eight of Stobaeus’ twenty-three items).<sup>83</sup> Stobaeus, following the trend of Late Platonism, is first and foremost interested in theology. His excerpts from Aët. 1.7.11–34 are located in the first chapter of Book I of the *Anthology*, while those from the earlier chapter on the principles, Aët. 1.3, come much later, in the tenth chapter of Book 1 of the *Eclogae physicae et ethicae*—while those from the earlier chapter on the principles, Aët. 1.3, come much later, in the tenth chapter of Book I of this work. This is the consequence of a reversal of priorities: first the god, than the principles, though these are by no means always material (there is a certain amount of overlap between Aëtian chapters 1.7 and 1.3).

Several passages in Aët. 1.7 arguably go back to Aristotle’s discussion in *Met.* N.4. We should look at these tenets not only in themselves but also in relation to each other. The tenet attributed to Speusippus at 1.7.20 (Stobaeus only) is such an echo: ‘Speusippus (held) that the Intellect (is God), identical neither with the One nor with the Good, but own-natured’ (Σπεύσιππος τὸν νοῦν, οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ).<sup>84</sup> If this cryptic statement also means that the One differs from the Good, we may have a reference to the doctrine of Speusippus, which according to Aristotle excludes the Good from among the first principles, for as we know Speusippus began with the One.<sup>85</sup> We cannot corroborate this in the *Placita*, for no tenet of Speusippus is listed in Aët. 1.3, the chapter on the principles. Actually Aët. 1.7.20 is the only mention of Speusippus found in the *Placita*.

The connection with the previous tradition becomes clearer when we look at the Speusippus lemma in combination with other lemmata in the chapter. | Speusippus, who in Aristotle is coupled with the Pythagoreans,<sup>86</sup> is at 1.7.20 sharply distinguished from the very Neopythagorean Pythagoras at 1.7.18 (both sources), whose ‘monad, which is Intellect itself, is God and the Good’:

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83 See Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 86–88.

84 Speusippus fr. 38 Lang.

85 See Tarán (1981), 376–379, who argues that the Aëtian lemma should be made to fit with Aristotle’s testimony.

86 Explicitly in M.7, not in N.4, see above, n. 61 and text thereto.

an unmistakable *diaphonia*. The absence of the Speusippus lemma in ch. 1.7 of ps.Plutarch's epitome has removed this diaphonic opposition from one line of the tradition. Pythagoras' doctrine at Aët. 1.7.18 echoes that of those Platonists who form the fourth group at Arist. *Met.* N.4. And so does the doctrine attributed to Plato at Aët. 1.7.31: 'God is the One, ... the Good'.<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, the *diaphonia* between Speusippus at the beginning and other Platonists at the end of the passage in the *Metaphysics* chapter is echoed by that between Speusippus on the one hand and Pythagoras and Plato on the other in the micro-context of the *Placita* chapter. In the present case the methodological inheritance turns out to be no less persistent than the survival of a (modified) specific content. The main contrast present in Aristotle's chapter survives in the *Placita* chapter.

Accordingly, certain links between Arist. *Met.* N.4 and Aët. 1.7 can be established. But it is clear that the ancient poets and 'theologians' have been excluded from one of the most theological chapters of the *Placita*. The secularizing tendency has made itself felt also here.

The lemmata on Anaxagoras and (to a lesser extent) Empedocles at Aët. 1.7.15 and (the second part of) 1.7.28 Diels<sup>88</sup> are not incompatible with what we find at Arist. *Met.* N.4, though it is impossible to argue that they are in some way dependent on it. The Anaxagoras lemma makes Intellect the God (and in Aristotle's chapter Intellect is the principle), but this Intellect is not identified with the Good. In the corrupt Empedocles lemma the four elements are said to be divine, while this is not said of the 'forms' Strife and Love. This is bizarre, but the lemma has lost more than its name-label, and I prefer not to draw further conclusions from this unsatisfactory piece of evidence.

Returning to the Eudemus fragment I submit that, as to the order in which the Eudemean theologies are listed, the simplest assumption is that Damascius made his excerpts just by unscrolling (or rather scrolling, as we would say today) Eudemus' text. That he always strictly followed his source as to the details is something we cannot know. We have seen that he explicitly corrected Eudemus' report of Homer's theology, and he may well have done so less outspokenly | with one or some of the others. As to the nature of Eudemus' overview, Betegh's suggestion that it was a *monobiblos* is quite plausible; its *Sitz im dialektischen Leben* may have been a discussion of the principles of

87 See Dörrie & alii (2008) on this chapter: 244 n. 102, on the 'platonisierende Deutung des Pythagorismus'; 246, Speusippus' 'Lehre klingt wie eine Auseinandersetzung mit Pythagoras [1.7.18 Diels], aber auch mit Platon [1.7.31 Diels]'.  
 88 For a reconstruction of its lost beginning see Empedocles A 32 DK.

the early poets and the oriental theogonists,<sup>89</sup> perhaps comparing them with the philosophers, perhaps not. Eudemus, born in Cyprus (with a population not only of Greeks but also of Phoenicians) and teaching there after his return from Athens, was closer to the Middle East than other Peripatetics. This may explain his inclusion of the Sidonians, even if he wrote the piece while still with Aristotle.

## 6

We may conclude with a brief word about *Plac.* 1.3.1–2 Diels, the beginning of the chapter on the *archai*, where we find the last Homeric quotation to be discussed in the present paper. The Thales lemma (1.3.1) explains the choice of water as principle with arguments ultimately deriving from Aristotle and Theophrastus.<sup>90</sup> In Aristotle, but not in Theophrastus, a further point follows. Theophrastus says that there have been earlier people like him who have been forgotten because Thales threw them into the shade, *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 23.29–32;<sup>91</sup> André Laks has plausibly suggested to me that this mention of a purported line of predecessors in the field of ‘the inquiry into nature’ (τὴν περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν) may explain the absence of a reference to Homer in his account. So according to Theophrastus the (forgotten) predecessors of Thales do not include Homer. But Aristotle says that some authorities believe that the people of long ago, ‘the first to speculate about the gods’ (πρώτους θεολογήσαντας—no names), held the same belief ‘about nature’ (περὶ φύσεως) viz. as Thales, for they made Ocean and Tethys the parents of generation (*Il.* X4.201) and had the gods swear by water, or the Styx (*Il.* 14.271 etc.).<sup>92</sup> Aristotle argues that it is not clear that the ancient poets spoke ‘about nature’ (περὶ φύσεως),<sup>93</sup> while Thales is reported to have spoken about the first cause. In the *Placita* this further point is paralleled not in the form of a discussion | or a decision as to the demarcation (in the case of this particular issue)<sup>94</sup> between ancient the- 354  
ology and subsequent physics, but by the sentences: ‘for this reason Homer too

89 Cf. above, text to n. 68.

90 Arist. *Met.* A.3 983b23–25 and Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 1 Diels ~ 225 FHS&G *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 23.24–26. Cf. Diels, *DG* 220, according to whom *Plac.* 1.3.1 goes back to Aristotle via Theophrastus, and cf. above, n. 71.

91 *Phys.Op.* fr. 1 Diels ~ 225 FHS&G. Cf. above, text to n. 41, and for the thought, e.g., Hor., *Carm.* 4.9.25–28.

92 Cf. above, n. 60.

93 See Mansfeld (1985), 115–117 = (1990), 132–134.

94 I accept the argument of Palmer (2000), 182–191, that the criterium of clarity does not

submits this view about the water: ‘Ocean, who is the generation for all’, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Ὅμηρος ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ὑποτίθεται περὶ τοῦ ὕδατος Ὀκεανός, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται (*Il.* 14.246). Lachenaud, commenting on this passage, correctly observes that ‘[e]n citant Homère notre auteur fait intervenir, sans tenir compte de la chronologie,<sup>95</sup> ceux qu’Aristote appelle *theologoi* pour les distinguer de Thales et des *physikoi* [...]’.<sup>96</sup>

Aëtius here puts *physikoi* and *theologoi* on the same level, which we may see as conflicting with Aristotle’s point. But note that the passage on Homer does not follow from the preceding Peripatetic arguments in support of Thales’ tenet; the reference to Homer has been tacked on regardless. The other sixteen times the formula διὰ τοῦτο is used in ps.Plutarch it introduces an explanatory comment that is part of an ongoing exposition. One can hardly argue that the reason why *Homer* mentions Okeanos is that *Thales* had certain reasons for making water the principle, though perhaps (as István Bodnár suggested to me) one may argue that Homer did so because these reasons are valid anyway. However this may be, the apparent *non sequitur* ‘for this reason’ can be paralleled: Servius, commenting on the Silen’s song in one of Virgil’s *Eclogues*, states that the views of the philosophers on the origin of things are dissimilar, and that some hold that all things ‘are produced by water, as Thales of Miletus, wherefrom (*unde*) the phrase ‘and father Oceanus’ derives’.<sup>97</sup>

Diels should not have given this passage the status of a separate lemma.<sup>98</sup> The quotation of *Il.* 14.246, synoptically placed beside it in the Stobaeian column of the *Doxographi Graeci*, conveys the impression that this evidence goes back to Aëtius. This may well be the case for the passage in the ps.Plutarchean column, but evidence in Stobaeus is more complicated. The Stobaeian abstracts from Aët. 1.3 are at *Anth.* 1.10.12–16, while the Homeric line is found several pages earlier in this chapter, viz. at 1.10.2, among the poetic quotations (Hesiod, Homer, Orpheus, Linus etc.) and without the διὰ τοῦτο introduction; it is immediately followed at 1.10.3 by Orph. 243.7–8 F Bernabé, and at 1.10.4 even by *Il.* X4.201 | (Okeanos and Têthus). We therefore have to find a motive for a purported omission of the line plus the introductory words by Stobaeus in his Thales lemma.<sup>99</sup> Elsewhere Diels himself derives the Stobaeian quotation from

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always obtain when theological views are involved; but as he admits it clearly obtains in Aristotle’s account of Thales.

95 Cf. above, n. 20 and text thereto.

96 Lachenaud (1993), 199.

97 Serv. in *Buc.* 6.31 ~ Thales fr. 319 Wöhrle, *alii ex umore, unde est ‘Oceanumque patrem’* (*Georg.* 4.363); see Wöhrle (2009), 267.

98 Cf. Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 77.

99 *Il.* 14.201 is repeated in the quotation of 14.200–201 + 205 at the end of Stob. 1.10.11b, so



a tradition concerned with the interpretation of Homer so not from Aëtius.<sup>100</sup> A derivation of Thales from Homer (or Hesiod) can be paralleled in other authors of the first two centuries CE.<sup>101</sup> Ps.Plutarch (or rather Aëtius), I believe, updated the lemma by adding the Homeric reference, and he chose a Homeric line also cited by others, though not by Aristotle and the majority.<sup>102</sup> He may have preferred the line with only one name (Okeanos) to that with two (Okeanos plus Têthus) because of Thales' purported monism, more clearly prefigured if you have one entity as the 'origin of all'. That the reference comes after the description of Thales' doctrine, just as the references to Homer in Aristotle, is to be explained by the emphasis in *Plac.* 1.3 on the Ionic and Pythagorean Successions—this would have been spoiled with a Homer at the beginning of the Ionic line. The *Placita* chapter on the principles is rather different from its Early Peripatetic predecessors; structuring it (at least in part) according to lines of Succession is a modernization. The addition of the Homeric reference to Ocean belongs with this updating. I suggest we regard this this poetical illustration of Thales' tenet as a modest attempt at retheologizing the first lemma. We may compare the incomplete theologization of ch. 2.6 by means of the heading cited at the beginning of the present draft, 'From what first element did the god make the cosmos?' And the isolated clause at 4.7.5 Diels also cited at the beginning of the present paper: 'the soul is not a god but the handiwork of the eternal God', is a syncretistic utterance we may safely attribute to a later phase of the tradition, too.

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found immediately before the Thales lemma of Aët. 1.3 at Stob. 1.10.12. These quotations of 14.201 and 246 earlier in the same chapter may have made it easier for Stobaeus to omit 14.246 in the Thales lemma. For these lines in Aristotle and Eudemus see above, nn. 54 and 57.

100 *DG* 93; but in the apparatus of the right column *ad* 1.3.2 he holds Stobaeus responsible, suggesting that 'versus a Stobaeo poeticis c. 10 eclogis insertus est' (i.e., taken from its Aëtian context).

101 See Mansfeld (1985), 124–128.

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### | Appendix 1: Preliminary Text of ps.Plutarch, *Placita* 3.16

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- ις'. Περὶ θαλάσσης, πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστι πικρά
- 16.1 Ἀναξίμανδρος τὴν θάλασσαν φησιν εἶναι τῆς πρώτης ὑγρασίας λείψανον, ἥς τὸ μὲν πλεῖον μέρος ἀνεξήρανε τὸ πῦρ, τὸ δ' ὑπολειφθὲν διὰ τὴν ἑκκαυσιν μετέβαλεν.
- 16.2 Ἀναξαγόρας τοῦ κατ' ἀρχὴν λιμνάζοντος ὑγροῦ περικαέντος ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλιακῆς περιφορῆς καὶ τοῦ λιπαροῦ ἐξατμισθέντος εἰς ἀλυκίδα καὶ πικρίαν τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποστήναι.
- 16.3 Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἰδρώτα τῆς γῆς ἐκκαιομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου διὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον πίλῃσιν.<sup>103</sup>
- 16.4 Ἀντιφῶν ἰδρώτα θερμοῦ, ἐξ οὗ τὸ περιληφθὲν ὑγρὸν ἀπεκρίθη, τῷ καθεψιθῆναι ἢ παραλυκίσασα,<sup>104</sup> ὅπερ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἰδρώτος συμβαίνει.
- 16.5 Μητρόδωρος διὰ τὸ διηθεῖσθαι διὰ τῆς γῆς μετειληφέναι τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν πάχους, καθάπερ τὰ διὰ τῆς τέφρας ὑλιζόμενα.
- 16.6 Οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὕδατος τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀέρος κατὰ περίψυξιν συνιστάμενον γλυκὺ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ γῆς κατὰ περίκαυσιν καὶ ἐκπύρωσιν ἀναθυμιάμενον ἀλμυρόν.

103 Compare πιλῇσθαι in the Empedocles lemma Aët. 2.6.3 Diels (ps.Plutarch only). Lucretius 5.480–488 has also been several times adduced by scholars, e.g., O'Brien (1969), 293–294; Munro (1886), 308, on 5.486, *salsus sudor*, adduces Aët. 3.16.3; see also Ernout and Robin (1928), 64.

104 Diels' restored text (see apparatus) is translated in Sprague (1972), 223. Pendrick (2002), 152 at his F 32 daggers θερμοῦ and παραλυκίσασα, and in his commentary, *ibid.* 308–310, rejects Diels' supplements. But even in its corrupt form the text is sufficiently comprehensible, since one can still see which two ingredients are combined.

16.2.2 λιπαρού das Fette Qusta ibn Luqa: λεπτοτέρου Diels *DG*, λεπτότατου Gomperz *Apol. d. Heilk.*<sup>2</sup> p. 145, probat Diels 59A90 DK

16.4.1 1–2 Ἀντιφῶν ἰδρώτα (τοῦ πρώτου ὕγρου ἐξατμισθέντος ὑπὸ τοῦ) θερμοῦ, ἐξ οὗ τὸ περιλειφθὲν ὕγρον ἀπεκρίθη (καὶ θάλασσα ἐπωνομάσθη) τῷ καθεψηθῆναι παραλυκίσασα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἰδρώτος συμβαίνει Diels 87B32 DK; (τοῦ) add. Diels *DG* ex Eusebio; θερμοῦ vix sanum est Diels *DG*, † θερμοῦ † Pendrick, an θερμόν scribendum? Lachenaud

16.4.2 παραλυκίσασα Mm παρακυλίσασα II; † παραλυκίσασα † Pendrick an παραλυκίσαι scribendum? Lachenaud

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### *Translation*

3.16 *On the sea, how it came to be and how it is bitter*

- 16.1 Anaximander says that the sea is the remainder of the primal moisture, the greatest part of which the fire dried up, and what is left altered its quality [i.e. became bitter] because of the great heat.
- 16.2 Anaxagoras (says) that in the beginning water was as a standing pool; and that it was scorched by the movement of the sun about it, and the fattish part of the water was exhaled, and what was left turned to saltiness and bitterness.
- 16.3 Empedocles (says that the sea is) sweat of the earth heated by the sun because of the greater compression//its closeness to the surface.
- 16.4 Antiphon (says) sweat of the hot, from which the moist remainder was separated, becoming salt by drying out, as happens with all sweat.
- 16.5 Metrodorus (says) that the sea by being strained through the earth acquired some part of its density; just as is the case with what is filtered through ashes.
- 16.6 The followers of Plato (say that the part) of the elemental water that comes together by cooling from air becomes sweet, but (the part) that is exhaled from the earth through heating and burning (becomes) salty.

Appendix 2: Aristotle and Alexander (Shared Wording Picked Out in Bold)

Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b16

Alex. *in Mete.* 66.10–67.23 (including Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels)

(a32) **περί δὲ θαλάττης, καὶ τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἀλμυρὸν τοσοῦτόν ἐστιν ὕδατος πλῆθος, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς γενέσεως λέγωμεν.**  
(a34) οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι καὶ διατρίβοντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας ποιοῦσιν αὐτῆς πηγὰς, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ὦσιν ἀρχαὶ καὶ ρίζαι γῆς καὶ θαλάττης· τραγικώτερον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ σεμνότερον ὑπέλαβον ἴσως εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον, ὥς μέγα τι τοῦ παντός τοῦτο μόριον ὂν· καὶ τὸν λοιπὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον περὶ τοῦτον συνεστάναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοῦτου χάριν ὥς ὄντα τιμιώτατον καὶ ἀρχήν.  
  
(b5) οἱ δὲ σοφώτεροι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν ποιοῦσιν αὐτῆς γένεσιν·

(66.10) καὶ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πεποίηκε, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὰς τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ περὶ αὐτῆς δόξας ἐκτίθεται τε καὶ ἐξετάζει.  
(66.12) τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀρχαιοτέρους τε καὶ περὶ τὰς θεολογίας καταγινόμενους (θεολόγους δὲ λέγει τοὺς περὶ θεῶν ἐπαγγελλομένους λέγειν, "Ὀμηρος καὶ Ὀρφεὺς καὶ Ἡσίοδος, ὃς καὶ θεογο[66.15]νίαν συνέγραψε), τούτους δὴ φησι ποιεῖν τινὰς τῆς θαλάσσης πηγὰς, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ὦσιν ἀρχαὶ τε καὶ ρίζαι ὁμοίως γῆς τε καὶ θαλάσσης, καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων τινῶν μεταβαλλόντων ἢ τούτων γένεσις ᾗ, ἀλλ' οἰκείας ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν. ἐσέμνυνον γὰρ δὴ οὗτοι μάλιστα τὴν τε γῆν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ περὶ ταύτην καὶ ταύτης χάριν τὰ ἄλλα ἔλεγον εἶναι τε καὶ γεγο[66.20]νέναι καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανόν. σεμνότερον δ' οὖν ἡγοῦντο καὶ τραγικώτερον εἶναι τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὰ ἀπὸ | τινος οἰκείας ἀρχῆς τε καὶ ρίζης. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεολόγοι καὶ τὴν θείαν σοφίαν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι οὕτως ἔλεγον περὶ αὐτῆς·  
(66.23) οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν σοφώτεροι (ἀντιδίσταται δὲ τοῖς θεολόγοις τοὺς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν σοφωτέρους ὑποσκώπτων ἐκείνους ὥς ἀλαζονικωτέρους· λέγει δὲ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν) οὗτοι δὲ γένεσιν ποιοῦσι τῆς θαλάσσης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγέννητον αὐτὴν λέγουσιν ἰδίας πηγὰς ἔχουσαν, ὥς οἱ θεολόγοι.

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(cont.)

Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b16

(b6) εἶναι γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ὑγρὸν ἅπαντα τὸν περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπον, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου ξηραίνονμενον τὸ μὲν διατμίσαν πνεύματα καὶ τροπὰς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης φασὶ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ λειφθὲν θάλατταν εἶναι· διὸ 353b.10 καὶ ἐλάττω γίνεσθαι ξηραينوμένην οἴονται, καὶ τέλος ἔσεσθαι ποτε πᾶσαν ξηράν.

(b11) ἔνιοι δ' αὐτῶν θερμαινομένης φασὶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου τῆς γῆς οἶον ἰδρώτα γίνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ ἄλμυράν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἰδρώς ἄλμυρός.

Alex. *in Mete.* 66.10–67.23 (including Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels)

(66.23) οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπόλειμμα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς πρώτης ὑγρότητος. ὑγροῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπου [67.5] κάπνεται τὸ μὲν τι τῆς ὑγρότητος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐξατμίζεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι πνεύματά τε ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τροπὰς ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης, ὥς διὰ τὰς ἀτμίδας ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις κάκείνων τὰς τροπὰς ποιουμένων, ἔνθα ἡ ταύτης αὐτοῖς χορηγία γίνεται, περὶ ταῦτα τρεπομένων· τὸ δὲ τι αὐτῆς ὑπολειφθὲν ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις τῆς γῆς τόποις θάλασσαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ ἐλάττω γίνεσθαι ξηραينوμένην ἐκάστοτε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τέλος ἔσεσθαι ποτε (πᾶσαν) ξηράν. ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο, ὥς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, Ἀναξίμανδρος τε καὶ Διογένης· Διογένης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἄλμυρότητος ταύτην αἰτίαν λέγει, ὅτι ἀνάγοντος τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ γλυκὺ τὸ καταλειπόμενον καὶ ὑπομένον ἄλμυρόν εἶναι συμβαίνει.

(67.14) οἱ δὲ τινὲς φασὶν οἶον ἰδρώτά τινα τῆς γῆς εἶναι τὴν θάλασσαν· θερμαινομένην γὰρ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ταύτην ἀφιέναι τὴν ὑγρότητα· διὸ καὶ ἄλμυράν αὐτὴν εἶναι· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ ἰδρώς. ταύτης τῆς δόξης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γέγονε.



(cont.)

Arist. <i>Mete.</i> 2.1 353a32–b16	Alex. <i>in Mete.</i> 66.10–67.23 (including Thphr. <i>Phys.Op.</i> fr. 23 Diels)
(b13) οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀλμυρότητος αἰτίαν τὴν γῆν εἶναι φασιν· καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ διὰ [353b.15] τῆς τέφρας ἡθούμενον ἀλμυρὸν γίγνεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ταύτην ἀλμυρὰν εἶναι μειχθείσης αὐτῇ τοιαύτης γῆς.	(67.17) τρίτη δὲ δόξα περὶ θαλάσσης ἐστὶν ὡς ἄρα τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς διηθούμενον καὶ διαπλύνον αὐτὴν ἀλμυρὸν γίνεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν γῆν τοιούτους χυμοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ· οὗ σημείον ἐποιοῦντο[67.20] τὸ καὶ ἄλλας ὀρύττεσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ νίτρα· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὀξεῖς χυμοὺς πολλαχοῦ τῆς γῆς. ταύτης πάλιν τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο Ἀναξαγόρας τε καὶ Μητρόδωρος. 67.11 (πᾶσαν) addidi ex Aristotele

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Note in 2018

I now believe that a simpler explanation for the absence of the Homeric line *Il.* 14.246 in Stobaeus’ version of Aët. 1.3.1–2 may be considered. Stobaeus removed the poetic quotation from its original context in the paragraph on Thales and inserted it among his collection of poetic quotations at the beginning of the chapter. See my paper ‘Theodoret as a source for the Aëtian *Placita*’, in: Mansfeld, J. and Runia, D.T. eds., *Aëtiana IV: Towards an Edition of the Aëtian Placita*, Leiden etc. 2018, 194.

# Insight by Hindsight

## *Intentional Unclarity in Presocratic Proems*<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

To attract the hearer's or reader's attention the proems of Parmenides' Poem, Heraclitus' *logos*, and Empedocles' *On Nature* announce the purpose of these works in an obscure way. What is meant only becomes clear when one has studied the whole.

### Keywords

Aristotle – Aristoxenus – Proclus – *asapheia* – interpretation – reason – sense perception

### 1

According to ancient rhetorical theory, a proem may have several functions. Both the author of the so-called *Rhetoric to Alexander*, ch. 29.1, and Aristotle himself, *Rhet.* III 14, discuss this topic,<sup>2</sup> Aristotle doing so at greater length and with attention to various literary genres in which these functions may be present in different ways, or even absent. The main division is between the means used to influence the public—by attracting its attention, rendering it benevolent, and so on—on the one hand, and the announcement of and introduction to the subject, or theme, on the other. According to Aristotle, the latter is the proem's main role; it should show 'what is the goal on account of which the tale (*logos*)' is told (1415a22–23, τί ἐστὶν τὸ τέλος οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος).<sup>3</sup> His evidence is poetical; among other examples he cites the famous opening words of

1 This paper is based on my notes for an invited lecture delivered at the 1994 FIEC Conference, Québec, and on Mansfeld (1988) 33f.

2 For later rhetoricians see the brief exposition of Hunger (1964) 19ff.

3 or the oration (*logos*) delivered, the account (*logos*) given, the argument (*logos*) propounded, the book (*logos*) given to the public. Hereafter *logos* will not always be translated.

the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.<sup>4</sup> But the general rule he derives from them has a wider application:

... an intimation of (the contents of) the *logos* is given, so that the public knows in advance what the *logos* is about<sup>5</sup> and understands what to expect. For what is vague causes confusion. He who so to speak hands them the point from which to start (ἀρχή),<sup>6</sup> enables them to cling to it and to follow the tale.

The famous anecdote about Plato's lecture *On the Good* transmitted by Aristoxenus<sup>7</sup> is an apt illustration of this approach. Aristotle criticized Plato for using a title which failed to tell what he was going to lecture about, or did so in such a way that the public was quite bewildered when they heard the lecture. Aristotle himself, Aristoxenus tells us, | always made it clear 'what the subject dealt with is and what it is about' (περὶ τίνων τ' ἐστὶν ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τίς).<sup>8</sup>

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In a similar way one of the aims of the proem is defined at *Rhet. Alex.* 29.1, namely as

a preparation of the audience and a summary clarification (ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ... δῆλωσις) of the subject for those who do not know it, so that they understand what the speech (*logos*) is about (περὶ οὗ) and (are able to) follow the theme.<sup>9</sup>

The point was anticipated by the Presocratic philosopher Diogenes of Apollonia, 64B1 DK *ap. D.L.* 6.81 and 9.57,<sup>10</sup> who at the beginning of his book writes as follows:

4 See further e.g. Zuntz (1945) 80 ff., who deals with the rhetorical rules as well.

5 The περὶ οὗ. See Meijering (1987) 187.

6 Cf. the Diogenes fragment quoted *infra*, text to n. 11, and Ion of Chius 36B1 DK, ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου κτλ.

7 *Elem. harm.* 39.8–40.11 da Rios.

8 *Ibid.* 40.10–11 da Rios. Cf. also e.g. Arist. *APo.* 1.1 24a10, [Arist.] *MM* 1.1 1182a24–b27, and in general the manner in which Aristotle himself begins a treatise, or a particular book of a treatise.

9 'Theme' translates πρόθεσις, which was to become a *terminus technicus* for 'plot' or 'subject' etc.

10 See Laks (2008) 17–19.

I do believe that the author, at the beginning of an account (*logos*), should make his starting-point (ἀρχή)<sup>11</sup> unmistakable and his mode of expression simple and dignified.

Are we justified in assuming that Diogenes utters a *cri de cœur*, which implies a rejection of the *modus operandi* of some of his predecessors? I believe we are.

## 2

As technical or quasi-technical expressions ‘intentional obscurity’, or ‘to be obscure on purpose’, are later than the Presocratic period.<sup>12</sup> But since practice as a rule precedes theory, we may readily believe that certain unclaritys to be found in the remains of some Presocratic philosophers are intentional. One may of course think of Heraclitus, already singled out in antiquity as a paradigm of willful obscurity (e.g. D.L. 9.6, ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι),<sup>13</sup> though his incomprehensibility has been exaggerated (or so I think). In the present paper I wish to concentrate on obscurities to be found in the introductions of Parmenides, Empedocles and Heraclitus. Rather than following the rule later formulated by Aristotle and others, these authors announce the theme or (part of the) subject of their work in such a way that one can only understand, or hope to understand, what is meant after having studied the whole, or at least all that remains. As to their purpose in doing this, one may hazard a guess. Their purported audience apparently was not the general public but a small and select group. By expressing themselves in an enigmatic fashion these authors moreover produce a deliberate blend of the two main | functions of the poem

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<sup>11</sup> See n. 6 and text thereto.

<sup>12</sup> See e.g. Pease (1955) on Cic. *ND* 1.74, *consulto dicis occulte*, Erler (1991), and Mansfeld (1994), index nominum et rerum 241 f. s.v. ἀσάφεια, for numerous examples including further references to the learned literature. Good early instances of expressions signifying deliberate unclarity are Plat. *Prt.* 316d, Arist. *Ath.* 9.2. Add Plat. *Cra.* 427d, and to the ones from Galen add *PHP* 2.5.54, *At.Bil.* 5.140.12 K., *Loc.Aff.* 8.312.16 f. K., *Diff.Puls.* 8.660.10 f. K., *Praes.Puls.* 9.370.7 f. K.

<sup>13</sup> Plat. *Tht.* 180a already speaks of the ‘enigmatic little utterings’ (ῥηματίσσια αἰνιγματώδη) of the Heracliteans, while Arist. *Rh.* 3.5 1407b11 ff. (22A4 DK, 1st text) argues that Heraclitus’ treatise does not conform to the precept of being ‘easy to read’ (εὐανάγνωστον), because it is hard to distinguish whether a word goes with what comes before or after; as his example he cites the αἰεῖ in the first line of 22B1 DK. See further Pease (1963) on Cic. *Div.* 2.133, *Heraclitus obscurus*, and (1955) on Cic. *ND* 1.74, *consulto dicis occulte tamquam Heraclitus*.

distinguished by later authorities: they announce their theme in such a way as to attract attention and create suspense.

We may begin with a well-known fragment of Empedocles, 31B6 DK, which is to be placed at the end of the proem, after the fragments that invoke the Muse, address the pupil or dedicatee, and describe human ignorance:

Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus and Nestis, whose tears are the source of mortal streams.<sup>14</sup>

These four roots, or 'root-things' (ρίζώματα), are the four elements: fire, earth, air and water. This much is clear from (what survives of) the sequel of the physical Poem. But from the announcement itself it is not at all clear that the elements are meant, and even to one who has studied what is left of what follows it remains quite problematic what divine name (except that of Nestis) pertains to what element. In antiquity, as is well known, there were two schools of thought, one holding that Hera is earth and Aidoneus air, the other that Aidoneus is earth and Hera air.<sup>15</sup> It is a plausible inference that the solution to this problem was not to be found in the lines that followed. Yet Empedocles *began* his exposition of his doctrine of the four elements with this puzzling statement, as is clear from the word 'first' (πρῶτον) in the first line of the fragment. Those who place the fragment later in the Poem rob it of its intended effect.<sup>16</sup> One cannot deny that these lines meet Diogenes of Apollonia's condition of dignity or solemnity, but they fail to comply with his condition of simplicity and clarity. I conclude from this that Empedocles purposely made a riddle his starting-point, in order to create an atmosphere of suspense and to incite curiosity.

This also holds for the proem of Heraclitus' book, 22B1 DK, which amounts to what we may call a declaration of obscurity. Heraclitus does not tell us what the contents of his 'account' (*logos*) are, he only advises us that men fail to understand this *logos* both before they have heard it and after they have heard it for the first time. They wrestle to no effect with 'the words and facts which I expound, as I divide up everything according to its nature (κατὰ φύσιν διαίρέων ἕκαστον) and point out how it is'. Yet these words contain a clue, viz. the expres-

14 Trans. Wright (1981) 164.

15 Compare e.g. D.L. 8.76 and Aët. *Plac.* 1.3.20 (at ps.Plutarch).

16 See Bollack (1969) 64 ff., who prints it as fr. 150 after others in which the elements have been described rather more clearly. So also Barnes (1987) 173, with the weak justification that the four roots 'are described more than once'. In Wright (1987) it is fr. 7 and correctly placed quite near the beginning of the Poem.

sion κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον. We may assume that this ‘division’ pertains to the famous Heraclitean opposites which are bound up with each other, and that the intelligent student would know at least this much after having gone through the ‘account’ as a whole, though he might still feel out of his depth as to its real significance.

228 The term *logos* however, one of the first words in the fragment,<sup>17</sup> should no longer be problematic, or obscure. In Heraclitus’ day it had not yet acquired the meaning it was to have in Stoic philosophy, and so should not be printed with a capital Λ or L and be translated, e.g., ‘formula of things’,<sup>18</sup> or ‘truth’. Yet the recent French editor who rightly | translates *logos* as ‘discours’ finds it unavoidable to counter the studied and solemn vagueness of Heraclitus’ opening words by demoting 22B1 DK to the status of second fragment and placing before it, as the first fragment in his collection, 22B50 DK = fr. 26(a) Marcovich:<sup>19</sup> ‘It is wise, hearing not me but the account, to agree that all things are one’. But upon reflection this rough remedy fails to achieve its purpose, for ‘all things are one’ (ἐν πάντα) is a quite puzzling expression, and most certainly so in an introduction which does not reveal in what way things are one. This attempt to rob Heraclitus’ proem of its intentional obscurity is not only in dubious taste, but otiose. What is more, no ancient evidence which could be quoted in support is available. Quite the opposite; Sext. *M.* 7.132 introduces his quotation of 22B1 DK with the words ‘beginning his *On Nature*, ..., he says: ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν Περὶ φύσεως ..., φησί’. If Sextus is to be believed, we really are dealing with the opening sentence.<sup>20</sup>

17 It begins with τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεί (‘Of this account which holds forever’). For *logos* see n. 6 and text thereto.

18 This is the translation of Kirk (1962) 39. See also Marcovich (1978) 8f. Both Kirk and Marcovich however admit that ‘discourse’ or ‘account’ is the word’s primary meaning. Conversely, Kahn (1979) 97f. argues that the ‘account’ implies the ‘structure which [Heraclitus] words intend or point at, which is the structure of the world itself’. I do not see why this should be so. At 22B31 DK = 53 Marc. λόγος means ‘count’. For *logos* in Diogenes of Apollonia see text to n. 11.

19 Conche (1986) 23ff., 28, who argues that Sextus’ ἐναρχόμενος leaves room for one or two short phrases before 22B1 DK. But see below, on Sextus’ introductory formula for Parmenides’ proem. 22B50 DK was already placed at the beginning by Bywater (1969). We may note in passing that the *ms. unicus* of Hippol. *Ref.* 9.9.1, our only source for this fragment, reads δόγματος not λόγου.

20 Aristotle’s ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, *Rh.* 3.5 1407b16, is less precise.

## 3

My third and last instance is, I think, the most interesting one. It is to be found in the proem of Parmenides, and most obviously in the two lines *ad finem* which have been transmitted by Simplicius only. Sextus, who at *M.* 7.111 quotes the proem (28B1 DK) as a whole as the first part of a cento which goes on with 28B7.2–6a + B8.1b–2a DK,<sup>21</sup> omits them. His introductory formula is virtually the same as the one he used for Heraclitus 22B1 DK, viz. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ Περὶ φύσεως γράφει κτλ. Sextus apparently believed that what he quoted was the proem and nothing but the proem. We may be certain that his quotation starts with its first line; it is hard to imagine what could have stood before it, and no one, to my knowledge, has ever argued in favour of the assumption that a line or two are missing at the beginning. The ‘me’ in the first line is the *sphragis*.

As Rocca-Serra has proved, a part of Sextus’ cento, or at least something very much resembling it, is found in Diogenes Laërtius.<sup>22</sup> At 9.22 this author quotes 28B1.28b–30 + B7.3–5 DK. lines also found in Sextus. Before his first quotation he points out that Parmenides distinguishes between Truth and Opinion,<sup>23</sup> and in between the two quotes he explains that Parmenides distinguishes between *logos* (‘reason’) and sense-perception. As | is clear from the remark preceding his quotation (where he distinguishes between opinative *logos* and cognitive *logos*), and from his exegesis, Sextus too believed that this is the main point of the long quotation he provides.

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A similar distinction, viz. between objects of knowledge and perception and modes of knowing and perceiving these, is made by Proclus. Plato according to Proclus was quite clear about this, but Parmenides, ‘though unclear because of his poetry’ (καίτοι διὰ ποιήσιν ἀσαφὴς ὢν), pointed it out as well. To illustrate this Proclus quotes 28B1.29–30 DK, which is then followed by 28B2 (*in Tim.* 1.345.12 ff. Diehl, with a καί between lines 6 and 7). Simplicius, *in De caelo* 557.19 ff. Heiberg,<sup>24</sup> argues on similar lines. He points out that people like Parmenides distinguished between the intelligible and the sensible realm, and

21 Diels (1897) 28 ff. and in the earlier editions of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* printed Sextus’ cento as Parm. fr. 1, inserting the extra lines from Simplicius. De Vogel (1969) 36 f. still has the *Lehrgedicht* text. The argument for splitting up Sextus’ cento into its component parts is succinctly stated by O’Brien (1987) 238 ff.

22 Rocca-Serra (1987).

23 Cf. Parmenides himself, 28B1.28–29 (quoted by both Diogenes and Sextus) and B8.50–51 (not quoted by Diogenes or Sextus) as echoed by Theophr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 6 Diels = fr. 227C FHS&G, quoted verbatim by Alex.Aphr. *in Met.* 39.8 ff. (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν—κατὰ δόξαν).

24 In the exegesis of *Cael.* 3.12 98b14–24, which deals with the views of Melissus and Parmenides. See further Perry (1983) 195 ff.

between the modes of cognition pertaining thereto; to illustrate this he quotes 28B1.28b–32 DK, followed by quotations of B8.50–52<sup>25</sup> and B19 (for which which he is our only source).

A traditional pattern becomes visible, viz. the interpretation, supported by quotation, of Parmenides in the light of the Platonizing distinction between knowledge and sense-perception, or between the intelligible and the sensible. Beyond doubt Sextus and Diogenes Laërtius are quoting at one or more removes from the original text. Sextus, or Sextus' immediate source, omits formulas such as 'and then he goes on' etc., or intermediate pieces of exegesis, which are feature of the expositions of Proclus and Simplicius. Even Diogenes Laërtius, whose selection of *ipsissima verba* is closest to that of Sextus, separates his two quotations from each other by a brief explanatory note. We may perhaps surmise that Proclus had access to a text of Parmenides; he is our only source<sup>26</sup> for the first two lines of 28B2 DK, lines 3–8 of this fragment also being quoted by Simp. in *Phys.* 116.28 ff. Diels. Yet Proclus probably is quoting from his phenomenal memory, or from excerpts he made, for he seems to be not quite sure that 28B2 is one continuous fragment (the revealing καί).<sup>27</sup> That Simplicius possessed a text is certain; this is clear from in *Phys.* 31.3 ff. (printed DK I, p. 240), and explicitly stated *ibid.*, 144.25 ff. (28A21 DK). If we compare his string of quotations at in *de Cael.*, *l.c.*, with those of Proclus, Diogenes Laërtius and Sextus discussed above, it becomes clear that he scanned the whole Poem for suitable and for the most part original quotations in support of the traditional interpretation of Parmenides' aims. The text adduced by Simplicius is that of a complete copy of Parmenides, a rare work he is proud to possess.<sup>28</sup>

25 He quotes the whole of 28B8.1b–52 at in *Phys.* 145.1 ff. Diels, and B8.50–61 *ibid.*, 38.30 ff. For large parts of this long fragment he is our only source, just as he is our only source for B9, B11 and B12.

26 Just as he is our only source for B5. He is also familiar with other parts of the text, see the lists before each fragment in O'Brien, *o.c.* Simplicius saw Parmenides as an obscure philosopher who had to be decoded; see the interesting phrase, in *Phys* 36.31–32 (part of the text not printed at 28A19 DK), in which by mistake he applies the apophthegm concerning the Delian diver to Parmenides, not Heraclitus, and attributes it to Plato instead of Socrates: δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων θαυμάζων οὕτως τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃν διελέγχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ βαθέος κολυμβητοῦ δεῖσθαι λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ. For other passages in Simplicius' dealing with Parmenides' obscurity see Perry (1983) 98 ff.

27 At in *Parm.* 1079.4 f. Cousin he only quotes 28B2.5–6 DK.

28 Whittaker (1971) 19 ff. correctly argues that Simplicius' readings are not always good, because (1) occasionally he may be quoting from memory and (2) the copy of the text he used may have been defective. I submit that (1) in the in *De caelo* passage he quotes from the text, and (2) that there is no evidence that his text was defective at fr. B1.32–33. I believe that it is idle to speculate about the provenance of his copy of Parmenides.



This brings me to my real point, viz. the intentional unclarity of the announcement of the contents of the Poem in the proem. Because Simplicius quotes from an original text, the two lines of 28B1, viz. 31–32, which are omitted by our other sources for (parts of) this fragment, should be included in the reconstructed proem. This as a matter of fact is what editors do;<sup>29</sup> as we have seen Diels even inserted the lines from Simplicius in the Sextan cento.<sup>30</sup>

The whole announcement of the bipartite theme<sup>31</sup> as transmitted by Simplicius runs as follows (B1.28b28–32):

χρεώ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι  
 ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμέος ἦτορ  
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνί πίστις ἀληθείης.  
 ἀλλ' ἔμπης<sup>32</sup> καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα  
 χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντός πάντα περῶντα.<sup>33</sup>

The first part, up to and including ἀλλ' ἔμπης, is not hard to translate. Yet the formula 'the unshakable heart of well-rounded truth' insufficiently prepares the reader, or listener, for the actual contents of the so-called 'Way of Truth', i.e. the doctrine of Being as set out in 28B8 DK. Even the words 'being', or 'to be', are not included. What we have here is not the descriptive announcement of a subject but an impressively worded phrase telling us that the account that will be provided is true—a sort of meta-description, if you wish. What should further be noted is that the term 'to be', whose absence here is quite remarkable, turns up in the sequel without making things clearer. Quite the contrary.

This sequel, consisting of lines 31b–32, ὥς τὰ δοκοῦντα ... περῶντα, is even more obscure. In spite of the fact that the individual words, or the expression διὰ παντός, are not uncommon, the translation of these one-and-a-half lines is desperately difficult. One understands why Sextus' and Diogenes' sources omitted them and why Proclus refrained from quoting them. Diels had a rem-

29 Thus already Karsten (1835) 30, whose text however is disfigured by emendation.

30 See n. 21.

31 I refrain from discussing the purely psychagogical and persuasive aspects of the proem; for these see e.g. Mansfeld (1994).

32 'Nevertheless', 'still', 'all the same', or 'and yet'; cf. e.g. Hes. *Op.* 142, 179; Hom. *Od.* 3.100, 14.214, 16.147, 20.311, 23.83. Information about the opinions of mortals cannot be withheld.

33 Three mss. of Simplicius have περ ὄντα, defended by Owen (1986) 9 (though he does not reject a *non liquet*), followed e.g. by Guthrie (1965) 9 and by Nehamas (1981) 107. Bague (1987) proposes the unlikely conjecture πανθ' ἄπερ ὄντα and claims that ἄπερ has the same meaning as καθάπερ. The ms. used by Willem van Moerbeke confirms the reading περῶντα, see *infra*, n. 34 *ad finem*.

edy; instead of the ambiguous adverb δοκίμως ('apparent' (?), 'acceptable' (?), 'approved' (?), 'verisimilar' (?)) he brilliantly read the infinitive δοκιμῶσ(αι), and translated: 'wie man alles und jedes durchgehen und dabei jenes Scheinwesen auf die Probe stellen sollte'. This makes sense, but at a cost; his attempt to connect εἶναι with δοκοῦντα (thus: 'what appears to be', 'Scheinsein', 'Scheinwesen')  
 231 rather than with δοκίμως is a bit forced, and his emendation and translation | no longer find favour anyway.<sup>34</sup> Other translations which try to make sense of these lines are as a rule inflated, even contorted.<sup>35</sup> Those which are more faithful, or literal, are obscure without exception and fail to tell us what the second part of the Poem is about. My favourite is that of Dumont:<sup>36</sup>

Comment il conviendrait que soient, quant à leur être,  
 En toute vraisemblance, lesdites opinions,  
 Qui toutes vont passant toujours.

Why not just admit that these lines are intentionally obscure and can only be understood, if at all, by someone who has understood the doctrine of the Poem as a whole and more particularly that of the so-called Way of Opinion? But the loss of most of the second part, in which the domain of men's opinions was

34 For Diels' argument see (1897) 57 ff.; he emended the conjectures of earlier scholars, viz. that of the *editio princeps* of the Greek text (Venice 1526), δοκιμάζειν εἶναι, which is a retroversion of the (revised!) medieval Latin translation by Moerbeke, Bergk's δοκιμώσμεναι, and Liebhold's δοκιμάζεσθαι. Karsten (1835) 69 cites Moerbeke's translation—as he calls it—of these lines from the ed. Venice 1540: *et haec discite quomodo quae videntur / oportebit probata esse per omne omnia terminantia*. As far as I know only de Vogel (1969) 37 with n. 1 still accepted Diels' *constitutio*. On Moerbeke's translation of the commentary and the earliest printed editions of revised versions of this translation and of a Greek text which was retroverted from the Latin see Bossier (1987) 320 ff. Bossier corrects the inaccurate reportage of Heiberg (1894) x ff., whose text is unreliable in those places where it is based on the Venetian revision of Moerbeke's translation. Prof. Bossier, whose much-needed *editio princeps* of the unadulterated text of Moerbeke is in preparation, kindly informs me (fax dated 2 Febr. 1995) that the translation of 28B1.28–32 is *exigo te cuncta percunctari, / hac quidem veritatis circularis intrepida anima, / hac autem mortalium opinionibus, quibus non est fides vera, / sed deceptio; et hec addiscetis, quomodo quae videntur / oporteat probate* [ms. D; ABN read *probare*] *esse per omne omnia terminantia*. Though clearly the hexameters were too difficult for Moerbeke—who as he tells us at the beginning of his work did not enjoy translating Simplicius anyway—the words *probate esse* are a typically Moerbekian calque of δοκίμως εἶναι. Accordingly *probata esse*, found in the edition printed in 1540, is a conjecture. As Dr. Paul Mercken informs me, elements in Moerbeke's rendering which impress us as odd (e.g. the ablative *intrepidata anima* for the accusative ἀτρεμές ἦτορ) are a consequence of the medieval method of translation.

35 See e.g. Frère (1987) 197, and *supra*, n. 33.

36 Dumont (1988) 257.

discussed and explained at some length, has produced a stalemate among the exegetes of Parmenides. There is as yet no *opinio communis* as to the interpretation of the relation of the two main parts of the epic to each other, or as to the place of the world we live in in Parmenides' philosophy, and I submit that these one-and-a-half obscure lines at the end of the proem anyhow fail to provide us with the clue. Attempts to elicit some information from them have always been based on an interpretation of Parmenides' system, and rightly so,<sup>37</sup> but it would appear that we do not know enough about the system.<sup>38</sup> Simplicius, I presume, failed to realize that these lines could be more obscure than others (we have noticed that he saw Parmenides as an obscure philosopher-poet who needed to be decoded)<sup>39</sup> precisely because he knew the whole Poem and believed he understood its meaning.

This leaves one further problem, admittedly a minor one, though again one on which scholars are, and are likely to remain, divided. Simplicius speaks of the 'well-rounded' (εὐκυκλῆος) heart of Truth, whereas Diogenes and Sextus<sup>40</sup> read 'very persuasive' (εὐπειθέος) and Proclus 'very bright' (εὐφειγγέος). The fact that Simplicius had a text in front of him is a weighty argument in favour of εὐκυκλῆος, though the formation on -ης is irregular. What is more, in the context of his argument which purports to give us the gist of Parmenides' philosophy nothing hinges on the attributive adjective qualifying Truth; the reading εὐκυκλῆος is unbiased. The alternative εὐπειθέος found in other witnesses is easily explained as a mistake, or vulgarization, caused by anticipation of the word πίστις in the next line. One understands how εὐπειθέος came to oust εὐκυκλῆος in fragments which were transmitted in isolation from the text as a whole.<sup>41</sup> No good reason, however, can be given for the substitution of the easily understood εὐπειθέος by the more difficult εὐκυκλῆος. That the witnesses for εὐπειθέος are earlier is irrelevant. Proclus' reading, on which he expands at some length, may be no more than a memory mistake, or a Neoplatonizing intru-

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37 A gallant attempt was made by Owen (1986) 4 ff.

38 This does not mean that I do not have a point of view about the system; see Mansfeld (1983) 286 f. An original interpretation of the second part of the Poem has recently been argued by Popper (1992).

39 See n. 26.

40 So also Clem. *Strom.* 5.59.6, who gives a Pythagoreanizing turn to what he calls Parmenides 'twofold teaching', and Plu. *Colot.* 1114D, who argues against Colotes that Parmenides gives both the intelligible and the sensible world their due. In the paper cited *supra*, n. 1, I still accepted εὐπειθέος.

41 Also note that in Sextus' text at 28B1.1b DK θυμός is substituted for μῦθος, presumably to bring the end of the cento into agreement with ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμός ἰκάνοι in the first line (ring composition).

sion, two alternatives between which it is hard to distinguish. A kind of bias is certainly involved.<sup>42</sup>

I have one further argument in favour of εὐκυκλῆος. The meaning of this word is obscure and needs to be explained, whereas εὐπειθέος and εὐφεγγέος are sufficiently clear. But in retrospect this obscurity disappears as one goes on studying the Poem and reaches the description of the perfect Sphere of Being (B8.42–49 DK), to which the adjective ‘well-rounded’ alludes in an entirely appropriate way and where the more regular formation εὐκύκλου is actually found.<sup>43</sup> The other qualifying term found at 28 B1.29, ἀτρεμές (‘unshakable’), also occurs in B8, viz. at line 4,<sup>44</sup> and a further explanation of what it means is provided at B8.26–30a which argues that Being does not move, or change. Accordingly the meaning of εὐκυκλῆος is one riddle in the proem which we still are in a position to solve.

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42 See Guérard (1987) 301.

43 At *in Phys.* 146.2 ff. (28A20 DK, 1st text) Simplicius points out that B8.43 εὐκύκλου σφαίρης need not puzzle us, because like Orpheus Parmenides is a poet and uses similar fictions. No bias here either, but acceptance and exegesis of the text found in the book in his possession.

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## Bothering the Infinite

### *Anaximander in the Nineteenth Century and Beyond*<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

The view, once generally accepted, that Anaximander's fragment is about existence as a crime or as the punishment for a crime, is dependent on the defective text of the Aldine edition of 1526 of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, which lacks the crucial word ἀλλήλοις, 'to each other'. Perhaps surprisingly, Brandis' discovery in 1835 of the correct manuscript reading, which should have entailed a less gruesome interpretation, for a long time failed to do so. Even Diels' critical edition of 1882 of the Simplicius text did not advance matters, and Diels himself till the end of his life stuck to the earlier interpretation. A paradigm shift towards the view that the fragment deals with cosmic justice and an everlasting cosmic equilibrium evolved only gradually, finding its first clear expression as late as the beginning of the 20th century. This became the dominant interpretation, though its predecessor never vanished completely, and despite the fact that this cosmic equilibrium is not so easily squared with the testimonia concerned with the past and future of Anaximander's cosmos.

#### Keywords

History of scholarship – textual criticism – Mysteries – Hermetism – mysticism – punishment – pessimism – Indo-European/Indo-German language family – Orientalism – cosmic balance/justice – reciprocity – Romantics – Jones – Friedrich Schlegel – Schleiermacher – Bopp – Hegel – Tiedemann – Tennemann – Coleridge – Creuzer – Brandis – Zeller – Nietzsche – Deussen – Diels – Heidel – Jaeger – Kahn

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Da erklang ein schmerzlich Ach!  
 Als das All, mit Machtgeberde,  
 In die Wirklichkeiten brach.

GOETHE

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## 1 Introduction

Interpretations come and go, but the sources remain. Yet even a source may undergo change as more or better evidence becomes available. Interpretations, on the other hand, not only tend to have a stubborn life of their own, but also are often enough based in part on notions deriving not from the source, or passage, that is studied, but from elsewhere. In order to interpret the difficult fragment of an early Greek philosopher, for instance, one has to paraphrase, or even partly to replace, its obfuscating narrative with another narrative that is easier to understand. Unavoidably such a secondary narrative, no matter how coherent, will be an aggregate. Parallels from elsewhere may be illuminating, but by no means always entail influence, whether direct or indirect.

Examples of such alternative narratives are provided by various modern ways of reception of the famous fragment of Anaximander as quoted and explained by Theophrastus, whose report is cited in Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*. The study of these approaches will be the theme of the present paper. I begin by quoting a part of the passage at issue.<sup>2</sup> I have dis-

2 Anaximander, fr. 12A9 DK, 1st text, in Simplicius *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria*, 24.13–25 Diels ~ Theophrastus, *Physicorum opiniones* fr. 2 Diels ~ fr. 226A FHS&G. For the full Greek text see the Appendix at the end of ch. 4 below. Since Diels' work on doxography scholars are agreed that this passage derives at least in part from Theophrastus; this is indeed the best hypothesis available, though the ultimate source is not a *Physicorum opiniones* but the Theophrastean *Physics*. Line 9 = Simp. *In Phys.* 24.19–20 Diels = *Ald.* f 6r.40–41: ἀλλήλοις not in the Aldina, which moreover has τίσιν καὶ δίκην where Diels' text has δίκην καὶ τίσιν, as pointed out to me by Noburu Notomi. Putting δίκην immediately before τῆς ἀδικίας (since there is no ἀλλήλοις in between) looks like a *Verschlimmbesserung* by the Venetian editor or one of his assistants, and suggests that ἀλλήλοις may have been omitted on purpose. The beautifully and very legibly printed Aldina, Venice 1526, edited by Aldus Manutius' brother-in-law Gian Francesco Torresani, a.k.a. Franciscus Asulanus, is the only complete edition of the *Physics*

tinguished reportage and elucidation from each other by printing the latter in smaller typeface, and have picked out in bold the formulas and phrases singled out as verbatim quotations in the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* at Anaximander fr. B1 DK:

- 10 [...] Anaximander [...] said that **the principle** (ἀρχήν) and **element of the things that are is the Unbounded** [or: Infinite, Inexhaustible, Undetermined: *Apeiron* (Ἄπειρον)],

being the first to give this name to the principle [or: to introduce the name 'principle']. He said that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a different sort of substance,

unbounded, from which all the heavens come to be and the orderings [or: worlds] in them. **And from which coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be** (τὸ χρεών), **for they pay penalty and retribution** (δίκην καὶ τίσιν) **to each other** (ἀλλήλοισι) **for the injustice** (τῆς ἀδικίας) **according to the order of time** (τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν)

– speaking of them thus in rather poetic words.

This cosmological passage has given rise to several varieties of interpretation from, say, Johann Christoph Adelung at the end of the eighteenth, and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to yesterday. Three main approaches may be said to be involved:

- (1) The interpretation according to which the fragment is about the present condition of the 'things that are' in the world, as well as about their past (cosmogony) and future (world's end) in relation to the *Apeiron*, *secundum seriem temporis*: Anaximander's cosmos as a normal dissipative system. This a minority view.
- (2) The interpretation which was dominant in the nineteenth century but still has not died out entirely, according to which the coming to be of things from the divine *Apeiron* is an act of injustice towards it, which is punished by death, that is to say by their returning to it. It is clear that the *Apeiron* plays an important part. I call this reading 'mystical' for reasons that will hopefully become clear.
- (3) The interpretation, first argued in the early twentieth century and dominant today, according to which the fragment is about an autonomous, or

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Commentary before that of Diels (1882–1895). In Brandis' edition of the so-called *Scholia in Aristotelem* (1836), a bulky cento of excerpts from the commentators, our passage is absent.



even lawlike, natural process. The *Apeiron* hardly plays a part, if at all. Anaximander's fragment now describes a conservative system or ideal pendulum, that is to say an (everlasting) equilibrium of opposed and warring physical contenders, as transgression is made good by precisely calibrated reparation: cosmic justice, *lex talionis*, retribution or retaliation, mutual and reciprocal revenge.<sup>3</sup> The quasi-juridical vocabulary has led scholars to assume a back|ground in power relations as they established themselves in the Greek *polis*.<sup>4</sup> One could equally well speak of cosmic injustice, because on this hypothesis the coming to be of *x* always occurs at the expense of *y*, and conversely; but this is by the way.

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The gradual replacement of the mystical reading by naturalistic ways of interpretation mirrors the growing secularization of the West, which makes itself felt even in this remote corner of the intellectual world. In its modest way the history of the reception of Anaximander is a part of cultural history, or history of mentalities. But secularization is not the cause of this change of direction, though it certainly favoured it, and continues favouring it. Its main incentive is philological, and has to do with the *constitutio* of the text of the fragment, viz. the presence of the word *allêlois* (ἀλλήλοις), and the scope of the terms 'injustice' and 'retribution'.

The present inquiry will focus on the mystical interpretation, because its history is less familiar; the varieties of the naturalistic reading will not be discussed in commensurate detail.

3 One may cite Herodotus 1.2, ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα ('tit for tat') or ἴσον πρὸς ἴσον, and τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ('requital', 'retribution'), which occurs once in Aristotle (see below, n. 15). Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* II–II, q. 61, a. 4, commenting on the Aristotelian passage (in his translation ἀντιπεπονθός is rendered by *contrapassum*), refers to Exod 21:23–25, *reddet animam pro anima, oculum pro oculo*, etc. (i.e. δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ). In general see Günther (1889) 76–108, 'Das griechische Recht und die griechische Philosophie'; Hirzel (1907–1910); Latte (1920). On reciprocity in Anaximander see Havelock (1978) 263–264, who uses the phrase 'oscillating rhythm'; in Herodotus and Anaximander Gould (1989) 85; in general Gill & alii (1999), Seaford (2006) 194–196, 200–202. On δίκη ('settlement', 'penalty') in Anaximander see the cautious remarks of Gagarin (1974) 195. On αἰτία ('blame', 'offence', 'responsibility', etc.), ἄδικία ('offence') and τίσις ('retribution') in Hdt. 1.1–5, and the whole succession of injustices in the proem see Asheri (2007) 37–41, and *ad loc.* For the widely shared assumption that Anaximander invented the 'idea of the cosmos' as 'a world governed by law' see e.g. Kullmann (1995) 39–40 (also on the equilibrium), Schofield (1997) 64, in detail Sassi (1997).

4 See esp. Vernant (1957), (1962), and (1968); and cf. below, n. 202 and text thereto.

## 2 Secular versus Mystical Interpretation

A key ingredient of the evidence for a reconstruction of Anaximander's thought is the absence or presence in the source text of the word *allêlois* (ἀλλήλοις), 'to each other'. When this is absent, as it is on the page of the Venetian *editio princeps* of 1526 of Simplicius' *Commentary* which held sway to 1835 and even beyond, it is not clear to whom or what 'the things that are' do 'pay penalty (*dikê*) and retribution (*tisis*) for the injustice (*adikia*)', so a candidate has to be found, or imagined. When *allêlois* is present, it is obvious that they do so to each other. Even so, as we shall see, interpretations have been preferred or argued either way *regardless* of the presence or absence of *allêlois*. People endorsed a view they believed to be more philosophical, or (as some of us would say today) more exciting.

For many years the first restoration of the correct text through the insertion of the word ἀλλήλοις failed to percolate to the larger scholarly community. Presumably this happened because Christoph August Brandis, the first to put it in (1835), paradoxically enough presented the mystical interpretation (see above, Section 1), much easier to believe when *allêlois* is absent.

It is not hard to see why the mystical reading could seem attractive. It associates Anaximander's (meta)physics with the Christian concepts of original sin and the Fall of Lucifer, and/or of Man, and of the Final Judgement. At the same time it is viewed in terms of the Neoplatonist doctrine of the emanation from and returning of Intellect and Soul(s) to the First Principle, especially in the Christianized version construed by the extremely influential Marsilio Ficino, the translator into Latin of Plotinus and Hermes Trismegistus. This First Principle, or God, so to speak functions as both an efficient and | a final cause. Other names should be mentioned for the traditions starting with Ficino, for example Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Francesco Patrizzi, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Boehme, (Spinoza,) Ralph Cudworth, and Henry More.<sup>5</sup> One may add that traditions do not go on automatically, but have to be rediscovered and reinvented again and again.

5 For a first orientation a number of lemmata with up-to-date bibliographies in the *DGWE* (2006) can be recommended: Hanegraaff on 'Tradition', Faivre on 'Hermes Trismegistus in the Modern period' and 'Hermeticist literature from the Renaissance to the present', Leyenhorst on 'Neoplatonism from the Renaissance', Allen on 'Ficino', Ciliberto on 'Bruno', Brach on 'Patrizzi', Weeks on 'Boehme', Hutton on 'Cudworth', Breymayer on 'Oetinger', Marquet on 'Schelling', Versluis on 'Baader', Blaufus on 'Pietism', Dachez on 'Freemasonry', and McCalla on 'Romanticism'. See also the lemmata 'Esoterik' (von Stuckradt), 'Philosophia perennis' (Faivre), and 'Platonismus' (Moisisch and Summerell) in the *Neue Pauly*, Bd. 15/2 (2002). On

To experience how this aggregate of ideas worked out in the pietistic and quietist currents in German Protestantism in the eighteenth century (e.g. Friedrich Christoph Oetinger) one need only read the first pages of Karl Philipp Moritz' novel *Anton Reiser*, 1785–1790.

These associations were strengthened by the purported influence of Indic philosophy on Greek thought (or what they believed Indic philosophy to be), argued by scholars who so to speak anticipated or, later, came under the spell of major trends in German Romanticism, or who just repeated one another.

Sometimes people believed that this profound version of Anaximander's theory is not at all Greek; that is to say, they viewed it as an intruder in an otherwise purely Greek environment. Others, however, pointed at its affinity with what was itself often believed to be a sort of deviant element, though in the context of authentic Greek religious thought, viz. Orphism (or rather what Orphism was taken to be). This did not at all harm the mystical interpretation, since from the days of at least the later Neoplatonists the Orphic poems have been interpreted as being about the Fall of the human soul from its origin and its returning to this origin. Discussing the mystical interpretation Charles Kahn not inappropriately uses the term 'neo-Orphism'.<sup>6</sup>

As to the distinction between the purely Greek and the adventitious, the influential Erwin Rohde for instance spoke of 'Mystik', and ungenerously called this a 'fremder Blutstropfen im griechischen Blute'.<sup>7</sup> But this quasi-racist view did not prevent him (in his magisterial *Psyche*), or others like him, to speak

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the 'interpretation of the ancient theology' from Ficino to Cudworth see Aspelin (1943) 32–45; on the *prisca theologia* see also Walker (1972) 1–36, esp. on its basis in pseudepigraphic literature; on its Hermeticist aspect cf. Ebeling (2007). On the 'Platonic dimension of *Frühromantik*' see the usefully brief account of Beiser (2005) 67–72; on Spinoza in this context McFarland (1969) 53–106. Aspelin (1943) 32 aptly quotes the following lines from More's *Psychozoia* (1647), Canto 1.4 (I have checked the ed. of Bullough): 'So if what's consonant with Plato's school / (Which well agrees with learned Pythagore, / Egyptian Trismegist, and th' antique roll / Of Chaldee wisdom, all which time hath tore / But Plato and deep Plotin do restore) / Which is my scope, I sing out lustily'. On Christianized Neoplatonism from Ficino to the Romantics and the 'horizontal' transformation of ancient cyclical processes see Abrams (1971) 143–195; on the Neoplatonist current see also Tigerstedt (1974). Ritter (1851) 100–101, speaking of the antecedents of Boehme, points out that the theosophic movements shunned publicity; '[d]aher laufen die Fäden der Überlieferung sehr im Verborgenen'. One wonders to what extent Leopardi's poem *L'Infinito* (1819) is indebted to this tradition. See further below, Section 6.

6 Kahn (1960) 194.

7 'Die Religion der Griechen' (1894), repr. Rohde (1901) esp. 331–338, where he also attributes to the Orphics 'die echt mystische Lehre von der Wesensgleichheit der menschlichen Seele mit dem Göttlichen'. Cf. below, n. 12, n. 190.

- 13 of two currents in *Greek religion*.<sup>8</sup> | The wonderful Homeric pantheon would represent the main current, while the ecstatic Orphic and Dionysiac Mysteries would constitute a very old undercurrent ('Bauernreligion'), which—stimulated by influences from abroad, viz. Anatolia and/or Thrace—is supposed to have risen to the surface in, say, the seventh to sixth centuries BCE.

The important classical scholar Karl Ottfried Müller (1797–1840) had defended the Greekness of Dionysus (representing the chthonic divinities which he contrasted with the Olympians) and of his ecstatic cult, but failed to convince the larger scholarly community.<sup>9</sup>

These largely secret Mysteries were (believed to be) characterized *inter alia* by their use of the myth of the dismemberment of Dionysus and the consumption of his remains by the gruesome Titans (which Titans then were destroyed by Zeus' thunderbolt, after which men sprung from their ashes: guilt, original sin), and by their emphasis on salvation.<sup>10</sup> Such doctrines were called 'mystical' and 'pantheist' (already by German Romantics), since it was believed that initiation in the Mysteries made it possible for the human soul to return to or rather *reunite* with the supreme divinity from which originally it had come forth (the parallel with the mystical interpretation of Anaximander should be clear). But this interpretation cannot be sustained.<sup>11</sup>

8 Rohde (1890–1894); on this aspect of Rohde's view see Edmonds (2004) 13–16. See further the account of Rohde and his impact on classical studies by Lortzing in Zeller (<sup>6</sup>1920) 80–88. In this respect Rohde was followed by e.g. Wide (1910) 223. *Psyche* influenced the redoubtable Jane Harrison, who reviewed it enthusiastically (1890) and (1894). Wilamowitz (1904) esp. 14, still puts 'Mystik' as a second current next to Homeric religion in the 6th cent. BCE.

9 See Blok (1994) and (1998), and Schlesier (1991–1992) and (1998).

10 It is often assumed that the Pindar fragment (fr. 133 Maehler: probably Pindar) at Plato, *Meno* 81b–c (*Orph.* F 443 Bernabé), alludes to this misfortune: 'those from whom Persephone receives requital for ancient grief', etc. In some stories Dionysus, slain by the Titans, is the son of Persephone. Also cf. Arist. fr. 60 <sup>3</sup>Rose ~ *Protr.* fr. 10b Ross ~ 106 Düring. Edmonds (1999) 66–70, 102–109, followed by Calame (2006) 229–288, argues that this 'myth' is a Christianizing invention of modern scholars, including original sin, but Bernabé (2002) 208–209 includes the 'péché original' in his list of fundamental characteristics of Orphism; cf. *ibid.* 227–236 (no evidence for reunion with the divinity). Kahn (1960) 194 argues that the genuine Orphic idea is 'that we undergo this life as punishment for some previous crime', whereas the neo-Orphic interpretation of the Anaximander fragment 'would imply that generation is the crime itself'.

11 Contrast Pugliese Carratelli (2001) 21: 'ottenere di ricongiungersi (non di confondersi) con la stirpe divina'. Henrichs (1993) 20 convincingly argues that the relation between the worshipers (*Bakchoi*) and their god (*Bakchos*) is not a 'fusion' or 'identification', but 'merely reflects the mood of the ritual occasion'. Cf. also Bremmer, cited below n. 190.

At the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century the great Hermann Diels argued that Orphic mysticism had penetrated the core of Ionian philosophy right from the start.<sup>12</sup> This purported ‘mysticism’ is perhaps not what we would understand by the term today. It represents a doctrine, or doctrines, according to which some, or all, of the following beliefs are true: (1), the condition of the soul in the body is inferior to its condition when free from the body; (2), being in a body is a form of punishment; (3), eventually the soul reverts to its origin: a divinity, or divine principle;<sup>13</sup> (4), the world in various ways is contained, or penetrated, by a single Entity to which the soul is related.

In the secondary literature the mystical (: kinship with the supreme Entity) and pessimistic (: injustice and punishment) interpretation of Anaximander’s fragment is often linked with the names of Rohde and Nietzsche (*Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen*, ca. 1872), although it is by no means original with them. Also note that Nietzsche’s interpretation remained unknown to the general public until the publication of | his essay in 1896, a few years after that of Rohde’s *Psyche*. Both Nietzsche and Rohde used a text that did not contain the word ἀλλήλοις, as we shall see below. Nietzsche’s dependence on a succession of philosophical and not always mainstream classicist predecessors for his concept of ‘das Dionysische’ and ‘das All-Eine’ in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* is now generally accepted, see e.g. the impressive material collected by Barbara von Reibnitz.<sup>14</sup> But the hardly less decisive Anaximandrian face of this coin has to the best of my knowledge not yet been studied sufficiently.

By the end of the nineteenth century the Simplicius text with ἀλλήλοις had finally percolated to the scholarly community, though not yet to everyone. In 1883 and 1892 Eduard Zeller pointed out that the mystical interpretation could no longer be upheld. Several years later the American scholar William Alexander Heidel, appealing to a very different set of notions, argued that ‘paying penalty and retribution to each other for the injustice’ entailed the idea of ‘jus-

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12 Diels (1897), (1923). Influence on and affinity with Ionian philosophy of Orphism is already claimed by Creuzer (1836–1843) Bd. 1, 200; Bd. 4, 661–664, and in (1806b); see further below, Section 6.

13 See again Rohde (1894) 414–415: return to the god; 419: soul exiled to body as punishment for a crime (we do not know what crime, Rohde says); 296: the idea that the soul is immortal belongs with mysticism, different from traditional religion, a current which started with sects and, or so he argued, influenced individual philosophical schools.

14 Von Reibnitz (1992). See also the wonderful account of Andler (1920) 394–428; further (also for references to the literature) Henrichs (1986) esp. 196–198, 209 ff., 215–216; Schlesier (1994) 21–23, 35–38, 195–199; Blok (1994); Wilson (1996) 19–24, 81–94; Blok (1998); Marelli (2000) 187–210; Bremmer (2002); Brobjer (2005) esp. 281–283 on classical scholarship; Baeumer (2006) 301–349.

tice between equals', and so that of a cosmic equilibrium.<sup>15</sup> This made it difficult to account for a possible end of the world. In our decades of distinct climatic instability we are perhaps a bit less responsive to this suggestion.

This cosmic equilibrium was so to speak canonized by Charles Kahn in his carefully argued and influential book *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, first printed 1960. It was not (and still is not) universally accepted, because according to our witnesses the required stability is hard to find, both at the beginning and in a future stage of the career of Anaximander's cosmos. Werner Jaeger, one of its more authoritative proponents, argued (1924 and later, see below, Section 4.3) that the formula 'according to the order of time' should be read as 'according to the jurisdiction of Time' with capital, personifying, T, thus accentuating the lawlike nature of the cosmic processes.

We may note that the authors of today's standard textbook concerned with the Presocratic philosophers vigorously point out that 'ἀλλήλοισις shows that that retribution is made *mutually* between the parties who are the subject of the sentence. Can we really believe that the divine Indefinite commits *injustice* on its own products, and has to pay them recompense?'<sup>16</sup> They also argue that the drying up of the sea does not entail that the cosmos disappears into the *Apeiron*.<sup>17</sup>

Daniel Watkins Graham, the most recent defender of this cosmic stability, argues that the equilibrium described in the fragment (according to this line of interpretation) should be given preference over the lack of equilibrium attested in the doxography.<sup>18</sup> | This is to ignore the fact that the verbatim parts of the fragment (the extent of which is anyhow disputed) are solidly enmeshed in a doxographical context.

15 Heidel (1908) and (1912). τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός ('retribution', 'requital') occurs once in Arist. *EN* 5.5 1132b21–23, 'some think that reciprocation is without qualification just, as the Pythagoreans said' (fr. 58B4 DK, last text). But note that Aristotle points out that this idea is valid in a *qualified* sense only, viz. 'in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of equality', see e.g. Dirlmeier *ad loc.* Speaking of distributive justice in private transactions he tells us that 'the law treats them (scil., the parties) as equals' (*EN* 5.4 1132a5, ὁ νόμος [...] χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις), that is, irrespective of their moral character, or status, etc., so equal only insofar as the conflict at issue is concerned. Cf. also above, n. 3. The idea of 'cosmic equality' was further illustrated and argued in several influential and several times reprinted papers by Gregory Vlastos, viz. Vlastos (1947) and (1953); quotation (1947) at (1995) 58.

16 This stands the dominant 19th cent. view on its head. Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983) 118 = Kirk and Raven (1969) 119; emphasis in the original; cf. below, text to n. 199.

17 *Ibid.* (1983) 138–140 = (1969) 139–140.

18 Graham (2006) 38.

### 3 From Brucker to Johansen

#### 3.1

In the present Section I shall examine the literature on Anaximander (or at any rate a part of what I have seen of this literature) in more detail, starting with Jacob Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae* (21767).<sup>19</sup> The pages on Anaximander are of considerable interest: the principle is infinite, not in number but in size<sup>(Simp.)</sup>, and its parts change while the whole is immutable<sup>(Laert.)</sup>, and all things come to be from it and return to it<sup>(Plut.Plac.)</sup>. Already in the first edition he argues that the interpretation of Anaximander is uncertain, for 'we know how Eusebius Plutarch Simplicius Philoponus etc. interpreted Anaximander's principle', 'but *not how he wanted it to be understood himself*' ('non vero, qua ratione ipse intelligi voluit'); '*this confusion was beyond doubt mostly brought about by Aristotle*' ('Arist. certe hanc rebus physicis confusionem maxime attulit'), because he used metaphysical instead of physical concepts.<sup>20</sup>

#### 3.2

A far less well-known figure, Johann Christoph Adelung, briefly discusses Anaximander in the first volume of his *Geschichte der Philosophie für Liebhaber* (1782). In our context he is important as the harbinger of a trend, because he calls the coming to be of things from the *Apeiron* by the (Neoplatonist) name of 'Emanation'.<sup>21</sup> This is not an accident, as the concept of emanation occurs several times in his book in an entirely appropriate way. Adelung uses the Neoplatonist terminology for Anaximander almost without reflecting. But no further details are given on the relation of things to the principle.

19 Brucker (21767) Bd. 1, 480–483. I give the source-references in superscript, after Brucker. Couprie (1989) quotes and discusses the literature in greater detail so should be compared throughout, also for his rich bibliography. However his aims are different from mine (as in the present paper); he blends his reports with attempts to establish what Anaximander meant, and pays no attention to Creuzer, Schlegel, Schelling and their antecedents.

20 Brucker (1747) 482–483 ~ (21767) 481–482 (my italics).

21 Adelung (1782) 235; Hulin (1979) 33 and 52, and (1983) 142–143, attributes the construction of this 'système de l'émanation' and its '(maigre) contenu' to Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel interpreting 'Les Lois de Manou', which is to miss out on the complicated tradition. For emanation cf. above, text to n. 5, below, n. 21, n. 33, n. 124 and text thereto, n. 125, n. 136 *ad fin.*, n. 162, text to n. 165.

## 3.3

The person who put the Milesian on the map is Schleiermacher.<sup>22</sup> The pioneering paper ‘Über Anaximandros’ of 1811, read in the Berlin Academy and first published in 1815, still remains one of the most impressive studies of its subject. Schleiermacher takes all the evidence that was available at the time into account. This means that for the Simplicius text he only had the old *Aldina*, lacking the word ἀλλήλοις, and with τίσις and δική in the wrong order. He translates accordingly: ‘Woher das, was ist, seinen Ursprung habe, in dasselbe habe es auch seinen Untergang nach der Billigkeit. Denn so gebe es seine Busse und Strafe für die Ungerechtigkeit nach der Ordnung der Zeit.’<sup>23</sup> The authors of |  
16 the annotated critical edition of the *Akademievorträge* (2002) refer to the text in Diels’ edition of Simplicius, and fail to indicate the crucial differences.<sup>24</sup>

The jejune and perhaps somewhat vague interpretation of the text does not comprise an explicitly mystical ingredient, though it comes quite close: ‘Und so schwebt *das Unendliche* [...] selbst *eins* und unverändert, aber alle seine, man weiss nicht, soll man sagen Theile oder Werke [i.e., particular beings and events] in immerwährender Veränderung darstellend, und was aus der ewigen Einheit [i.e., the *Apeiron*] *heraustritt in die kurze Freude des für sich bestehenden Lebens durch den Untergang wieder strafend*, jedes zu seiner Zeit, nach den Ordnungen des ewigen Rechts’ (emphasis added). Compare, a few pages down: ‘dass alles aus den Gegensätzen bestehende die Freude seines Daseins wieder durch Untergang bezahlen muss’.<sup>25</sup> It is the *Apeiron* that (actively) intervenes and punishes the beings that successively separate themselves off from it to enjoy life for a brief period, and does so by condemning them to death. Schleiermacher omits to tell us explicitly against whom or what the *Ungerechtigkeit* (injustice) is committed. As it is the departure from the *Apeiron* that is punished, it would follow that this separation is unjust—and this injustice can only have been committed against the *Apeiron*. But unlike Nietzsche and others (see below) Schleiermacher does not have a pessimistic view of Anaximandrian life, for it is there to be enjoyed, however briefly: ‘Freude des Lebens’, or ‘Daseins’.

He also formulates a dilemma that continues to haunt the scholarly discussion, viz. stability versus loss of stability. He speaks of a cosmic equilibrium

22 Tennemann (1798) 65–73, on Anaximander, for instance, is unremarkable.

23 Schleiermacher (1815) at (2002) 47. This translation was often followed or even quoted, e.g. Wendt (1829) 68 n. \*, Fries (1837) 107–108. Schleiermacher quotes the *Aldina* text in a footnote, 47 n. 37.

24 Cf. below, n. 102 and text thereto.

25 Schleiermacher (1815) at (2002) 54.



but does not believe it lasts: 'Nach jenem Hauptgrundsatz des Anaximandros findet auch eine Aufreibung der Dinge statt, *wodurch nemlich jedes seine Strafe giebt*. So lange nun diese im *Gleichgewicht* bleibt mit der Erzeugung, läuft auch das wechselnde Dasein der Welt nach seinen Gesetzen unverrückt ab. [...] Nun sind allerdings *Spuren*, dass er sich ein *wechselndes Übergewicht* der Prozesse gedacht habe [...], und das Meer, als nur der Überrest des Feuchtungsprozesses nach wieder überhandgenommenem Verbrennungsprozess deutet allerdings auf eine *weit über das Gleichgewicht hinaus gehende Ausdehnung dieses Prozesses*. Und gewiss ist es auf alle Weise [...] natürlicher im Gebiet des Wechsels überhaupt auch ein solches wechselndes Übergewicht anzunehmen, als ein immer unverrückt bleibendes Gleichgewicht' (emphasis added).<sup>26</sup> There are two possibilities, he adds: first, a cosmogony etc. may be followed by a destructive process, which is again followed by a cosmogony, this destructive process being pictured as a sort of 'Weltzerstörung'.<sup>27</sup> Schleiermacher's model here will be the view of Plato in the *Timaeus*: periodical catastrophes in an indestructible cosmos. Secondly, assuming a plurality of worlds, there may be a cosmogony in one system at the same time as such a destructive process occurs in another. The idea expressed by the formula 'was aus der ewigen Einheit heraustritt' much resembles the Neoplatonist process of emanation, but there is no *epistrophê*, as Schleiermacher explicitly excludes a returning of all things to the *Apeiron*. One may assume he did this because the ancient evidence for Anaximander fails | to include an explicit reference to the destruction of the cosmos. Others were less circumspect.

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### 3.4

Heinrich Ritter, in his *History of Ionic Philosophy*, does not yet have the text with ἀλλήλοις either.<sup>28</sup> He explains the fragment as follows: 'Also betrachtete Anaximandros das *Hervorgehn* der Welten und Himmel als eine *ungerechte* Tat, gleichsam als einen *Abfall* von der höchsten, rechtmäßigen Gewalt und verlangte nach dem Begriffe einer allmächtig waltenden Gerechtigkeit, daß dieser Missethat auch ihre Strafe werden müsse. Unter dieser Gestalt erschien ihm

26 *Ibid.* 58–60. More cryptically expressed in the posthumously published *Vorlesung* on the *Geschichte der alten Philosophie* (1839) 32 on the fragment: '[...] die Gleichmässigkeit des Untergangs mit dem Entstehen als Strafe für die Ungerechtigkeit, welches offenbar bedeutet, dass das Bestehende Sein der Dinge nur in einem fixierten Übergewicht gegründet ist'. These 'Spuren' obviously pertain to information in Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. below, n. 83 and text thereto.

27 This is also the view of e.g. Kirk (1955) 29–30 = (1970) 336–337, and (influentially) Kirk and Raven (1957) 140 ~ Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983) 139–140.

28 Ritter (1821) 188–189. For the quotation see *ibid.* 189.

das Vergehn, die Zerstörung der Welt ...' (emphasis added). Here we do have a form of *epistrophê*, so Ritter goes much further than Schleiermacher. Kahn rightly points out that this is a variety of the mystical interpretation. The term *Abfall* is suggestive.<sup>29</sup>

But Ritter is not consistent. He also writes, about ten pages further down: 'Man sieht hieraus, wie Anaximandros sich die Welt in einem *beständigen* wechselseitigen Zerstörungsprozeß gedacht habe, wie nach ihm die *einzelnen Dinge* Strafe geben für ihre Ungerechtigkeit durch ihren Untergang und wie zuletzt mit fortschreitender Zerstörung auch die ersten Gegesätze sich *wechselseitig* vernichten und wieder in den Zustand des ursprünglichen Gleichseins aller Dinge zurückkehren' (emphasis added). In part this resembles the interpretation according to which injustice is committed by things *against each other*. Dirk Couprie, referring to this passage, believes that Ritter would have welcomed the addition of ἀλλήλοις to the text.<sup>30</sup> Which is, as we shall see, what happened in the first edition of Ritter & Preller (1838), though the word was left out again in the second edition.

In a later book, the first volume of his *History of Philosophy* (1829), Ritter again quotes the *Aldina* text at p. 286 n. 2, and he largely sticks to the second position argued in the monograph of 1821.<sup>31</sup> He first translates the text, then comments: 'Doch das Sittliche in dieser Vorstellungsweise ist wohl als sehr untergeordnet anzusehen, und die *Ungerechtigkeit des Hervortretens* der einzelnen Elemente aus dem Unendlichen möchte wohl in nichts anderem bestehn, als in der ungleichmässigen Vertheilung verschiedenartiger Elemente, welche bei ihrer Sonderung durch die Bewegung hervorgebracht wird' (emphasis added). Ritter now does not mention any offense against the Infinite. The formula 'ungleichmässige Vertheilung' seems to exclude (a period of) equilibrium. On the other hand he assumes (just as in his book of 1821) that '[s]o wie aber das Unendliche nach dem Anaximander der Grund alles Entstehens ist, so ist es auch der Grund alles Vergehens', though this formula is not explicit about the end of the cosmos.

In the second and revised edition of the *History* (1836) Ritter repeats the judgement expressed at p. 286 of the first edition verbatim. At p. 294 n. 2 the text is again quoted without ἀλλήλοις. Brandis' new reading of 1835 (for which see below) has not been incorporated. Interpreting the fragment, however, Ritter now writes, (1836), p. 284 n. 3, that 'wir aus den eigenen Worten des Anaximan-

29 Kahn (1960) 194. For the 'Abfall' cf. below, n. 36, n. 99 and text thereto, n. 136, text to n. 155, text to n. 156, n. 163 and text thereto, text to n. 171, text to n. 177.

30 Couprie (1989) 26.

31 Ritter (1829) quotes the *Aldina* text again at 286 n. 2.

der wissen, dass er das Hervortreten der | Gegensätze aus dem Unendlichen einer Ungerechtigkeit der einzelnen Dinge zuschrieb'. Exactly the same formula is found in the slim volume of addenda (1838) to his *History*, p. 15, where (see his n. 1) he argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Brandis (1829)<sup>32</sup> and (1835). Ritter sticks to the view that coming to be from the Infinite is a mechanical process, a separation off from an original mixture caused by its eternal motion. We may conclude that if this separating off is due to the injustice of the particular things, Ritter's considered view must still be that this injustice is directed against the Infinite, however 'untergeordnet' the juridical metaphor, or ethical aspect, may be. And it is clear that he fails to provide a sufficiently precise interpretation (e.g. the separation is caused both by the eternal motion and by the injustice of the particular things).

One should of course also take into account that Ritter was not less familiar with the history of philosophy in general and the dominant currents of his own time than, say, Tennemann, Buhle, Ast, Hegel, and other philosophers and historians of philosophy from the same period one could mention. He knew his Plotinus and the various traditions beginning with Ficino, which he was to treat in the subsequent volumes of his *History*.<sup>33</sup>

### 3.5

Expertise of this kind may also be attributed to Brandis, the first scholar to read ἀλλήλοις in the text of Simplicius. He did so in his *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie*: 'τε und ἀλλήλοις aus den Handschriften hinzugefügt' (he translates 'einander Busse und Strafe').<sup>34</sup> Presumably he noticed the passage while preparing his massive edition of the *Scholia in Aristotelem*. Note that he preserves the order τίσιν καὶ δίκην of the *Aldina*. But in spite of ἀλλήλοις the ἀδίκη according to Brandis is aimed against the *Apeiron*, return to which is punishment.

One may say that 'zwei Seelen leben, ach, in seiner Brust': the soul of the philologist, conscientiously following his *recensio* of manuscripts, and that of an admiror of not only Schleiermacher but also Schelling (who much respected him),<sup>35</sup> who allows a profound vision to supervene upon the enigmatic words

32 Brandis (1829) had argued against Ritter (1829) on Anaximander.

33 Plotinus in Ritter (1834) e.g. 583, on his 'Bilder der Emanationslehre'; (1850), on Cusanus, Ficino (284, his 'Emanationslehre'); (1851) 100–101, Boehme compared with Paracelsus and Weigl. For emanation see above, text to n. 5, n. 21, below, n. 124 and text thereto, n. 125, n. 136 *ad fin.*, n. 162, text to n. 165.

34 Brandis (1835) 129, note f; trans. 126.

35 Brandis (1855) read the (rather critical) commemorative lecture on Schelling in the Berlin

of one of the earliest Presocratics. For what is noteworthy is that Brandis, in spite of his better text, is also one of the first scholars to argue explicitly that according to Anaximander the things that are do not have the right to exist, which is why they are punished in the course of time for hav[ing] existed: Anaximander 'betrachtete das unendliche Urwesen als Zustand der Vollkommenheit, *alles endliche als theilweise Störung oder Trübung dieses Zustandes*, welches nicht wie jenes an sich zu sein berechtigt, *sein Dasein* durch den Zeitwechsel gewissermassen *büsse*, dem es unterworfen' (emphasis added).<sup>36</sup> So individual existence is an injustice, and by implication this can only be an injustice towards the perfect Infinite. Also note his 'romantic', or rather Platonizing, characterization of Orphic cosmotheism p. 59: 'die göttliche Kraft sei durch das All verbreitet, und aus ihr die menschliche Seele abzuleiten.' In the simplified and revised later edition of the work he still keeps ἀλλήλοis but once again fails to interpret correctly: 'die Unrechtigkeit (ihres Seins)'.<sup>37</sup>

*Pace* Brandis it is much easier to believe and defend the pessimistic interpretation when ἀλλήλοis is absent than when the word is present. According to the text as restored things make amends for their injustice, and give reparation, *to each other*, not to the *Apeiron*. I vividly remember one of the first lectures on Greek philosophy I ever heard, given by my *Doktormutter* Professor Cornelia Johanna de Vogel in September 1954, in the course of which the importance of ἀλλήλοis was rubbed in with some emphasis.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, it has been generally admitted for quite a long time now, and is cryptically recorded already at the

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Academy. He also edited Schleiermacher's (posthumously published) *Lehre vom Staat* in the *Sämmtliche Werke* Abt. III Bd. 8, Berlin 1845. In his reminiscences printed in Nippold (1868) 55–64, Brandis tells us of a trip of eight days to Heidelberg in 1814, and meeting with the 'umfassend gelehrte und freundliche' Creuzer, and others. In his commemorative lecture on Brandis in the Berlin Academy Trendelenburg (1869) 5, 10–11, speaks of Brandis' relation with Schleiermacher and also mentions that with Schelling, 'den von ihm hochgehaltenen Philosophen' (*ibid.* 13), whom Brandis had met in 1822 in Erlangen. 'Ihn befreundete Schellings klassisches Wesen und die platonische Verwandtschaft [...] auch mit Schellings Philosophie [...]' (*ibid.* 16, cf. 17). Among Brandis' books in Schelling's personal library was Vol. 1 of the *Handbuch* (1835), see no. 566 at Müller-Bergen and Ziche (2007) 144–145, where Schelling's letter to Brandis in reply to the gift of *Handbuch* Bd. 2.1 (1844) is also quoted. See also Geldsetzer (1968), who 72 n. 38 writes that Brandis was influenced by among others Schelling and Jacobi. Also Scholtz (1979).

36 Brandis (1835) 129, 135. Cf. already Brandis (1829) 147, 'zeitweisen Abfall von der Grundeinheit'. For the 'Abfall' cf. above, text to n. 29, below, n. 99 and text thereto, n. 136, text to n. 155, text to n. 156, n. 163 and text thereto, text to n. 171, text to n. 177.

37 Brandis (1835) 59; (1862) 56 with n. 18. For his review of Zeller (1844) see below, text to nn. 48–49.

38 Compare de Vogel (1969) 11, with references to Nietzsche and Rohde cited from Jaeger (1947).

bottom of the page and more openly in the 'Nachtrag' to this page at the end of the first volume in the fifth edition of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, that the so-called Nietzsche–Rohde interpretation is difficult to maintain.<sup>39</sup> Charles Kahn, for instance, is in a position to state calmly 'there is no place, either in the wording of the fragment or in the immediate context, for any penalty or wrongdoing which could involve the Boundless'.<sup>40</sup>

### 3.6

I go back to Ritter, this time accompanied by his collaborator Ludwig Preller.<sup>41</sup> The Simplicius abstract, printed in the section on Anaximander in the first edition of their often reprinted and revised sourcebook for the history of Greek philosophy, includes ἀλλήλοις. A note tells us the word has been 'added by Brandis from the codices'.<sup>42</sup> Ritter & Preller accordingly do take ἀλλήλοις (translated *invicem*) into account: '*poenas sibi invicem reddunt, quia coelum et mundus, calor et frigus sese invicem velut confunderunt quippe contraria, eoque ut omnia in infinitam illam mixtionem absumantur efficitur*' ('they punish each other reciprocally, because heaven and earth, hot and cold so to speak have reciprocally destroyed each other since they are opposites, which is why it comes about that | all things disappear into that infinite mixture').<sup>43</sup> Ritter & Preller go further than Schleiermacher and apparently follow Ritter's own view as expressed earlier (as well as that of Brandis) in claiming that all things in the end return to the *Apeiron*. One need not be surprised that, limiting themselves to an 'eoque efficitur', they fail to describe how this comes about.

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In the second edition of Ritter & Preller (1857), edited by Preller alone, the *Aldina* text is reinstalled, and the note referring to Brandis' correction is gone.<sup>44</sup>

39 DK Bd. 1, ad 89.10, with some references to the literature; also see the 'Nachtrag', 487–488. Diels' note at 89.10 (present from the second edition) opaquely explains ἀλλήλοις as 'das Untergehende dem Überlebenden und dieses wieder untergehend dem künftig Entstehenden'. See further again Jaeger (1953) 46–48, with references *ibid.* 239–240 (not to Zeller). For Burnet and Heidel see Kahn (1960) 178 n. 2, 194, and below, Section 4.3.

40 Kahn (1960) 167, cf. e.g. already McDiarmid (1953) at (1970) 190–191, against Diels. Now also e.g. Rapp (1997) 46–48, Graham (2006) 34–38. Cf. below, Section 7.

41 Ritter & Preller (1838).

42 Ritter & Preller (1838) 30, no. 57, 'hanc vocem Brandis addidit ex codicibus'. Kahn (1960) 194, and Conche (1991) 179 n. 30 refer to both Brandis (1835) and Ritter & Preller (1838). Louguet (2001) 19 n. 13, refers to Brandis (1835), and adds 'le texte erroné a continué à être cité pendant tout le XIXe siècle', which is not entirely correct.

43 Quoted Kahn (1960) 194.

44 Ritter & Preller (1857) 12 at no. 18. One year earlier this obsolete *constitutio* had also been reintroduced at Zeller (1856) 163 n. 2, cited below, text to n. 50. The first to reinstate Brandis' text was Usener (1858), see below, Section 4.2.

In the preface Preller tells us that Ritter was no longer in a position to help with the new edition, so he had to shoulder this task alone: 'So I did what had to be done in a virtually new book and one by me, i.e., I changed what I believed should be changed, though I consulted Ritter' (p. vi, 'Feci igitur quod faciendum erat in libro quasi novo et meo, hoc est mutavi quae mihi mutanda videbantur, consulto tamen Rittero ...'). Ritter in his earlier contributions had argued that things by separating off commit an injustice towards the *Apeiron*. Maybe it was Preller, the philologist, who in the first edition included Brandis' emendation. Ritter, as we have seen, argued against Brandis, and this may have induced Preller to throw out Brandis' *constitutio* this time. Ritter may even have prompted this unfortunate regression, though Zeller's return to the *Aldina* text (more about which presently) may also have been a factor.

The third edition of the sourcebook was inaccessible to me. In the fourth edition, by Gustav Teichmüller (1869), see his footnote 10 to no. 18, we find the same text as in Preller's second edition. In the fifth edition (1875), Teichmüller again, the editor adheres to the interpretative trend exemplified (in spite of their differences) by both Ritter and Brandis, and subsequently by quite a few other scholars: he somewhat opaquely speaks p. 27 of '[d]ie Rolle der ewigen Bewegung in dem Weltdrama Anaximanders, in welchem alle Dinge schliesslich zu Busse und Untergang für ihre Sünde gebracht werden [...]'.<sup>45</sup>

### 3.7

Brandis' *Handbuch* was soon rendered obsolete by the monumental work *Die Philosophie der Griechen* of the great Eduard Zeller, which was regularly revised and amplified. One may, for instance, adduce the judgement of August Böckh: 'Unstreitig die beste Darstellung der alten Philosophie'.<sup>45</sup>

In the first edition of the first volume (1844)<sup>46</sup> Zeller in a footnote prints the Simplicius text including ἀλλήλοις as established by Brandis (1835), presumably from Ritter & Preller (1838). He argues against what he says is Ritter's interpretation of the 'Ungerechtigkeit des Hervortretens' of the individual things, though he bases his position not on his knowledge of the correct Simplicius text which he quotes, and which rather surprisingly plays no role at all, but on the argument that the origin of motion is not to be attributed to individual things, but to the principle.<sup>47</sup> So individual things cannot be responsible for their coming to be. We should however note that Ritter did not argue | that this motion is a mat-

45 At Bratuschek (1877) 583–584.

46 Zeller (1844) 75 n. 3.

47 Zeller (1844) 74–76, arguing against Ritter 'Gesch. D. Phil. I, 284, Anm.', a passage cited above.

ter of the individual things rather than of the Infinite, for (1836), 293–294, he states that the Infinite is ‘Grund alles Entstehens’ and ‘Grund alles Vergehens, beides durch die ewige Bewegung’. But Zeller is justified to the extent that Ritter, as we have seen, not only adduces the eternal motion in this context but also speaks of the guilt of the individual things.

This first volume was reviewed, praised, and to some extent criticized by Brandis in the same year. Brandis, true to his vitalistic stance, argues against what he claims is Zeller’s interpretation of Anaximander’s *Apeiron* as a ‘ruhen-des Sein’.<sup>48</sup> Against this view, he says, one need only quote the fragment: ‘woher das, was ist, seinen Ursprung hat, in dasselbe hat es auch seinen Untergang usw.’, and he adduces Aristotle’s famous characterization of early Greek thought in *Metaphysics* Book A as the important parallel.<sup>49</sup> One wonders about this ‘usw.’, then realizes that the omission of the part of the text which seems to derive more or less verbatim from Anaximander himself confirms, interestingly enough, that the new *constitutio* meant little to Brandis himself.

Subsequently Zeller changed his mind; from the second (1856) to the fourth (1876) edition of the first volume of the *Geschichte* he defended a variety of the mystical interpretation argued by Ritter and Brandis. It would indeed seem that he believed that Brandis’ *constitutio* was not relevant (we saw above that in the first edition he quoted the emended text in a footnote without dealing with the particulars, and that Brandis himself believed it to be unimportant). Zeller (21856) now quotes the old *Aldina* text, so no ἀλλήλοις, and interprets as follows (emphasis added):<sup>50</sup> ‘Die Sonderexistenz der Dinge ist gleichsam ein Unrecht, eine Vermessenheit, die sie durch ihren Untergang büßen müssen’. The *principium individuationis*, as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were to call it, as a sort of original sin. However (perhaps influenced in this respect by Schleiermacher) he adds that it is not certain that this is also applicable to the ‘Weltganze’. He translates ‘wie aber Alles aus dem einen Urstoff hervorgegangen ist, so muss auch Alles in denselben zurückkehren, denn alle Dinge müssen Busse und Strafe erleiden für ihre Ungerechtigkeit, nach der Ordnung der Zeit’. So the individual things return to the principle, while the cosmos, perhaps, continues to exist.

Zeller only changed his mind for the second time much later, viz. after he had seen Diels’ definitive *constitutio* of the Simplicius text, that is to say by

48 Brandis (1844) 137–138.

49 *Met.* A.3 983b8–18, ‘That of which all existing things consist, and the first from which they come to be and the last into which they perish, the substance persisting but changing as to its affections, this is the element and this the principle of existing things’ etc.

50 Zeller (21856) 163 n. 2, then 172.

the time of the second edition of his *Grundriss* (<sup>2</sup>1883, no Greek text here), and then at greater length in the fifth and revised edition (1892) of the first volume of the *Geschichte*, the last edition to be published by the great man himself, forty-eight years after the first edition.<sup>51</sup> Note that in the manual published in 1883 he was the first scholar to try and deal adequately with ἀλλήλοις. A few years later Franz Lortzing in one of his authoritative *Forschungsberichte* also emphasized the crucial difference made by the restoration of this word.<sup>52</sup>

22 Zeller (1856) argued that in this respect Heraclitus was influenced by Anaximander (emphasis added): ‘denn wie Heraklit alles einzelne als flüchtige Erscheinung im Strome des Naturlebens auftauchen und wieder verschwinden lässt, so betrachtet auch Anaximander die *Einzelexistenz als ein Unrecht, für welches die Dinge durch ihren Untergang | büssen müssen*’.<sup>53</sup> For this view see also the large monograph on Heraclitus by Ferdinand Lassalle.<sup>54</sup> Lassalle quotes the *Aldina* text for Anaximander, refers to Zeller, and argues that for Heraclitus ‘alles Gewordene [...], als Endliches und Bestimmtes, somit in seiner Bestimmtheit zugleich die Negation [hat], seine Grenzen, nach Raum wie Zeit, an sich. Diese [sc. Grenze] ist [...] die ἀδικία: *Trübung jenes unendlichen Seins*’. In Lassalle’s interpretative Heraclitean / Anaximandrian context an (as we would now say) Middle Platonist passage in Plutarch plays a part, which seems to attribute to Empedocles and Heraclitus the view that *genesis* (‘coming to be’, ‘existence’) is *adikia* (‘injustice’). This passage has virtually disappeared from the scholarly discussion<sup>55</sup> and is for instance almost lacking in the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.<sup>56</sup> It remained present in the way of the grin of the Cheshire cat, and we should quote it:

51 For his definitive view see Zeller (<sup>2</sup>1883) 34, and (<sup>5</sup>1892) 207 n. 2 = (<sup>6</sup>1920) 282 n. 2, and (<sup>5</sup>1892) 229 with n. 2 = (<sup>6</sup>1920) 305–306 with n. 4.

52 Lortzing (1903) 179–180.

53 Zeller (<sup>2</sup>1856) 492.

54 Lassalle (1858) 45–48.

55 It was quashed by Zeller (<sup>2</sup>1856) 492, and (<sup>4</sup>1876) 661.

56 Partially cited Empedocles, fr. 105 Bollack, Heraclitus, fr. 28 (d) Marcovich ~ T 493 Mouraviev, cited as ‘reminiscence’ ad F 80 Mouraviev (= B80 DK ~ fr. 28 (a) Marcovich). DK quote the formula containing the word πόλεμος in the apparatus to fr. B80. ἀνάγκην recalls Empedocles B115.1 DK, while (pace Bollack and Mouraviev) the formula τῷ θνητῷ συνερχομένου τοῦ ἀθανάτου recalls Heraclitus B62 DK ~ 47 (a) Marcovich ~ F 62 Mouraviev. The interesting final sentence seems to be based on an ingredient of Empedocles’ embryology in which Strife plays a part. For the idea cf. also a very full cento at Clement, *Stromata*, 3.14.1–21.1, where Plato, the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, and Empedocles are corroborated by quotations from other luminaries. It is introduced at 12.1–2: Plato and the Pythagoreans, just as later Marcion and his followers, ‘assumed coming to be is evil’ (κακὴν τὴν γένεσιν



Plutarch, *De sollertia animalium*, 964D–E:

ἐπεὶ τό γε μὴ παντάπασι καθαρεύειν ἀδικίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὕτω τὰ ζῶα μεταχειριζόμενον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὡς ἀληθές προσδέχονται, πολλάκις ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ λοιδοροῦντες τὴν φύσιν, ὡς ἀνάγκην καὶ πόλεμον οὔσαν, (E) ἀμιγῆς δὲ μηδὲν μηδ' εἰλικρινές ἔχουσαν ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν κἀδίκων παθῶν περαινομένην ὄπου καὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτὴν ἐξ ἀδικίας συντυγχάνειν λέγουσι, τῷ θνητῷ συνερχομένου τοῦ ἀθανάτου, καὶ τρέφεσθαι τὸ γεννώμενον παρὰ φύσιν μέλεσι τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀποσπωμένοις.

Trans. (Loeb, slightly modified):

For certain it is that Empedocles and Heraclitus accept as true the charge that man is not altogether innocent of **injustice** when he treats the animals as he does; often and often these men lament and exclaim against Nature, declaring that she is 'Necessity' and 'War', that she contains nothing unmixed and free from tarnish, that her progress is marked by many **unjust** inflictions. As an instance, they say, even **birth itself springs from injustice**, since it is a union of mortal with immortal, and the offspring is nourished unnaturally on members torn away from the parent.

So according to this cento birth is unjust because the immortal soul combines with a mortal body, or because the embryo grows from parts wrenched away from (all) the parts of the parent's body. But we should note that this in no way constitutes a parallel to the injustice of conflicting parties to each other, or to the principle.

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ὑπειλήφεν). At 14.1 we hear about 'Heraclitus, apparently stating that coming to be is not good' ('Ἡράκλειτος γοῦν κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν—the prooftext cited is B20 DK). Empedocles is made to agree with him (consecutively the prooftexts Empedocles B108, B115, B124 DK are quoted, lines traditionally attributed to the *Purifications*), the Sibyl (one prooftext), Theognis (one prooftext), Euripides (two prooftexts), Herodotus (one prooftext), Homer (two separately cited prooftexts), then Plato *Crat.* 400 b–c, on Orpheus or rather some Orphics on the punishment of the soul in the body and the body as its tomb, which leads to quotations of Philolaus (confirming *Crat.* 400b–c) and a Pindar quotation said to be 'about the mysteries of Eleusis', and again to a lot of Plato, viz. a minicento from *Phaedo* followed by a number of quotations incorporated in what follows, the whole ending (ring composition) with a quotation of Heraclitus B21 DK, who again says that to be born is death, a view resembling views shared by Pythagoras, and Socrates in the *Gorgias*. A similar thought is attributed to Heraclitus at Diogenes Laertius 8.84 (Heraclitus 22A1 DK), 'the opposite leading to coming to be [or: to be born] is called war and strife', τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔριν (cf. Her. 21B53, B80 DK).

## 23 3.8

The handbook literature of the time on Anaximander generally follows the trend exemplified by Zeller from the second to the fourth edition of the *Geschichte*: individual existence, the *principium individuationis*, as injustice. Zeller in the fourth edition still interpreted as follows: ‘wie alles aus dem einen Ursprung hervorgegangen ist, so muss alles in denselben zurückkehren, denn alle Dinge müssen, wie unser Philosoph sagt, Busse und Strafe erleiden für ihre Ungerechtigkeit nach der Ordnung der Zeit.’<sup>57</sup> We note that Zeller is not explicit about injustice against the Infinite; ‘alle Dinge’, again, refers to individual things, not to the cosmos.

For this general trend previous to the publication of the first volume of Diels’ authoritative text of Simplicius *In Physica* (1882) which definitively includes ἀλλήλοις in our passage,<sup>58</sup> see, for instance, the following scholars:

Karl Prantl (1854), p. 13: ‘daher alles Gewordene dadurch, dass es in das Unbegrenzte zurücksinkt, Busse leistet für jene Verletzung des Allgemeinen’. *Ibid.*, p. 9 on the mystics who ‘den Namen des Orpheus vorschoben’.

Albert Schwegler and Carl Köstlin (1859), p. 16 n. 4, read ἀλλήλοις (also at (1886), 17–18 and n. 4) like Brandis (1835), Ritter & Preller (1838), and Usener (1858), but their syncretistic interpretation, p. 16, still is: ‘alles endliche, bestimmte, selbständige Sein (erscheint) als Störung und Trübung des ruhigen harmonischen Zusammenseins der Dinge im Urgrund, als gegenseitige Feindschaft, als Raub und Ungerechtigkeit’, for which ‘Ungerechtigkeit’ individual things pay by returning to the *Apeiron*.

The much criticized collection of texts of Friedrich Wilhelm August Mullach (1860), p. 240, which has the *Aldina* text as Anaximander fr. 2, translates ‘sic enim eas temporis ordine inustitiae poenas dare et supplicia luere’ but fails to provide an explanation.

Friedrich Michelis (1865), p. 7, writes: ‘... und zwar existierten die einzelnen Dingen gewissermaassen mit Unrecht, so dass ihr Untergang die gerechte Strafe ihres Daseins sei’. He laconically refers the reader to Simplicius for further information.

57 Zeller (41876) 210.

58 Same text already in the Theophrastus fragment in the *Doxographi Graeci* (1879) 476, following Usener (1858) who followed Brandis, see below, Section 4.2.

Friedrich Überweg (1871) ~ rev. ed. by Max Heinze (1875), 40–41, has the *Aldina* text, and sees individual existence as *adikia*.<sup>59</sup>

But Johann Eduard Erdmann (1869), p. 18, refers back to Schleiermacher: ‘periodisches Ausgleichen des einseitig sich Vordrängens eines der Gegensätze’.

### 3.9

Varieties of the mystical interpretation were also proposed *after* the publication of Diels’ *Doxographi* and the first volume of Diels’ text of Simplicius *In Physica* (1882), which includes ἀλλήλοισ in our passage—even, as we shall see, by Diels himself. See, for instance:

Wilhelm Windelband (1888), p. 142 ~ (1894), who p. 29 brackets i.e. deletes (!) the irritating word ἀλλήλοισ from his first edition on (cf. Theobald Ziegler (1888), below, Section 4.1), and sees individual existence as *adikia*. He is *ibid.*, p. 31, reminded of ‘orientalisch-religiöse Vorstellungen’ (see further below, Section 6). Compare also Windelband (1900), p. 39, where he describes the fragment as the ‘ersten dunklen Versuch, das Weltgeschehen als sittliche Notwendigkeit zu begreifen und die Schatten der Vergänglichkeit, welche auf dem heiteren Bilde auch des hellenischen Lebens ruhen [cf. Rohde and others, above, Section 2], als Vergeltung der Sünde aufzufassen. [...] Hier erscheint Anaximander als Vorgänger Heraklits’ (cf. above, on Zeller and Lassalle).

24

Albert Stöckl (1888), p. 39, states that things return to the *Apeiron* ‘durch eine Art Verhängnis’.

We may also cite the flimsy *Habilitationsschrift* of Rudolf Seydel (1860), 15–16, who cites the fragment in translation (no ‘einander’), adduces Sophocles, *O.C.* 1225–1226 to document a preference for non-existence in ancient Greece, and compares the power of the *Apeiron* with that of fate and a succession of dominant first gods. He speaks of the ‘furchtbare und unheimliche Macht des ewigen uralten Eines, das wie ein drohender Gewitterhimmel über der Sonnenheiterkeit des griechischen Lebens ruht’. He is reminded of Schelling, whose ‘Magierblick’ saw the ‘Ähnlichkeit des Ganges der Entwicklung der griechischen Philosophie mit dem der Mythologie’, refers to Schelling’s qualification of Socrates as the Dionysus of Greek philosophy, and of the philosophers before Socrates as ‘vordionysisch’, and cites the *Philosophie der Mythologie*.<sup>60</sup>

59 Couprie (1989) 193, for Überweg (1862) quotes the translation in the revised ed. of the handbook by Praechter (1926), who translates ἀλλήλοισ.

60 Schelling (1856) 283–284. For Schelling see further below, Section 6.7.

A large monograph written in Latin was published by the Bonn philosopher Neuhaeuser (1883). At p. 335 n. 1 he does read ἀλλήλοις. His interpretation p. 336 is the most bizarre I have seen: coming into being is an injustice (a) of the *Apeiron* against what comes to be, because it lets them go, and (b) of these things against the *Apeiron*, because they went. Both the *Apeiron* and the things are punished, things by having to return to the *Apeiron*, the *Apeiron* because it has to accommodate them.<sup>61</sup>

Clemens Baeumker (1890), p. 15 n. 1, reads *allélois* too, but interprets, p. 14: ‘das Hervortreten des Endlichen ist ein Unrecht, welches durch den Kampf und die gegenseitige Vernichtung der Sonderexistenzen gesühnt werden muss’. The opposites revert to the *Apeiron*.

For the ancient historian Eduard Meyer it is Orphism (or what he thinks Orphism is) that is important. In the second volume of his *Geschichte des Altertums* (1893) he argues that Orphism is (1) concerned with the divinity and its relation to the world (pantheism etc.), and (2) with the essence and fate of the human soul. Its literature is the product of anonymous poets masquerading as Orpheus or Musaeus.<sup>62</sup> He is also concerned with the rise of philosophy.<sup>63</sup> As to the relationship between Orphism and philosophy he refrains from using the word influence: ‘Mit den Anfängen der Philosophie steht [scil. die orphische Lehre] in Wechselwirkung; gleichzeitig mit ihr und aus den selben Wurzeln ist sie erwachsen’.<sup>64</sup> Several of its doctrines ‘decken sich fast völlig mit Spekulationen der ältesten Philosophen; beide sind ja Erzeugnisse der selben Zeit’.<sup>65</sup> But he also sees philosophy as a ‘Gegenströmung’, Ionia’s gift to humanity (a wonderful expression!), which the ‘religiöse Bewegung durchbricht und in langem Ringen zu Boden wirft’.<sup>66</sup> Yet in Anaximander we still find ‘Anklänge an orphischen Gedanken’—‘das Unrecht, das sie [sc. the things that | are] einander anfügen, indem sie in Erscheinung treten’, as Meyer declares using a rather original

61 Reviewed by Zeller (1883), who refrains from dealing with Neuhaeuser’s interpretation of this aspect of the fragment. The book is discussed at length by Natorp (1884). Natorp, 395, reads ἀλλήλοις too (in *Sperrdruck*), but differs from Neuhaeuser in stating ‘so mögen wohl die streitenden Elemente zuletzt alle im Kampfe einander aufreiben und so in den Urstoff zurückkehrend ihr gegenseitiges Unrecht einander abbüssen’.

62 Meyer (1893) 734–739 = in a later ed. Bd. 3, 673–693.

63 Meyer (1893) 734–739 = in a later ed. Bd. 3, 693 ff.

64 Meyer (1893) 747.

65 Meyer Bd. 3, 697.

66 Meyer (1893) 751.

formula, which preserves an echo of injustice towards the principle as a back-drop of that of things against each other.<sup>67</sup>

Theodor Gomperz (1896) depicts individual existence as rank injustice and transgression, though omitting to tell us who or what has been offended. For these offenses the beings that in turns replace and destroy *each other* must be punished and give compensation according to the order of time.<sup>68</sup> We may note that an echo of ἀλλήλοις is here grafted upon the inherited mystical interpretation.

Auguste Diès (1909) too argues in favour of the mystical interpretation, basing himself on evidence that fails to support his case, viz. the (then known) Orphic tomb tablets. The formula 'you have become a god', for instance, does not entail that one has merged with God. Later discoveries of tables have failed to modify this picture.

According to Cornford (1912), p. 176, Anaximander belongs with 'the mystical tradition'; he is placed in the context of Buddhist, Persian, and Orphic as well as Pythagorean thought because 'the penalty of injustice' is paid by perishing again, '*according to the order of time*' (italics in the original). Cf. Cornford (1926), p. 54 (reading 'to one another'): injustice is 'paid for by the dissolution of every temporary combination, and finally by the relapse of the warring powers themselves into the primitive confusion of the Unlimited'. But at (1912), p. 147, the injustice consists in 'the encroachment of one element upon another', so the *Apeiron* is not involved.<sup>69</sup>

### 3.10

Although the naturalistic interpretation of the fragment has come to dominate the discussion, varieties of the mystical view by no means became extinct. I cite a few for the most part rather recent examples:

Ernst Howald (1931), p. 13 (includes 'einander'): Anaximander's 'Diktion [...] zeigt die Einheitsidee der Natur ausgedrückt in der Sprache der Orphik. [...] Die Formen, die es [scil., the *Apeiron*] annimmt (wie die unsterbliche Seele durch

67 Meyer (1893) 755–756. I have transcribed a few phrases from Mansfeld (1989).

68 Gomperz (1896) 46 = (\*1922) 47: 'Jede Sonderexistenz erschien ihm als ein Unrecht, als eine Usurpation, für welche die *sich wechselseitig* verdrängenden und vertilgenden Wesen »Busse und Strafe erleiden müssen nach der Ordnung der Zeit«' (emphasis added).

69 The naturalistic interpretation is argued Cornford (1952) 34.

immer neue Körper geht), sind mit Sünde behaftet, wie die Leiber als Gräber der Seelen.' He uses the term 'Erbsünde'.

Hans Meyer (1947), 24–25, translates 'einander', speaks nevertheless of 'Schuld' because of 'Absonderung der Einzeldinge vom Urgrund'.

Rodolfo Mondolfo (1950), p. 38: '*ingiustizia reciproca [...] sia nella loro generazione stessa, che è un distacco dal seno dell'essere infinito, sia nella loro lotta successiva a questa scissione dei contrari*' (emphasis added). At Zeller and Mondolfo (<sup>2</sup>1950), 202–205, where he rejects the interpretation of 'Nietzsche, Rohde, Ziegler, Gomperz, Rivaud, Diès, Joël' etc., who argued a 'pessimismo mistico per il quale è ingiusta l'individuazione', he nevertheless still speaks of a 'doppia ingiustizia', viz. to be born and to engage in strife, so also of compensation to the *Apeiron*.

For Hermann Schmitz (1959) see below, n. 123, *ad finem*.

Arnold Ehrhardt (1968), 30–32, argues for affinity with Orphic cosmogony and says, p. 27: 'Empedocles was not the first who taught that it was individualization by defilement which plunged the living (τὰ ὄντα) into being'.

- 26 Reale (1972), p. 82, and (<sup>4</sup>1980), p. 63, follows Mondolfo as to the 'twofold injustice'.

Colli (1979), p. 297, in a tortured sentence posits that the interpretation of Rohde and Nietzsche is strengthened (!) by the addition of ἀλλήλοις: 'in realtà l'ingiustizia non è commessa contro l'unità divina, bensì è qualcosa che appartiene al nostro mondo, è la 'volontà di Potenza' [viz. Nietzsche's Wille zur Macht] che la fa sorgere e perire; gli individui sono puniti gli uni dagli altri perché così vuole, perché in ciò consiste la loro esistenza determinata, e tutta la nostra vita non è causata dalla divinità, ma è un distaccarsi dalla divinità primordiale'.

A quite recent book by a sociologist: Sandywell (1996), e.g. p. 157: 'By definition, finite beings overstep or transgress the divine *Apeiron*; by existing at all they violate the sacred source of undifferentiation. [...] *Dike* requires that the Whole be restored, that finite things and 'encroaching' opposites be returned to the Infinite 'according to the ordered process of time'. Time is personified, etc.

Johansen (1998), p. 25, presents a compromise not much different from Mondolfo's. Though he rejects the mystical interpretation, he argues that the fragment works on two levels: (a) 'transition of things into each other in this world'; (b) applicable to 'worlds in relation to the Apeiron'. He believes that Anaximander fr. 12B1 DK has been cobbled together from two fragments.<sup>70</sup>

## 4 From Ziegler to Jaeger

### 4.1

We may allow ourselves a further look at the issue of the presence or absence of the word ἀλλήλοις in the Simplicius passage. Four years before the fifth revised and amplified edition of the first volume of Zeller's *Geschichte* (<sup>5</sup>1892), but five years after the second edition of his *Grundriss* (<sup>2</sup>1883) and six years after the publication of Diels' critical edition of the first half of Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (1882), Theobald Ziegler published a paper in the first volume of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*.<sup>71</sup> It is above all interesting because of its critical overview of (part of) the relevant literature. Ziegler cited the fourth edition of Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen* (1876) as well as the second of the *Grundriss* (1883), correctly pointing out that following Diels' text Zeller had changed his mind between 1876 and 1883.<sup>72</sup> He also discussed the interpretations and translations of Überweg and Heinze (1875), Teichmüller's edition of Ritter & Preller (1869), Schleiermacher (1815) and (1839), C. Baumann,<sup>73</sup> Schwegler (1859), and Neuhaeuser (1883),<sup>74</sup> the majority of whom have

<sup>70</sup> This is also argued by Louguet (2001); McDiarmid (1953) at (1970) 192–193 argues that the clause about the cycle of generation and destruction is parenthetical; Ehrhardt (1968) 23 thinks of a single fragment with two distinct parts; Capizzi (1990) 267 believes that the Simplicius text perhaps is not a single fragment.

<sup>71</sup> Ziegler is also the author of a book (1886) on Greek and Roman ethics dedicated to Zeller. At p. 255 (n. 43 to 26) of this book he cites Mullach (1860) for the Anaximander text, and *ibid.* 26 wonders why Anaximander failed to apply his view of the 'Unrecht der Sonderexistenz der Einzeldinge' to ethics.

<sup>72</sup> Ziegler (1888) 16–18.

<sup>73</sup> I have not been able to trace C. Baumann, *Ein Versuch zur Darstellung des philosophischen Systems Anaximander's*, but note that according to Ziegler (1888) 18 he too believed individual existence to be an injustice.

<sup>74</sup> Ziegler (1888) 18, 'Nur bei Schwegler sieht man, dass er ἀλλήλοις liest [...]; Brandis und Baumann dagegen nehmen auf das von ihnen vorausgesetzte ἀλλήλοις überhaupt keine Rücksicht'. He further points out, *ibid.* 19–20, that Neuhaeuser's view that the *Apeiron* has an 'adpetitio generandi' implies that the 'offenbar scholastisch geschulte Verfasser' anachronistically posits the traditional 'concupiscentia (generandi)' as the root of all evil.

27 been quoted above. Not unreasonably he argued that the differences between those who did and those who did not read ἀλλήλοις are | far from consistent, or decisive for their interpretation. His way out (p. 169) is to come up with the drastic solution that *allêlois* should be deleted (he mentions no earlier instance of this drastic measure): it would have got into the text by mistake, anticipating the εἰς ἄλληλα a few lines down. The only reasonable recipient of the ‘just redress and penalty for the injustice’ according to Ziegler, who obviously prefers the mystical reading, is the *Apeiron*, and the sinners are humans.<sup>75</sup> These human sinners Christianize the interpretation of the fragment even further, but failed to find favour with the scholarly community.

The proposed expunction of ἀλλήλοις is also found in the same year 1888 in the handbook of Windelband, as we have seen above, and it occasionally attracted later scholars.<sup>76</sup> We have also seen that others, like Zeller (<sup>2</sup>1856), or Ritter & Preller (<sup>2</sup>1857), had cited a text that lacks the word, whether on purpose or not it is impossible to say. Ziegler’s maneuver of course belongs with the tradition of reading the fragment in a mystical way.

Soon enough, however, Zeller pointed out (against Ziegler) that one should not delete a word that is found in all the manuscripts though missing in the *Aldina*.<sup>77</sup>

#### 4.2

But Ziegler had neglected to refer to Usener. Brandis’ pupil and Diels’ future *Doktorvater* Hermann Usener in his exemplary dissertation on Theophrastus (1858), containing *inter alia* an edition of the fragments he attributed to the *Physikôn Doxai* (as he called the work), again put the word ἀλλήλοις in the text of Simplicius.<sup>78</sup> He followed the *constitutio* of Brandis, but failed to get through to Zeller & *alii* and was only followed by his pupil Diels about fifteen to twenty years later. Usener in fact tells us in so many words that he was only able to provide a better text of Simplicius thanks to the collations of several manuscripts generously provided by Brandis.<sup>79</sup> But this modifica-

75 Ziegler (1888) 20.

76 E.g. Rivaud (1906) 93: ‘existence individuelle comme une injustice’, so ἀλλήλοις perhaps ‘se comprend mal’. Rivaud is mentioned by Maddalena (1963) 95 n. 38, who contrasts the ‘interpretazione mistica’ with that of Jaeger.

77 Zeller (<sup>5</sup>1892). A few years later Bellaar Spruyt (1900) quoted and translated the correct text, and pointed out that no agreement had been reached as to its interpretation. For the text he oddly referred to Simplicius ‘6r41 (Aldus Venet.)’.

78 Usener (1858) 31 ~ (1912) 76.

79 Usener (1858) ~ (1912) 74, ‘quod Simplicii in phys. locos aliquanto emendatiorum quam quales in exemplo Aldino feruntur edere licuit, id totum debetur Chr. A. Brandisii viri celeberr-



tion pertains to the correct reading of the text, not to its interpretation. Diels reprinted Usener's Theophrastus fragments (with some additions and modifications) in the magisterial and fundamental *Doxographi Graeci* of 1879, and followed his master's example as to the *constitutio* for the second time in the edition of Simplicius (1882) of which the text has been cited above, Section 1 (cf. below, Appendix to ch. 4). In a footnote to his introduction of this edition he refers to Brandis' collations in an ungenerous way, and tells us that they are to be found in Brandis' personal copy of the *Aldina*, preserved in the library of the Berlin Academy.<sup>80</sup>

Zeller, as noted above, only changed his mind, quotation, and interpretation 28 because of Diels' work on the text of Simplicius. The better text is interpreted by him as follows (<sup>5</sup>1892), p. 229: 'was durch seine Entstehung ein anderes aus dem Dasein verdrängt, es in sich aufgezehrt hat, muss *ihm* für diese Verletzung dadurch Genugtuung geben, dass es sich bei seinem Untergang in den Stoff wieder auslöst, aus dem es geworden ist' (emphasis added). He now adds that Anaximander may also have applied the idea expressed in the fragment to the 'Weltganze' (an idea he had rejected (<sup>2</sup>1856) p. 172) and so might have assumed a 'dereinstige Weltuntergang', although this is disputed by scholars. Things must compensate *each other* for their injustice; no compensation is paid to the primary substance, and individual existence is *not* an impertinence, or 'Unrecht'. Reactions were not always favourable. August Döring (1899), for instance, argued that the 'Weltuntergang' was spun out of Theophrastus' words by later doxographers echoed in Simplicius, and that Zeller is wrong in having the 'mysterious' ἀλλήλοις pertain to the cosmos. He of course had a point; the question is still disputed.

Nevertheless we may conclude that, where Brandis' *philologia* had been ineffective, Diels' *philologia* had succeeded and become *philosophia* in Zeller. The irony of the situation is that Brandis was blind to his own reading, and that Zeller only understood what it meant when it had become Diels' reading. As to Diels himself, from a philological point of view his affiliation is via Usener with Brandis as to the *constitutio*, whereas from an interpretative point of view his preference lies not with Zeller's revised interpretation but with a version

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rimi singulari liberalitati'. The dissertation is dedicated to Usener's *Doktorvater* Friedrich Ritschl, and to his other master, Brandis, who aroused his interest in the problems connected with the transmission of ancient philosophy, see Bremmer (1990).

80 Diels (1882) vi n. 2. Usener too refers to this copy (1858) ~ (1912) 74. Diels (via Usener) also used Brandis' collations ('Brandisii ... apparatus') of two manuscripts for his edition of Theophrastus *De sensibus*, *DGr* 114, but felt obliged to point out that they are not always reliable.

of the by his time venerable and virtually omnipresent mystical interpretation. Which shows again that it is not always sufficient to have a good critical text in order to get an interpretation that does justice to it.

An addition between square brackets by Wilhelm Nestle to Zeller's footnote (<sup>5</sup>1892), p. 229, at Zeller and Nestle (<sup>6</sup>1920), p. 306 n. 4 refers to recent literature, e.g. Heidel and Burnet (see below, Section 4.3) and begins with the words 'Dass das ἀλλήλοις auf das Verhältnis der Dinge zueinander und nicht etwa zum Apeiron zu beziehen sei, darüber ist jetzt wohl alles einig'. But at the end of this comment he pulls up his own anchor, refers to Nietzsche, Rohde, and Gomperz (though not to Diels), and says: 'Hier liegt in der Tat die Vermutung einer Anknüpfung Anaximanders an die orphische Lehre von dem Eintritt ins Dasein infolge einer Schuld nahe'.<sup>81</sup> Nestle falls for a confused paper of the Orphic enthusiast Josef Dörfler (1917). Also see an appropriately vague statement in the otherwise very critical review of two articles of Dörfler by Lortzing (1914), p. 1482: 'Anaximanders ἀπειρον und Weltentfaltungslehre, vor allem sein berühmtes Bruchstück [...], tragen etwas Mystisches an sich, das an ähnliche Vorstellungen der Orphiker erinnert'. This demonstrates the tenacity of the mystical interpretation, also as we shall see exemplified by Diels.

#### 4.3

In 1908 and 1912 the American scholar Heidel, a pupil of Diels, arguing that justice (δική) 'obtains between peers', for the first time emphasized that 'paying penalty and retribution *to each other* for the injustice' entails the idea of a *stable cosmic equilibrium*. He referred to day following night and conversely, to the cycle of spring summer autumn winter spring, etc.<sup>82</sup> Heidel pointed out that few scholars had bothered to acknowledge the better text of Usener and Diels.

That what happens obtains between *equals* is not found in the texts pertaining to Anaximander. Heidel's secular interpretation has been remarkably

81 Cf. Nestle (1922) 25 on the influence of Orphic mysticism on Anaximander: '... daß er unter dem Einfluß orphischer Mystik die Existenz der Einzelwesen als eine unrechtmäßige Emanzipation vom ewigen Sein auffaßte und damit die Notwendigkeit ihres Untergangs begründete (ähnlich wie Schopenhauer wenigstens über das menschliche Dasein dachte)'. In his translation of Anaximander A9/B1 DK, *ibid.* 109, he leaves out part of the central text. Nestle, one of the first classical philologists to admire Nietzsche openly, together with Otto Crusius edited a volume of the latter's unpublished philological writings, Nietzsche (1913).

82 Already Heidel (1908) esp. 218–219, then (1912) 233–234. This has been often repeated by later scholars.

successful nevertheless, presumably because it is not mystical, and because the succession of days and nights and the cycle of the seasons were believed to provide a satisfactory background to the word ἀλλήλοις.

Aristotle attests that ‘some people held that at first the whole region about the earth was wet, that this was dried up by the sun, that as it dried up the water that evaporated became the cause of winds and of the turnings of sun and moon, that what is left is the sea, that it is still drying up and becoming less, and that in the end it will be (completely) dry’. In his paraphrase Alexander adds the names of Anaximander and Diogenes from (as he says) Theophrastus. Though the ‘turnings of the sun’ presumably denote the summer and winter solstices, this account of the cosmos’ history does not present an equilibrium that is sufficiently stable in its final phase. The best one can do is to argue (like Schleiermacher a long time ago) in favour of the complementary natural catastrophes of flood and conflagration in a so-called great year.<sup>83</sup>

In 1892, the year that saw the publication of the fifth and revised edition of the first volume of Zeller’s great work, the Scotsman John Burnet, who had thoroughly studied Diels’ *Doxographi* and Simplicius edition, seems to have come to a conclusion that resembles that of Zeller (who as we noticed had already argued in this sense by 1883). In the fourth edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy* (1930), referring to the first edition (1892), Burnet points out that the omission of ἀλλήλοις ‘made the sentence appear to mean that the existence of individual things (ὄντα) was somehow a wrong for which they must be punished. With ἀλλήλοις restored, this fanciful interpretation disappears’.<sup>84</sup> I have not been able to find a copy of this first edition. But what is clear is that in 1930 Burnet is rather less ambiguous than in the corresponding passage in his second edition (1908), which I have seen: in the earlier passage he merely states that ‘the important word was omitted in the Aldine Simplicius, but it is in all the MSS. We shall see that in Herakleitos ‘justice’ means the observance of an equal balance between what were later called the elements’.<sup>85</sup> In the second edition, this

83 Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353b5–11 (Anaximander A27 DK, 2nd text; cf. Alexander *ad loc.*, in *Mete.* 67.3–12 ~ Theophrastus, fr. 221 FHS&G (~ *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels) ~ Anaximander A27 DK, 2nd text): the sea is ‘*dried up* (more) every day by the sun, *and in the end it will one day be* (completely) *dry*’ (trans. FHS&G; italics for words cited verbatim from Aristotle, cf. Diels *ad loc.*, *DG* 494). Alexander in *Mete.*, 66.8–67.22 paraphrases Arist., *Mete.* 2.1 353a32–b16, and preserves much of his wording; he adds names (also those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Metrodorus) from a similar account of Theophrastus. Also compare Olympiodorus in *Mete.* 130.3–131.4, a much freer account (and no names). For Schleiermacher cf. above, text to n. 26.

84 Burnet (1930) 54 in the long footnote 1 referring to his 1st ed. (1892) 60–62.

85 Burnet (1908) 56 n. 2, of which <sup>4</sup>1930, 54 n. 1, is a thoroughly revised version.

time just repeating his statement in the fourth, he adds that the ‘fundamental reality’ cannot be e.g. water (which is cold and moist), for then ‘injustice would have prevailed and the warm and dry would have been driven from the field long ago’.<sup>86</sup> This seems to imply that the balance is permanent and stable. Burnet immediately adds that we need something ‘more primitive, | out of which they [scil., the opposites] arise, and into which they once more pass away’. This turns the *Apeiron* into a material cause in the Aristotelian sense. On the other hand, he argues in both these editions that the ‘gradual drying up of the water by fire is a good example of what A. meant by ‘injustice’’.<sup>87</sup> This suggests that the equilibrium comes to an end ... One may conclude that in the course of time Burnet became gradually more convinced of the stability of Anaximander’s cosmos, although he failed to provide an interpretation which so to speak was able to neutralize the testimony about the gradual drying up of the sea.

In the edition of 1930 Burnet approvingly refers to Heidel’s paper of 1912, but there is of course no such reference in the second edition of 1908 (where, naturally, there is no reference to Heidel’s contribution of 1908 either).<sup>88</sup>

Heidel and Burnet could of course use the first edition of Diels’ *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* in one volume, published in 1903.

On the 13th of November 1924 Werner Jaeger lectured in the Prussian Academy at Berlin, of which he had become a fellow earlier in the same year. In the *Sitzungsberichte* we only find a brief abstract.<sup>89</sup> Jaeger emphasized the function of ἀλλήλοισι (entailing ‘*ewiger Ausgleich*’ according to the ‘*Rechtsnorm*’; emphasis added), and argued that the formula ‘according to the order of time’ should be read as ‘according to the jurisdiction of Time’ (I write a capital T to indicate the personification),<sup>90</sup> thus emphasizing the juridical and normative aspect of the process and brushing aside the possibility of a sequence of events

86 Burnet (1908) 56 = (1930) 54.

87 Burnet (1908) 71 = (1930) 65.

88 Burnet (1930) 54 n. 1 on Heidel (1912) 233–234.

89 Jaeger (1924) 227, cf. an oration pronounced in 1924: Jaeger (1934a) at 90 of the repr. (1960), where he posits that the Greek *polis* and Greek law stand for equilibrium, and says of Anaximander: ‘auch die Kräfte im Weltall, die sich titanisch zu vergewaltigen suchen, müssen am Ende sich beugen und einander Rechtsbuße zahlen und Schadenersatz für ihre Übergriffe nach dem Rechtspruch der Zeit’. See also Sassi (2009) 134–135, quoting and commenting on Jaeger (1947) 50. Jaeger was followed by many, e.g. by his student Pagel (1927) 29–30, who in his turn influenced the literature on Herodotus.

90 The Dutch philosopher and follower of Hegel Bolland (1920) 18 in his translation of the fragment already wrote ‘Tijd’ (Dutch unlike German does not use capitals with nouns). He knew the secondary literature, had, among others, studied Eduard Meyer and Karl Joël, and accepts their view, adding *ibid.* 57 that who looks for philosophy at its beginning only finds theosophy. In this sense he also wrote on the Mysteries, Bolland (1917).

that would allow for major disturbances, or for the disappearance of the cosmos. 'Time' is the judge before whom things contend with each other the way human opponents would. (Because of the term 'ewiger' this Time comes close to Eternity, or to the immortality of the *Apeiron*, but in view of the cosmogony this eternity, *more Platonico*, can only pertain to the future.)

For the false interpretation ('mystic concept of guilt') Jaeger listed the names of Nietzsche, Rohde, Zeller, and Diels. In the detailed accounts found in his later publications Jaeger, who said he found Burnet's view not entirely satisfactory, mentions only Nietzsche and Rohde for the idea that 'Individuation' is a 'Sündenfall', an 'Abtrünnigwerden vom ewigen Urgrund',<sup>91</sup> though he could have left in Diels' name. For Zeller (before 1883) see above; in 1924 Jaeger failed to take Zeller's change of mind from 1883 onwards into account.

An interesting variety of the equilibrium interpretation is that of the philosopher of law Hans Kelsen (1942), p. 241, who knew Jaeger's view. Kelsen argues: 'Der die Ungerechtigkeit erzeugende Widerstreit zwischen den Dingen führt zur Zerstörung van allem, mit Ausnahme der Ur|substanz, in der sich die Gegensätze aufheben, um freilich aus ihr wieder hervorzugehen'. The order of time is 'die Abfolge von Schuld und Strafe'. On the opposites: 'Deren [sc. the opposites'] Funktion ist: das Gleichgewicht im Sinne der vergeltenden Gerechtigkeit herzustellen.' But according to Kelsen this equilibrium does not seem to be permanent. 31

## 5 Nietzsche and Diels

### 5.1

As pointed out in Section 1 above the mystical interpretation of the Anaximander fragment is perhaps most familiar as that of Nietzsche (1872–1873) and Rohde (1894). I here concentrate on Nietzsche. Just as Diels (1897, 1923), Nietzsche (1872–1873) used the words pessimism and mysticism in relation to Anaximander in his study of the Presocratics, first published in 1896.<sup>92</sup> He was indebted to a broad tradition in classical studies, the same as Diels. He owned the more important recent scholarly literature: Prantl (1854), Teichmüller's edi-

91 Jaeger (1934b and <sup>4</sup>1959) 217–218 (engl. trans. 159–160); and (1947) 34–36 with n. (arguing against the 'hope of tracing this back to the Orphic religion', with critical reference to Rohde <sup>3</sup>*Psyche*, 2.119 n. 1).

92 Nietzsche (1872–1873) at (1988) 818.

tion of Ritter & Preller (<sup>4</sup>1869), and Zeller (<sup>3</sup>1869).<sup>93</sup> What is more, discussing ancient philosophy in his lecture series *Encyclopädie der klassischen Philologie* of 1870–1871 he points out:<sup>94</sup> ‘Die Fragmente muss man original studieren: bei Mullach fragm. Philos. [...] Werthvolles Compendium mit Quellenexcerpten Ritter u. Preller. Umfassende Darstellung von Zeller, jetzt 3. Auflage’. So it is as certain as can be that he depends on this secondary literature, though no references are given in the *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter*. These authorities quoted and/or based themselves on a text without *allélois*, as we have already seen *ad satietatem*. For all his qualities as an author Nietzsche as to his interpretation of Anaximander simply belongs with an *opinio communis*. He is original only in his appeal to a deeply pessimistic passage in Schopenhauer’s *Parerga und Paralipomena*<sup>95</sup> concerned with the *principium individuationis* with which he begins his account: man is a ‘Wesen [...] welches gar nicht existieren sollte’. Nietzsche tellingly cheats a little by omitting the final words of this paragraph, viz. ‘Dies allegorisiert auch die Erbsünde’<sup>96</sup> He adds that Schopenhauer has heard the holy word about the moral value of human existence on the ‘Höhen der indischen Lüfte’.<sup>97</sup> The quotation marks are Nietzsche’s; he refrains from telling us exactly what is Indic about this point of view, and in any case does not say explicitly that Anaximander’s thought is Indic. But when it is argued

32 Anaximander can be interpreted through Schopenhauer | and that Schopenhauer in the respect at issue has been influenced by Indic thought, we have the premises of a syllogism.

93 See the list at von Reibnitz (1992) 354–355, and Campioni & alii (2003).

94 At Müller-Lauter and Pestalozzi (1993) 407.

95 Nietzsche’s reference is to p. 327 of the second ed. of the *Parerga* (<sup>2</sup>1862), where we find ‘passages bearing on’ ch. 12, ‘Nachträge zur Lehre vom Leiden der Welt’. In this chapter Schopenhauer, 324, says we should see the world as an ‘Ort der Busse’, as a ‘Strafanstalt’, and quotes Clement of Alexandria, Origen *ap.* Augustine, and Cicero in support, adding that he is not exceptional in sharing this view, since it is also typical of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras, and true Christianity.

96 We may note that Nietzsche in *Geburt der Tragödie* § 9 (Colli and Montanari <sup>2</sup>1988, 69) compares the ‘Aryan’ myth of Prometheus with the ‘Semitic’ myth of the Fall (‘Sündenfallmythos’). In the former case, mankind acquires its best and highest possession through a crime (‘Frevel’), and it has to accept the ‘Glut von Leiden und Bekümmernissen’ the gods must punish it with. This ‘aktive Sünde’ is then opposed to the feminine i.e. passive causes of original sin in the Semitic myth. On Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the Prometheus myth see the excellent commentary of von Reibnitz (1992) 244–253. Von Reibnitz discusses sources, and points out where Nietzsche differs from Schopenhauer, who *Parerga* (<sup>2</sup>1862) 447 and 449 approves of the idea of the Fall. See further the scathing but justified comments of Lincoln (1999) 64–66.

97 Perhaps echoing *Parerga* (<sup>2</sup>1862) 427, ‘alles athmet hier indische Luft’.

I cite in passing the words of an eminent Indologist, writing about the *Upanishads* in 1969: ‘... le démiurge commence à créer en proférant *aham* [I am]. L’individualité qui se pose elle-même est mythiquement le premier moment du cosmos différencié, comme elle est le dernier lien à rompre pour se perdre dans l’Absolu. Elle est l’équivalent hindou du péché originel de la *Bible*, ou du *non serviam* luciférien.’<sup>98</sup> Mme Biardeau is not thinking of Anaximander.

Nietzsche claims that we have to *share* Anaximander’s view that ‘alles *Werden wie eine strafwürdige Emanzipation vom ewigen Sein* anzusehen [ist], also als ein Unrecht, das mit dem Untergange zu büßen ist.’ This identification with his subject is typical: to my knowledge no other classicist, or philosopher, used such sentimental language. Anaximander takes refuge in ‘mystische Möglichkeiten’: ‘[D]as ewige Werden kann seinen Ursprung nur im ewigen Sein haben, die Bedingungen zu dem *Abfall* von jenem Sein zu einem Werden in Ungerechtigkeit sind immer die gleichen [...]’.<sup>99</sup> Emphasis added by me.<sup>100</sup>

Wilson (1996) in his study of Schelling and Nietzsche discusses the Basel lectures on pre-Platonic and Platonic philosophy that cover part of the same ground as the unfinished *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter*.<sup>101</sup> He is entirely unaware of the background to Nietzsche’s view of Anaximander’s thought: no mention of Brandis, Ritter, and alii. What is more, he quotes the Anaximander fragment in the translation of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, that is to say inclusive of ‘einander’ (‘Nietzsche zitiert [...] einen griechischen Satz, den wir (nach Diels) in deutscher Übersetzung wiedergeben’), although the text quoted by Nietzsche is Simplicius *In Physica*, p. 6a, i.e., without ἀλλήλοις. An embarrassing mistake.<sup>102</sup> But he correctly points out that the interpretation added by Nietzsche ‘lässt an den Fall des Menschen und die Verfallenheit der Welt bei Schelling denken.’<sup>103</sup>

98 Biardeau (1969) 99, italics in the original.

99 Nietzsche (1872–1873) at Colli and Montanari (21988) 818–822. For the ‘Abfall’ cf. above, text to n. 29, n. 36, below, text to n. 136, text to n. 155, text to n. 156, n. 163 and text thereto, text to n. 171, text to n. 177.

100 Ramnoux finds Nietzsche’s ‘intuitive’ interpretation the best available and rejects those of e.g. Burnet and Jaeger, but appears to be unaware that Nietzsche, unlike Burnet and Jaeger, had a text that lacked ἀλλήλοις.

101 Nietzsche (1872a) at Bornmann and Carpitella (1995), where Anaximander is treated 239–246, and the Greek text of the fragment (the same as in Mullach and 4Ritter & Preller) quoted p. 241.

102 Kohlenbach and Haase (1997) 1483 are also satisfied with a bare reference to Anaximander B1 DK. The editors of Schleiermacher make the same mistake, see above, text to n. 24.

103 Wilson (1996) 45–46. For Nietzsche on the Fall of Man see however above, n. 96; he may depend on an anti-Christian (or at least antisemitic) line of interpretation in one case, and on one that is not antichristian in another. For Schelling see below, Section 6.7.

For his part, Rohde still refers to fr. 2 Mullach, where ἀλλήλοις is lacking in the text, but he had of course been working on *Psyche* for years.<sup>104</sup> Things have come to their ‘Sonderdasein durch ein Frevel’, ‘eine ἀδικία, für die sie “Busse und Strafe” zahlen müssen’.

## 5.2

Hermann Diels, as already noted, also failed to provide a better interpretation of his own better text. In his posthumously published lecture on Anaximander (1923) he at some length discusses the fragment, which according to him describes the generation of the universe and its parts from the One and its  
 33 return to this source, so that all things | that are born are destroyed again.<sup>105</sup> For Anaximander it is an injustice, an ἀδικία, when an individual separates itself off from the Infinite Whole, and this morally wrong courage is paid for with death, ‘eine Strafe für das Unrecht der Absonderung aus dem göttlichen Apeiron’. One being’s generation depends on another being’s demise. He points out that for us it is strange to find physical events expressed and understood in moral terms.

So Diels to the end of his life stuck to the mystical interpretation. For comparison he adduced Orphism and Pythagoreanism, mysticizing currents that prized the divine and immortal soul away from the mortal and sinful body. Similarly, Anaximander summarizes the whole world in the opposition of unlimited to limited. Just as according to the secret doctrines of these sects the human soul, after endless sufferings, may in the end be united with divine Nature, so according to Anaximander one creature after another and one cosmos after another falls back into the divine, eternal, infinite Alone. Cosmological speculation blends with moral and religious thinking. In this way Greek idealism is born, Diels says, which contrasts the lowly and fleeting world and the body with eternity, and sees life down here as merely a transition towards this other life, and as a punishment for the injustice consisting in separating off from the divine *Apeiron*, ‘eine Strafe für das Unrecht der Absonderung aus dem göttlichen Apeiron’.

As a matter of fact, as to the interpretation of Anaximander’s thought there is virtually no difference between this lecture and an *Archiv* paper of twenty-six years before.<sup>106</sup> Nietzsche’s *Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter* had been published for the first time one year earlier, so Diels in 1897 could have seen it (as he had certainly seen Rohde’s *Psyche*), but it should by now be clear that the interpretative tradition Diels depends on is much older. In a review published

104 Rohde (1894) 412 with n. 3 ~ <sup>3</sup>*Psyche*, 2.119 n. 1; (1894) 436 ~ <sup>3</sup>*Psyche* 2.144 with n. 4 and n. 5.

105 Diels (1923).

106 Diels (1897).



four years before Rohde published the first volume of *Psyche*, for instance, he already insists on the importance of studying the influence of the mysticism of the seventh and sixth centuries on the philosophers of the sixth to fourth centuries.<sup>107</sup>

Following the lead of Zeller<sup>108</sup> Diels at any rate takes some care to be dissociated from those scholars who argue an important Oriental influence. An offprint of his 1897 paper must have been sent to Gomperz. The letter of thanks is lost, but Diels' reply is exant.<sup>109</sup> The paper, he writes, was written merely to give Stein, its editor, something for the *Archiv*. He has attempted to understand Anaximander without appealing to Oriental influences, though he is not against such an approach on principle. His argument is not really involved with the interpretations of Gomperz and others. He says he has been thinking more of issues in the history of religion, a field in which he has been doing some work of late.<sup>110</sup>

## 6 Mysticism and Orientalism

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In the previous Sections we have looked at the mystical and Neoplatonizing reading of Anaximander, and on our way have also encountered several examples of a subsidiary elucidation by the help of parallels derived from what, for want of a better phrase, we may call Oriental ways of thought.<sup>111</sup> In the present Section I shall try to convey an impression of the complicated traditions on

107 Diels (1888) 108–109, reviewing Pfeleiderer (1886).

108 Zeller (<sup>5</sup>1892) 20–41, as in earlier editions; supported by Lortzing *ap.* Zeller (<sup>6</sup>1920) 44–52. Note that Zeller (<sup>5</sup>1892) 55 refuses to accept the influence upon philosophy of Orphic notions such as those expressed in the famous and as we now know early line (*Derveni Papyrus*, col. xvii.12), 'Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, from Zeus all things are brought to completion', though he believes, *ibid.* 56, that the idea that the soul is immortal is originally religious. For Zeller's stance cf. below, n. 149. Lortzing *ap.* Zeller (<sup>6</sup>1920) 80–88, following Rohde, disagrees with Zeller's rejection of Orphic influence.

109 At Braun, Calder III and Ehlers (1995) 135–137, dated 4.2.1897.

110 *ibid.* 136, 'ich dachte vielmehr meinen jetzigen Studien entsprechend mehr an religionsgeschichtliche Problem'.

111 Orientomania of course has its roots in Classical Antiquity. For the purported influence of Indic thought (as available and interpreted at the time) on German Romanticism and philosophy see e.g. von Glasenapp (1960) 25–67, Halbfass (1981) 91–92, Schwab (1984) *passim*; on Romanticism and Classics e.g. Bernal (1987) 224–280, Marelli (2000) *passim*. See further Braun (1973) 261–283 on the 'vision romantique de l'histoire de la philosophie', and 264 on the appreciation of mystics, theosophers, and alchemists, and of the Orient: 'La sagesse asiatique était ardemment étudiée'; also Schneider (1998) 227, 238–239, Clarke (1997) 54–67.

which these interrelated approaches in the historiography of ancient philosophy depend. German Romantic philosophers and writers are a major influence, but these, in their turn, are dependent on a variety of earlier traditions, that is to say on their reception of these traditions. Varieties of Christianized Neoplatonism and various forms of Platonizing interpretations of the Mysteries are among the main ingredients. Mystics such as Jacob Boehme play a part, with regard to whom the historian of philosophy Johann Gottlieb Buhle pointed out that 'seine Mystik im wesentlichen, sofern irgend logisch verständliche Begriffe ihr zum Grunde liegen, auf Alexandrinische [i.e., Neoplatonist] Philosopheme beruht'.<sup>112</sup>

### 6.1

In the course of an inquiry into the reception of Anaximander one cannot, or should not, pretend to purvey more than a superficial and lacunose overview. So let us begin from somewhere, and mention some names of German Romantics: Joseph von Görres,<sup>113</sup> Friedrich von Schelling,<sup>114</sup> and Friedrich von Schlegel, who according to Raymond Schwab's formula welcomed Indic philosophy (or rather what he believed Indic philosophy to be) as an equal.<sup>115</sup> The classicist Friedrich Creuzer, too, may be included in this group.

<sup>112</sup> Buhle (1800) 438. *Ibid.* 172 he characterizes the philosophy of Ficino as an aggregate of ideas derived from the Neoplatonists, the Gnostics, the Cabbala, and the Platonizing Church Fathers; its main doctrine pertains to the origin from the divinity of the human soul and its returning to this origin. Also cf. Heeren (1797) 269 on Ficino's promotion of 'mystische Philosophie'. On the 'conglomerate' in the 17th–18th cent. see Zimmermann (1969) 19–43. Also cf. above, n. 5.

<sup>113</sup> The representative *Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt*, Görres (1810), cited here from the repr. (1935), is dedicated to Creuzer and a Heidelberg audience. One encounters quite a few trite notions. In the introduction, 8, he appeals to Hermes Trismegistus for Egyptian mysticism (11, the *Corpus* is said to be a free translation of an 'Egyptian' (!) *Upnekatha* [i.e. *Upanishads*]); 10, 'so ruht Pythagoras ganz auf orientalischer, chaldäischer, sabäischer, ägyptischer, phönizischer, orphischer Weisheit', while Plato depends on Pythagoras on the one hand and on the Ionians, Parmenides, Socrates on the other; 11, 'Identität ägyptischer und indischer Lehre' plus a reconstruction of purported Egyptian doctrine. Scornfully rejecting the arguments of those who argue a late date for the *Corpus Hermeticum* (the first to do this being Casaubon in 1614), he quotes p. 10 a passage from Lydus referring to Epimenides as a parallel in support of its great antiquity from his friend Creuzer's *Dionysus* (1809) 171 (see fr. Epimenides fr. B26 DK, of course 'Spätgefälschtes'). He later published a labyrinthine *Christliche Mystik*. On Görres see e.g. von Glasenapp (1960) 29–30, Gérard (1963) 181–187, Halbfass (1981) 91–92.

<sup>114</sup> E.g. *Die Gottheiten von Samothrake* (1815) much influenced by Creuzer; see e.g. the comments of Brown (1976).

<sup>115</sup> Schlegel (1808) at (1975), e.g. the 'Zweites Buch: Von der Philosophie'; cf. below, n. 126, and

As is well known the difficult translation into Latin from the Persian (translation of the Sanskrit original) of the *Upanishads* by Anquetil Duperron (published 1801–1802)<sup>116</sup> became a major influence on Schopenhauer, who enjoyed reading and citing the work, and via Schopenhauer on Nietzsche. The fact that the *Vedas* were the secret preserve of the Brahmins made it attractive to associate them with the Greek Mysteries.

Anquetil Duperron in his annotation had already compared (Christianized) Neoplatonism (esp. the *Hymns* of Synesius) and recent German philosophy, and invited a whole phalanx of contemporary German thinkers to study a text that in his view so strikingly resembled their thought. This suggestion was taken up by an admirer of Schelling, Thaddä Rixner, in his annotated German translation (1804) of parts of Anquetil Duperron's Latin text. Rixner brought the 'ancient Indian doctrine of the All-One' as close as he possibly could to contemporary German *Identitätsphilosophie*, especially Fichte and Schelling. This presentation influenced, among others, Görres, Krause,<sup>117</sup> Hegel, and Schopenhauer. In the collection of texts printed as an appendix to the first volume of his handbook (1829), he prints a 'collection of abstracts from the *Oupnekhat's*' mostly deriving from the earlier publication, illustrating (I select) 'the essential identity of God and the All', the trinitarian notion of God, the creation of the cosmos, and the 'Verhältnis der Seele zu Gott, und Mittel ihrer endlichen Wiedervereinigung mit ihm'.<sup>118</sup> In a similar way Friedrich Ast, still familiar as

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text thereto. In general see e.g. Schwab (1984) 164–167, 215–221, and *passim*, who however fails to emphasize that in this work Schlegel is already turning away from Indic thought. In his lecture series of 1829 Schlegel again discussed Indic religion and philosophy, formulating a comparison with European mysticism (1829) at (1971) 127, 130, and citing Colebrooke, 137–139. For Schlegel's preparatory studies, his main themes, and the early reception of the book see U. Struck-Oppenberg at Schlegel (1975) clxxxvii–ccxxviii, and especially her subsequent paper, Struck-Oppenberg (1980). Good brief critical accounts of Schlegel (1808) at Aarsleff (1967) 156–159 and Halbfass (1981) 94–97.

116 Anquetil Duperron (1801–1802), *Oupnek'hat* (*id est, Secretum tegendum*); on this work and its influence see von Glasenapp (1960) 25–26, Halbfass (1981) 80–85; von Glasenapp (1960) 26–27 on Rixner's translation, which was criticized by Görres (1809b). Note that Anquetil Duperron announces his translation at (1778) 21 briefly describing the work and its contents: 'L'Oupnekhat, ouvrage Samskretam, dont le nom signifie, *parole qu'il ne faut pas dire* (secret qu'il ne faut pas reveler). Cet ouvrage est l'extrait des quatre Vêdes. Il présente en 51 sections le système complet de la Théologie Indienne, dont le résultat est l'unité du premier Être, ses perfections et ses opérations sont le nom des principales Divinités Indiennes; & la reunion de la nature entière à ce premier Agent'.

117 See Krause (1823) at (1911) 278–284 India (229, *Oupnek'hat*), 284–286 China, 287–289 *Zend-Avesta*.

118 Rixner (1829) 'Anhang' 3–14; this appendix, concluding with several *Hymns* of Synesius (already favoured by Anquetil Duperron 1801–1802), further contains the Orphic *Hymn*

the author of the not yet replaced *Lexicon Platonicum* (1835–1838), argued that everything began in the Orient in the introductory pages of a much more modest handbook published in the same year as that of Rixner. According to Indic thought Brahma generates, Siva destroys, and Vishnu regenerates, God is eternal and the same as All, and all things in the end revert to God.<sup>119</sup>

## 6.2

The syncretistic efforts of Creuzer, Görres, Schelling, and Schlegel were encouraged by the limitations and inaccuracies of the evidence at their disposal, and the absence of a reliable chronological framework (though Schlegel refused to date his ‘Orphische Vorzeit’ to before the Homeric poems).<sup>120</sup> The much older idea of a common *urlan|guage*, which received spectacular support from the discovery by pioneering English Sanskritists (Halhed, Jones)<sup>121</sup> in the last quarter of the eighteenth century that Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, German, and other (Indo-European) languages belong to *one* family, was also helpful. The *haute vulgarisation* of this understanding of Sanskrit by Schlegel (1808) and the spectacular scientific contributions of Franz Bopp were a further stimulus.<sup>122</sup> Other conceptions are similar, e.g. Goethe’s overarching *Urpflanze*, in philology the stemmatology (cladograms) traditionally linked with name of Lachmann, and of course theories of evolution.<sup>123</sup>

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(Porphyry at Euseb. *PE* 3.9 ~ *Orphica*, fr. 168 Kern ~ 243 F Barnabé ~ Porphyry, fr. 354F Smith) which played an important role in Platonizing philosophy from the Renaissance (Parker 1972, 36), fragments of Heraclitus (after Schleiermacher), Xenophanes, and Empedocles, and poetical compositions by Crates and Cleanthes.

119 Ast (1829) 4–5.

120 Schlegel (1798) at (1978) 399–428. Close reading required; at a first glance the formula ‘Orphische Vorzeit’ is not clear. K.O. Müller rejected Creuzer’s claim that Homer had declined to mention older forms of religion.

121 On Halhed’s *Grammar of the Bengal Language* (Hoogly, Bengal 1778, repr. Menston, England 1969) see Law (1993); on Jones (1786) see e.g. Aarsleff (1967) 132–134, Halbfass (1983) 77–80. The famous passage on the affinity of Sanskrit with Latin, Greek, and other languages which came to be called Indo-European (or Indo-German) is at *Asiatick Researches*, 1, 422–423 ~ *Works*, Vol. 1, 26 = Marshall (1970) 15.

122 Bopp (1816), etc.

123 See Mansfeld (1998); I failed to include mythological studies. Goethe in Book VI of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* describes his youthful infatuation with, *inter alia*, the Neoplatonically influenced alchemist treatise *Aurea Catena Homeri*, see Gray (1952) 8–15, and the rich documentation of Zimmermann (1969–1979). Inspired by Brucker (1756) he also read Plotinus in Ficino’s translation and even in the Greek original, as he tells us on a page that was not included in Book VI of the autobiography; see Weimarer Ausg. Bd. 27, ‘Lesarten’, 382, ‘wie durch eine Inspiration Plotin ganz ausserordentlich gefiel’, etc. In 1805 Creuzer sent him *Studien* Bd. 1, with his translation of a Plotinian treatise (see below, text to n. 136).

Schlegel's summary of the thought of Manu in the seminal book of 1808, which combines an introduction to novel information with a critique of pantheism, is quite interesting in view of our Anaximandrian theme, see, in the chapter 'Seelenwanderung und Emanation': 'Am vorteilhaftesten und schönsten stellt sich das System der Emanation dar, wenn wir es als *Lehre der Rückkehr* betrachten. Von dem göttlichen Ursprung des Menschen nimmt es überall Anlass ihn an die Rückkehr zu erinnern, und sich die Wiedervereinigung mit der Gottheit als einzigen Zweck aller seiner Handlungen und Bestrebungen zu setzen' (italics in the original).<sup>124</sup> In the earlier notes posthumously published with the title *Philosophische Lehrjahre* we find various items pertaining to the 'Kette' linking Ficino and others to Boehme, who is the most complete of all mystics, and the dependence of Alexandrian, i.e., Neoplatonic philosophy on Indic thought.<sup>125</sup>

The so-called *Laws of Manu* had recently become known in the West through Sir William Jones' translation of 1794: *Institutes of Hindu Law*, a German translation of which was published in 1797. Its first chapter was translated into German for the second time as the third of his four selected pieces of Sanskrit literature and philosophy by | Schlegel (1808), now directly from the Sanskrit.<sup>126</sup>

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This stimulated Goethe to read Plotinus again. He added a fragment (*viz. Enn.* 5.8.1) in German translation to a letter dated 1.9.1805 to his friend Zelter, not mentioning Plotinus' name but referring to him as an 'ancient mystic'; this was followed by an exposition of Goethe's own view, beginning 'Man kann den Idealisten alter und neuer Zeit nicht verargen, wenn sie so lebhaft auf Beherzigung des Einen dringen, woher alles entspringt, und worauf alles wieder zurückzuführen wäre' (cf. Buhle, above n. 112, and text thereto). Reprinted *Maximen und Reflexionen*, nos. 1183–1193, without reference to its source, and *ibid.* nos. 1192–1194. See Koch (1925) 28, and the impressive pages of Schmitz (1959) 54–69, 527–531; also *ibid.* 59–63, on the 'Neuplatonismus im Zeitalter Goethes' (see also Nisbet 1972, 6–22). We may note that Schmitz cites Anaximander as a herald of this tradition, which implies that he endorses a variety of the mystical interpretation of the fragment.

124 Schlegel (1808) at (1975) 213. Cf. e.g. Gérard (1963) 102, 112, Hulin (1979) 52–53. For emanation cf. above, text to n. 5, n. 21, n. 33, below, n. 125, n. 136 *ad fin.*, n. 162, text to n. 165.

125 Schlegel (1796–1806) nos. viii 177, xii 104, xii 104, from the years 1804–1805. Cf. Schlegel (1805–1806a) at (1964) 360, 368 on emanation, and the critical remark anticipating Tennemann (below, text to n. 152) 335, on 'die neuen Platoniker oder Synkretisten', especially Plotinus: 'diese Philosophie war sehr zur Schwärmerei geneigt' (also anticipating the title of Tennemann (1807)). I find it impossible to translate 'Schwärmerei'; it denotes an exaggerated prejudice or parti pris or fulsome (religious) feeling coming close to delusion. For other instances see below, text to n. 152, and n. 171.

126 Schlegel (1808) at (1975) 382–391. The first chapter, Jones (1794) 65–81 'On the Creation', describes a cosmogony, of which Jones' translator Hüttner (1797) vi remarks: 'Es enthält eine Schöpfungsgeschichte, die zu fruchtbaren Ideen und Vergleichen Anlass geben kann' (for a perhaps less useful comparison see below, n. 131). Cited by Hegel (1827b) 485

Schlegel also included a freshly translated *Bhagavad-Gita*.<sup>127</sup> The idea of a common human *urmythology* or even *urmonotheism* to be reconstructed plays an important part.<sup>128</sup> We should here recall the accomodationist *interpretatio Christiana* in a monotheistic and trinitarian sense of Asian and other religions by European missionaries in China (e.g. Matteo Ricci) and India (Roberto de Nobili) in especially the seventeenth century,<sup>129</sup> which for instance influenced English deists like Cudworth,<sup>130</sup> and was also believed by the influential Jones<sup>131</sup> and by Creuzer, who explained polytheistic Homeric religion away as a second stage of Greek religion.

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n., cf. Jaeschke *ad loc.*, Bd. 4b 768–769. The final chapter, Jones (1794) 443–462, is ‘On transmigration and final beatitude’.

- 127 First published in a European language by Charles Wilkins in 1785; soon translated into German from the English and so known to Herder and others; see further Herling (2006). On Herder as harbinger of Romanticism also where Indic thought and literature are concerned see e.g. Gérard (1963) 47–55, Willson (1964) 49–71, Halbfass (1981) 86–90. Meiners (1776) 216–217, just as Herder in the beginning, had to rely on the writings of Dow and Holwell, who taught him about a secret Indic ‘Lehre vom höchsten Gott, von der Schaffung der Welt, und ihrer periodischen Erneuerung’.
- 128 Schlegel (1808/1975) e.g. 193: ‘Grundgesetz der Mythologie: gemeinsamer Ursprung’. For Schlegel and *urmythology* plus *urmonotheism* see Hulin (1979) 50–53, Halbfass (1981) 92–97, Park (2004) 91–98.
- 129 Some examples at Windisch (1917) 1–22; good account at Marshall (1970) 20–43, see also Willson (1964) 8–43, Halbfass (1981) 52–69, Murr (1987). On accommodation see further Dahmen (1924), Thaurén (1927) 130–145, Mungello (1985) 72–74, Clarke (1997) 41, Zupanov (1999), Mungello (1999) 12–18, 20–22, 59–61, 72–73, 83–84, Zürcher (2007) 1.113–118.
- 130 See Manuel (1959) 57–62, who 59–60 quotes Cudworth (1678) 308—I have checked the original—, where ‘Zoroaster and Orpheus’ are put on a par as the two most prominent polytheists who in fact recognized ‘one Supreme Deity’; and so did the Egyptians, who acknowledged ‘one Supreme, and Universal Numen’. *Ibid.* 305–307 Cudworth quotes pan(en)theist Orphic lines from Procl. in *Tim.* 1.307.31 (fr. 168.10 Kern) 1.313.21 (fr. 21a2–168.2 Kern ~ *Pap.Derv.* col. xvii.12), 2.256.21–22 (fr. 165.1 Kern) and 1.325.9–10 (fr. 21a.8–9 Kern). On others writing from a Deistic point of view see Marshall (1970) 25, 27, Halbfass (1981) 70–72. On Cudworth and his rejection of Casaubon’s dating of the *Corpus Hermeticum* see also Assmann (1997) 80–90; Cudworth is followed by Creuzer (1837–1843) 2.117, who argues that though the words may be Christian the thoughts must be very old, and who in his *History of Classical Philology* (1854) 57–65 manages to discuss Casaubon without mentioning the *Hermetica*. For Cudworth on Greek philosophy see Aspelin (1943), and Osborne (2011).
- 131 The idea of an original monotheism degenerating into mutually resembling polytheisms is accepted by Jones (1784/1789) 221 = Marshall (1970) 196, who speaks of ‘a general union or affinity between the most distinguished inhabitants of the primitive world, at the time when they deviated, as they did too early deviate, from the rational adoration of the only true GOD’. He declares 244 = Marshall (1970) 216 that the first chapter of ‘Menu’ (above, n. 126) is a bad paraphrase of the first chapter of *Genesis*. For interpretative syncretism

## 6.3

Georg Friedrich Creuzer, a friend and admirer of Görres, Schelling, and Hegel, is well known as the author of the immensely learned *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* in four volumes, reprinted several times in a thoroughly revised and amplified form (1810–1802, <sup>2</sup>1818–1822, <sup>3</sup>1837–1843). Creuzer explains Greek religion, Olympic as well as Orphic and Bacchic, by help of parallels from the Orient.<sup>132</sup> In his autobiography he tells | us that his interest in the Orient was originally awakened by Herodotus and the *Zend-Avesta*.<sup>133</sup>

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Already in his preliminary paper *Idee und Probe alter Symbolik* Creuzer briefly cites the *Ezour-Vedam* (an 18th cent. Jesuit forgery!),<sup>134</sup> follows Plotinus' mystical interpretation of the Egyptian hieroglyphs (*Enn.* 5.8.6), *ibid.* calls Orphism and Pythagoreanism Egyptian (as Herodotus had already done), adds a mystical Heraclitus, and argues that the Bacchic mysteries derive from Thrace and India.<sup>135</sup> He is also much indebted to the Neoplatonists. He had translated choice Plotinian passages for his beloved Karoline von Günderrode in the letters he wrote to her in the years 1805–1806, and published a German translation with comments of *Enn.* 3.8.<sup>136</sup> In 1808–1809 he published a study of Dionysus,

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see e.g. Droit (1997) 47–53, for Jones e.g. Windisch (1917) 25, Marshall (1970) 15–16, 35–37, Halbfass (1981) 77–80.

132 See e.g. Creuzer's autobiography (1822) at Howald (1926): 33 on the *Asiatick Researches*, on Anquetil Duperron's discoveries, etc.; *ibid.*, 31, on his contact with the brothers Schlegel, Görres, Tieck, and 36 on Schelling. For his admiration for Schelling and love of Plotinus see his letters from 1805 and 1806 in Preisendanz (1912) esp. 35–36, and *ibid.* 'Register' s. vv. Wind (<sup>2</sup>1967) 192–194 cites evidence for his contacts in the early 1820s with Hegel when editing Proclus, and with Schelling when editing Plotinus. On Hegel and Creuzer see Hulin (1979) 35–36, 51, and Halfwassen (1999) 94–96, 398–399. See further the studies of Gérard (1963) and Sedlar (1982). The brief monograph of Münch (1976) is a good introduction to the *Symbolik*, placing the work in its systematic and historical context, and discussing its reception on which see also Howald (1926).

133 Creuzer (1848) 65.

134 First published (anonymously) by de Sainte-Croix (1784). See Rocher (1984), who edits the text with a substantial introduction.

135 Creuzer (1806b) 226, 228, 265–269, 230.

136 Creuzer (1805b). In the introduction to Vol. 1 of the *Symbolik* of 1810, p. xi (~ Howald (1926) 44) he tells us that the ancient authors, esp. the Neoplatonists 'durch die reicheren Hilfsquellen in den Stand gesetzt waren, manches merkwürdige und vergessene Datum früherer Religion ans Licht zu ziehen'. *Ibid.* 23–29 passages from Neoplatonist authors are quoted and followed: e.g. Procl. *Theol. Platon.* 1.20.1–10 on Orphic and Pythagorean symbolism, and Plot. *Enn.* 5.8[31].6 on hieroglyphs. In 1814 he edited the treatise *Peri tou kalou* of Plotinus together with *inter alia* a work of Proclus, in 1820–1822 works by Proclus and Olympiodorus, and finally the complete *Enneads* accompanied by Ficino's translation in 3 Vols. in 1835. For a brief account of Schelling and Creuzer and 'die orphisch-pythagoreische Überlieferung antiker Mythologie und die Ideenlehre des Spätantiken Platonismus' see

Bacchism, and Orphism, thus stimulating a trend in German classical studies. In his *Symbolik* Orphism and the Mysteries play a crucial role, and that of Indic thought increases with each subsequent edition (in the first edition the emphasis is on Egypt and then Zoroaster, and Oriental influences in Greece are further developed by the Ionians and Pythagoras).<sup>137</sup> The oldest tracts of the *Corpus Hermeticum* are four in number: 'dies sind die vier Vedas der Indier, sie enthalten hermetische Weisheit'.<sup>138</sup> Mysteries and so-called Indic notions were amalgamated (Nietzsche and Schopenhauer were not the first to do so) and turned  
 39 into Mysticism with a capital M.<sup>139</sup> And Creuzer | tells us that 'Ficinus trägt viel bei zur besseren Einsicht in die alten Mythen'.<sup>140</sup> Looking back late in his life he states, on the concluding page of his *History of Classical Philology*, that the new evidence provided by the Persian and Sanskrit literature had had an enormous impact on philology, particularly on the part which studies faiths, cults, symbols, and myths (a nice self-reference to the *Symbolik*). Renewed attention for long neglected philosophers, who have preserved prehistoric religious doc-

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Anton (21970) 301–337. On Creuzer see also Strich (1910) 333: 'Creuzer wandte sich [...] besonders dem dionysisch-bachischen Mythenkreis zu, der für mystische Deutungen den weitesten Spielraum gewährte'; 'Die orphischen Hymnen sind mystische Andeutungen des Unendlichen'; *ibid.* 334 'Neuplatonismus als die wahre Wiederherstellung der morgenländischen Religion' (emphasis added). Informative critical account of Creuzer in Gruppe (1887) 34–43, esp. about the fact that good sources were unavailable at the time (thus 39, 'seine besten Quellen waren noch die Nachrichten der spätesten griechischen Mystiker'). See further e.g. Korff (21953) 522–528, on his pessimism, the influence of Plato's Theory of Forms and the doctrine of emanation of Neoplatonism, and what Korff calls the 'uralte orientalische Vorstellung von dem Abfall der Welt von Gott' (524). For emanation cf. above, text to n. 5, n. 21, n. 33, n. 124 and text thereto, n. 125, below, n. 162, text to n. 165. For the 'Abfall' cf. above, text to n. 29, n. 36, below, text to n. 155, text to n. 156, n. 163 and text thereto, text to n. 171, text to n. 177.

137 Champollion's decipherment of hieroglyphics in the 1820s in the end was fatal to the Egyptian hypothesis, so India became more prominent. For the modest but significant presence of India in the 1st ed. of the *Symbolik* see 1. 120–121, Indic myths; *ibid.* 1.267, India sends 'Religionscolonien' to Egypt; 3.130–138, it is the 'Vaterland der Bakchischen Mythen', and 4.255, that of the 'Eleusinischen Religion'; 4.573, its language is 'in Eleusinischen Formeln erkennbar'. Bd. 3.133 refers to 'indische Urkunden' published by the 'Akademie von Calcutta', i.e. to the *Asiatick Researches*, but in these general terms only.

138 Creuzer (21837–1843) 2.111.

139 Creuzer (1810) at Howald (1926) 45.

140 Creuzer (1812) Bd. 1, index s.v., repeated (21819). On Ficino cf. his *History of Classical Scholarship* (1854) 10–21; on Cudworth see his melancholy backward glance (1847) 330: 'Von der grossartigen Weise, wie ehemals Cudworth alle Systeme der alten Philosophie und Theologie aufgefasst hatte, kann jetzt gar nicht mehr die Rede sein; scheint doch selbst die weite freie Blick eines Will. Jones nicht mehr so recht anerkannt, der über alle Religionen der Welt bis ins ferne Indien getragen hatte [...]'].



trines albeit in Alexandrian [i.e., Neoplatonic] dress, led to a drastic change of perspective. This philological current could be called religious, he says, and would therefore come a bit closer to the first philology, that of the Mediceans (i.e., Ficino *cum suis*). Creuzer makes it entirely clear where, in retrospect, he wants to put his roots.<sup>141</sup>

In the eighteenth century too the Mysteries were a matter of particular interest; we may mention the names of Warburton, de Sainte-Croix, and the more sober Meiners (who is one of Creuzer's *bêtes noires*), and refer to the publications by prominent freemasons in the later quarter of the century popularized by Schiller.<sup>142</sup> Creuzer was not so much influenced by the treatise *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la religion secrète des anciens peuples, ou recherches historiques et antiques sur les mystères du paganisme* of the antiquarian de Sainte-Croix as by people like William Warburton, who tried to solve the mystery of the Mysteries by means of an allegorical explanation of their myths. Christian August Lobeck's affirmation that Creuzer 'in omnibus Sancrucium [i.e. de Sainte-Croix] pedetemptim sequitur' is a polemical ploy.<sup>143</sup> Wilamowitz in his famous polemics against Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* among other things employed the strategy of identifying Nietzsche's view with that of Creuzer and de Sainte-Croix—clearly imitating Lobeck's tactics.<sup>144</sup> And in his later essay 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion' he imperturbably argues that Ionia is different from the rest of Greece: no mysticism, because 'die Religion [*sic*] der Wissenschaft sich ganz loslöst von allen überlieferten Formen'.<sup>145</sup>

#### 6.4

The idea of an Egyptian, Phoenician, and/or Indic origin of philosophy had been rejected in favour of its independent rise in Greece by Christoph Mein-

141 Creuzer (1854) 228–229. His final words are: 'ich kann die Überzeugung nicht verleugnen, dass, wie jede Wissenschaft, so auch die unsere, sich allein wahres Heil bereitet und erhält, wenn sie sich in religiös-sittlichem Geiste bewegt und kund gibt.'

142 Warburton (1738–1742) and later repr.; de Sainte-Croix (1771), 2nd ed. (1817); Meiners (1776). On the Baron de Sainte-Croix and Warburton see e.g. Assmann (1997) 115–125, Graf (1998), Assmann (2000), Assmann (2008) 92–122; on de Sainte-Croix' aims and method (a critical study of the ancient mysteries in their historical and social context) see Widemann (1987), on the freemasons Assmann (2008) 147–166. De Sainte-Croix's book on the historians dealing with Alexander (<sup>2</sup>1804) is praised by no less an authority than Droysen (1833) xiii. On Schiller (1786), the theosophical effusions, see Beiser (2005) 33–37; on Schiller (1790), with his references to the Mysteries, see e.g. Assmann (1997) 125–128, Assmann (2008) 295.

143 Lobeck (1829) 8 n. 1. On Lobeck see e.g. Kern (1938) 292.

144 Wilamowitz (1872). On Wilamowitz and mysticism see Kern (1938) 309–310.

145 Wilamowitz (1904) 16.

ers,<sup>146</sup> whose rather amusing argument is that early Greek philosophy is too primitive to have been influenced by ideas from the Orient. The laudably critical pages on Orphism by Johann Gottlieb Buhle were either forgotten or neglected.<sup>147</sup> Buhle had been very critical of the (at the time) available sources for Orphism, and emphasized the unreliability of Neoplatonist authors from a historical point of view. Of the Orphic 'Philosopheme' he only discusses the cosmogony, and his treatment of Indic thought too is much different from that of the Romantics.

In the first volumes of the great historical works of Dieterich Tiedemann (1791) and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1798) the Orient is no longer present. A significant contrast with Brucker. Schelling's admirers Ast and Rixner, and Windischmann, the friend of Friedrich Schlegel, again argued that philosophy derives from the Orient.<sup>148</sup> But Schleiermacher's pupils Brandis and Ritter, and then Zeller, influentially argued in favour of its birth in Greece.<sup>149</sup>

As to the importance traditionally attributed to what we today see as pseudepigraphic literature, the Appendix in Bd. 6 of Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, with the unmistakable title 'Von dem Betrüge mit untergeschobenen Büchern', is of particular interest. This is a discussion of most of the remains of the Pythagoreans, of Orpheus in Syrianus and Proclus, of Zoroaster, of the *Theologia Aristotelis*, and of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and Casaubon's critique.<sup>150</sup> Tennemann does not particularly like the Neoplatonists (whom he calls Alexandrians, as is often the case in the eighteenth century);<sup>151</sup> he speaks of their 'schwärmerische Philosophie', and the use of the word Schwärmerei, as we have noticed, implies a strong criticism.<sup>152</sup> But the critical stance of the professional historians failed to convince the Romantic minds, including Creuzer.

146 Meiners (1781) 144–145.

147 Buhle (1796) 150–151. This book is to be recommended for its *bibliographies raisonnées* of 17th–18th cent. literature, e.g. translations and studies of Persian and Indic works, with dates of publication.

148 See Braun (1973) 297–310, on 'les Schellingiens'; Scholtz (1979) 303–304, who refers to Ast (1807, 21825) and Rixner (1822, 21829).

149 See Zeller (1843), though the paper is disappointingly reticent about the arguments and contents of the works of the opponents. Zeller went on rejecting the influence of Oriental ideas for the rest of his scholarly life, also arguing against new defenders such as Röth. Cf. also above, n. 108.

150 Tennemann (1807) 438–479. On Casaubon and his predecessors see the papers edited by Mulsow (2002).

151 Cf. e.g. Brucker (21756) 315: 'Plotinus Platoniorum Alexandrinorum principes'.

152 Tennemann (1807) 3–19. For 'Schwärmerei' cf. above, n. 125, below, n. 171.

An early voice dissenting with Creuzer is that of August Böckh in a letter to Schleiermacher of 18.3.1808, first published in 1916.<sup>153</sup> He forwards what must be the two publications of 1806 Creuzer has given him for Schleiermacher, viz. the preliminary essay on 'Symbolik' and a short paper with texts on providence and fate selected from the ancient philosophers, beginning with Cicero and ending with Heraclitus. Böckh comments: 'Das Programm [i.e. the essay on 'Symbolik'] ist sehr gelehrt, aber ich kan damit mich nicht recht verständigen, indem die Combination des Orientalischen, Aegyptischen und Griechischen und aller Zeiten mir gar zu wild durcheinander läuft. Creuzer combinirt mehr, als dass er kritisch sonderte; manches macht er *μυστικώτερον* [...]. Creuzers Hauptidee [...], welche den Heraklit nicht nur mit der Orphischen Lehre in sehr grosse Verwandtschaft bringt, sondern mit dem gesammten orientalischen Mystizismus der Indier'. Böckh objects both to the syncretism and the absence of a chronology.

## 6.5

41

An addition by Amadeus Wendt<sup>154</sup> to the second edition of Tennemann's first volume (1829) claims our attention. It surprises at first, because it does not agree with Tennemann's anti-Orientalist stance, but it is clear, also from the volume's title-page, that Wendt's job was to bring the work up-to-date by 'correcting and adding to' it. He believes that the Anaximander fragment is about the passing away of things ('das Vergehen der Dinge'), and quotes Schleiermacher's translation of the Simplicius text. He then adds, without committing himself much: 'welche *bildliche Rede unwillkürlich an die orientalische Rede vom Abfall der Dinge erinnert*, und nach Ritter [(1821)] S. 197 die ungleiche Vertheilung der Theile des Unendlichen, das Hervortreten und die Aufhebung eines Übergewichts bezeichnet' (emphasis added).<sup>155</sup> It is virtually certain that Wendt derived the significant term 'Abfall' from the page of Ritter he quoted.<sup>156</sup>

Wendt's note was cited by the learned Eduard Maximilian Röth in the second volume of his *History of Western Philosophy*, in the course of his discussion of Anaximander (Röth, as is immediately clear from the subtitles of his two volumes, wanted to derive Greek philosophy from the Orient). In a footnote he

153 Meisner (1916) 21; at the time of writing the critical edition of Schleiermacher's *Briefwechsel* is not yet available for 1808. At (1806b) 21, Creuzer himself admits that he presents his evidence without bothering much about chronology.

154 Amadeus Wendt (1783–1836) *inter alia* also published a German translation amplified by himself of Stendhal's *Vie de Rossini*.

155 Wendt at Tennemann (21829) 68 n. \*.

156 Ritter (1821) 189.

cites a text including ἀλλήλοις, with reference to the Aldine pagination, and he prints τίσις and δική in the order of the *Aldina*. The presence of ἀλλήλοις does not prevent him (just as it did not prevent others, as we have seen above, Section 3) from presenting the mystical interpretation—he just does not translate the word! See his translation with comments: ‘woraus das Vorhandene—d.h. die Welt—seine Entstehung hat—aus dem Unendlichen, der Gottheit—dahin hat es auch nothwendiger Weise seinen Untergang; denn es gibt Ausgleichung und Ersatz der Beeinträchtigung in der Reihenfolge der Zeit’. By way of explanation he adds: ‘Er fasst also die Entstehung der Welt aus dem Unendlichen als eine dem Unendlichen zugefügte Schmäherung, Beeinträchtigung, ἀδικία, auf, welche durch die Wiederkehr der Welt in das Unendliche ihren Ersatz und ihre Ausgleichung, τίσις καὶ δική, empfängt’. He argues that Wendt spoke of the ‘fremdartige’ (i.e. un-Greek, Oriental) ‘Färbung dieser Stelle’ (emphasis added).<sup>157</sup> We may find that Röth perhaps gets more out of Wendt’s a bit loose phrase than seems to have been intended. Even so, though Röth does not speak of man but of the cosmos, or of things in general, Nietzsche’s personalist interpretation is not far away.

Wendt’s comparison as such between Greek and Indic thought is not a novelty. What is noteworthy is the explanation of Greek doctrine by reference to an Indic parallel, just as Creuzer and others explained the origin of Greek religious phenomena by appealing to the Orient. In relation to philosophy such comparisons also used to occur the other way round. Henry Thomas Colebrooke, for instance, in his influential pioneering account of Indic philosophical thought (1823–1824), the first to be based on a thorough study of the original literature in Sanskrit, which impressed Hegel, Goethe, Cousin, Ritter, and many others, argues that ‘the development of corporeal existences, and their returning to the first principle at their dissolution’ according to the view of the ancient | Vedic sage Kapila (to whom the Sankhya *Sutras* are attributed) ‘correspond with the upward and downward way, the ὀδὸς ἄνω and ὀδὸς κάτω, of Heraclitus’.<sup>158</sup> And Abraham Rogerius, in the chapter ‘On the world, its creation, and end’ of his remarkable and (in translation) widely read book on India *Open Door to Hidden Paganism* of 1651, already referred to Epicurus and Metrodorus for the idea of a multiplicity and a succession of worlds, and to Heraclitus and the Stoics for

157 Röth (1858) 158–159, with his notes 144 and 145. The work is dedicated to Wilhelm von Humboldt and August Böckh. Röth knew Sanskrit and Egyptian; he has not been treated entirely fairly by opponents such as Zeller, see Geldsetzer (1986) 96–103.

158 Colebrooke (1823–1824 repr. 1858) 266, referring to Diogenes Laërtius 9.8–9, in a footnote; cf. Deussen, below n. 174.

that of a final conflagration.<sup>159</sup> These two passages, cited somewhat at random, demonstrate the extent to which reports about Indic cyclical cosmologies were already known in Europe.

## 6.6

We have encountered a parallel to Wendt's and Röth's suggestion in Windelband (1888),<sup>160</sup> and may now add that in his lecture course on the history of philosophy (posthumously printed on the basis of now lost original manuscripts and of *Vorlesungsnachschriften*) Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, discussing Anaximander, paraphrased the doctrine as follows: 'Unzählige Welten und Götter gehen aus dem Unendlichen hervor, und sie gehen wieder darin zurück.' He tersely comments: 'Das sind noch orientalische Vorstellungen'.<sup>161</sup> Hegel concentrates on the *ouranoi* mentioned at the beginning of the fragment and is far from interpreting the *principium individuationis* as a misdemeanour victimizing the *Apeiron*, although he was familiar with the Indic doctrine of transmigration. We note that associations with Indic thought take various forms ... Hegel is rather critical of Schlegel; like Cousin he bases himself on Cole-

159 Rogerius (1651) 113–140, 'Van de Werelt. Haer Scheppinghe, ende haer Eynde'. The book was much read in its French and German translations, for instance by Goethe. The footnotes of the original edition, not by Rogerius (their learned author AWJC<sup>tus</sup> has not been identified), contain many more parallels from Greek philosophy. We may note that Megasthenes (cited Clement *Strom.* 1.72.5 ~ *FGrH* 715 fr. 3) provided an example that proved influential; he already explained the philosophy of the Brahmins by comparison with Greek natural philosophy, Aristotle, and Plato.

160 Above, Section 3.9.

161 Hegel (1829–1830a) 16; in earlier editions of this *Vorlesung* the text is somewhat different ('Das hat einen ganz orientalischen Ton'). In their comment *ad loc.* Garniron and Jaeschke (1984) refer to Hegel's account of Indic cosmology in his *Philosophie der Religion*, esp. Hegel (1827b) 475–490. See already Hegel (1827a) 96, 101, with references to Colebrooke (1805) 118–119 on the cosmogony of Manu; 102 on the 'höchste Stufe', i.e., 'das vollbrachte, der Werke und des Strebens entledigte Einssein und Wohnen mit Gott'; 133 'Verwandlung in Brahma ad extinctionem in numine'. On 'Pantheismus', 'All-Eins-Lehre', and Indic thought, esp. the *Bhagavad-Gita* in the Latin translation of August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Bonn 1823, see the two later versions of Hegel's *Enzyklopädie* of 1817, viz. (1827) § 573, at (1899) 407–410, and at somewhat greater length (1831) § 573, 557–562, both times with the notes of Bonsiepen and Lucas, *ad loc.* For the Indic cosmic cycles (including the vicissitudes of the self) see e.g. above, text to nn. 158–159, Deussen (1899) 163–204 = English trans. (1906) 180–225, Deussen (1907a) 52–53, Deussen (<sup>2</sup>1914) 45–47, Apte (1951b) 444–446, von Glasenapp (1955) 154–155, Biarreau (1981) *passim*, Biarreau (1995) 163–182, Biarreau (2002) 1.56–64. On Hegel and Indic thought see von Glasenapp (1960) 39–60; Hulin (1979); Viyagappa (1980) 14–60, who provides a bibliography of old and new Indic sources known at the time and 39–42 discusses Colebrooke; Halbfass (1983) 104–121. On Hegel in relation to the Hermeticist tradition see Magee (2001).

brooke's essays of 1824, the first to provide reliable information. As a matter of fact his lectures on Indic philosophy are for the most part a paraphrase of these essays.<sup>162</sup>

## 43 6.7

The term 'Abfall' used by Ritter and Wendt recalls the thought and vocabulary of Friedrich Wilhelm Jacob Schelling,<sup>163</sup> who seems to have developed his ideas independently<sup>164</sup> and only later saw them confirmed by Indic thought and (to some extent) by the Christian mysticism of Jacob Böhme, and by the theory of emanation of the Neoplatonists and their interpretation of Orphism and the Greek Mysteries.<sup>165</sup> His philosophy was already quite close to Neoplatonism

162 Hegel (1825–1826a), cf. (1827a); Cousin (1861) 122–123; see Hulin (1979) 39, 113–115. Ritter (1834) 349–418 discusses Indian philosophy, mostly relying on Colebrooke for information. He argues, 415–417, that later Greek philosophy (i.e., Neoplatonism) was possibly but not necessarily influenced by Indic thought, esp. as to the doctrine of the 'Emanation der Dinge aus Gott nach bestimmten absteigenden Graden des Daseins', and as to the 'mystische Anschauung Gottes'. For emanation cf. above, text to n. 5, n. 21, n. 33, n. 124 and text thereto, n. 125, n. 136 *ad fin.*, and below, text to n. 165.

163 See Vergauwen (1975) and e.g. Zeller (1873) 683–687, on Schelling's theosophy, the 'Sprung', 'Entfernung', 'Abfall' (Iliad) from the Absolute and the return (Odyssey) towards it of souls; also Deussen (<sup>3</sup>1922) 2.3.333–335, on Schelling's 'Wendung zum Neoplatonismus (1804–8)', theosophy culminating in Mysteries, the fall of the soul from the 'Ewig-Eine' as 'Strafe für ihre Selbstheit' (Iliad) and its returning (Odyssey); Copleston (1965) 126–148, esp. 127, on the cosmic Fall which however is 'not an event in time but the eternal and ontological self-expression of the eternal Idea', 'the emergence of the image of an image'; Beierwaltes (<sup>2</sup>2004) 121–123, 'das Losreißen der Dingen von Gott sei die Folge einer Schuld'. Applying this to Anaximander entails getting back to the world of time ... For the 'Abfall' cf. above, text to n. 28, text to n. 36, n. 136, text to n. 155, text to n. 156, below, text to n. 177.

164 For his early reading of Plato see Franz (1996), for his affinity with pietism the studies of Benz as summarized Benz (1968, trans. 1983).

165 Böhme was rediscovered by the Romantics, esp. Schelling's friend Franz von Baader. Schelling knew the work of Oetinger, who was influenced by Böhme. See Brown (1977), Mayer (1999) 182–221, McCalla (2006), Marquet (2006). For Oetinger in the context of the hermeticist-mystical tradition see Zimmermann (1969) 149–158, and *passim* (1979), 353–433; Breyer (2006). On 'Böhm's confused mysticism in relation to Paracelsus ('astrologisch-chemisch-magische Kunstsprache') and to 'Alexandrinische Philosopheme' i.e. (Neo)Platonism see the apposite remarks of Buhle (1800) 437–438. Gérard (1963) 209–214 points out that Schelling's early philosophy is remarkably parallel to what may be called Brahmanist thought, but was developed independently. He cites Schelling's first utterance of enthusiasm for the Orient in the letter to Windischmann of 18 December 1806 (Fuhrmans (1975) 384): 'Was ist Europa, als der für sich unfruchtbare Stamm, dem alles vom Orient her eingepropft und erst dadurch veredelt werden musste?' For emanation cf. above, text to n. 5, n. 21, n. 33, n. 124 and text thereto, n. 125, n. 136 *ad fin.*, n. 162.

before he began to read Plotinus, as Creuzer observed in 1804 and Schlegel in 1805. Samuel Taylor Coleridge<sup>166</sup> noticed this too.<sup>167</sup>

A few quotations from Schelling's earlier works will have to suffice here.<sup>168</sup> In a dialogue much appreciated by Goethe, *Bruno oder über das göttliche und natürliche Prinzip der Dinge* (1802), he discourses on the Mysteries, and speaks of the 'heiligen Abgrund [...], aus dem alles hervorgeht und in dem alles zurückkehrt', calling it the 'absolute Unendlichkeit'.<sup>169</sup> The essay *Philosophie und Religion* (1804) begins with the remarkable | claim that the earliest philosophers should be seen as the 'Urheber der Mysterien'. He introduces the doctrine of the 'Sprung' or 'Abfall' from the absolute, the 'Vorbild' (emphasis added), and argues that this actually is also the true Platonic doctrine, viz. that of *Phaedo* and *Republic* (the *Timaeus*, with its view of matter as a principle, is in his view too dependent on earlier cosmogonies). This doctrine has been prepared in the secret doctrines of the Eleusinian Mysteries ('vorgebildet in den Mysterien von Eleusis'). He speaks of the 'Strafe, welche in der Verwicklung mit dem Endlichen besteht'. The affinity with a central doctrine of Christianity is seen as an advantage. He even refers to the 'Prinzip des Sündenfalls, in höchster Allgemeinheit ausgesprochen'. Finally, he speaks of the 'alte, heilige Lehre [...]: dass die Seelen aus der Intellektualwelt in die Sinnenwelt herabsteigen, wo sie zur

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166 Coleridge (1817) 144–151 at (1983) speaks of his 'early study of Plato and Plotinus', and of the commentaries and 'the *Theologia Platonica* of the illustrious Florentine', 'of Proclus', and of two works of 'the philosopher of Nola', and mentions Jacob Boehme, read in English translation. He was well prepared for his notorious study and use of Schelling; for his marginalia on the latter see Coleridge (1998) 344–462, for Coleridge and Schelling Orsini (1969) 192–237.

167 In the dialogue of Berg (1804) 'Plotinus' represents Schelling; Creuzer, letter to Günderrode 7.11.1804 at Preisendanz (1912) 35; Schlegel (1796–1806) at (1964) ix 333, from 1805; see also Kiss (2004), Beierwaltes (2004) 84, 100–101. Coleridge wrote on the endpaper of Vol. 6 of Tennemann's *Geschichte* that Tennemann wanted 'to show the identity of the neo-Platonic System, especially as exhibited by Plotinus and Proclus, with the Natur-Philosophie of Schelling and his School—2.<sup>nd</sup> to confute the latter under the name of the former' (quoted from McFarland 1969, 244–245). On Schelling's subsequent encounter with Plotinus and his influence on Creuzer see e.g. Wundt (1915) 660–666. In his turn Creuzer influenced Schelling (e.g. Schelling 1815), who (1857) 277 defended him against 'das jedem Verstehen den widerwärtige Gezänke' of Voss.

168 Quoted from the reprint (1973) of (1859). In the notes to his *Bruno* Schelling (1973) 226–228 refers to the 'geistreiche Auszug' by Jacobi (1789) of Giordano Bruno *De la causa, principio, et uno* (1584), found as 'Anhang zu den Briefen über die Lehre des Spinoza' (2nd ed.), and quotes several passages. On Neoplatonist thought in *Bruno* see Beierwaltes (1980) esp. 233–234, on the presence of Plotinian notions in (Jacobi's excerpts from) Bruno's work.

169 Schelling (1802) at (1973) 128–132, 154.

*Strafe ihrer Selbstheit* und einer diesem Leben (der Idee, nicht der Zeit nach) *vorhergegangenen Schuld* an den Leib wie an einen Kerker sich gefesselt finden', etc. (emphasis added).<sup>170</sup> Virtually pure (Christianized Neo-)Platonism, though we note that Schelling in *Philosophie und Religion* refers to Plato, not to later Platonists.<sup>171</sup>

How close to the mystical interpretation of Anaximander's fragment can you get!

## 6.8

I add a few examples of views of the Anaximander fragment as being influenced by or at least comparable with ideas from the Orient:

The Catholic philosopher Otto Willmann quotes a text without ἁλλήλοις, and speaks of a 'Mystischer Zug', 'worin der Gedanke der vedantischen Mystik ausgesprochen wird, dass alles Endliche gar nicht sein sollte'.<sup>172</sup>

The great Orientalist Paul Deussen, famous among other things for his translation of the *Upanishads*, had known Nietzsche from their days at Schulpforta.<sup>173</sup> In the volume of his *History of Philosophy* dealing with the *Upanishads* he writes: 'Das Brahman ist der Mutterschoss, aus dem alle Wesen hervorgehen, und es lag sehr nahe, anzunehmen, dass dieselben im Tode in das Brahman zurückkehren wie schon Anaximandros sagt, "woraus die Entstehung der seienden Dinge ist, darein geschieht auch ihr Vergehen nach der Notwendigkeit"'.<sup>174</sup> In the volume dealing with Greek philosophy, still quoting

<sup>170</sup> Schelling (1804) at (1973) 602, 624–629, 633.

<sup>171</sup> For young Schelling's study of Plato see his *Timaeus* study (1794), and Franz (1994). In the *Philosophische Briefe* (1795) ~ (1976) 325–326, he states that the 'Sündenfall' must be interpreted 'im platonischen Sinn, als das Heraustreten aus dem absoluten Zustande' brought about by our having stopped looking at things in themselves. The opposite view, viz. that it is the Fall which caused this loss, which looks for the 'Rückkehr in die Gottheit, die Urquelle aller Existenz, Vereinigung mit dem Absoluten, Vernichtung seiner Substanz' is, as 'Prinzip aller Schwärmerei' (for this term cf. above, n. 125), put on a par with 'allen Träumereien der Kabbalisten, der Brachmanen, der Sinesischen Philosophen, sowie der neuen Mystiker'. So subsequently he changed his mind as to the New Mystics and the Brahmins.

<sup>172</sup> Willmann (1894, <sup>2</sup>1907) 219–220.

<sup>173</sup> Interesting memoir Deussen (1901). On his achievements see von Glasenapp (1960) 123–126, Halbfass (1981) 145–151.

<sup>174</sup> Deussen (1899) 203, English trans. (1906) 225. He goes on to compare what he calls the later doctrine of the periodical destruction of the universe by Brahman with Heraclitus' way up and way down and the Stoic cosmic cycle (cf. already Colebrooke, above, text to n. 158).



Mullach's text without ἀλλήλεις (!), he writes: 'In diesen Worten scheint Anaximander mit seltenen, vom hellenischen Altertume unbegriffenem Tiefsinne die individuelle Existenz selbst als eine Schuld (ἀδικία) aufzufassen [...]'.<sup>175</sup> Anaximander as the exception ...

In a contribution with the ominous title *Der Ursprung der Naturphilosophie aus dem Geiste der Mystik* (1903) Karl Joël had gone quite far in emphasizing Orphic and other forms of what he saw as mysticism as the source of philosophy. Though eighteen years later in the first volume of his | *History of Ancient Philosophy* he translates the word ἀλλήλεις, he still speaks of pessimism, 45 of the 'mystisch-eschatologische Verkündung der zwingenden Allmacht des Unbegrenzten', and of Oriental (this time Persian) influence: injustice entails 'das hellenische Maass überschreiten', the *Apeiron* is depicted as an oriental despot.<sup>176</sup> But compared with the earlier pamphlet the later book is a partial retraction.

In a book on the Presocratics by Gustav Kafka we find the following translation: '[...] denn Busse und Sühne seiner Schuld leistet eines dem anderen nach dem Gesetz der Zeit'; so Kafka reads ἀλλήλεις. He explains: 'Ganz im Sinn der indischen Philosophie stellt sich hier bereits die individuelle Existenz als Sünde, als Abfall aus dem schuldlosen Zustand der Vereinigung aller Gegensätze dar, der nur durch Vernichtung, durch Preisgabe der Individualität, durch zurücksinken in das Nirwana gesühnt werden kann.' This occurred only once in Hellas, he adds, and must have seemed foreign to the 'wurzelhaften griechischen Lebensgefühl'. Another instance of the mystical interpretation in spite of the presence of ἀλλήλεις, this time with added Buddhist colouring.<sup>177</sup>

The philosopher Ernst Cassirer provides a more straightforward comparatistic interpretation in his *History of Greek Philosophy from the Beginning to Plato*.<sup>178</sup> He somewhat surprisingly posits that the quest for the 'Abstraktum des 'Weltgrundes'' is more a mythical than a philosophical undertaking. He then quotes from a 'Schöpfungslied' from the *Rigveda* (the often-cited creation hymn *Rksamhita* 10.129): 'es atmete, windlos, von selbst nur das Das [...] es gab nichts

<sup>175</sup> Deussen (1911b) 44.

<sup>176</sup> Joël (1921) 259–262.

<sup>177</sup> Kafka (1921) 21.

<sup>178</sup> Cassirer (1925) at (2003) 320–323.

anderes als dies',<sup>179</sup> and argues that such 'Urfragen der Kosmogonie und Theogonie' are still to be discerned behind a thin veil in Ionian natural philosophy—especially in Anaximander. On the other hand he explicitly states that one should not infer (like Joël) that the spirit of mysticism is where Ionian natural philosophy came from, or claim that the *Rigveda* hymn is philosophical, for this destroys the distinction between philosophy and myth that began with the Ionians. The Anaximander fragment (with ἀλλήλοισις) is about the 'Prozess der Entstehung des Besonderen und des Vergehens des Besonderen' *from and into* the *Apeiron*, a process which is the manifestation of 'die ewige Ordnung und das ewige *Recht* der Natur' (emphasis added).

The Orientalizing interpretation is briefly described by Antonio Capizzi: 'Questo passo ha fatto pensare molti a ciò che il Brahmanesimo e il Buddhismo chiamano la «legge del *kharmā*», o legge di causa ed effetto. In virtù di tale legge, il premio e la punizione delle azioni umani non vengono decisi della libera volontà di un Dio giusto, ma seguono automaticamente («secondo necessità» dice Anassimandro) al merito o alla colpa; cosicché l'atto cattivo porta con sé per logica conseguenza «la pena e l'espiazione». Può darsi che dottrine consimili fossero insegnate nelle scuole Orfiche, e che Anassimandro ne fosse venuto a conoscenza.'<sup>180</sup>

*A History of Philosophy* sponsored by the Indian government fails to offer an explicit comparison of Anaximander and (aspects of) Indic thought.<sup>181</sup> Nevertheless, we learn that according to Anaximander '[e]very created thing is

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179 See the translation with comments of the third and fourth lines of the second couplet of Renou (1956) 125–126, 254, quoted Biarreau (2002) 1.47–48, 'L'Un respirait de son proper élan, sans qu'il y ait de souffle. En dehors de cela, il n'existait rien d'autre', and that of Doniger (1981) 25, 'That one breathed, windless, by its own impulse. Other than that there was nothing beyond', quoted Hamilton (2001) 26. Dutch translation in Rietbergen (2007) 8, where a large part of the poem functions as the book's motto. The hymn is already among those translated by Colebrooke (1805) ~ (1858) 17–18; cited from Colebrooke by Hegel (1827b) 486 n. 2, see Jaeschke *ad loc.*, 4b.769, Fussnote (2). 'Dieser berühmte ... Hymnus' is quoted in rhyming translating with commentary by Deussen (1894) 119–127, who speaks of 'vielleicht das bewundernswürdigste Stück Philosophie, welches aus alter Zeit uns überkommen ist'; it is also quoted Deussen (1904) 7–8, and is the first text translated in Deussen (1907b). See also e.g. Apte (1951a) 379–380, Gonda (1966). Burkert (2008) 69 omits to cite *Rk-samhita* 10.129 as a parallel for the beginning of *Enuma Elish* and formulas in other texts.

180 Capizzi (1972) 6–7 n. 5. But at Capizzi (1990) 94, 113, 265–269, he follows the naturalistic interpretation.

181 Ranade and Kaul (1953) 30–31.

doomed to destruction'. 'Each separate existence he regarded as an iniquity, a usurpation, for which the clashing and mutually exterminating forms of life would suffer atonement and penalty in the ordinance of time'. The natural order transformed itself in his mind to a comprehensive order of justice, since 'all that has existence is worthy of decay'. The early Ionian is here obviously interpreted in terms of traditional Hindu religion and philosophy.

## 7 Epilogue

The quest for Oriental parallels for early Greek thought never lost its attraction. Evidence from the Middle East that for the most part was discovered after the heyday of Romanticism also plays a part. The admirable work of Walter Burkert and Martin West on the Oriental connection has widened our horizon.<sup>182</sup> The Babylonian *Enuma Elish* has been cited as a general parallel for Hesiod's theogony, and so for philosophical cosmogony, by Cornford,<sup>183</sup> for mythical cosmogony is a sort of predecessor of Presocratic cosmogony (though one should remain aware of the crucial differences). Uvo Hölscher, in his large paper on Anaximander first published in the 1950s, constructs a background by adducing the Hittite and Hesiodic 'Sukzessionmythos' of the divine generations, Sanchuniathon's purported *Phoenician History* as reported by Philo of Byblos, the *Enuma Elish*, and the Egyptian Ogdoads.<sup>184</sup>

One cannot deny that such Oriental parallels as are cited today provide an illuminating general background, although immediate and detailed influence is difficult to prove. It should anyhow be stressed that apposite Oriental parallels for the very core of our fragment 12A9/B1 DK are effectively ruled out by the varieties of the dominant secular interpretation. In the vast literature dealing with Anaximander I have found no parallels from the Orient for the juridical setting, for the idea of equality before the law, for the notion of cosmic justice,<sup>185</sup> for the rule of law, or for the balance of power in a political community. For these ideas one has to remain in Greece.

182 One need only refer to Burkert (1992), (2003b), and (2008), and West (1997). On Cornford, Burkert and the question of Oriental influence see now Sassi (2009) 37–50.

183 Cornford (1952) 254–259.

184 Hölscher (1953) at (1968) 49–52, 65–77, 52–55, 58.

185 With the exception of Burkert (2008) 67–68, who cites Egyptian Maat ('Order') and Babylonian Misharu ('Just Order'). These divine forces are more apposite as parallels for Heraclitus B94 DK. The (possibly) Orphic parallels for a form of cosmic justice (see Bernabé 2002, 220–221, with references; add Kouloumentas 2007) at Plato, *Lg.* 715e–716a ~ Orph.

The quest for Orphic parallels for early Greek thought also retains some of its attractions. The subsidiary hypothesis for the mystical interpretation, which depends on the assumption of an influence of Orphism, or at least a striking parallel with Orphism, especially with its theogony (about which we know much more today than was known, say, forty years ago, let alone during the whole of the nineteenth century) is still alive today, though in a less intense condition than formerly.

William Keith Guthrie, well known as a historian of Greek philosophy, drew a strict parallel between Anaximander's cosmogony and Orphic theogony in his book on Orpheus: Anaximander's 'productive entity which generates hot and cold' (γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ, fr. 12A10 DK) is put on a par with the notorious Orphic god Phanes.<sup>186</sup> But this god, just like the Orphic world-egg, also adduced sometimes, so far fails to | make an appearance in the theogony of the *Derveni Papyrus*, or in the other early evidence (the egg appears in Aristophanes and in Indic thought).

Early Orphic passages are available today, though we cannot with certainty date these to before Anaximander (so the discussion will go on for some time), for example *Derveni Papyrus*, col. XVI.2–8:

And he [sc. Orpheus] says that the things that are now come to be from the things that exists: 'Of the first-born king, the reverend one; and upon him all / The immortals grew, blessed gods and goddesses / And rivers and lovely springs and everything else / That was born then; and he himself was alone.' In theses [sc. lines] he indicates that the things that are have always existed, and that the things that are now come to be out of the things that exist.<sup>187</sup>

The Greek editors of the papyrus argue that 'this quotation [...] can be assumed to describe the absorption in Zeus of the cosmos Protogonos [i.e. the First

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FF 31–32 Bernabé do not bring us to the East. A striking Iranian parallel for the position of the heavenly bodies in Anaximander's system has been resuscitated by Burkert (1963), cf. Burkert (1994–1995), but the adoption of this arrangement has to be justified in terms of the system itself.

186 Guthrie (1935) 222–223 (not modified 1952).

187 ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τὰ νῦν ὄντα γίνεται λέγει· 'πρωτογόνου βασιλέως αἰδοίου· τῷ δ' ἄρα πάντες / ἀθάνατοι προσέφυν μάκαρες θεοὶ ἡδὲ θεάιναι / (5) καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ κρήναι ἐπήρατοι ἄλλα τε πάντα, / ἄσσα τότ' ἦν γεγαῶτ', αὐτὸς δ' ἄρα μόνος ἔγεντο.' [ἐ]ν τούτοις σημαίνει ὅτι τὰ ὄντα ὑπ[ὲρ]χεν αἰεὶ, τὰ δὲ νῦν ὄντα ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων γίν[ε]ται. [Note 2018: text and translation slightly changed, following Valeria Piano at Laks, A. and Most, G.N., *Early Greek Philosophy* Vol. 6, Cambridge MA—London 2016, 408–411].

God in the succession] had created',<sup>188</sup> but this is the opposite of what Derveni author believes.

The pan(en)theism of the Orphic poem cited in the *Papyrus* has recently been compared to pre-Anaximandean ideas from Egypt and Mesopotamia by Walter Burkert, and even in some sense derived from these ideas.<sup>189</sup>

A contemporary scholar in favour of direct Orphic influence on Anaximander is Arye Finkelberg, who notices the presence of a single principle contrasted with a plurality of other entities in both cases, and (like Rohde) mistakenly believes that both times one may speak of an origin from the principle and reunification with it of individual *souls*.<sup>190</sup> Recently, Gábor Betegh has argued that as to the One-versus-Many problem the evidence does not allow us to decide between Orphic influence on Anaximander and Anaximandean influence on Orphic poetry.<sup>191</sup>

Alberto Bernabé, the respected editor of the Orphic fragments in the recent Teubner edition, has reviewed the relations between Orphism and Presocratic philosophy in a rather optimistic paper. Basing himself on Theophrastus' characterization of the wording as 'rather poetical', he advances a precise Orphic reference for the Anaximander fragment. The expressions διδόναι δίκην and κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν make him think of 'une version primitive d'une cosmogonie orphique'.<sup>192</sup> It will be clear that this is entirely speculative.

Not so long ago Alexis Pinchard has published a substantial and learned study (2009) in which he compares | the *Vedas* and other early Indo-european literature with the (early) Greek philosophers and poets, though as a rule with little regard for chronology. The 'Orphic-Eleusinian Theologies' would have

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188 Kouromenos & *alii* (2006) 215.

189 Burkert (2003b) 70–107, Burkert (2006).

190 Finkelberg (1986) 322: One-Many problem (cf. Bernabé (2002) 212–214); *ibid.* 332 'Orphism and the first Presocratic doctrines [...] shared a common doctrine of soul: its divine nature, sinking, transmigration, and eventual rise and reunion with the divine'; *ibid.* 334: 'If my interpretation is correct, Greek philosophy originated as a trend within the religious movement of the 6th century BCE'. He may be unaware of the venerable antiquity of these suggestions, though *ibid.* 332 he refers to Joël (21906). Also cf. Finkelberg (1989). For the first Presocratics, viz. Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, there is no evidence whatever concerning such a view of the *soul*. There is no early Orphic or Pythagorean evidence either that the soul would reunite with its divine origin, see Bremmer (2002) 11–26. See also the moderate view of Pugliese Carratelli quoted above n. 11. Classen (1986) 70 argues that Anaximander's cosmic equilibrium (as to which he follows Heidel, Jaeger, etc.) should not 'durch orphische Vorstellungen belastet werden'.

191 Betegh (2002) 175–176.

192 Bernabé (2002) 218.

Indo-European roots.<sup>193</sup> Pinchard legitimizes his approach by an argument from analogy, pointing at Indo-European linguistics and at the successes of philologists who have discovered common literary traditions. One looks in vain for references to predecessors in this comparatist field, such as de Sainte-Croix, Creuzer, Röth, or Deussen, to name only a few. Anaximander, perhaps unsurprisingly, is not mentioned in this book either.

We end with a few instances of recent views focusing on Anaximander. Some scholars take into account (whether explicitly or not) that the balance must have been disturbed if the cosmos is to disappear into the *Apeiron*. See for example Martin West, who states that the formula 'τὰ ὄντα does not denote worlds, but it certainly includes them'.<sup>194</sup> Note that in his monograph *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* he does not cite Oriental parallels for the separation of things from the *Apeiron*, or for what goes on in the cosmos.

Keimpe Algra concedes that the cosmos, qua 'living and generated being', may eventually die and disappear; he rightly points out that it is 'unclear how we should envisage the details of this process'.<sup>195</sup>

Thomas Buchheim however posits that the fragment deals exclusively with a permanent equilibrium: 'Der wörtlich überlieferte Satz des Anaximander betont ja die interne Geschlossenheit des Geschehens, innerhalb dessen die Dinge und alle bestimmten Gefüge nur aus *einander* werden und in *einander* vergehen' (italics in the original).<sup>196</sup> Malcolm Schofield argues that Simplicius' first sentence is about the generation of worlds from the *Apeiron*, while the second 'is introduced by a remark focused on *destruction*, which despite its plurals ('out of those ... into these') looks designed to furnish a balancing comment on the death of worlds. Yet the plurals give the game away: the only evidence Theophrastus actually can offer to support the implication of cosmic destruction is a statement of Anaximander about the effect of opposites on *each other*' (italics in the original).<sup>197</sup>

On the other hand Richard McKirahan, who sets out the arguments in favour of cosmic stability at required length, is not happy with this perpetuum mobile, because the cosmogony is a 'conspicuous exception'. He wonders whether there

193 Quotation Pinchard (2009b) 5–6.

194 West (1971) 82–83. No reference to Anaximander in West (1997); he claims, p. 620, that Thales' cosmology shows Poenician features and that Pherecydes introduced Oriental 'motifs into Greek mythical philosophy'.

195 Algra (1999) 57. See also Sassi (2006) 3–26.

196 Buchheim (1994) 64.

197 Schofield (1997) 62–63.

may be 'gaps in the evidence', and points out that an eventual destruction of the cosmos entails that the idea of a stable equilibrium has to be jettisoned.<sup>198</sup>

A balanced discussion of the options is formulated by Christoph Rapp: 'Ob Anaximanders Gesetz (a) auf eine Wechselwirkung von kosmos-immanenten Kräften oder Substanzen zu beziehen ist [...], oder (b) auf die Wechselwirkung zwischen Kosmos und Unbegrenztem [...], lässt sich auf grund der spärlichen und z.T. widersprüchlichen Zeugnissen nicht endgültig entscheiden; beide Parteien haben gute Gründe auf ihre Seite—am Ende wiegen vielleicht die Gründe für (a) etwas mehr.' In favour of cosmic parity would be that 'das in Anaximanders Gesetz beschriebene Wechselspiel nur zwischen gleichgeordneten Parteien sinnvoll [ist]'. The mystical interpretation is rejected | out of hand: 'Schwer zu begreifen wäre ferner die Vorstellung, dass in der Entstehung des Kosmos eine Ungerechtigkeit des Unbegrenzten liegt, die durch ein entsprechendes Vergehen wieder ausgeglichen werden könnte.'<sup>199</sup> With this rejection in itself one cannot but agree. But we have seen that numerous scholars for one reason or other failed to find other versions (and, exceptionally, even this version) of the mythical reading hard to understand ... This holds for Ritter, for Brandis, for the editions of Ritter & Preller from the second to the fifth, for Zeller's great work from the second to the fourth edition, for Prantl, for Nietzsche, for Überweg, for Windelband, for Rohde, for Gomperz, for Diels, and for quite a few figures of lesser renown. It would be going too far to speak of a *catena aenea*, but we are certainly dealing with a widely established tradition. What is bizarre in one century may well be commonplace in earlier one. We have also seen that in spite of the evidence the alternative naturalistic interpretation of the Simplicius passage was slow in coming, took time to establish itself, and still has not resulted in an overall consensus.<sup>200</sup>

A novel approach has been argued by Richard Seaford, to which it is not possible to do justice here. Seaford discusses the fragment and several related texts at some length, and leaves some choices open, e.g. whether or not the cosmos is in fact destroyed. Anaximander does not think in terms of natural law, but projects an archaic 'judicial process on the cosmos'. The novel idea is that the nature and functioning of the *Apeiron* are to be interpreted in terms of its analogy with money, an entity both abstract and real. But at best this monetary analogy provides a backdrop to a certain state of mind; it is not sufficiently

198 McKirahan (1994) 33–47.

199 Rapp (1997) 44–49; cf. above, text to n. 16. For the 'Gesetz' cf. above, n. 3 and text thereto.

200 See Schwabl (1953) 1516–1517 (whose summary of McDiarmid (1953) does not seem entirely correct); Hölscher (1953) at (1968) 28–29; Freudenthal (1986); Conche (1991) 206–207; Engmann (1991); McKirahan, above, n. 198, and text thereto.

fine-tuned to handle the philological issues that vex the interpretation of the Simplicius passage.<sup>201</sup>

As far as I know no other new ideas have been forthcoming. Apart from studies by specialists like Maria Michela Sassi and Dan Graham it would seem that in recent years interest in these matters has somewhat abated.<sup>202</sup> At any rate one looks in vain for a discussion of Anaximander's fragment and the problems of its interpretation in useful handbooks such as the recent *Blackwell Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, or the even more recent *Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*.<sup>203</sup>

### *Addendum to Section 5.2 Above*

At the end of November 2009 I received a copy of Hermann Diels, *Griechische Philosophie. Vorlesungsmitschrift aus dem Wintersemester 1897/98*, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010, as the wonderful gift of its editor, Dr. Johannes Saltzwedel. The proofs of my paper on Anaximander had just become available, so it was impossible to take account of this new evidence (consisting of  
50 91 pages of lecture notes) in the text of the paper itself. | I must limit myself to the chapter on Anaximander (Mitschrift 5B–9), who is admired as a scientific genius, but still is a mystic and a pessimist especially in his verbatim fragment, and therefore unable to resist Orphism. '(S)ein Verständnis hat Schleiermacher eröffnet», Diels tells his students. I quote a few telling phrases: the numbers of the sizes and distances of the cosmic bodies are 'wohl rein schematisch-mystisch' (p. 21). 'Anaximander hält die Sonderexistenz für ein Unrecht, die Vernichtung ist Strafe für die Vermessenheit, sich von der Allmutter getrennt zu haben. Das ἄπειρον ist die wahre Existenz [R.P. 13 no. 12 = DK 12 B 1]. Der Gedanke taucht in Indien bald darauf im Buddhismus auf. Auch die Lehre von der Erbsünde damals niedergeschrieben. Und in Indien führt es wie in Hellas zum Pantheismus. [new alinea] Der alte Zeus ist dafür der orphische Ausdruck. Anaximander hat in diesem Punkt nicht widerstehen können, hier ist er Kind seiner Zeit, nicht wie Schopenhauer'. (p. 23). What Diels means is that Schopenhauer's pessimism is foreign to the true spirit of the nineteenth century.

201 Seaford (2006) 190–209, quotation 202. For the invention of money as a stimulus see also e.g. Müller (1977).

202 Sassi (2006); Graham (2006) 28–44; Sassi (2007), criticizing the 'political' interpretation of Vernant.

203 Gill and Pellegrin (2006), Curd and Graham (2008).



### Note in 2018

I have refrained from expanding the overview of the scholarly literature beyond 2009, the year of the first appearance of this paper. For my interpretation of Anaximander and further literature see below, ch. 4: *Anaximander's Fragment: Another Attempt*, with the Simplicius text containing the fragment as an Appendix.

### References

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#### Sigla:

DGr see Diels.

DGWE see Hanegraaff & alii.

DK see Diels and Kranz.

FHS&G see Fortenbaugh & alii.

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\*sc. RigVeda, Yajurveda, Samaveda, Atharvaveda.

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# Anaximander's Fragment: Another Attempt<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

I argue for the interpretation of Anaximander's world as an unstable and dissipative system. The inconsistency found by scholars in Theophrastus/Simplicius' text disappears when it is realized that the elemental forces of nature do not change into each other. They are in the Infinite in time as well as in space. To some extent preference is given to Aristotle's evidence over the doxographical vulgate habitually derived from Theophrastus, though of course the Theophrastean passage containing the verbatim quotation remains the primary witness.

## Keywords

world-system – cosmic region – temporal – irreversible – destruction

## 2 I Recommendations Rejected

We all know that the so-called 'fragment' of Anaximander is extant because it had been quoted and explained by Theophrastus, whose report is cited in

1 This article grew out of lectures delivered at the Scuola Normale, Pisa, 3 and 4 April 2008, and of a paper read at the Vakgroepscolloquium Geschiedenis van de Filosofie, Utrecht University, 11 September 2009. Thanks are due to the audiences at those occasions, especially to Glenn Most for inviting me to Pisa and for several stimulating discussions, to Maria Michela Sassi, André Laks, and David Runia for observations concerning the penultimate draft, and to Patricia Curd for finding Burnet (1892) for me. I am also most grateful to the anonymous referee of *Phronesis* for pointing out mistakes and unclarities in my presentation. When the paper was finished I realized that I should again consult Kerschensteiner (1962), whose discussion of the meaning of *κόσμος* in Anaximander I had forgotten I had quoted in a book published in 1971. I now also saw that Kerschensteiner had made the point, against Kahn (1960), that the natural forces do not change into each other, just as I argue here (and as has also been claimed by Couprie (1989) and Fehling (1994), see below, n. 74 and text thereto, n. 75). But my conclusions are reached in a quite different way, and Kerschensteiner not only brings the argument insufficiently forward (see (1962), 60 n. 1: a full discussion of fr. 12 B1 DK is not intended) but also fails to account for the problem of the plurals *ἐξ ὧν* // *εἰς πάντα* as con-

Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*.<sup>2</sup> The explication of Simplicius' text has been made more difficult than it already is because of the noteworthy differences among the interpretative traditions, often stimulated by the hope that access may be had to Anaximander's thought in a sort of direct way. Thus, we often find (1) the claim that the word στοιχείον ("element") should be ignored as a Peripatetic intrusion, while ἀρχή ("principle") is Anaximandrian.<sup>3</sup> Here Diels and Kranz have been very influential, who at fr. 12B1 DK print ἀ ρ χ ή with spaced letters to indicate verbatim quotation, and translate "Anfang" ("beginning");<sup>4</sup> (2) the claim that the attribution of a multiplicity of worlds (ἅπαντας ... τοὺς οὐρανούς, "all the worlds") is due to a confusion with the Atomists; (2a) the subsidiary claim that the word ἅπαντας ("all") should be ignored.<sup>5</sup>

The first of these claims, (1) above, is based on one of the two possible interpretations of Theophrastus' report that Anaximander πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς, "was the first to introduce this name of the principle". This is often believed to mean that Anaximander was the first to introduce the term ἀρχή, "principle".<sup>6</sup> It is however equally possible to understand Theophrastus to mean that Anaximander was the first to call the principle by the name "infinite", ἄπειρον. Each of these interpretations is supported by a parallel in Simplicius. In the *Physics* commentary he speaks of "Anaximander, the first to call the substrate 'principle'".<sup>7</sup> In the *De caelo* commentary he tells us that Anaximander posited as the single element "something indefinite, rarer than water but denser than air, because the substrate had to be naturally suited to change into

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trusted with the singular ἐξ ἧς. Kerschenshteiner's point, not mentioned in Kerferd's review of 1964, has failed to influence the secondary literature. See further below, nn. 15, 16, and 35.

2 Anaximander fr. 12 A 9 DK, 1st text, *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 24.13–25 Diels = Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 2 Diels = fr. 226A FHS&G. For the text see the Appendix at the end of this paper. The source is not a *Physicorum opiniones* but Theophrastus' *Physics*. Note however that Fehling (1994), 96, 107–108, 190–191, attempts to argue that Simplicius on Anaximander does not derive from Theophrastus, because a combination of contrasting pieces of information (cf. below, nn. 28–31 and text thereto) should not be attributed to the Eresian.

3 Thus still in the *vulgata* of DK, Reale (2006), 181, 197.

4 In order to avoid the Peripatetic connotations of the term "principle"; English translations may use "source" for this purpose e.g. below, n. 6.

5 For both claims see e.g. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), 122–126.

6 See e.g. Kahn (1960), 30–32; against e.g. Graham (2006), 29, and Palmer (2009), 336–337 (who translate ἀρχή as "source"), Gemelli Marciano (2007), 64. André Laks points out (*per litt.*) that strictly speaking Anaximander (supposing he used the word ἀρχή) was not even the first to use it; the interpretation I disprefer demands that he was the first to give the term a special and new sense.

7 *Simp. in Phys.* 150.23–24 (before the phrase printed as Anaximander fr. 12 A 9 DK, 2nd text), [...] Ἀναξίμανδρος, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἀρχὴν ὀνομάσας τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

opposite directions. He was the first to posit this as infinite, to be able to use it abundantly for the comings-into-being”.<sup>8</sup>

So Simplicius cannot help us. But Aristotle can. Speaking of the Infinite (and subsequently mentioning “Anaximander and the majority of the physicists”) he says: “All rightly posit it [*scil.*, the Infinite] as principle”.<sup>9</sup> Theophrastus takes Aristotle’s arguments into account, but tends to render the master’s statements and overviews more precise and complete. In Book One of *Physics* and Book Alpha of *Metaphysics* Aristotle had omitted to include Anaximander in his diaeretic and developmental overviews. Theophrastus in the introductory section of his *Physics* sets this right. In Book A of *Metaphysics* Aristotle had pointed out that Thales is the archegete of physics and the first to introduce the material cause, or principle, and Anaxagoras the most likely candidate to be the first to have introduced the efficient, or rather final, cause. Theophrastus agrees, though he is not explicit about the materiality of the principle, and adds that there have been earlier ‘Thaleses’ (plural) who were eclipsed by Thales.<sup>10</sup> He also omits Hermotimus, mentioned as a purported predecessor of Anaxagoras by Aristotle, and focuses on the efficient cause.<sup>11</sup> In our passage dealing with Anaximander he includes scraps of information variously available in Aristotle. Remembering that Aristotle had attributed the Infinite as principle to a multiplicity of physicists, among whom Anaximander, he profits | from the occasion by adding that Anaximander was the first to call the principle “infinite”. There is moreover a close link between Theophrastus’ Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxagoras, because Anaximander is said by him to be Thales’ pupil, and Anaxagoras’ infinite material principle (also according to Theophrastus’ reading)<sup>12</sup> compares well with that of Anaximander. All three are first finders of something important.

8 Simp. in *Cael.* 615.13–16 (not in DK), Ἀναξίμανδρος δὲ Θαλοῦ πολίτης καὶ ἐταῖρος ἀόριστόν τι ὕδατος μὲν λεπτότερον ἄερος δὲ πυκνότερον, διότι τὸ ὑποκείμενον εὐφυὲς ἔχρην εἶναι πρὸς τὴν ἐφ’ ἐκότερα μεταβάσιν. ἄπειρον δὲ πρῶτος ὑπέθετο, ἵνα ἔχῃ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰς γενέσεις ἀφθόνως. This explanation of ἄπειρον of course derives from Arist. *Phys.* 3.4 203b15–20 = Anaximander fr. 12A15 DK. For the intermediate element see below, n. 13, text to n. 63.

9 *Phys.* 3.4 203b4, the beginning of 203b4–15 = Anaximander fr. 12A15/B 3 DK.

10 For the thought cf. e.g. Hor., *Carm.* 4.9.25–28.

11 Thales: Arist. *Met.* A.3 983b20–21, 984a1–2 = fr. 11A12 DK; Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 1 Diels = fr. 11A13 DK = Thphr. fr. 225 FHS&G, *ap.* Simp. in *Phys.* 23.29–34. Anaxagoras: Arist. *Met.* A.3 984b18–19 = fr. 59A43 DK; Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 4 Diels = 228A FHS&G = fr. 59A41 DK, *ap.* Simp. in *Phys.* 27.3–4, 15–17.

12 See below, n. 70 and text thereto. An incomplete list of “Philosophen als E(r)finder” is at Thraede (1962), 1222–1223.

We may conclude that it is Theophrastus who introduces ἀρχή as well as στοιχειόν, in their Peripatetic sense of course, and that he gives us Anaximander's name for a specimen of what the Peripatetics designate by means of the general term "principle". These terms cannot have been used by Anaximander in an Aristotelian, or quasi-Aristotelian, sense.

The second claim, (2), viz. that a plurality of worlds is attributed to Anaximander by mistake, has to do with the difficulty of translating the formula ἅπαντας ... τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους, "all the heavens ... and the *kosmoi* in them". Though the words κόσμος and οὐρανός can be used interchangeably, they must have different denotations here. What we should do also in this case is appeal to Peripatetic terminology.

To start with the οὐρανοί: the formula "all the heavens" (ἅπαντας *sive*) πάντας τοὺς οὐρανούς, often found in Christian authors, already occurs in a related context in Aristotle, which provides independent evidence that Aristotle ascribes the plural *ouranoi* to Anaximander:

Because the (number of) elements must necessarily be finite, it remains for us to consider whether there are more than one. Some philosophers posit one alone, either water or air or fire or a substance rarer than water but denser than air, and this they say is infinite and *encompasses all the worlds*, ὁ περιέχειν φασὶ πάντας τοὺς οὐρανούς ἄπειρον ὄν.<sup>13</sup>

This encompassing Infinite of course recalls the principle that "encloses everything and steers everything", attributed by Aristotle to Anaximander | *disertis* 5 *verbis*.<sup>14</sup> And *ouranoi* inside the Infinite must be worlds, or world-systems. This denotation fits with the third meaning Aristotle attributes to the word οὐρανός when listing its various senses in a well-known passage of *On the Heavens*: "we apply the word [sc. οὐρανός] in yet another sense to the body which is enclosed by the extreme circumference, since we habitually give the name *ouranos* to the whole and the all (τὸ ... ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν)".<sup>15</sup>

13 *Cael.* 3.5 303b9–13 (trans. Guthrie, Loeb, modified: he has "infinite in extent"). Printed as DK 2.51.9–14: *Idaios*, 3rd text, because at one time the doctrine of the intermediate element was "vermutungsweise" attributed to this little known figure. The protest of Kahn (1960), 44–46, is justified, see below, n. 63 and text thereto. Kerschensteiner (1962), 30, toys with the idea that an anonymous Milesian follower of Anaximander may be meant.

14 περιέχειν ἅπαντα, see *Arist. Phys.* 3.4 203b10–15 (cf. above, n. 9 and text thereto); see e.g. Kerschensteiner (1962), 30–31, who speaks of a "Reminiszenz" of Anaximander.

15 *Cael.* 1.9 278b10–21; see Kerschensteiner (1972), 36, who translates "Welten" (cf. *ibid.*, 38). For further examples of the third meaning ("ἵη τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον, ὁ κόσμος") see Bonitz, *Index v.* οὐρανός, 541b56–542a17.

Secondly, the plural κόσμοι in the phrase “the *kosmoi* in them” (τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους) too should be understood in a specific Peripatetic sense here. Aristotle’s words at *Mete.* 2.2 355a23–24 concerned with “the cosmos about the earth” (τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν) as distinguished from τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν, “the whole heaven”, show that one may (in technical Peripatetic language) speak of more than one *cosmos* in an *ouranos*, or world-system. Also compare *Mete.* 1.2 339a18, ὁ ... περὶ τὴν γῆν ὅλος κόσμος (“the whole terrestrial region”) filled by the four elements, and 1.3 339b18, ὁ περὶ τὰς ἄνω φορὰς κόσμος (“the whole region of the celestial motions”) filled by the fifth element.<sup>16</sup> Note moreover that Aristotle’s “cosmos about the earth” may have two parts, or “places”, that is, one “bordering on the heavenly motions” (*Mete.* 1.8 346b10–11, τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν κόσμῳ τῷ συνεχεῖ ταῖς φοραῖς), namely the area of air and the vaporous and fiery exhalations, and a second one that is next but comes first in relation to the earth, |  
6 namely the common location of water and air.<sup>17</sup> So in one and the same Aristotelian world-system there can in fact be three *kosmoi*, or cosmic regions, each with its own specific phenomena: (1) the heavenly region (also called *ouranos*), and the (2) upper and (3) the lower sublunary region (the latter including the earth). It is in the two sublunary *kosmoi* that the so-called meteorological phenomena described in the *Meteorology* occur. In his treatise Aristotle proceeds from the circumference to the centre, first discussing the region bordering on the heavenly motions, then the remainder, though he does not adhere to this order throughout.<sup>18</sup>

16 See especially the seminal account of Kerschensteiner (1962), 44–48, esp. 46 for more passages from the *Meteorology*; accepted in the review by Kerferd (1964), 183; followed by Mansfeld (1971), 42–45; cf. Kahn (1985), xiv, Schibli (1990), 22–24. Other parallels cited Mansfeld (1971), 44 n. 35. But Kerschensteiner takes *kosmoi* to denote specific elemental layers (“Schichten”) which she even claims as valid for Anaximander, whereas I prefer to stick to the Aristotelian usage. Conche (1991), 169, 191 (“le cosmos dans l’*ouranos*”), believes that *kosmos* denotes a passing condition of the whole *ouranos* e.g. the *kosmos* of winter, or of summer, but does not quote evidence. For parallels of κόσμος meaning “cosmic region” see Simp. in *Cael.* 271.1–4, and Plu. *De E* 389F, 390C, *Def. Orac.* 422E–423A: interpretation of Hom. *Il.* XV.187–193 and the enigmatic passage Plato, *Ti.* 55d, see Kerschensteiner (1962), 51–57, Rescigno (1995), 356–359 (I cannot deal with the latter issue here).

17 *Mete.* 1.9 346b16–18, περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῇ θέσει μὲν δευτέρου τόπου μετὰ τοῦτον, πρώτου δὲ περὶ τὴν γῆν, λέγωμεν· οὗτος γὰρ κοινὸς ὕδατός τε τόπος καὶ ἀέρος. Also *Mete.* 1.7 344a9–11, “the first section of the cosmos about the earth, beneath the circular revolution” (τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν, ὅσον ὑπὸ τὴν ἐγκύκλιόν ἐστιν φοράν, ... τὸ πρῶτον μέρος) and 344b12, “the motion of the [sc. lower] cosmos about the earth” (ἡ φορὰ τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν). For further examples see Bonitz, *Index v.* κόσμος, 406a46–49.

18 This Aristotelian division of the world into sections became fundamental in later literature. E.g. Aëtius, proœm. to Book III (in fact to chs. 3.1–8.1 + 3.18) plus 3.8.2 Diels (actually a very short proœm. to ch. 3.9–17), distinguishes between “things in the heavens” (οὐράνια),

Significantly, Aristotle mentions “the cosmos about the earth” in his second account of *Anaximander's* cosmogony.<sup>19</sup> One may well believe that this is where Theophrastus found the justification for a plurality of *kosmoi* in the present passage.

Of the parallel texts depending on the doxographical traditions<sup>20</sup> only Hippolytus has preserved the significant words “in them”, but has lost | the word “all”, and reduced the plural *kosmoi* to the singular: ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμον, “(the principle), from which the heavens come to be and the *cosmos* (ordering) in them”. κόσμον may be a mistake, for in the next sentence Hippolytus says that the principle “encompasses all the *kosmoi*”, πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους—here even the word “all” has been preserved.<sup>21</sup> But the singular may also be a *Verschlimmbesserung* or disimprovement, a misguided attempt to make sense of a text that was hard to understand. The *Stromateis* of ps.Plutarch has muddled the information in a different way: ἐξ οὗ δὴ φησι τοὺς τε οὐρανούς ἀποκεκρίσθαι καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους, “(the Infinite), from which as he says the heavens have (been) separated off and (so) generally all the infinitely many *kosmoi*”.<sup>22</sup> Here heavens and *kosmoi* have been put on a par, which has made it easy for the word ἅπαντας to leave the former and become an attribute of the latter. Finally, “infinitely many *kosmoi*” are also mentioned by Aëtius, but (all) the *ouranoi* and the phrase “in them” have gone.<sup>23</sup>

“things on high” (μετάρσια), and “things belonging to the earth” (πρόσγεια). Seneca, *Nat.* 2.1, likewise distinguishes between *caelestia*, *sublimia*, and *terrena*; applied to divination Dion. Hal. 2.64.4 (περὶ τὰ οὐράνια καὶ τὰ μετάρσια καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια). We note that this scholastic terminology is not yet found in Aristotle. See further Hine (1984), 124–126; Mansfeld and Runia (2009), Pt. 1, 46–47, 54–55 (I should have cited the Aristotelian precedents mentioned in the above paragraph).

19 *Mete.* 2.2 355a23, which pertains to Anaximander alone, not to Diogenes. Cf. below, n. 55 and text thereto.

20 Conveniently printed in Kahn (1960), 33–34.

21 *Ref.* 1.6.1 = Anaximander fr. 12A10 DK; Marcovich prints Ritter's conjecture κόσμους in his text. Hippolytus' πάντας περιέχειν τοὺς κόσμους rather precisely reproduces Aristotle's formula cited above, text to n. 13.

22 Ps.Plut. *Strom.* 2 = Anaximander fr. 12A10 DK.

23 Aët. 1.3.3 Diels = Anaximander fr. 12A14 DK. For this half of the simplified division see also Aët. 2.1.3, “Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaus, Xenophanes, Diogenes, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus and his teacher Metrodorus (declare that there are) infinitely many *kosmoi* in the infinite throughout the whole surrounding area” (trans. Runia, slightly modified); see the dialectical-doxographical parallels for the *diaphonia* between (mostly, but not entirely) “one” and “infinitely many” collected by Runia for Aët. 2.1 at Mansfeld and Runia (2009), Pt. 2, 321–323, and for further evidence of the more complete distinction

Our survey of the Aristotelian evidence as applicable to the Anaximander fragment has shown that the *kosmoi* are not worlds but cosmic regions, and that the multiple world-systems are denoted by the term *ouranoi*. Placing Anaximander (and others) on the same side of the doxographical diaeresis as the Atomists in the simplified division of the number of worlds as “one” versus “infinitely many” will have furthered this attribution of *infinitely* many world-systems to the Milesian. It is of course easy to understand that infinitely many worlds are ascribed to someone who called his principle “infinite”. Yet we must note that “all”, as said of the world-systems in the Simplicius passage (and in Hippolytus), is by no means the same as “infinitely many”.<sup>24</sup>

- In the above I have used the formula doxographical tradition on purpose.
- 8 The famous hypothesis of Usener<sup>25</sup> (perfected on a vast scale by Diels | in the *Doxographi Graeci*) that the parallel accounts in Hippolytus' *Refutatio omnium haeresium*, ps.Plutarch's *Stromateis*, Diogenes Laërtius' *Vitae*, and Aëtius' *Placita* all go back to Theophrastus, just like the Simplicius passage, has sometimes been an excuse for arbitrary dealings with these texts. Scholars have felt encouraged to prefer sections in one or the other of these accounts to their parallels, as being closer (or so they believe) to the original reportage of Theophrastus, or even to the lost original of Anaximander. But what is needed first is an interpretation of the Simplicius passage without recourse to these parallels. It is only where Simplicius' text provides no information (it does not deal with the details of physics, or of cosmology) that we are constrained to look at other texts.

We should also take dependence of the doxography on Aristotle rather than on Theophrastus into account. And a part of the evidence concerned with Anaximander's cosmogony in a chapter of Aristotle's *Meteorology* has been somewhat neglected. Following Diels' example parallel texts that are believed to derive from Theophrastus are in the scholarly literature often presented in parallel columns.<sup>26</sup> You never find a column adding the evidence in Aristotle. In their Anaximander chapter (as also often enough elsewhere in their *magnum opus*) Diels and Kranz as a rule print what they believe to be Theophrastean evidence before the passages from Aristotle, viz. frs. 12A9–14; at fr. 12A9 they insert an Aristotelian sentence only to explain a longish piece attributed to

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between “one”, “many” and “infinitely many” in parts of the tradition Mansfeld (1992), 84 with n. 88 and 70 with n. 120 (= (2010), 59 and 70).

24 Cf. below, text to n. 88, and above, n. 23 *ad finem*.

25 The pioneering contribution of Usener (1858, repr. 1912), 72–73, and apparatus to the fragments, has been forgotten, though Regenbogen (1940), 1535, points out: “Wesentliches über die Nachwirkung des theophrastischen Werkes hat schon Usener gesehen und ausgesprochen, auch die Abhängigkeit des Ps.Plutarch, Galen und Hippolytos bemerkt.”

26 E.g. Finkelberg (1994).



Theophrastus. Kahn invariably begins his useful collections of quoted passages with the purported Theophrastean evidence and concludes with Aristotle. Yet it is often Aristotle's evidence that is primary.

As to the multiple world-systems, the real issue is not their number, but the way in which their coming into being from (and perishing into) the Infinite are to be reconciled with the sentences (partly verbatim Anaximander) about cosmic justice and injustice, which tell us

from which [plural] coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these [plural] their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be (*to chreôn*), for (*gar*) they pay penalty and retribution (*dikên kai tisin*) to each other (*allêlois*) for the injustice [or: offence] (*adikia*) according to the order of time (*ton tou chronou taxin*).

If these sentences describe a cyclical and stable equilibrium of cosmic forces, as has as a rule been believed, a contradiction ensues. Barnes, for instance, argues that the ascription to Anaximander of "from which coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these their perishing too comes to be" makes the argument "inexplicable".<sup>27</sup> One therefore understands why scholars have argued that the phrase about injustice is a parenthesis,<sup>28</sup> or that the Simplicius text consists of two rather different fragments. Schofield argues that Theophrastus by emphasizing destruction presents things in a false light: The sentence "He said that it is neither ... orderings [i.e., *kosmoi*] in them" "concerns generation of worlds from the *apeiron*", while the next sentence "is introduced by a remark focused on *destruction*, which despite its plurals ("out of those ... into these") looks designed to furnish a balancing comment on the death of worlds. Yet the plurals give the game away: the only evidence T(theophrastus) actually can offer to support the implication of cosmic destruction is a statement of A(naximander) about the effect of opposites on *each other*".<sup>29</sup> Johansen argues that the fragment works on two levels, as it pertains both to a "transition of things into each other in this world" and is applicable to "worlds in relation to the Apeiron".

27 Barnes (1979), 33–34; cf. below, n. 66 and text thereto.

28 Thus McDiarmid (1953, repr. 1970), 190–191, who denies that *gar* links the phrase about *dikê* and *adikia* to that about a purported cycle of generation and destruction. Cf. Kahn (1960), 167.

29 Schofield (1997), 62–63; his italics. Engmann (1991), 17, argues that "a deep inconsistency is charged to Anaximander by the interpretation of the justice of the fragment as a self-perpetuating cycle of genesis and perishing"; she refers to Kraus (1950), 366–369, who spoke of "ein krasser Widerspruch".

He concludes that 12B1 DK has been cobbled together from two fragments.<sup>30</sup> Similarly Louguet, who argues that Simplicius found the problematic sentence elsewhere and inserted it in his Theophrastus abstract.<sup>31</sup> Graham argues that we may depart from what he calls the “doxographical reading, no matter how venerable it may be” in favour of the interpretation of the fragment as dealing with a cosmic equilibrium.<sup>32</sup>

- 10 The situation is difficult, for one does not need an Infinite as principle (or source) when the process of becoming and perishing is cyclical, as was already pointed out by Aristotle:

In order that coming to be should not fail, it is not necessary that there should be a sensible body that is actually infinite. The passing away of one thing can be the coming to be of another, the all being limited.<sup>33</sup>

So perhaps the interpretation of the difficult sentences as being about a stable and continuous cosmic cycle is not good. At any rate I believe, and shall argue in what follows, that the recommendation to cut up the Simplicius passage into two unrelated parts need not be accepted.

## II Varieties of Interpretation

The two main readings of Anaximander’s fragment 12A9/B 1 DK in Simplicius are (1) a mystical interpretation, dominant in the nineteenth century, and (2) a naturalistic interpretation, dominant in the twentieth century. When you

30 Johansen (1998), 25.

31 Louguet (2001), 28–35. Thus already Fehling (1994), 109, who derives ἐξ ὧν δὲ ... τὰξιν from the doxographical vulgate, but *ibid.*, 187–191, argues that the combination of the two ingredients (or purported fragments), for which he manages to find parallels *ad sententiam* at Lucr. *DRN* 5.251–278 and Ovid. *Met.* 15.244–250, is much earlier than Simplicius.

32 Graham (2006), 37–38. But he believes that “on the ancient reading of the doxographers” compensation is paid by the opposites to the Infinite, an idea which is in fact an echo of the interpretation dominant in the nineteenth century, see below, n. 34 and text thereto. No trace in the doxography. McKirahan (1994), 33–47, on the other hand, is not happy with the equilibrium, because the cosmogony is a “conspicuous exception”. He wonders whether there may be “gaps in the evidence”.

33 Arist. *Phys.* 3.8 208a8–11 οὕτε γὰρ ἴνα ἡ γένεσις μὴ ἐπιλείπη, ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεργεῖα ἄπειρον εἶναι σώμα αἰσθητόν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὴν θατέρου φθορὰν θατέρου εἶναι γένεσιν, πεπερασμένου ὄντος τοῦ παντός (the first sentence, οὕτε [...] αἰσθητόν = Anaximander fr. 12A14 DK, final text). For the thought cf. *Phys.* 5.2 225b23–26, *GC* 1.3 318a23–25, 319a20–22, and Bonitz, *Index v. κύκλος*, 414a6–14.

consider them in their chronological succession they turn out to belong with the history of mentalities, and to illustrate the process of secularization. What in the nineteenth century was a commonplace view becomes a more or less bizarre one in the twentieth.<sup>34</sup>

A third interpretation, according to which Anaximander's cosmos is a normal dissipative system (i.e., a system that is not in a state of equilibrium), and the fragment is about the present condition of the "things that are" in the world, as well as about their past (cosmogony) and future | (world's end), is a minority view.<sup>35</sup> In the present paper I shall argue for this interpretation. 11

The two other readings attribute a profound world-view to Anaximander, a sort of meta-view. Their supporters are constrained to look rather far beyond the text.

When the word ἀλλήλοις, "to each other", is lacking in the text (which it was for a long time) the things that are do pay penalty and retribution, but it is far from clear why they have to do this, or to whom or what. The solution according to the mystical interpretation, only arguable as long as ἀλλήλοις is absent, or is ignored, is that the generation of things from the Infinite must be a crime committed against the Infinite, a sort of Fall (*Sündenfall*), which must be punished by death, that is, by their disappearing again into the Infinite.<sup>36</sup> In the past scholars used to appeal to what they believed to be parallel ideas in Early Orphism, a mistaken suggestion that has been recently revived by Finkelberg and Bernabé, who believe that both for Anaximander and for Early Orphism one may speak of an origin from the principle and reunification with it of individual souls.<sup>37</sup>

According to the now dominant naturalistic interpretation, based on a text that includes the word ἀλλήλοις, the unjust acts are committed against each other by forces of nature that oppose one another as equals, and they also pun-

34 These interpretations, esp. the mystical one (see already Kahn (1960), 193–196), are discussed in ch. 3 above, on Anaximander's *Sitz im Nachleben*.

35 Represented by e.g. Kerchensteiner (1962), Freudenthal (1986), Conche (1991).

36 The first to have thought of this explication seems to have been the philosopher Heinrich Ritter (1821), 188–189. It is still advocated by Sandywell (1996), 157.

37 Finkelberg (1986), 322, 332; Bernabé (2002), 212–214 (the verbatim section of Anaximander's fragment reminds him of a "cosmogonie orphique", *ibid.* 218). For the first Presocratics there is no evidence concerning such a view of the soul. There is no early Orphic or Pythagorean evidence either that the soul reunites with its divine origin, see e.g. Bremmer (2002), 11–26; Pugliese Carratelli (2001), 21, on the message of some of the gold tablets: "ottenere di ricongiungersi (non di confondersi) con la stirpe divina". Betegh (2006), 36–37, claims that Orphic frs. 436F–438F Bernabé "say that the soul comes from *aither*, is from *aither*, and returns to *aither*"; the evidence, however is not early (437F Bern. is admittedly a pastiche of Heraclitus fr. B36 DK), and also as to content fails to live up to this expectation.

ish each other. As a rule this is further explained as an autonomous and even law-like natural process, which ensures that the cosmos does not come to an end because the cycle of transformation lasts forever. The *prôtos heuretês* of this idea seems to have been the American scholar Heidel, a pupil of Diels, who in 1908 and 1912 argued that justice (*δίκη*) “obtains between peers”, and for the first time emphasized that “paying penalty and | retribution to *each other* for the injustice” entails the idea of a stable cosmic equilibrium. He referred to day following night and conversely, and to the cycle of spring summer autumn winter spring, and so on.<sup>38</sup> The origin of this powerful idea of equally balancing forces has subsequently been sought in the history of the Greek polis.<sup>39</sup> But equality before the law is not an ancient Greek notion.<sup>40</sup>

There is also another problem with this equilibrium. Anaximander’s cosmogony (like Hesiod’s theogony) is a quite violent affair. What is more, it is reported that at some time in the future the sea will completely dry up.<sup>41</sup> This information is incompatible with the idea of a cosmic equilibrium. A reference to periodical cataclysms (deluge, drying out) somehow compensating each other is often used as a way out of this difficulty, although there is no evidence that Anaximander spoke of such cataclysms.<sup>42</sup>

38 Already Heidel (1908), esp. 218–219, then (1912), 233–234, and even Fehling (1994), 46–47. Heidel pointed out that few scholars had bothered to acknowledge the better text of Usener (1858) and Diels (1882), which includes *ἀλλήλοις*. For the cyclical equilibrium see further e.g. Vlastos (1947) and (1953), Kahn (1960), 132–133, 186–193, Rapp (1997), 44–49. Sassi (2006), 17–18, argues for a dynamic equilibrium among non-equals.

39 Vernant (1962/1987), iii, “une loi immanente à l’univers, une règle de répartition (*nomos*) imposant à tous les éléments constituant la nature un ordre égalitaire”, and Vernant (1968), esp. 19–23; criticized by Laks (2006), 86–98, Sassi (2007), and Laks (2008b). See e.g. already Jaeger (cited below, n. 52).

40 Gagarin (2002), 21–22, argues against the assumption of an equilibrium because the sentence “they pay penalty and retribution to each other for the injustice” in no way entails that the opposed forces are equals, and he points out that the “notion that Greek justice was an affair between equals, involving equal compensation for injury or some other sort of equilibrium, is simply not supported by the evidence”. The picture here is that of a “cosmos as continual strife” (so, one may add, still no world’s end). It should however be noted that those who argue in favour of the equilibrium base themselves not only on the sentence on penalty and retribution, but on this sentence in connection with the preceding phrase “from which coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these their perishing too comes to be”.

41 Anaximander fr. 12A27 DK 2nd text (= Diogenes T32 Laks) = Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels = fr. 221 FHS&G, *ap. Alex. in Mete.* 67.3–12, who comments on Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353b6–11 = Anaximander fr. 12A27 DK, 1st text. See further below, n. 53 and text thereto.

42 Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), 138–140. The issue was already discussed by Schleiermacher (1815), 58–60.

### III Other Options

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The moment has come to discuss a few other ideas, by no means all original with the present writer. These alternatives taken together enable us to begin reading the fragment in a way that not only avoids the pitfalls of its presumed inner inconsistency, but also does not contradict the doxographical information about the drying up of the sea.

(1) The first of these other ideas is that the verb *periechein* (περιέχειν), said of Anaximander's Infinite by Aristotle<sup>43</sup> and as a rule interpreted by scholars as "surround", or "encompass", or "enclose", in a *spatial* sense, may also be understood in a *temporal* sense. Barnes writes: "What limits did it [*scil.*, the Infinite] lack? Common sense suggests the boundaries of space and time".<sup>44</sup> But common sense needs the assistance of philology. The temporal sense can be paralleled in Aristotle, even in a passage that as to contents is quite similar to one on Anaximander:

The fulfillment which encloses the length of life of every creature (τὸ ... τέλος τὸ περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἐκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον), and which cannot in nature be exceeded, is called the *aeon* of each. By the same analogy, also the fulfillment of the whole heaven, the fulfillment which encloses all time even to infinity (τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος), is *aeon*, taking the name from αἰεὶ εἶναι ("to be everlastingly"), for it is immortal and divine (ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος).<sup>45</sup>

A cosmological interpretation of the Anaximander fragment allowing for the disappearing of the world-system(s) becomes quite plausible once the verb *periechein* is taken in a temporal sense as well.

(2) The *second* of these ideas is that the interpretation according to which balanced reciprocal offence against and punishment of each other is equivalent to a law of nature becomes inconsistent when applied to the future of a cosmos only (eternal balance) and not to the cosmogony (where no | equilib-

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43 See above, nn. 14 and 15, and text thereto.

44 Barnes (1979), 29. Conche (1991), 60, refers to Arist. *Phys.* 4.12 228a28–29, see below, n. 46. Cf. also Mansfeld (1984), 58. The passage quoted above, text to n. 13, also becomes easier when one thinks of time as well. Diels in his lectures of 1897–1898, 20, discussing Anaximander, believes that temporal infinity is more important than spatial infinity.

45 Arist. *Cael.* 1.9 279a23–28 (cf. *Phys.* 4.2 218a11–14, "the shorter time is contained (περιέχεται) by the other"; 4.12 228a28–29, "everything in time is contained by time"); for the Anaximandrian parallel see fr. 12B3 DK *ap.* Arist. *Phys.* 3.4 203b13, ἀθάνατον ... καὶ ἀνώλεθρον.

rium). Though cataclysms may be believed to be helpful, reciprocity need not be a matter of equality, or of permanence.

(3) The *third* is that the particle γάρ, “for”, which has often been applied to the whole clause “from which coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be”, may equally well apply to its second part only, viz. to “to these their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be”.<sup>46</sup> We then have an *argument*,<sup>47</sup> proving that (certain) things *do perish* into that from which they came *because* they are punishing and compensating each other for the unjust acts perpetrated against each other. So Anaximander is able to *argue* that generation *entails* destruction. What is provided, in other words, is an explanation of destruction, not of generation-plus-destruction.

(4) I believe that in Anaximander’s environment the generation of the world and of what successively comes to be in it did not present a problem.<sup>48</sup> You had for instance Hesiod’s *Theogony*, or the Orphic poems, which in the fashion of myth describe the coming to be of the world and what is in it. *Genesis* just happens: *Th.* 115, 116, etc., ἐγένετ’. (Or think of a famous Euripides fragment: “blessed whoever acquired knowledge through inquiry, contemplating the *unaging* order of *undying* nature, the way it came together and when and how [...]”).<sup>49</sup> Because the generation of the world is accounted for in the mythological traditions and has by now, after the defeat of the powers of destruction, been brought to a successful conclusion under the rule of Zeus, there is no reason to think of its corruption. | There is indeed no evidence suggesting that the end of the world was a matter people thought about (we are not in India). Geoffrey Kirk even argued that the early Ionians were only concerned with “cosmic evolution from a single kind of matter.” This concern “did *not* necessitate

46 Barnes (1979), 33, argues (like McDiarmid) that *gar* is to be ascribed to Theophrastus not Anaximander (cf. above, n. 28 and text thereto); the phrase about *genesis* and *phthora* in his view means that the “*general* [his italics] principle that things are destroyed into what they came from” (he calls this an “ancient and popular” “sentiment”) is accepted. Engmann (1991), 6, translates “and perishing too takes place into that from which things have their genesis” and says that this phrase concerns the infinite as terminus; *gar* pertains to *kata to chreôn* (but this, in my view, would take the rest of the phrase with it). By having *genesis* and perishing change places in the (translated) sentence Engmann emphasizes perishing. Conche (1991), 167, also argues that the emphasis is on perishing. For Schofield see above, text to n. 29.

47 Cf. Conche (1991), 166–167, 176–179.

48 Interestingly enough this was already pointed out by Tannery (1887), 106, though he got Anaximander’s argument wrong.

49 Fr. 910 Nauck = Anaxagoras fr. 59A30 DK, 6th text, ὁλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας / ἔσχε μάθησιν, / [...] ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως / κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη / καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως.

the irrelevant and bizarre hypothesis of the world again disappearing into that same kind of matter".<sup>50</sup> Wonderful rhetoric!

But that others did not consider the disappearing of the world by no means entails that Anaximander failed to do so. The idea that the world will be destroyed, just as individual things around us can be destroyed when their time has come, was novel, so had to be *proved* in some way. As a matter of fact, Anaximander's explanation of the generation of the world as a natural process comparable to the generation of, say, a tree, or a marine animal, unavoidably suggests that, just as such a tree or animal, the world too will at one time come to its end.

(5) If the emphasis is on destruction (*phthora*), the expression κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν ("according to necessity", "according to what must be"), too, is thrown into sharper relief. *To chreôn*, "necessity", can also denote death. The formula "according to the order of time" then also falls into place a bit more easily. Of course this expression in the first place pertains to a succession of events. But time is also the great destroyer, as for instance Sophocles and Aristotle emphasizes,<sup>51</sup> so this reference to what is unavoidable and happens according to the order of time indeed strengthens the notion of passing away. I believe that the idea of calling time Time, elevating it to the status of a divinity,<sup>52</sup> and translating "according to the jurisdiction of Time", first argued by Werner Jaeger and popular with many scholars, is not helpful.

(6) As to the injustice(s) that is/are to be revenged, it is hard to believe that the succession of day and night and the cycle of the seasons really amount to varieties of injustice that are sufficiently spectacular. Though the seasons are part of the picture in one of the testimonia on the drying up of the sea (the

50 Kirk (1955, repr. 1970), 355. Italics in the original.

51 Soph. *O.C.* 609–610, τὰ δ' ἄλλα συγχεῖ πάνθ' ὁ παγκρατὴς χρόνος. φθίνει μὲν ἰσχύς γῆς, φθίνει δὲ σώματος ("Everything else sinks into chaos from time which overpowers all. Earth's strength decays, and so too the strength of the body", trans. Jebb); Arist. *Phys.* 4.12 221a30–b5, φθορὰς γὰρ αἴτιος καθ' ἑαυτὸν μᾶλλον ὁ χρόνος ("time itself is more a cause of destruction"). Cf. *Ov. Met.* 15.234.

52 Jaeger (1924), 227, cf. an oration pronounced in the same year, Jaeger (1934a) repr. (1960), 90, where he posits that the Greek *polis* and Greek law stand for equilibrium (cf. above, text to n. 38), and says of Anaximander: "auch die Kräfte im Weltall, die sich titanisch zu vergewältigen suchen, müssen am Ende sich beugen und einander Rechtsbuße zahlen und Schadenersatz für ihre Übergriffe nach dem Rechtspruch der Zeit". Cf. Jaeger (1934b and 1959), 217–218 (engl. trans., 159–160); and (1947), 34–36 with n. (arguing against the "hope of tracing this back to the Orphic religion"). See also Sassi (2009), 134–135, quoting and commenting on Jaeger (1947), 50. Jaeger was followed by many e.g. by his student Pagel (1927), 29–30, who in his turn influenced the literature on Herodotus.

“turnings of the sun”, i.e., the summer and winter solstices),<sup>53</sup> it is (if only for the sake of the argument) more attractive to begin by considering the *cosmogonical process* as a series of injustices (τῆς ἀδικίας) committed against each other (ἀλλήλοις) by the forces of nature. And these injustices against one another perpetrated during the cosmogony are punished and so compensated for by those committed against each other when the world is destroyed.<sup>54</sup>

- 17 (7) Anaximander’s cosmogony is briefly cited twice (without name-label; Theophrastus, cited by Alexander *ad loc.*, mentions Anaximander and Diogenes) in Aristotle’s account of various views on the origin of the sea and the cause of its saltiness, since the process of dessiccation which according to some is responsible for its condition began at the beginning of the world, and will continue until everything is dry.<sup>55</sup> The action of the sun (as Aristotle calls it) on the primeval mud dries it and produces air, so that the whole heavens (or the whole world) are expanded (*Mete.* 2.2 355a24, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀυξηθῆναι), and winds come about, i.e., air | in motion. Note that Laks correctly points out that Aristotle’s wording here rules out Diogenes, whose air, qua primary element, is not generated by the action of heat on mud. The account, he adds, is typical for Anaximander, esp. as to “the growth of the whole heaven”.<sup>56</sup>

53 τροπὰς ἡλίου, Arist. *Met.* 2.1 353b6–11 (no names) = Anaximander fr. 12A27 DK, 1st text, cf. Alexander’s paraphrastic commentary citing Theophrastus (*Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels = 221 FHS&G) for the name-labels Anaximander and Diogenes, in *Mete.* 67.6 = Anaximander fr. 12A27 DK, 2nd text. Cf. above, n. 41 and text thereto.

54 As intimated by Burnet (1892), 60, 62, who however in subsequent editions changed his mind, see ch. 3 above, pp. 81–82. For the Simplicius text Burnet accepted the *constitutio* of Usener (1858), which includes ἀλλήλοις (cf. above, n. 38), though he could have referred to that of Diels (1882), which he often refers to. Diels’ text was already accepted by Zeller (1883), 34–35 (cf. below, n. 75).

55 Arist. *Mete.* 2.1 353b6–11 (cf. above, n. 41 and text thereto), plus the somewhat different passage *Mete.* 2.2 355a22–25, printed at DG 495 in the apparatus to Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 23 Diels = fr. 221 FHS&G (and as Diogenes 64A9 DK, but not in the Anaximander chapter of DK; printed in Kahn (1960), 64, Laks (1983), 202 = (2008), 213, Conche (1991), 195). Cf. Sedley (1998), 177–178, who cites our passage as a parallel for the “withdrawal of the sea” (θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως) in a fragment of Theophrastus which, he argues, belongs with the *Physikai doxai* (*Phys.Op.* fr. 12 Diels = 184 FHS&G *ap. Philo. Aet.* 117 and 120); here however no mention of its saltiness is found. Arist. *Mete.* 2.2 355a22–25 is lacking in the collection of Gemelli Marciano (2007), thus permitting the author to deny (pp. 59–60) that the heavens are formed gradually. Fehling (1994), 155, rejects the testimony about the drying up of the sea because he believes it conflicts with the verbatim fragment.

56 Laks (1983), 202 = (2008), 213, referring to Kahn (1960), 66, 87; *probat* Conche (1991), 195 n. 8. A similar argument also at Kerschensteiner (1962), 46, 48.



In partly different detail this process is described by ps.Plutarch, *Stromateis*:<sup>57</sup> a *gonimon*, a substance which generates the hot and the cold is separated off (from the “Eternal” something, i.e., the Infinite). The term *gonimon* is not found in Aristotle’s references to Anaximander. On the other hand Aristotle’s description of the *origin* of air is absent in the *Stromateis* passage, for the next thing we read in this ps.Plutarch is that a ball of fire grows around the *air* about the earth. When this is torn off, and is enclosed in certain rings, the sun, the moon, and the stars come to be—which corresponds with Aristotle’s much shorter remark about the expansion of the heavens (no rings in Aristotle). The drying up of the sea, again, is not found in the *Stromateis* passage, which is about the cosmogony only, and does not deal with Aristotle’s specific theme of the origin of the saltiness of the sea. But as to cosmogony the accounts in Aristotle and ps.Plutarch supplement each other. We may add that what becomes the earth remains in the place where the cold had been while the rest, so to speak, is blown away from it. We may well believe that today’s conditions are mild compared with those obtaining at the times of the cosmogony, although the sun, farthest away but still hot, is still dehydrating the earth-plus-sea further (injustice continued!).<sup>58</sup>

But I wish to argue that a non-verbal parallel for the *gonimon* exists in Aristotle. In a well-known passage of the *Physics* he tells us that

some (affirm) that the opposites are present in the One and are separated out from it (ἐκ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι), as Anaximander says, and | those who (affirm) that what is is one and many, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras; for they too separate the other things out from the mixture.<sup>59</sup>

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This brief comparison has led to the assumption that the opposites (e.g. hot and cold) are present in (ἐνούσας) the Infinite, that is, *actualiter* in the principle itself, which then would be a mixture just as Empedocles’ Sphairos. This view is no longer popular.<sup>60</sup> Elsewhere Aristotle argues that they are present poten-

57 Cf. above, n. 22.

58 A perhaps early parallel for a battle of natural forces (here the dry and the wet, the hot and the cold, the heavy and the light, fire and water) is provided by the famous allegorical interpretation of the theomachy in *Iliad* Book XX attributed to Theagenes of Rhegium (ca. 529–522 BCE), fr. 8.2 DK; see Primavesi (2005), 72–74. Note however that further on in this text the “elements” (*stoicheia*) are said to be destroyed individually once but to be eternal collectively (κατὰ μέρος μὲν ἐπιδέχεσθαι φθορὰν ἅπασι, τὰ πάντα δὲ μένειν αἰωνίως).

59 *Phys.* 1.4 187a20–23 = Anaximander fr. 12A9 DK / Anaxagoras fr. 59A16 DK, 3rd text.

60 See Kahn (1960), 41–42, with references, though it is not clear what is the basis for his

tially.<sup>61</sup> The (Anaximandrian) One, which Aristotle here does not call by the name of Infinite, in the context of the *Physics* passage pertains to the “underlying body”, or “matter”. Note that the Empedoclean Sphairos is not a principle either: Aristotle is here concerned with the beginnings of cosmogony, and for his present purpose has Empedocles’ cosmic cycle start from a phase where, as in Anaxagoras, all elementary things are together. According to the *Stromateis* passage cited above the opposites are produced by a generative something (the *gonimon*) that itself at one time is separated off from the Infinite (the word ἀποκρίνεσθαι can be used of semen).<sup>62</sup> So the opposites are not present earlier. I suggest that the Anaximandrian One mentioned by Aristotle may in the first place be associated with this *gonimon*. Also note that according to ps.Plutarch this generative something comes about *in* the Infinite, which of course continues to contain it. The opposites which come to be in the *gonimon* are therefore also in the Infinite, as the coins that happen to be in the purse in my pocket are in my pocket. But note that the opposites are not only in a spatial sense in the Infinite; they are also in it in a temporal sense, because they are generated at some time from something which itself is generated in the Infinite, and, as we may assume, they will at some time be destroyed. The Infinite remains. The hot and the cold are, in Aristotelian conceptual language, potentially present in the Infinite before they are separated out at a specific moment via the *gonimon*, and they are actually present as from that same specific moment, for so long as it takes, that is.

- 19 (8) As to the *meson*, the element “in between water and air or air and fire” (we may recall that “the middle ground has a considerable extension and is not indivisible”),<sup>63</sup> I see no need to disagree with those ancient commenta-

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remark that Theophrastus “implicitly rejects the interpretation of the opposites as ‘inhering’ (ἐνούσας) in the ἄπειρον before their separating-off”; Conche (1991), 96. But Graham (2006), 55, says that Aristotle here believes that the Infinite is “a mixture of preexisting elements”. Fehling (1994), 53, believes Anaximander’s One is the earth.

61 *Met.* Λ.2 1069b19–24 (not in the Anaximander chapter of DK).

62 Kahn (1960), 156.

63 E.g. *GC* 2.5 332a21–22, μέσον τι ἄερος καὶ ὕδατος ἢ ἄερος καὶ πυρός. See *GC* 2.7 334b27, τὸ δὲ μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιείρετον. Full lists of intermediates for Aristotle at Kahn (160), 37 n. a, and Whitby (1982), 225 n. 1. Aristotle also speaks of something “besides” the regular four elements, e.g. *Phys.* 3.5 204b22–26 = Anaximander fr. 12A16 DK, 4th text (see Whitby, *ibid.*, n. 2), echoed in the final paragraph of the Simplicius text, τὶ ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα (see below, Appendix). Palmer (2009), 338 n. 18, argues that Aristotle’s distinction at *Phys.* 1.4 187a12–23 between on the one hand those who posit one of the familiar three elements as substrate, or something denser than fire and rarer than air, and on the other Anaximander (and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, one should add), who separated out of the One the opposites that are in it (above, text to n. 59), precludes attribution to Anaximan-

tors who think that Aristotle attributes it to Anaximander.<sup>64</sup> Kahn writes that we do not know whom else we could attribute it to.<sup>65</sup> I believe, however, that we should accept that Aristotle has a problem. Thinking of the cosmogony he cannot help presenting the Infinite as in some way becoming, or being, a plurality. But thinking in the direction of the principle itself he wishes to express its unitary character in physical terms that make sense, and bring it closer to the principles of early physicist monists such as Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus.

#### IV Disproving the Equilibrium

An important problem that remains is that of the denotation of *onta*, a term that occurs twice in Simplicius' text:

(a), ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχείον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, "he said that the principle and element of *the things that are* is the Infinite", 20

and

(c), ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών, "and from which [plural] coming to be occurs for *the things that are*, to these [plural] their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be".

In the introductory phrase (a), *onta* seem to denote in a rough way everything, not excluding the *ouranoi* of which the Infinite is the principle and element. Indeed, in the sentence that precedes (c), viz. the sentence

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der of the intermediate element. But Aristotle's opposition of views here is very formal, as Zeller (1919), 285 n. 1 already pointed out: it is clear that Aristotle "überhaupt nicht darauf ausgeht, die Ansichten einzelner, streng auseinandergehalten, mit geschichtlicher Genauigkeit darzustellen, sondern vielmehr eine allgemeine Schilderung nach sachlichen Kategorien gibt, deren einzelne Züge er von Verschiedenen entlehnt". In the text after n. 65 I argue that as to Anaximander he has it both ways; a similar argument is at Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), 111–113.

64 Interesting arguments against the attribution at Whitby (1982). For some passages where the concept is found cf. above, text to n. 14 (Aristotle), and n. 9 and text thereto (Theophrastus).

65 See above, n. 14.

(*b*), ἐτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους, “a different sort of substance, infinite, from which [singular] all the heavens (i.e., world-systems) come to be and the *kosmoi* in them”.

These *ouranoi* (plus the *kosmoi* in them) are explicitly said to come to be from the Infinite.<sup>66</sup> So the *ouranoi* might seem to be a subset of the set of *onta* in general.

But it is difficult to believe that the *onta* of phrase (*c*) include the *ouranoi*, not only because “from which” and “into which” are plurals, while we have just been told that the *ouranoi* are generated from an infinite substance in the singular,<sup>67</sup> but also because it is excluded that the *ouranoi* “pay penalty and retribution to each other (*allêlois*) for the injustice according to the order of time”. It is hard to  
 21 imagine in what way | *ouranoi* (“world-systems”) can commit injustice against each other and be punished for this injustice, unless one wants to think of contemporaneous Democritean (or Epicurean) worlds in collision. There is no evidence pertaining to Anaximander to support this thought. It is even harder to imagine in what way successive world-systems could harm one another. Thus, the *onta* in sentence (*c*), i.e., those that do “pay penalty and retribution to each other” can only be inside an *ouranos*, or world-system. Accordingly, starting, so to speak, from the other side, we may hypothesize that in phrase (*c*) *onta* is used in the sense of “main ingredients (features) of a world-system”, which is a bit more specific than Barnes’s “furniture of the world” (loc. cit.). Looking back at sentence (*a*), we may add that the *onta* mentioned there are the same as those in sentence (*c*). But these *onta* do not derive from the principle directly, but by proxy, that is to say via the *gonimon*.

The *onta*, I suggest (combining the information of Aristotle, *Meteorology*, and ps.Plutarch, *Stromateis*), are wet earth and fire, and next air produced by the impact of fire on wet earth, and the sea which is left over, and then fire that has been pushed outward and broken up into wheels, and is blown around by the winds, and perhaps forced to turn around in search of the dampness it needs to sustain itself. The region of the earth plus air and the heavenly region

66 Barnes (1979), 33 (cf. above, nn. 27, 46 and text thereto) correctly points out that phrases (2) and (3) deal with different matters. I agree that (*b*) is (also) about cosmogony, and (*c*) (also) about the “production of the furniture of the world from its component stuffs”, but do not believe that they are incompatible.

67 Engmann’s argument that the clause “and perishing too takes place into that (εἰς ταῦτα) from which (ἐξ ὧν) things have their genesis” (her translation, cf. above, n. 46) pertains to perishing into the Infinite is facilitated by her claim, *ibid.*, 9, “that in the context of the formula it is indifferent whether the singular or the plural is selected”. Cf. also below, n. 74.

are the *kosmoi* in the *ouranos*. There is still interaction, for e.g. the heavenly wheels are still turning and the moisture of the sea is still drying up.

Now to the text of Simplicius again. The interpretation is made difficult because the account is not chronological. One should realize that the *ouranoi*, or world-systems, with *kosmoi* inside them have not come forth from the Infinite the way Athena was born from the head of Zeus, in full panoply. An *ouranos* that includes *kosmoi* is the *result* of a complicated cosmogonical process. By mentioning the *ouranoi* first Theophrastus commits the sin of prolepsis, or *husteron proteron*, though it is quite possible that this sequence echoes one in Anaximander.<sup>68</sup> The *ouranoi* with their internal *kosmoi* do come from the *Apeiron*, but they do so eventually and indirectly, via their constituent elements (or ingredients), and as the result of the process of world-formation. To use later terminology (though with some hesitation): *ouranoi* with *kosmoi* are a later *form* of the world's *matter*, while the ball of fire round the air about the earth compared to the tree with its bark cited by ps.Plutarch, *Stromateis*,<sup>69</sup> is an earlier form.

The series *ouranoi*—*kosmoi*—*onta*, I believe, is best understood as a listing *a capite ad calcem*, or from whole to parts, though we should realize at the same time that *ouranoi* plus *kosmoi* are the way these *onta* are organized. A parallel for this sequence is provided by Theophrastus' account of Anaxagoras (whom he compares with Anaximander):<sup>70</sup> "as the cause of motion and coming to be Anaxagoras established Intellect; (it was) through this (*scil.*, Intellect) \*\*\* by separation that they<sup>71</sup> accounted for the creation of the worlds and of the other natural things" (ὅφ' οὗ \*\*\* διακρινόμενα τοὺς τε κόσμους καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φύσιν ἐγέννησαν). The order here, too, is first "the world-systems", and then "the other natural things"—and these other natural things, I gather, are to be found inside such systems.<sup>72</sup>

68 See below, text to n. 72.

69 τίνα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαίραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν. Reference above, n. 22.

70 *Phys.Op.* fr. 4 Diels = 228A FHS&G = Anaxagoras fr. 59A41 DK, *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 27.15–17.

71 Namely Anaximander and Anaxagoras, who have just been compared by Theophrastus. Words may have dropped out (I have indicated this by asterisks). Diels (1882) reads the plural ἐγέννησαν with the majority of mss., and so do FHS&G, but they translate the singular ("he [*scil.*, Anaxagoras] accounts for creation"). Usener, following other mss., reads the singular ἐγέννησε; so still Diels *DG* 479.9. At DK 2.15.29, and Kahn 1960, 40, the text is that of Diels' Simplicius too. One cannot, of course, attribute Intellect as efficient cause to Anaximander.

72 Cf. Philolaus fr. 44B1 DK *ap. D.L.* 8.85, esp. ὅλος (ὁ) κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα, "the whole world-system and all things in it".

To repeat: the phrase telling us that all the fully organized world-systems are generated from the Infinite, as we saw, is true in the sense that, in the long run, these systems do derive from the Infinite. This also holds for the *onta*.

In order to avoid making Anaximander's cosmology as reported by Theophrastus in Simplicius inconsistent, or inexplicable, or resorting to the rather drastic surgery of explaining one or more phrases as a parenthesis, or interpolation,<sup>73</sup> we have to find a non-cyclical interpretation <sup>74</sup> of the difficult section

23 "from which [plural] coming to be occurs for the things | that are, to these [plural] their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be, for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for the injustice [or: offence] according to the order of time".

We can do so by refusing to identify the *onta* with the plural "from which" and the plural "into which". The things "from which" and "to which" are the same (in some sense of the word 'same'), but the *onta*—heavenly rings, inhabited earth, air, sea, etc.—which are generated out of them and perish back into them are different (in some sense of the word 'different'). No change, *metabolê*, into each other, although most scholars believe that this change is at issue.<sup>75</sup>

73 Cf. above, nn. 29–31, and text to these notes.

74 As pointed out by Kerschensteiner (1962), 59–63, who however fails to provide a solution for the problem of the contrast between the singular ἐξ ἧς and the plurals ἐξ ὧν // εἰς ταῦτα; she argues that the formula ἐξ ὧν etc. suggests that "die peripatetische vorstellung vom *Ineinanderübergehen der Stoffe*" has been blended with that of their destruction by each other (cf. above, n. 1). See also Couprie (1989), 60–64; I cannot accept his final interpretation of the fragment, for he refers the plurals "from which" and "to which" to the Infinite. Similarly Conche (1991), 166 with n. 13, "ἐξ ὧν reprend ἐξ ἧς de la phrase précédente, où l'antécédent est bien l'infini". Thus also Engmann, cited above, n. 46; her solution (1991), 15, perishing and genesis as "a continual process, linked with the continuing existence of the world", is not good. My own suggestion, Mansfeld (2002), 45, that the plurals apply to the Infinite as well as to the cosmic masses and the individual things, is not good either.

75 The first to conclude from Diels' Simplicius text of 1882 with ἀλλήλοις that paying the penalty to each other means changing into each other was Zeller (1892), 229. This idea, influentially argued by Kahn (1960), 181–183, has been opposed by Kerschensteiner (1962), 59–65; no "*Ineinanderübergehen von Qualitäten*" (cf. also *ibid.*, 105, for the contrast with Heraclitus). She in my view correctly applies the "paying of penalty and retribution" to e.g. the disappearance of the sea (*ibid.*, 65). That the elements do not change into each other (the verbatim fragment on injustice and punishment "gibt keinen Anlaß, an Umwandlungen zwischen den Elementen zu denken") is also claimed by Fehling (1994), 47–48, 187–191. The notion of a change into each other of the four elements (τὴν εἰς ἀλλήλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων), contemplation of which is attributed to Anaximander in the final paragraph of the Simplicius passage, does not occur before Aristotle; three elements are changing into each other according to Heraclitus, while of Plato's four the element earth does not change into the others, and conversely.

The first Presocratic thinker to argue that the opposites, or elements, change into each other is Heraclitus. We may cite two verbatim fragments: 22 B31 DK, "Turnings of fire: first, sea; of sea, half is earth, half *prêstêr*; sea is dissolved and measured into the same proportion that existed at first", and B36 DK, "for souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth, but from earth water comes into being, from water soul". Compare also B126 DK, "cold things grow hot, the hot cools, the wet dries, the parched moistens", probably verbatim.

So the solution to the puzzle would then be that the main masses of the world-system revert to their far | simpler prior identities as shapeless hot and cold. Lines of Xenophanes which are sometimes invoked as a parallel for Anaximander's cyclical equilibrium in fact provide no parallel at all for a change of elemental forces into each other, though they do constitute a parallel for the coming to be of things from and ending up as something simpler. In the verbatim fragments we read, fr. 21B27 DK, "all things (come) from earth and into earth all things end", B29 DK, "all things which come to be and grow are earth and water", and B 33 DK, "for all of us came to be from earth and water".<sup>76</sup> But earth and water do not change into one another. Both at the beginning and at the end there are no people, but only earth (and water).

24

What presumably we have to imagine (the testimonia fail to provide information) is that in the end Anaximander's opposed powers are combined in, say, a *φθοροποιόν*, a "destructive" counterpart of the "productive" *gonimon* mentioned by ps.Plutarch, *Stromateis*;<sup>77</sup> that then they destroy each other, so that they can no longer be distinguished; or that it is relatively easy for hot and cold to merge into the Infinite. After the turbulent beginnings of the cosmos things are so to speak slowing down till everything has gone and only the Infinite remains. What seems possible is that, when the moisture has been consumed by the fire, fire itself will die out for lack of sustenance, and that the earth, no longer held together by moisture, will crumble and vanish.

But apart from the information about the drying up of the sea, that is, of the total and irreversible disappearance of moisture, there is no evidence to tell us in what way this happened, and perhaps there never was. We may compare fr. 28B19 DK of Parmenides:

<sup>76</sup> Various interpretations are discussed by Leshner (1992), 124–128, 131–134.

<sup>77</sup> See above, n. 22.

Thus, I say, according to opinion these things originated and now are,  
and in later times, having received their sustenance, will end (τελευτή-  
σουσι).

On these men bestowed a name to give its mark to each.

trans. COXON

25 Parmenides described the cosmogony and cosmology, the how “these things originated and now are” in detail, but just announces that all will come to an end.<sup>78</sup> He can be certain of the fact, because according to his | ontology everything that has an origin will perish. If the above interpretation is correct, Anaximander believed that things will come to an end not for any ontological reason but for both physical and moral reasons, as a compensation for their violent beginnings.

It is at any rate clear that an *ouranos* with its *kosmoi* inside disappears when the great masses of an organized world-system revert to their primitive condition. This presumably explains why in the Simplicius text we are only told that the world-systems derive from the *Apeiron*, but are neither told how this happens nor that or how they revert to it. Both times this occurs via intermediate stages we have to supply from other source texts, or from our imagination.

As to “all the world-systems” I do not know how one is to decide between successive ones on the one hand and contemporaneous as well as successive ones on the other. But to reject out of hand that more than one world-system is involved is to contradict the evidence.<sup>79</sup> Presumably the idea that worlds succeed each other is simpler. We then still have to assume a cycle of generation, but only in the sense that each world has been preceded and will be succeeded by a similar world.

What about the Infinite itself? To explain its influence the “eternal motion”<sup>80</sup> which leads to the separating out of the opposites mentioned in the final para-

78 See Hipp. *Ref.* 1.11.1 = Parmenides fr. 28A23 DK, “he said that the cosmos is destroyed, but did not tell in what way” (τὸν <δε> κόσμον ἔφη φθείρεσθαι, ᾧ τρόπῳ, οὐκ εἶπεν). Remarks on lack of evidence are also found elsewhere in the doxography, e.g. D.L. 9.33 on Leucippus: “a world grows, decays, and perishes in virtue of some necessity, the nature of which he fails to make clear”. Simp. *in Cael.* 558.5–7 cites the beginning lines of the *Doxa* part of the Poem (fr. 28 B 8.50–52), and then, 558.8–11 fr. B19, i.e. the end of the Poem, introduced with the words “having set out the orderly arrangement of the sensible things (τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν διακόσμησιν), he continues [fr. B 19 follows]”; so the whole cosmogony and cosmology came in between fr. B 8.50–52 and fr. B 19.

79 Cf. McKirahan (2001), 51–53.

80 Simp. *in Phys.* 24.24–25.



graph of the Simplicius text has often been invoked,<sup>81</sup> though how this should work is not entirely clear. In its present form this final paragraph cannot be attributed to Theophrastus. The remark that “this is why Aristotle put him on a par with Anaxagoras” belongs in a commentary on Aristotle, not in Theophrastus’ *Physics*.<sup>82</sup> Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge Theophrastus never refers to Aristotle by name. Finally, as Schwabl (using parallel columns) has demonstrated, Simplicius’ account of Anaximander is as to structure and phraseology<sup>83</sup> entirely parallel to the | almost immediately preceding account 26 of Hippasus and Heraclitus,<sup>84</sup> and the wording of the final paragraph of the latter cannot be attributed to Theophrastus because of its partly Stoic colouring.<sup>85</sup> Now Simplicius a few lines further down attributes the eternal motion also to Anaximenes.<sup>86</sup> In the works and *reliquiae* of Theophrastus ἀίδιος combined with κίνησις occurs only in these two fragments, so I believe we had better not count these instances as verbatim quotations. The attribution by Simplicius (or by an intermediate source between Theophrastus and Simplicius) of eternal motion to Anaximander and Anaximenes can be explained as based on, yes, a confusion with the Atomists. For eternal motion is ascribed by Aristotle to “those who say there are infinitely many *kosmoi*”, clearly Leucippus and Democritus.<sup>87</sup> We have noted above that the expression “all the *kosmoi*” as used in relation with Anaximander led to its assimilation with the “infinitely many” *kosmoi* of the Atomists, though “all” is not the same as “infinitely many”.<sup>88</sup>

81 E.g. Kahn (1960), 37–42, Conche (1991), 136–156.

82 At Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 4 Diels = 228A FHS&G, partly verbatim, where Anaxagoras is also put on a par with Anaximander as to the material cause, there is no reference to Aristotle.

83 Also in the final paragraphs: καὶ δὴλον ὅτι ~ δὴλον δὲ ὅτι, οὗτοι ... θεασάμενος, ἀλλοιωτικὸν ~ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμενου (the latter pair contrasting Anaximander with Hippasus and Heraclitus).

84 Simp. in *Phys.* 23.31–24.8 = Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 1 Diels = 225 FHS&G = Hippasus fr. 18.7 DK, 2nd text = Heracl. fr. 22 A 5 DK, 2nd text (note that the final paragraph, printed in FHS&G, is not printed in *DG* and *DK*, so rejected as Theophrastean evidence by Diels). For the parallels see Schwabl (1964), 59–72.

85 Simp. in *Phys.* 24.6–7 (not in *DG*, see previous n.) τὸ ζωογόνον καὶ δημιουργικὸν καὶ πεπτικὸν καὶ διὰ πάντων χωροῦν καὶ πάντων ἀλλοιωτικὸν τῆς θερμότητος, “the life-giving and demiurgic and digestive and all-traversing and all-changing force of the heat”. For διὰ πάντων χωροῦν cf. the *Index* of *SVF*, νν. χωρέω and διήκω. The digestive force of heat is paralleled Arist. *PA* 4.3 677b33, τὸ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν πεπτικόν, its demiurgic force Thphr. *CP* 1.19.4, 6.8.4, *Ign.* 5–6.

86 Simp. in *Phys.* 24.31 = Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 2 Diels = 226A FHS&G, κίνησιν δὲ καὶ οὗτος αἰδίον ποιεῖ.

87 Arist. *Phys.* 8.1 250b18–20 ~ Democr. fr. 348 Luria, αἰεῖ ... εἶναι κίνησιν, cf. *Met.* Λ.6 1071b32–33 ~ Leuc. fr. 67A18 DK, and Λ.6 1072a6–7. In Aristotle’s own system eternal motion is attributed to the heavens.

88 Above, n. 24 and text thereto.

27 The infinite not only encloses, but also “steers” (πάντα κυβερνᾶν).<sup>89</sup> To steer means to determine the direction in which something is going.<sup>90</sup> The Infinite determines the direction in which the conflicting powers are going simply by being there, and does so from beginning to end. At the begin|ning of our world it creates by separating something, viz. the *gonimon* of hot and cold, from itself (ἐκ τοῦ αἰδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι), and thus sets an irreversible natural process into motion. Hot and cold (or dry and wet) can only act on each other as opponents, or enemies (*frigida pugnabant calidis, umentia siccis*). Thus the process of separation is continued, for next the hot is in a violent way separated from the cold. Air is separated from the mud. Conflicts and offences continue until a fully organized world-system has been formed, but do not stop. Air, for instance, continues shutting off (or attempting to shut off) the openings in the heavenly wheels in order to punish fire for its attack on the sea, while fire takes its revenge on the sea for having been driven away in the beginning. The system is self-destructive because the struggles of the opposing powers go on until they have destroyed each other (or so I presume). Diastole and systole ...

Coming to be and passing away comprise the whole of physics, as Plato's Socrates tells us.<sup>91</sup> Theophrastus' account as preserved in our Simplicius passage is a highly selective and very compressed treatment of the principle and the cosmogony. He informs us that a fully developed world-system such as the one we know has ultimately come to be from the principle by simply speaking of the *ouranoi* with the *kosmoi* in them. By adding that the things that are by punishing each other for their injustice pass away into what they came from he only gives us a hint about how things will turn out in the end. The report is not an introduction to Anaximander.

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89 Above, n. 14 and text thereto.

90 Parmenides' *daimon* “steers everything” (πάντα κυβερνᾶ) by “sending” (πέμπουσ') for instance female towards male and male towards female, fr. 28 B 12.3–6.

91 Plato, *Phd.* 95e–96a.

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## Appendix: The Simplicius Text

In the Greek text and English translation of the fragment (Anaximander fr. 12 A 9/B 1 DK = Theophrastus *Physicorum opiniones* fr. 2 Diels ~ Thphr. fr. 226A FHS&G)<sup>92</sup> and its English translation I have distinguished reportage (paraphrase plus quotation) and elucidation from each other by printing the latter in smaller typeface. The distinction between paraphrase and quotation is not of primary importance for my argument. I have picked out in bold the formulas and phrases singled out as verbatim quotations in the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* at fr. 12B1 DK:

τῶν δὲ ἐν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον,

πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς·

λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν τινὰ φύσιν

ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ᾧ δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν,

ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.

δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὗτος θεασάμενος οὐκ ἤξιωσεν ἐν τι τούτων ὑποκείμενον ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα. οὗτος δὲ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμενου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως·

διὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῦτον ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνέταξεν.

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Of those who said that it is single and in motion and infinite, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, from Miletus, who became the successor and pupil of Thales, said that **the principle and element of the things that are is the Infinite** [or: Unbounded, Inexhaustible, Undetermined: *Apeiron*],<sup>93</sup>

being the first to give this name to the principle [or: to introduce the name 'principle'].<sup>94</sup> He said that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a different sort of substance,

92 Anaximander text 5B Gemelli-Marciano (2007) 36–37, comments 64–65.

93 We are not told in what sense we are to take ἄπειρον here. Elsewhere in Theophrastus the adjective can mean both “undetermined” (*H.P.* 6.1.4) and “infinitely large/many” (*Sens.* 78, *Met.* 11a17). Also cf. *Met.* 9b4, ἡ ... εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον ὁδός.

94 But see above, text to nn. 9–11.

**infinite**, from which [singular] all the heavens (i.e., world-systems) come to be and the kosmoi in them. **And from which** [plural] **coming to be occurs for the things that are, to these** [plural] **their perishing too comes to be, according to what must be** (*to chreôn*), for they pay penalty and retribution (*dikên kai tisin*) to each other (*allêlois*) for the injustice [or: offence] (*adikia*) according to the order of time (*ton tou chronou taxin*)

– speaking of them thus in rather poetic words.

It is obvious that, having noticed the change into each other of the four elements, he did not think any one of them should be the underlying substance, but something else apart from these. And he does not make generation occur because the element changes, but because the opposites are separated off through the eternal motion,

which is why Aristotle put him on a par with Anaxagoras.<sup>95</sup>

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95 See above, n. 59 and text thereto.



# Anaximenes' Soul<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

The so-called fragment of Anaximenes found at Aëtius *Placita* ch. 1.3 is a pseudo-quotation. It is an instantiation of the widespread technique of upgrading by means of interpretation. The explicit argument from analogy between the human soul and the guiding principle of the cosmos cannot be early. It points to a Stoic background, as does the use of *pneuma* as equivalent for the early term *aër* (air). The refutation of Anaximenes' thesis uses an Aristotelian argument that has been made to fit a Stoic doctrine.

## Keywords

doxography – context – Diadochai – principles – *pneuma* – Aristotle – Theophrastus – Cicero

## 1 The Doxography

The third chapter of the first Book of the Aëtian *Placita* entitled *On principles, what they are*, plays a crucial part in the work, because it identifies the principles and elements of physics according to twenty-four important philosophers, from Thales' 'Water' and Anaximander's 'Infinite' via Pythagoras' 'Numbers', Plato's 'God, Matter and Idea', and Aristotle's 'Form, Matter, and Privation', to the Stoic Zeno's 'God and Matter' and the 'Hot and the Cold' of the Peripatetic scholar Strato of Lampsacus. | The reconstruction of this chapter is quite difficult, because the sources are rather diverse with regard to both composition and reliability. Arranging the lemmata deriving from these sources in the usual way, that is, in sequence as the teeth of a zipper, is therefore on several occasions a matter more of credibility than probability. Various individual doxai are quite problematic, too, so that it has proved impossible to arrive at a consen-

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<sup>1</sup> It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to my friend of long years Pieter van der Horst on occasion of his seventieth birthday. *Ad multos annos!*

sus concerning their correct interpretation. The scholarly discussion is (too) often confined to a single view, without regard for its context in the chapter and the treatise and for the wider doxographical tradition as a whole, though taking this context and this tradition into account as a rule proves to be quite helpful.<sup>2</sup>

## 2 Interpretation and Creative Interpretation

What is also most helpful is the study of the rich ancient traditions concerned with the content of a particular doxa, which include parallels beyond the sphere of the name-label that is linked with it. Inferring the real or putative meaning of an author from his statements is a standard principle of interpretation in antiquity, and this may result in *hineininterpretieren*, in creatively reading something in them that need not be there. This practice is already found in Aristotle, who insists *disertis verbis* that one has to interpret the utterances of early philosophers according to their meaning and not to their lisping expression, and who claims that Empedocles would have agreed if someone else had assisted him in this way.<sup>3</sup> In later antiquity Aristotle himself underwent the same treatment, and his thought still has to endure this kind of actualization today. The general rule has been appositely formulated by the young Cicero in the following words: *ex eo quod scriptum sit ad id quod non scriptum sit pervenire*, ‘to arrive from what has been written to what has not been written’.<sup>4</sup>

## 3 The Problem of the ‘Quotation’

The doxa with the name-label Anaximenes is the fourth in Diels’ edition of the *Placita* chapter.<sup>5</sup> I translate the text, with the putative quotation in italics:

- 189      Anaximenes, son of Eurustratos, the Milesian, declared Air to be (the) principle of the things that exist, for from this all things come to be and (back) to it they are dissolved again. *Just as, he says, our soul, which is air, holds us together and dominates us, so also pneuma and air contain*

<sup>2</sup> See below, ch. 7 and Runia (2018).

<sup>3</sup> See Arist. *Met.* A.4 985a4–10, A.10 993a11–24, *Cael.* 3.4 303a10.

<sup>4</sup> Cic. *Inv.* 2.152. See Hadot (1957) and Mansfeld (1994), 148–161.

<sup>5</sup> Aët. 1.3.4 Diels, *DG* 278a9–26/b9–24.

*the entire cosmos.* (Air and *pneuma* are used synonymously.) But this man too<sup>6</sup> goes astray when he appears to compose the living beings out of simple and uniform air and *pneuma*, for it is impossible for matter to subsist as the single principle of the things that exist. Rather it is necessary also to postulate the efficient cause. For example, silver is not sufficient for the generation of the drinking cup, unless there is also the efficient (cause), namely the silversmith. And similarly in the case of bronze and wood and other (kinds of) matter.<sup>7</sup>

That according to Anaximenes the principle or element from which all things come to be and into which they are dissolved again, is Air, has also been transmitted elsewhere and does not pose a problem. The *Gretchenfrage* pertains to the next sentence, which presents itself as a verbatim quotation, the word φησίν, 'he says', flagging a phrase in *oratio recta*. The vocabulary is already a cause for alarm. Is it possible for κόσμος to be used in the sense of 'world', or 'universe', as early as the end of the sixth century BCE, when other attestations of this use are much later?<sup>8</sup> Problematic also is the verbal form συγ-κρατεῖ, for this kind of composite term only becomes current in much later Greek. Difficult further is the word ψυχή, 'soul', in the conceptual sense required here. Originally the ψυχή is a little fluttering thing (the word also means 'butterfly') that leaves the body at the hour of death and departs to the nether world. In the quoted sentence the word is used for the soul that controls the body, the way we find it used for instance by Heraclitus (probably), Socrates, and Plato. No less striking, finally, is the analogy between man and cosmos, that is, between microcosm and macrocosm, first found explicitly in Democritus about a century and a half later,<sup>9</sup> as well as the formulaic way this analogy has been formulated: 'just as x ..., so also y ...'. Even if one discounts the anachronistic wording, | not decisive 190 by itself because early thoughts may be dressed up in later language, the quotation still yields two ideas which are far in advance of their own time. We are

6 Namely in the same way as Anaximander, mentioned in at Aët. 1.3.3 Diels.

7 Anaximenes 13B1 DK: Ἀναξίμενης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀέρα ἀπεφάνετο· ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι· οἶον ἢ ψυχῇ, φησὶν, ἢ ἡμετέρα ἀήρ οὐσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει· (λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀήρ καὶ πνεῦμα). ἀμαρτάνει δὲ καὶ οὗτος ἐξ ἀπλοῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς ἀέρος καὶ πνεύματος δοκῶν συνεστάναι τὰ ζῶα· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀρχὴν μίαν τὴν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ὑποστήναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι· οἶον ἄργυρος οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐκπῶμα γενέσθαι, ἀν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾗ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος· ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ τοῦ ξύλου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης.

8 Possibly at Heracl. 22B30 DK, probably at Emped. 31B134-5, Philol. 44B2.7 and Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11.5, certainly at Pl. *Phlb.* 29e1.

9 Democr. 68B34 DK.

accustomed to see the early thinkers as awe-inspiring pioneers, but this is too much of a good thing.

That we are in the presence of an interpretative approach is clear from the phrase that follows immediately: ‘air and *pneuma* are used synonymously’, intended as a justification of the phrase ‘*pneuma* and air’ of the quotation. Standard meanings of *pneuma* are ‘breath’ and ‘wind’, but later also ‘life-breath’. The author of the *Placita*, or his source, wishes to signal that, ‘air’ being used here—according to Anaximenes, as he wants us to believe—in the sense of *pneuma*, this can only be the divine *pneuma*, which according to Stoic doctrine (as we know) pervades all matter, is present everywhere, moulds everything in the cosmos and determines whatever happens, while the *pneuma* constituting our soul is a fragment of this divine *pneuma*.<sup>10</sup>

Confirmation is found further down, in the Anaximenes lemma of Aët. ch. 1.7, *Who is the God?* This reads (my emphasis):

Anaximenes (says that the deity is) the air. Statements such as these *should be understood* as referring to the powers that pervade through all parts of the elements or the bodies.<sup>11</sup>

As is clear from a comparison of Aët. ch. 1.3 with ch. 1.7, principles can be gods and gods function as principles. ‘Statements such as these’: namely statements such as the simplistic doxa of Anaximenes that the divinity is Air, or that the principle or element of things is Air.<sup>12</sup> These ‘powers that pervade all the parts of

10 See the Stoic doctrine as formulated at Aët. 1.7.33 Diels (*SVF* 2.1027), God as πνεῦμα ... ἐνδιήκον (for the term see next n.) δι’ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, Alex. *Mixt.* 214.14–16 (*SVF* 2.473), proto-Stoic doctrine at Aët. 1.7.30 (*DG* 304b15–16, Xenocrates fr. 28 Heinze) ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις, etc. For the human soul as such an ἀπόσπασμα see D.L. 7.143 (*SVF* 2.633), Epict. *Diss.* 1.14.6. Also below n. 25 and text thereto. At Aët. 4.3.2 Anaximenes (13A23 DK) and four other philosophers declare that the soul is ‘air-like’ (ἀεροειδῆ), whereas in the next lemma, ch. 4.3.4, the Stoics make it an ‘intelligent warm *pneuma*’ (*SVF* 2.779). So here no Stoic interpretation of Anaximenes’ psychology.

11 Aët. 1.7.13 = 13A10 DK, Ἀναξिमένους τὸν ἀέρα· δεῖ δ’ ὑπακούειν ἐπὶ τῶν οὕτως λεγομένων τὰς ἐνδιηκούσας τοῖς στοιχείοις ἢ τοῖς σώμασι δυνάμεις. Diels *DG* 750 ad verbum ἐνδιήκειν notes ‘Stoicorum’.

12 The motive for this upgrading is to neutralize the criticism represented by e.g. a remark of Philodemus, *Piet.* (*PHerc.* 1428) fr. 8.25–28 Vassallo (2015) 293–295, cf. *DG* 531b–532b, who argues against Anaximenes because he posits a ‘god deprived of sensation’ (οὐδὲ | καλ]ῶς θεωρεῖ τ[ὸν θε|όν] ὡς ἐστερημ[ένον | τῆς αἰσ]θήσεως), i.e. a dumb physical element. See my forthcoming paper ‘Lists of principles and lists of gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius and others’, to be published in: Vassallo, Chr. ed., *Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition. A Philosophical Reappraisal of the Sources*, Berlin—Boston: de Gruyter, in press.

the elements or bodies', i.e. entirely pervade the whole of matter, are of unmistakably Stoic provenance.

Plato and Xenophon share an argument for an analogy between man and cosmos. Plato formulates this in some detail in the *Philebus*, Xenophon more succinctly in the *Memorabilia*.<sup>13</sup> Plato argues as follows: in our body there are small quantities of the elements fire, water, and air (we note that for air he uses the word *pneuma*), which are very large in the universe. Our body also has a *psychê*, a soul. The universe not only has a body, like us, but must also, like us, have a soul, but a superior and divine one that on a large scale performs the same tasks as our soul does on a small scale. Xenophon mentions earth, 'the wet' and 'the other large elements' of which there is only a small part in our bodies, and speaks of 'something intelligent' and 'the soul in us' which controls the body. This should persuade us to recognize a divine intellect that controls the elements. That Xenophon follows Plato is more plausible than the other way round, and it is even more plausible that both Plato and Xenophon follow a third thinker, namely Diogenes of Apollonia, who just like Anaximenes posits that the principle and element of things is Air.<sup>14</sup> Diogenes moreover claims *dis-ertis verbis* that what people call by the name of 'air' is endowed with intellect, and that the air inhaled by men and other living beings is for them 'soul and intellect'.<sup>15</sup> This analogy, based on the single element air, is closer to the thesis | Aëtius ascribes to Anaximenes than the more complicated and explicit argument from analogy of Xenophon and Plato, who employ four elements. But what we have there is an *analogia utens*, not an *analogia docens*, as in the Aëtian Anaximenes text.

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In her important paper on Aët. ch. 1.3 Karin Alt has suggested that Anaximenes has here been confused with Diogenes, or even that the reference is not to Anaximenes, but to Diogenes.<sup>16</sup> Against this suggestion is the fact that further down in the chapter Diogenes is mentioned explicitly, together with his element air: 'But Diogenes of Apollonia (says that the principle of the things that exist) is unlimited air'.<sup>17</sup> What is more, the five famous names

13 Pl. *Phlb.* 29b–30e; Xenoph. *Mem.* 1.4.8–9. S.E. *M.* 9.92–100 integrates the Xenophon passage in a series of Stoic proofs of the existence of God.

14 Diog. 64B1 DK.

15 Diog. 64B4–B5 DK.

16 Alt (1973).

17 Aët. 1.3.27 Diels, Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης (64A7 DK) ἀέρα ἄπειρον, inserted too far down by Diels. The lemma is protected by its antecedent in Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 2 Diels (= 226A FHS&G) ap. Simp. in *Phys.* 25.1–4 (Diog. 64A5 DK), τὴν δὲ τοῦ παντός φύσιν ἀέρα καὶ οὗτός φησιν ἄπειρον.

listed after each other from the beginning of ch. 1.3, namely Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Archelaus constitute the inalterable first section of the so-called Ionic Succession (*Diadoché*) purportedly founded by Thales of Miletus in Ionia, which lists these philosophers in a descending order of masters/predecessors and pupils/successors. The Aëtian chapter explicitly presents itself as arranged according to the two principal Successions: on the one hand the Ionic Succession, on the other the Italic beginning with Pythagoras. This manner of presentation is Hellenistic and later, though for the Ionian line there is precedent in Theophrastus. The series from Thales to Archelaus, the two main parts of which are already Theophrastean,<sup>18</sup> has not entered Aët. ch. 1.3 by accident, and the names have not been arranged in this particular order by accident either. Therefore ‘Anaximenes’ at ch. 1.3.4 really must refer to Anaximenes.

To return to the issue of the quotation: Aëtius’ use of ‘he says’, *φησὶν*, in no way ensures that the quotation is genuine, for *φησὶν* is also used with paraphrases, or to grant an air of reliability to something not quoted verbatim, or even to introduce a *Schwindelzitat*.<sup>19</sup> An example of the latter is found further down in our Aëtian chapter, in the Pythagoras lemma. Immediately after the quotation (not announced as such) of the distichon with the well-known Pythagorean oath, of which this is the first attestation (elsewhere more often found without ‘not’ than with it):

Not, by him<sup>20</sup> who has given our soul the *tetraktys*,  
which is the source and root of the ever-flowing nature—

we find the following quotation: ‘our soul, too, he says (*φησὶν*), consists of the *tetraktys*’. This explicit analogy recalls that of the Anaximenes lemma, both as to form and as to content. Who this ‘he’ may be, we are not told, though the suggestion is of course that this is the sixth-century guru Pythagoras. This is cannot

18 On Sotion’s system of *Diadochai* see Wehrli (1978), 8–15, for precedent in Aristotle and Theophrastus *ibid.*, 10. The fullest treatment of this subject is still that of von Kienle (1959). For the sequence Thales—Anaximander—Anaximenes in Theophrastus see *Phys.Op.* fr. 2 Diels (= 226A FHS&G) ap. Simp. *in Phys.* 24.13–14 plus 24.26, for Anaximenes—Anaxagoras—Archelaus see *Phys.Op.* fr. 4 Diels (= 228A FHS&G) ap. Simp. *in Phys.* 27.2–3 plus 27.23–24. The word *διάδοχος* at *in Phys.* 24.13 cannot certainly be attributed to Theophrastus.

19 For a collection of passages where *φησὶν* introduces pseudo-quotations see Kerschens-  
steiner (1962), 76–77 n. 4.

20 Pythagoras. The *tetraktys* or ‘quaternary number’ is the set of the first four numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, which together give the number 10.

be endorsed among other reasons because of the fact that the Pythagoras of our Aëtian lemma is the Platonized Pythagoras of Neopythagoreanism.

#### 4 A False Parallel and Some Authentic Ones

Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia are put on the same level in a passage of the *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* of the late Neoplatonist Philoponus. He presents us with a mixture of half-remembered data from one or more handbooks and a few shreds of Aristotle's account of the views on the soul of his predecessors in the second chapter of the first Book of the treatise he is commenting upon:<sup>21</sup>

Diogenes of Apollonia and Anaximenes, who say that the air is the principle of what exists, said that also the soul consists thereof, and that the soul grasps everything | because she has the principle of everything in herself and is most mobile because of her fine structure. 192

This example of bad scholarship<sup>22</sup> may be ignored, because there are better parallels for the ideas that have been employed to interpret the thought of Anaximenes. An illuminating parallel is encountered in a treatise of the Epicurean Philodemus (first cent. BCE), who quotes another Diogenes, namely a Stoic:<sup>23</sup>

Diogenes of Babylon writes in his *On Athena* that the cosmos is the same as Zeus, or comprises Zeus in the same the way as man contains his soul. [Alternative and perhaps better translation: 'or Zeus comprises the cosmos in the same the way as his soul contains man'].

His contemporary Varro, cited by Tertullian, expresses this as follows:<sup>24</sup>

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21 Philop. *in de An.* 87.2–5 Διογένης ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης (–) καὶ Ἀναξιμένης (= fr. 168 Wöhrle) ἀρχὴν τῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀέρα λέγοντες, ἐκ τούτου καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλεγον, καὶ γινώσκειν μὲν πάντα τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἔχουσιν τὴν τῶν πάντων ἀρχήν, κινητικωτάτην δὲ εἶναι διὰ λεπτομέρειαν.

22 For the quality of the scholarship of Ammonius and his pupils, among whom Philoponus, see Tarán (2001), 494–497.

23 Philod. *de Piet.* (PHerc. 1428) col. 8.14–21 Henrichs Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος (SVF 3 Diog. 33) ἐν τῷ Περὶ | τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν | κόσμον γράφει τῷ Δ[ι]τ[ι]δὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρ[χ]ειν ἢ περιέχειν | τ[ὸ]ν Δία καθάπ[ε]ρ | ἄνθρωπ[ον] ψυχὴν.

24 Tert. *Ad nat.* 2.2, 43.29–30 unde et Varro (*Rerum Divinarum* fr. 23 Cardauns) *ignem mundi animum facit, ut perinde (i)n mundo ignis omnia gubernet sicut animus in nobis.*

This is why Varro makes Fire the World-Soul, so that the Fire in the world administers everything in the same way as the soul administers us.

To the best of my knowledge these two passages have never been cited in connection with the Anaximenes 'fragment'. But another passage has been cited in this context, a very striking one indeed, from the *Compendium of Greek Theology* of Nero's contemporary the Stoic Cornutus:<sup>25</sup>

Just as we are administered by soul, so also the cosmos has a soul which keeps it together, and this is called Zeus, who is alive in the primary sense and pervades everything and is the cause of being alive for the living beings; for this reason, too, Zeus is said to reign over the totality of things, just as also the soul and the nature in us may be said to reign over us.

A comparable thought is attributed to two earlier Stoics. The cosmos is administered in accordance with Intellect and Providence, as Chrysippus says in Book 5 of his *On Providence* and Posidonius in Book 13 of his *On Gods*: 'Intellect penetrates into each part of the cosmos, just as the soul with us, although into some to a larger and into others to a smaller degree'.<sup>26</sup>

The argument from analogy is formulated explicitly. Those scholars who have posited that the Anaximenes quotation has been Stoicized appear to have argued correctly.<sup>27</sup>

## 194 5 An Evolving Tradition

This Stoic backdrop is also apparent from the refutation that follows after the account of the doctrine ascribed to Anaximenes. The corporeal monistic principle Air, in spite of being called *pneuma*, cannot on its own determine what happens. According to Stoic doctrine it is the *pneuma* and not the matter that has to be assumed besides it that is the operative cause, and the identification

25 Corn. 2.1, p. 3.2–8 Lang ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσιν αὐτόν, καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεὺς, πρῶτως καὶ διὰ παντὸς ζῶσα καὶ αἰτία οὖσα τοῖς ζώσι τοῦ ζῆν· διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὄλων, ὡς ἂν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡμῶν βασιλεύειν ῥηθῇ.

26 D.L. 7.138 τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος (SVF 2.634) ἐν τοῖς ε' Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδωνίου (F 21 E.-K, 345 Theiler) ἐν τοῖς ιγ' Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος δῆκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἥδη δι' ὧν μὲν μάλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον.

27 Reinhardt (1926) 209–212, Kerschensteiner (1962), 78–79.



of God and matter which occurs in Aët. ch. 1.3.4 when combined with ch. 1.7.13 spoils the dualism of the Stoic principles. For according to the Stoics there are no less and no more than two principles (*archai*), God—also called World-Soul, or *pneuma*—and matter, or 'the active principle' (τὸ ποιῶν αἷτιον, just as in the criticism directed against Anaximenes), and matter (ὕλη, just as in the criticism directed against Anaximenes), or the passive principle that is pervaded, formed and administered by the active divine principle.<sup>28</sup> The interpretation of Anaximenes' 'air' as *pneuma* simplifies the refutation—for imputing to someone something different, something less, or something more than he actually meant makes it much easier to take him to task.

But a Peripatetic, too, would have recognized himself in this critique. Aristotle already criticizes the early monists with the help of precisely this argument since, as he says, they had not yet discovered 'the moving cause', and Aristotle, too, uses the verb ἀμαρτάνειν, 'to make a serious mistake',<sup>29</sup> which is found several times in Aët. ch. 1.3 and also elsewhere in the *Placita*. The Aristotelian simile of the artisan (the moving cause) who for a certain purpose (final cause) gives form (formal cause) to matter (material cause) which illustrates the system of the four so-called causes is cited also in later literature.<sup>30</sup> The critique of Anaximenes is therefore in essence Aristotelian, and we need not doubt that a version thereof was already present in an earlier version of the chapter, before the doctrine of Anaximenes had been Stoicized. It can also be applied, and as we saw has been so applied, against an earlier version of Anaximenes' view of the monistic principle. This criticism, of Aristotelian descent, has been adapted to fit the Stoic doctrine of the two principles. The interpretation we are faced with in this doxographical chapter has so to speak evolved in an organic way, so that an earlier phase may be discerned in the later phenotype.

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28 See above, n. 10 and text thereto.

29 Arist. *Met.* A.8 988b22–28.

30 Arist. *Phys.* 2.3 194b23–195b4, *Met.* A.3 984a22–27, Δ.2 1012a24–35, and Sen. *Ep. Luc.* 65.4–5, Alex. Aphrod. *de Fat.* p. 167.2–11. For the simile of God or nature as artisan or artists see e.g. Cic. *ND* 2.57 (= SVF 2.171), and the texts cited above in n. 10 and n. 25. See further Rolke (1975), 59–65.

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# Minima Parmenidea<sup>1</sup>

*Exegetical Notes on 28B1.22–23a, B2.1–5, B6.3, and B8.38–41 DK*

## Abstract

Discussion of the meaning of the handshake in B1, the question of the subject of ‘Is’ in B2, the problem of the third way in B6, and the reference of ‘changing place and colour’ in B8.

## Keywords

good faith – grammatical subject – three ways – celestial phenomena

## 1 A Handclasp

Parm. B1.22–23a DK, *καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ / δεξιτερὴν ἔλεν* ..., ‘and the goddess received me in friendly fashion, and took my right hand with hers ...’. What is the significance of this handclasp? Is the goddess merely welcoming her visitor? H. Roodenburg writes that ‘in antiquity the handshake was widely known, though it was not the everyday gesture of greeting and leave-taking as we now know it’. Commentators on Parmenides pay little or no attention to the goddess’ gesture, with the exception of Hermann Diels, who quotes Homer’s lines describing Telemachus’ grasping of the stranger’s (i.e. Athena’s) hand and his promise that she will be well received.<sup>2</sup> The situation in Parmenides’ proem is different in that it is a goddess who takes a mortal guest by the hand and speaks. As a matter of fact, scenes of Heracles or Theseus shaking hands with Athena on archaic and classical vases represent ‘acceptance [...] as an equal by the gods, and in particular [...] comradeship with’ the goddess. The late Hellenistic kings of Commagene are pictured shaking hands with Heracles on their reliefs; here ‘it is the monarch whose status is being enhanced’.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I wish to thank Teun Tieleman and Jan van Ophuijsen for criticism of earlier drafts.

<sup>2</sup> Roodenburg (1991), 152, *Od.* 1.120–123; situation ‘aus α 120’ according to Diels (1897), 53.

<sup>3</sup> Davies (1985), 627, 630.

The handclasp may be a pledge of good faith, or the formal confirmation of a promise, or an agreement, or even a treaty; the act often is but need not be followed by an oath, and the formula is frequently strengthened by the word *πίστις*.<sup>4</sup> One understands why one of the Pythagorean *akousmata* runs ‘do not give your hand easily’.<sup>5</sup>

Some examples. Wily Antinous grasps Telemachus’ hand and promises help in his quest for his father;<sup>6</sup> the gesture clearly is intended to convince the other person that he is sincere, though he knows (as well as we, readers or listeners, do) that this promise is not made in good faith. Hera grasps the hand of Hypnos, whom she wants to persuade (*πείθειν*, she says) to make Zeus fall asleep.<sup>7</sup> Another interesting case is in Sophocles’ *Ajax*.<sup>8</sup> The seer Calchas approaches Teucer, places his right hand in friendly | fashion in that of Teucer and speaks, imploring him to ensure that Ajax does not leave his hut the present day. Surely, the gesture is meant to help convince Teucer that what he is going to tell him is both important and true.

I therefore believe that the goddess by pledging her good faith wants to *convince* her visitor (just as, in fact, the poet wants to guarantee his audience) that what is going to be said is both true and important, and that the poet wants his public to understand that his status has been enhanced.

## 2 A Subject

Parm. 28B2.1–5 DK: εἰ δ’ ἄγ’ ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας, / αἶπερ ὁδοὶ μούνηι διζήσιός εἰσι νοήσαι· / ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὥς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, / Πειθοῦς ἔστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείη γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ), / ἢ δ’ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὥς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι. ‘Come now, I will tell you (and do you preserve my story when you have heard it), which ways of enquiry are the only ones to think about. The one, that it is and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the path of trust, for [this, sc. trust] attends upon truth; the other, that it is not and that it is necessary that it is not’.

4 E.g. *Il.* 6.223 (with Kirk’s note *ad loc.*), *Il.* 14.232, *Soph. Tr.* 1181–1184, *Ph.* 813, *χειρὸς πίστιν*, *O.C.* 1632 (with Kamerbeek’s note *ad loc.*), *Ar. Nu.* 81 (with Dover’s note *ad loc.*), *Ra.* 754 and 789, *E. Med.* 21–22, *δεξιᾶς / πίστιν μεγίστην* (with Mastronarde’s note *ad loc.*), *Xen. Cyr.* 3.2.14, *App.Rh.* 1.1229–1235. See further Herman (1987), 49–54, Boegehold (1999), 23–24, Knippschild (2002).

5 D.L. 8.17, μὴ ῥαδίως δεξιᾶν ἐμβάλλειν, cf. *Iamb. Protr.* 21, 108.2 Pistelli.

6 *Od.* 2.302, ἔν τ’ ἄρα οἱ φῦ χειρὶ ἔπος τ’ ἔφατ’ ἔκ τ’ ὀνόμαζε.

7 *Il.* 14.231–242. Line 233 is the same as the one quoted in the previous n.

8 *Soph. A.* 750–753, Κάλχας μεταστὰς οἶος Ἀτρειδῶν δῖχα, / ἐς χεῖρα Τεύκρου δεξιᾶν φιλοφρόνως / θεὶς εἶπε κάπεσκηψε κτλ. With φιλοφρόνως cf. πρόφρων at *Parm.* 28B1.23.

One may feel certain that no agreement will ever be reached about the translation and interpretation of these difficult lines. I attempt to provide a cautiously literal rendering. One of the riddles which have plagued scholars is that of the subject of the verbal form ἔστιν in line 3 and so of οὐκ ἔστιν in line 5 of the fragment. I refrain from giving an overview of the ones that have been proposed, and shall suggest one that, as far as I know, has not been considered before, viz. that the subject is νοῦσαι from line 2. This produces the following: 'I will tell you [...] which ways of enquiry are the only ones to think about: (a) that (thinking) exists and that it is impossible that it does not exist, [...] (b) that (thinking) does not exist and that it is necessary that it does not'. This 'it', viz. 'thinking', is also the subject of the negated infinitives (εἶναι both times) at the end of lines 3 and 5. But thinking that thinking does not exist and does so necessarily is self-contradictory, since one is still *thinking* this. The goddess consequently continues by stating, B2.6–8: 'this, I tell you, is an entirely indiscernable path, for you could not know what is not (for this cannot be achieved), nor could you describe it', τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθεῖα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν / οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἔδν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) / οὔτε φράσαις.

The vexed and vexing lines B6.1–2a should, I suggest, be punctuated in a different way than they always are, with a high point after γάρ, a comma after ἔμμεναι, and no comma after εἶναι, as follows: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τὸ<sup>9</sup> νοεῖν τ' ἔδν ἔμμεναι, ἔστι γάρ· εἶναι / μὴδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Then the translation is: 'thinking-and-saying must be being [or: Being], for it exists; that it is nothing is not possible'. In defense of this suggestion one may | point out that the first ἔστι here corresponds with the first ἔστιν ('exists') at B2.3, and the οὐκ ἔστιν here corresponds with the οὐκ ἔστιν ('is impossible') at B2.3.

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B3 may be adduced now (by which I do not imply that I know where in the first part of the Poem this fragment should be placed). This is the famous incomplete line τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶν τε καὶ εἶναι, quoted by Clement of Alexandria (for whom it may already have been part of a *Wandercento*) and Plotinus, both of whom beyond any doubt believe the meaning to be 'thinking and being are the same'.<sup>10</sup> Recently this interpretation, which has been long out of

9 Tarán has discovered that the reading of the mss. is τό not τε, see Cordero (1979), 24 n. 1 and 1984, 110 n. 1. Nevertheless some scholars prefer to stick to Karsten's conjecture τε; see references at Wiesner (1996), 7–8, who (ibid., 8) points out that parallel nouns, so also these substantivized infinitives, may be connected by a single τε and thus form a whole. For Wiesner's discussion of possible and preferable interpretations see references in his index (*ibid.*, 264–265).

10 Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.2.23.2–3 quotes in succession Hdt. 6.86 γ2, Ar. fr. 711 Kassel–Austin, and Parm. 28B3. Plot. *Enn.* 5.1[10].8 comments εἰς ταὐτὸ συνήγεν ὃν καὶ νοῦν (the line is also quoted *Enn.* 5.9[5].5).

favour,<sup>11</sup> has been strongly defended by Long<sup>12</sup> and Sedley.<sup>13</sup> Long argues that ‘the same’ here means that ‘veridical thinking and reality are *coextensive*; thinking is the life or heart of Being, and being characterizes the ontological and veridical status of thinking’; he is even willing to think of Being in hylozoistic or, if you wish, Plotinian terms.<sup>14</sup>

The lines B8.34–36a can also be translated in a simple way based on the above proposal that νοῆσαι is the subject both of the first ἔστιν B2.3 and of the first ἔστιν B2.5. The text runs ταῦτόν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὐνεκεν ἔστι νόημα. / οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστίν, / εὐρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν, ‘thinking is the same as that thought exists; for not without Being, in which it exists as spoken, will you find thinking’.

In fact fragment B8.1–49, the ‘tale of the way that it exists’, is itself a demonstration of the sameness of speaking (or telling), thinking, and Being. Thinking is the process which brings us progressively from one characteristic of Being to the other, and it coincides with the telling of this tale—the tale, precisely, of the Being in which it exists as spoken. Quite circular. I suggest that B5, ‘to me from wherever I start is shared, for I shall come back there again’ (ξυνὸν δὲ μοί ἐστιν, / ὁππόθεν ἄρξωμαι· τόθι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὐθις) pertains to precisely this circularity.

### 3 A Way

One of the more disturbing problems in the interpretation of Parmenides is the question whether two or three so-called ‘ways’ are distinguished in fragments B6 and B7. The assumption that there are only two such ways, according to some of those who hold this view, means that the way ‘that it is not and that it is necessary that it is not’ of B2.5–7 coincides with the way of mortals at B6.4–9, that is to say with the world according to the opinions of humans which is announced in the proem, B1.30–32, and described in the second part of the Poem, beginning at B8.50.<sup>15</sup>

11 I have argued in favour of this interpretation at Mansfeld (1964), 63–68.

12 Long (1998).

13 Sedley (1999), 120, starting from 28B8.34–36. Also cf. Cerri (1999), 57–61.

14 Long (1998), 146, his emphasis; 140–143, referring to the arguments of Coxon (1986), 168–169 and 181.

15 I am thinking especially of Cordero (1979) and (1984), 193–200, and *passim*, Nehamas (1981), and Curd (1998), 51–63. The point of departure is the analysis of 28B6.2–4 by Tarán (1965), 59–61. Valuable discussion of problems, views, and possibilities by Wiesner (1996), 84–138, who concludes that there are three ways not two.

Part of this argument is concerned with the lacuna at the end of B6.3, where Diels (followed by many) added ⟨εἰργω⟩; the line may then be translated ‘this is the first way of enquiry from which I keep you’. This is then followed at lines 4–5 by ‘and subsequently (I keep you) from the | one on which humans roam’ etc. 557 So there should be two ways one should avoid. Diels’ conjecture was accepted by Tarán, who however postulated a substantial lacuna between lines 3 and 4.<sup>16</sup> Cordero replaced Diels’ ⟨εἰργω⟩ by ⟨ἄρξει⟩ and preferred the τ’ of some mss. of Simplicius earlier in the line to the σ’ of others among these mss., translating ‘car tu commenceras par ce premier chemin de la recherche’.<sup>17</sup> Nehamas keeps σ’ which he interprets as σοῖ not σε, and inserts ⟨ἄρξω⟩ in the lacuna, which gives ‘for first I shall begin for you from this first route of inquiry’.<sup>18</sup> The Cordero-and-Nehamas line 3 is then followed at lines 4–5 by ‘and subsequently (I begin) for you from the one on which humans roam’, etc. Curd accepts this, finding Nehamas’ intervention ‘slightly preferable’ to that of Cordero.<sup>19</sup>

But there is a snag. Of the way and the opinions of mortals, that is to say of the cosmogony, cosmology, astronomy, human biology etc. of the second part of the Poem, sadly mutilated though it is, enough survives in verbatim lines alone to show that a quite complete account was provided, comparable to the kind of treatise which later received the designation *On Nature*, or the title *Timaeus*. Now the goddess, that is to say the poet, tells us at B2.6 that the way ‘that it is not and that it is necessary that it is not’ is a path that is ‘*entirely* indiscernable’ (παναπευθής), or (as Ms Curd translates)<sup>20</sup> ‘wholly without report’. I fail to see in what way this epithet should be applicable to the detailed report on the opinions of humans. These are said to be ‘without *true* trust’ at B 1.30, not without trust at all—and even a total absence of trust, or trustworthiness, is not equivalent to being entirely beyond reach from a cognitive point of view. Plumping for the *varia lectio* παναπειθέα does not help either, since ‘*wholly* without trustworthiness’ is not the same as ‘without *true* trust’ either. What is more, the entirely uncontroversial reference to the decision taken in B2 about the way ‘that it is not’ (B8.16, οὐκ ἔστιν) at B8.17 characterizes it as ‘nameless’ (ἄνωυμος). But the world ‘according to opinion’ (B19.1, κατὰ δόξαν) is not ‘nameless’.

16 Tarán (1965), 54, 60–61.

17 Cordero (1979), 21–24 and (1984), 24, 37, 132–144, 168–175.

18 Nehamas (1981), 104–105.

19 Curd (1999), 57–58. The criticism formulated against Cordero’s view by Babut (1985), 301 is equally applicable to that of Nehamas, ‘il est difficile de comprendre comment le Poète peut être exhorté à commencer par le premier chemin, puis, dans un deuxième temps (αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα), à commencer aussi par l’autre chemin’.

20 Curd (1999), 56. She submits that ‘this claim is consistent with the view that the beliefs of mortals lack ‘true trust’’. Consistent with yes, but not the same as.

Quite the opposite, for humans ‘name’ things: B8.38, ὄνομ(α) ἔσται or ὀνόμασται; B8.53, ὀνομάζειν; B9.1, ὀνόμασται; B 19.3, presumably the last line of the Poem, τοῖς δ’ ὄνομ’ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ’ ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι.

Accordingly, whatever the correct emendation and interpretation of the first three lines of B6 may be, the identification of the way of mortals with the second of the two ways outlined in B2 should in my view be rejected. One can only agree with Giannantonio’s point that the way ‘that it is not’ is not that of the second part of the Poem, because ‘la δοξα ... non sola è qualcosa di *esprimibile* ..., ma è qualcosa che, sebbene priva di πίστις ἀληθής, deve tuttavia essere appresa’ in the manner announced at B1.31–32.<sup>21</sup> And if the punctuation and interpretation of B6.1–2 εἶναι / μηδὲν δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ‘it (viz., thinking and speaking) cannot be nothing’ is accepted, these five words clearly refer to the second way of B2. Then, naturally, the way described B6.4 ff. (αὐτὰρ ἐπειτ’ κτλ.) will be different from the | way referred to at B6.3. Note that also on the Cordero/Nehamas/Curd interpretation the way of B6.3 is different from that of B6.4 ff. The word αὐτὰρ, ‘but’, is telling.

#### 4 Changing Place and Colour

At B8.38–41 we are informed about ‘names which mortals have laid down, trusting them to be true: coming to be and passing away, being as well as not-being, and changing place and altering bright colour’, γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί, / καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροά φανὸν ἀμείβειν (40–41). I wonder what the objects are to which the ‘names’ in the last of these lines should apply.

The ‘names’ ‘coming to be’ and ‘passing away’ listed in line 40 pertain to processes which earlier in the fragment (B8.6–14) have been proved to be invalid for Being. As to the other ‘names’ mentioned in this line, to assume ‘being’ as well as ‘not-being’ is of course forbidden by the argument of B2 and those sections later in the Poem which rely on this argument. These supremely important ‘names’ laid down by humans deny the validity of the gist of Parmenides’ grandiose thesis. Naturally one can say that the names ‘change of place’ and ‘altering of bright colour’, which flaunt the rejection of motion and change argued at B8.29–30, pertain to things in the world in general. True enough. I for my part suspect, but cannot prove, that the goddess, that is to say the poet, is in the first place thinking of the heavenly bodies, and of the elements ‘light’, or ‘aetherial fire’, and ‘night’ which play so fundamental a part in the second

<sup>21</sup> Giannantonio (1988), 220–221; my emphasis.



part of the Poem. Coxon points out that 'φανόν alludes to Parmenides' view that light is one of the two constituents of them all [i.e. physical things in general] (B11), so that a change in a thing's brightness may reflect a change in its general state'.<sup>22</sup> But night too is 'one of the two constituents of them all'. Both elements should be included.

τόπον ἀλλάσσειν in fact means 'changing places'. διὰ ... χροᾶ φανόν ἀμείβειν means 'alter their bright aspect to dark and from dark to bright', as Coxon translates.<sup>23</sup> We may think of the moon and the stars *changing places* with the sun, of the difference in the colour of the sky during the day as compared with the night, or of the spectacular phenomena of for instance a Mediterranean sunset.<sup>24</sup> There is abundant evidence for Parmenides' interest in colourful or less colourful heavenly phenomena. In a verbatim fragment he speaks of the 'destructive deeds of the pure torch of brilliant sun' and of the 'circumambient deeds of round-faced moon' (B9.2–4). He is the first to state that the light of the moon is derived from the sun,<sup>25</sup> i.e. in the colourful lines B14 and B15, which cannot have been far apart in the original text: 'an alien light, shining brightly in the night, wandering about the earth' (B14), 'always looking for the rays of the sun'. [559]

People believe that what they see every day and night is real; they even believe that the moon shines with its own light. They are doubly wrong.

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<sup>22</sup> See next n.

<sup>23</sup> Coxon (1986), 75, see his comments *ibid.*, 211–212.

<sup>24</sup> For the relation between philosophical colour theories and natural, esp. cosmic phenomena see Struycken (2003).

<sup>25</sup> See the remarkable paper of Graham (2002), 363–367.

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## Parmenides from Right to Left

### Abstract

Parmenides devotes considerable attention to human physiology in an entirely original way, by appealing to the behaviour and effects of his two physical elements when explaining subjects such as sex differentiation in the womb, aspects of heredity, and sleep and old age. Unlike his general cosmology and account of the origin of mankind, this *topos*, or part of philosophy, is not anticipated in his predecessors. What follows is that the second part of the Poem, whatever its relation to the first part may be believed to be, is meant as a serious account of the world and man from a physicist point of view.

### Keywords

proem – ending – ontology – demiurge – human physiology – reception – *Placita*

### 1

Scholars habitually read Parmenides' Poem from left to right, just as they think about its message from its beginning to its end, from fragment 28B1 via fragment B8 to the conclusion in fragment B19 DK; that is to say from the proem to the ontology, and from the ontology to the cosmogony and cosmology, or, in the ancient sense of this term, physics. The testimonies (fragments 28A1 to A54 DK) are distributed and interpreted according to this sequence as well, again from left to right. But order of presentation is not equivalent to order of discovery. To arrive at the ontology one has to leave the world behind, or at least the world of humanity, as the proem of the Poem in fact intimates. But to be able to leave this world one must have been there. It seems to me that it is in fact the time-honoured problem of the origin and organization of the world, a problem that had been approached both in a mythologizing and in a more or less rational manner, which was of primary importance for Parmenides. Just like others, for instance his rivals Hesiod or Anaximander, he convinced himself that behind or beyond the phenomena there is something else, something more important and fundamental, and that therefore one may distinguish two

different levels, namely of the phenomena and of what is behind them, which are present simultaneously albeit in different ways. He even went much farther, persuading himself that this other dimension is not the ultimate level, and did so in a way that is very different from that of Anaximander.<sup>1</sup>

- One may approach Parmenides' thought in different ways, and thus make a choice. Melissus of Samos, and Plato, who for the most part looked at Parmenides with the eyes of Melissus, were almost exclusively interested in the ontology and its implications. Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the Atomists were in the first place interested in the physics, into which they variously included crucial ingredients of the ontology. Neither Melissus or Plato, nor Anaxagoras, Empedocles or the Atomists, as far as we know, worried explicitly about the problem of the interpretation of Parmenides that to a large extent dominates the scholarly discussion, namely that of the relation | between ontology and physics, and of the status of this physics in relation to the ontology.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of the proem, 28B1.28–30, we are told that *all things* (πάντα) have to be learned, 'both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust'. The expression 'heart of well-rounded truth', words that are as fascinating as they are enigmatic, can only be understood when at B8.49 we have reached the end of the first part of the Poem. The two lines that follow in the proem, B1.31–32, justifying the teaching of also these opinions, are even more cryptic, and because so much of the second part of the Poem has been lost we are unable to fathom their precise meaning, or so I believe.<sup>3</sup> The only thing that is clear is that these beliefs are to be evaluated in some way. For once we should read the lines B1.28–32 backwards, and at least accept that 'it is appropriate' (χρεώ) that 'all' things be learned, opinions as well as truth. To find out more about the status of the physics we should concentrate on what Parmenides is actually doing in the second part of the Poem.

1 'Nota praefabor', to quote von Wilamowitz–Moellendorff (1975) 131.1.

2 Overviews at Zeller–Mondolfo–Reale (1965 = 2011) 292–391, Kraus (2013) 481–486. See esp. Finkelberg (1998) 158–160, 168–169, on 'lies resembling truth' and a 'plausible account' accompanying a 'truthful' one.

3 Mansfeld (1995) 230–232. Another interpretation of B1.31–32 is proposed by e.g. Marcinkowska-Rosól (2007), who takes χρῆν as infinitive and translates 'aber trotzdem wirst du auch diese kennen lernen, als diejenigen, die scheinen, wirklich sein zu müssen, alles beständig (bzw. ganz und gar) durchdringend'. But also this interpretation is based on an evaluation of the status of the second part of the Poem, and read without such backshadowing and foreshadowing the lines with χρῆν as infinitive are still enigmatic.

The first to place the relation between the two parts of the Poem explicitly on the agenda was Aristotle, who says that Parmenides on the one hand placed himself beyond physics by postulating that there is only one immobile Being—but that, on the other hand, constrained to follow the phenomena, he introduced two physical elements, the hot and the cold or fire and earth in order to construct the world, and in this way designed a theory of nature. A remarkable divergence, but not, it appears, a fatal one. Aristotle even provides a link between the two parts of the Poem by adding that Parmenides classified the hot as Being and the cold as non-Being.<sup>4</sup> That this particular link is most unlikely matters much less than that he endeavoured to find one.

What is therefore no less interesting is that Aristotle cites individual doctrines selected from Parmenides' physics without bothering about this discrepancy. Of the two alternatives offered by Parmenides Aristotle definitely prefers the second.<sup>5</sup> | Parmenides' theory of human knowledge, for instance, is put by him on a par with Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' (and even Homer's).<sup>6</sup> In this way he made possible a reception and valuation of the ideas and suggestions constituting the second part of the Poem as no more, or no less, problematic than those of other Presocratic thinkers<sup>7</sup> or of Plato, and even, in the eyes of later philosophers, than those of Aristotle himself.

In the present paper I shall be concerned with a substantial part of the history of this reception, and use it to try and draw some conclusions. Though for

4 Arist. *Met.* A.5 986b14–987a2 (= 28A24, in part). Cf. *Phys.* 1.2 184b26–185a1, 'to inquire whether Being is one and immobile is not to inquire about nature' (τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὄν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν), and Gal. *Elem.* 1.448.8–14 K., who refers to and quotes from this chapter of *Physics*. Also *GC* 1.3 318b6–7, 'Parmenides says Being and not-Being are fire and earth'. For this identification of fire and Being Aristotle, interpreting ὄν as a substantivized participle, may have been inspired by 28B8.55–56, πῦρ, / ἥπιον ὄν: 'fire, a gentle Being'. In the lines that follow in B8 night is described as the contrary of fire.

5 Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 185a5–20, esp. 17–19, even Melissus and Parmenides 'raise physical questions, though nature is not their subject' (περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὐ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς). Here Parmenides is still looked at through the eyes of Melissus. Alexander ap. *Simp. in Phys.* 71.3–4 explains that it is their 'account of motion and the infinite and the void', which raises these questions.

6 Arist. *Met.* Γ.5 1009b12–31, successively citing Emp. 31B106 and B108, Parm. 28B16, Anaxag. 56A28, and a parallel to Democr. 68A101 (ap. Arist. *de An.* 1.2 404a27–31) and 68A135 DK (ap. Theophr. *Sens.* 58). A faint echo of this passage is found at *Plac.* 4.5.12. For a parallel to this attitude see below, n. 27 and text thereto.

7 See e.g. Plu. *Adv. Col.* 114B–D (28A34, cf. B10), and Alexander ap. *Simp. in Phys.* 71.6–8, 'Parmenides, when practicing physics (φυσιολογῶν) according to the views of the many and the phenomena, not saying that Being is one or ungenerated, posited fire and earth as principles of becoming'.

the sake of simplicity the evidence will not always actually be discussed from right to left, a fair amount of backshadowing underlies most of the following inquiry.

## 2

For the most part I shall look at the evidence of the Aëtian *Placita*, the foundational doxographical treatise to be dated to somewhere in the first century CE, which deals with physical philosophy. Here Parmenides is present in the form of 30 extant lemmata (i.e. paragraphs of chapters) that contain his name-label, distributed from left to right over the whole treatise:<sup>8</sup> 3 lemmata in Book 1 on principles and general concepts, 13 in Book 2 on cosmology, 3 in Book 3 on meteorology and the earth, 7 in Book 4 on psychology and some epistemology, and 4 in Book 5 on human physiology and related themes.<sup>9,10</sup>

Some of these lemmata apparently or even clearly reproduce Parmenides' original point of view more or less faithfully, while in others this has been reinterpreted.

I briefly mention some examples. Clear instances of reinterpretation, and even of some sort of normalization and trivialization, are the two lemmata with multiple name labels in chs. 4.9.1 and 4.9.6. In ch. 4.9.1 Parmenides, along with ten other philosophers, is said to hold that the senses are false. This will ultimately be based on his rejection of the use of eyes, ears, and tongue at 28B7.3–5, lines that have indeed been generally interpreted as pertaining to sense perception. I have argued elsewhere, however, that Parmenides refers to our means  
4 of communication, and that here the | tongue is not the organ of taste but the instrument with which we speak.<sup>11</sup> In ch. 4.9.6 he is made to share with five oth-

8 Numbers for comparable name-labels: Xenophanes 20, Zeno 3, Melissus 6; Thales 23 (often *honoris causa*), Anaximander 21, Anaximenes 20; (Neopythagorean) Pythagoras 36; Heraclitus 23.

9 We are handicapped here because for Book 5 Stobaeus is mostly lost. Even so, Parmenides' 4 citations for Book 5 in Stobaeus may be contrasted with 1 for Xenophanes, 1 for Thales, 5 for Pythagoras, 1 for Heraclitus, and none for the others listed in n. 8 above.

10 These texts are cited from back to front, i.e. from ch. 5.30.4 to ch. 1.7.27, in the Appendix at the end of the paper, in English translation. I shall not discuss all of them.

11 Mansfeld (1999); see also below, ch. 8. Note that Theophr. *Sens.* 1–3 (28A46) finds no evidence enabling him to attribute to Parmenides a theory of perception through the individual senses, and does not refer to B7.3–5; see below, ch. 8. This shows that the attribution of the theory of Hipparchus to him at ch. 4.13.10 is as mistaken as that to Pythagoras, the reference to the Poem notwithstanding.

ers the view that the various sense objects fit into the pores of the sense organs at which they are directed, which is a view not of Parmenides but of Empedocles. In other cases, too, his doctrine has been assimilated to that of others. At ch. 1.25.3 his stance has been reinterpreted and coalesced with a reinterpreted view of Democritus. We recognize Democritus' Necessity as cited for instance at Diogenes Laertius 9.45 (68A1 DK) and Parmenides' Justice and Necessity as found in 28B10.6–7 and B8.30–31 (though functioning differently in the latter), who seem to have been blended with the steering Goddess of 28B12.3 and B13. But the introduction of 'fate' and even 'providence' is surely anachronistic, and is meant to cater to a Hellenistic audience. Providence as a term for what happens in Parmenides' cosmogony is not entirely wrong, but certainly beyond the mark for Democritus. The formula of ch. 2.7.1\*,<sup>12</sup> 'he also calls it (sc. 'the central band that is both the ⟨origin⟩ and the ⟨cause⟩ of all motion and coming into being') directive *Daimôn*, Holder of the keys, Justice and Necessity' is to some extent similar to what is at ch. 1.25.3, but much closer to what is in the verbatim fragments 28B12–13. In fact, ch. 2.7.1\* is not at all bad qua paraphrase of B11–13<sup>13</sup> and, as we may presume, of the lost lines in the vicinity of these three fragments. But the advancement of the sphere of B8.42–49 to divine status at ch. 1.7.27, where this God retains the attributes 'immobile and limited' of the verbatim fragment, turns an ontological simile into a standard feature of natural theology. Appropriately, this lemma does not speak of Being, for we are dealing with physics not first philosophy. Another echo of the ontology in the *Placita*, at ch. 1.24.1, also omits to mention Being, but correctly focuses upon the crucial rejection of coming to be and passing away.<sup>14</sup> But again the resulting immobility is not attributed to Being. This time it is the property of the All, into which Parmenides' and Melissus' Being had by now been transposed, a move prepared by Aristotle.<sup>15</sup> Zeno, the third Eleatic of note, has been included in their company because he did argue against motion. But this amalgamation of a distant echo of this aspect of his thought into the ontology of Parmenides and Melissus, reinterpreted in a cosmological sense, is of course

12 Asterisks are added because the lemmata of Book 2 are numbered according to the reconstruction of the chapters in Mansfeld and Runia (2009), Part II—and not, like those of the other books, according to that of Diels in the *DG*.

13 Diels (1897) 104 believed that only Theophrastus could have composed a paraphrase of such excellence. A partly parallel excerpt is found at Cic. *ND* 1.28 (28A37).

14 As to this rejection the lemma echoes Arist. *Cael.* 3.1 298b14–17 (28A25) on Melissus and Parmenides, while τὸ πᾶν echoes *Met.* A.5 986b17–19, οὗτοι δὲ ἀκίνητον εἶναι φασιν (sc. τὸ πᾶν) ... Παρμενίδης (–) ... Μέλισσος (–).

15 The word πᾶν is applied in the verbatim fragments to the Being of Parmenides (28B8.5, B8.22, B8.25, B8.48) and to that of Melissus (30B2, B7(1), B7(4)), but as a predicate.

incompatible with the brilliant paradoxes as we know them. A further reminiscence of ontological attributes that have now been turned into physical assets is at ch. 2.4.5\*, where Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus are credited with the view that ‘the cosmos is ungenerated and everlasting and indestructible’.

- 5 Here Xenophanes has been made to toe the line | of his purported successors. And the ontological One is echoed in the cosmological lemma ch. 2.1.2\*, where Parmenides and Melissus are made to share the view that ‘the cosmos is unique’ with nine others (but presumably the Zeno mentioned *ad finem* is the Stoic, not the Eleatic).

Even so, the rejection of coming to be and passing away and the resulting immobility of the All as formulated at ch. 1.24.1 cannot not so easily be matched with all those lemmata in the *Placita* where Parmenides is credited with fairly standard physical tenets. This contrast recalls Aristotle’s seminal observation about Parmenides as being, on the one hand, extraneous to physics with his doctrine of the immobile One, and on the other as being forced to introduce two elements for physical philosophy, and undoubtedly echoes it.<sup>16</sup> Aristotle’s analysis of these two options is variously followed elsewhere, and in one form or another influences Theophrastus and the main doxographical accounts, namely those of Hippolytus, Diogenes Laërtius, ps.Plutarch *Stromateis*, and Theodoret. In the majority of these accounts the ontology and the physics are described without any suggestion that a serious problem of consistency is involved. Diogenes Laërtius moreover begins and ends with physical tenets, and deals with the ontology in the middle. However, in a few passages dealing with the elements in the *Stromateis* and Theodoret that may derive from a shared source the ontologies of Xenophanes and Parmenides are said to conflict with their physics.<sup>17</sup>

Of the lemmata in the cosmological Book 2 that are normal and unobjectionable qua physical doctrine, I have already briefly discussed ch. 2.7.1\*. The others are: ch. 2.30.5\*, on the ‘appearance of the moon’ due to the blending of

16 See above, n. 4. For the elements cf. Arist. *Phys.* 1.5 188a19–21, *GC* 1.3 318b6–7, *GC* 2.3 330b13–15 (28A35 DK), Theophr. *Sens.* 3 (28A46), the texts of Theophrastus, Hippolytus, Diogenes Laërtius, Theod. *CAG* 4.7 mentioned in the next n., Cic. *Luc.* 118, and above, n. 7 *ad finem*.

17 Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 6 Diels = 227C FHS&G (28A7), Hipp. *Ref.* 1.11.1 (28A23), and D.L. 9.21–23 (28A1) speak in terms of ‘both x and y’. But Xenophanes is charged with inconsistency at [Plu.] *Strom.* 4 (21A32) and Theod. *CAG* 4.5–6 (Aët. 1.3.12 Diels, 21A36), onto whom a Parmenidean distinction between two levels of reality has been projected backward: ‘forgetting about those (sc. the ontological) arguments (τῶνδε τῶν λόγων ἐπιλαθόμενος) he said that all things are generated from the earth’. Parmenides is similarly charged with inconsistency at [Plu.] *Strom.* 5 (28A22) and Theod. *CAG* 4.7 (Aët. 1.3.13 Diels, not in DK). These criticisms are implicitly anticipated at Theod. *CAG* 2.10.



the dark element with fire-like element; ch. 2.28.6\*, on the moon as illuminated by the sun, a view said to be shared with five other philosophers; ch. 2.26.2\*, again on the moon as illuminated by the sun<sup>18</sup> and as being equal to it in size; ch. 2.25.3\*, the moon is fiery as to its substance, a view said to be shared with two other philosophers;<sup>19</sup> ch. 2.20.3\*, the sun is fiery as to its substance, a view said to be shared with one other philosopher; ch. 2.20.5\*, on the origin of sun and moon as having been separated off from the Milky Way,<sup>20</sup> 'the former from the more rarefied mixture which is hot, the latter from the denser (mixture) which is cold';<sup>21</sup> ch. 2.15.7\*, on the order of the heavenly bodies in the ether; first the Dawn-Star, 'considered by him to be identical with the Evening-Star',<sup>22</sup> then the sun, then 'the heavenly bodies<sup>23</sup> in the fiery region, which he calls | 'heaven''; ch. 2.13.8\*, the heavenly bodies are condensations of fire, a view said to be shared with one other philosopher; and finally ch. 2.11.4\*, the heaven is fiery, a view shared with three others.<sup>24</sup>

6

Thus we have a total of ten lemmata, where Parmenides' view is listed as one among a number of different others in the usual manner of chapters in the *Placita*, and in several cases is even said to be shared with other philosophers, another sign that here he is presented as an average early physicist. In some cases the original hexameters from which these summary statements derive are still extant.

### 3

Six among the ten chapters, from ch. 2.30 to ch. 2.11, that I have just cited, also list earlier philosophers who are credited with a view on the issue at hand: ch. 2.28 Thales and Pythagoras; ch. 2.25 Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes; ch. 2.20 Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes; ch. 2.15 Anaximander; ch. 2.13 Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes; and ch. 2.11 Anaximander and Anaximenes. That is to say, Thales three times, Pythagoras (whom we may discount) once, Anaximander five times,

18 See 28B14–15.

19 For the origin, nature, and works of the moon see the announcements at 28B10.1 + 4–5 and B11.1.

20 For the Milky Way in a cosmogonical context see the announcement at 28B11.2.

21 For the origin, nature, and works of the sun see the announcements at 28B10.2–3 and B11.1.

22 Cf. 28B12, which however is about cosmogony.

23 Cf. D.L. 9.23 (28A1).

24 For the origin and nature of the stars see the announcements at 28B10.1–2, B10.7, B11.3, for those of the heaven those at B10.5–7, B11.2.

Anaximenes four, and Xenophanes three. There is sufficient parallel evidence elsewhere for this attribution of cosmological doctrines to Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes, although not in every detail. Parmenides, the last member of this company of early cosmologists, is here just one of the happy few. Though in some cases his views may be somewhat or even substantially different from those of his predecessors, they all belong to what, in later parlance, we may see as the same discourse, or the same sub-division of physics.

But this is not at all the case for those lemmata with name-label Parmenides in Book 5 that deal with human physiology and matters concerned with heredity. No predecessors are mentioned here, and there is absolutely no evidence elsewhere either that Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, or Xenophanes attempted to deal with these issues. The only exception is ch. 5.7 on 'The origin of animals' (Περὶ ζώων γενέσεως). At ch. 5.17.4 a famous doctrine of Anaximander is cited, which in various forms is also attested elsewhere.<sup>25</sup> But this topic is also an ingredient of creation myths the world over.

In Parmenides the origin of animals (or rather: mammals) became connected with the question of sex determination. See ch. 5.7, 'How males and females are engendered'. Parmenides' name-label is in ch. 5.7.2 and the lemma is about how things were in the beginning, when they were much different from how they are now. We learn that then the first males were generated in the north (sc. of the earth), because of their larger share in the dense element [i.e., earth or night; the cold], and the first females in the south, on account of their low density [i.e., their share in fire; the hot]. This | view is explicitly said to be the opposite of the previous view cited at ch. 5.7.1: according to Empedocles sex differentiation is a question of hot and cold, and the first males were born from the earth more in the east and south, and the first females in the north. We note the non-chronological sequence of the doxai in this chapter, naturally according to a procedure that commonly occurs in doxographical texts. The coupling of these two thinkers and the two (partly rewritten) doxai themselves derive from a passage in Aristotle's *On the Parts of Animals*, where however the chronological order is preserved and it is Empedocles who is said to represent the opposition. Aristotle, limiting himself to the difference in temperature between males and females, does not mention the origin of the animals from various regions

25 Ch. 5.19.4, 'the first living beings were born in the moist substance and were covered with spiky bark. But (he says that) as they got older they moved away to the drier part and, when the bark had broken up, for a short time they changed their mode of life'. See the parallel texts collected at 12A30 plus [Plu.] *Strom.* 2 (12A10) and Hipp. *Ref.* 1.6.6 (12A11), which also speak of the origin of humanity.

of the earth.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand he does attribute to Parmenides a difference in this respect between women and men *disertis verbis*, women being hotter and possessing more blood.

We observe again that Aristotle does not differentiate as to status or validity between a doctrine cited from Parmenides' physics and one from the physics of Empedocles.<sup>27</sup>

In another lemma of this chapter on sex differentiation, ch. 5.7.4, Parmenides is said to share with Anaxagoras the view that semen 'from the right' (δεξιῶν, plural; sc. parts of the body of the male parent), that is deposited ('sown', καταβάλλεσθαι) 'in the right parts of the womb', produces males, and from the left (parts) in the left (parts) of the womb produces females. Right is supposed to be cold, and left hot.<sup>28</sup> This is not about the primeval history but about how things are now.

Heredity is at issue in ch. 5.11, 'How the likenesses to parents and ancestors come about'. I believe that in ch. 5.11.2, name-label Parmenides, the phrase τῆς μήτρας ὁ γόνος ἀποκριθῆ is lacunose. As transmitted this means 'the semen (that) is excreted from the womb', but as we have seen above at ch. 5.7.4, semen is supposed to be 'sown from', that is, to derive from, the 'right parts' of the body of the male parent.<sup>29</sup> Excretion or separating off, moreover, does not seem as normally applicable to the formation of 'seed' in the womb as it is to the emission of semen from the body of the male parent. Another possibility is that γόνος<sup>30</sup> has to be taken in the sense not of 'semen' but of 'offspring'. But this does not help, for though the sex of the child when issuing from the womb is of course clear, no explanation is now put forward as to how this came about in the first

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26 Cens. 4.7–8 (28A51) mentions Empedocles' theory of the origin from the earth of individual limbs and what followed, adding that Parmenides held virtually the same view.

27 Arist. *PA* 2.2 648a25–31 (28A52, not printed in the Empedocles chapter). Censorinus (above, n. 26) does not differentiate as to status or validity between a doctrine cited from Parmenides' physics and one from Empedocles' either.

28 The original account has been partly preserved in 28B17, 'boys on the right sides and girls on the left sides'. A parallel echo is at Cens. 5.2 (28A53), cited below, n. 32. In general see further the various accounts of Geurts (1941) 30–35, Lesky (1948), Lesky (1950) 44–50, Lloyd (1962) 60, (1966) 17, 50 with n. 1, and (1972), Gambetti (2006) 98–99, Coxon (2009) 383–387, and Journée (2012) 11–16. Unfortunately no information that would be helpful in the present context is found in the otherwise useful books of Congourdeau (2007) and Brisson & alii (2008).

29 That the sex of the embryo depends on the side of the womb where it develops is a view that is found elsewhere (e.g. [Hipp.] *Aph.* 5.48, in a context dealing with the womb). But ps.Plutarch's ἀποκριθῆ, or Censorinus' *exeat* (cf. Kemble (1971) 70) do not mean 'develops'.

30 The word does not occur elsewhere in ps.Plutarch, and, curiously enough, is not listed in the index of *DG*.

place. And according to ch. 5.7.4 and the verbatim fragment 28B18 (cited below) both parents have to be involved.

Nevertheless we read in ch. 5.11.2 according to the text of the Byzantine manuscripts of ps.Plutarch that children resemble their male ancestors when the seed is excreted from the right side of the womb, and their female ancestors when this is excreted from the left side. The association of left with female and right with male is consistent with the other evidence,<sup>31</sup> but otherwise this lemma is unclear. But the parallels in Censorinus, which mention ‘the right parts and left parts’ as ‘giving semen’ (*dederint*) or as those from which semen ‘is emitted’ or ‘originates’ (*exeat*), provide further information.<sup>32</sup> Here the right and left parts of the body of the male parent must be meant. Yet the womb of ch. 5.11.2 has to be explained as well. I take it that, analogous to what is at issue in ch. 5.7.4, what is produced by the right parts must be deposited in the right side of the womb to result in resemblance to male ancestors, and what is produced by the left parts must be deposited in the left side of the womb to result in resemblance to female ancestors.<sup>33</sup>

Parmenides’ involvement with heredity is also at issue in the verbatim fragment B18, Caelius Aurelianus’ translation in six Latin hexameters of a number of lines in the original Poem dealing with both the happy and the unhappy outcome of the blending of the ‘offshoots of love’ (*Veneris ... germina*) of woman and man. This suggests that not only males but also females produce seed. In fact this is attested for Parmenides by Censorinus.<sup>34</sup>

31 See, in general, Journée (2012).

32 Cens. 6.8 (28A54), *cum dexterae partes semina dederint, tunc filios esse patri consimiles, cum laevae, tunc matri*, and 5.2 (28A53) *semen unde exeat inter sapientiae professores non constat. Parmenides enim tum ex dextris tum ex laevis partibus oriri putavit*.

33 Thus disagreeing with Kember (1971) 71–72. [Gal.] *PhH* c. 115, *DG* p. 642.12–15, coalesced the two lemmata of ch. 5.11.1–2 (Empedocles—Parmenides) and omitted the name-label Parmenides. In this ‘Parmenides’ section he reads ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν μερῶν τῆς μήτρας τὸ σπέρμα instead of ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιῶν μέρους τῆς μήτρας ὁ γόνος. Thus one branch of the tradition of ps.Plutarch preserved τῶν δεξιῶν and τὸ σπέρμα, another branch τοῦ δεξιῶν and ὁ γόνος. In view of the parallel with ch. 5.7.4, τὰ δεξία μέρος τῆς μήτρας and the plurals δεξιτεροῖσιν and λαιοῖσιν in B17 and those in Censorinus (above, n. 32), ps.Galen’s formula δεξιῶν μερῶν is better than ps.Plutarch’s δεξιῶν μέρους (the change from σπέρμα to γόνος in relation to the womb may have brought along that from plural μερῶν to singular μέρους). To restore the text of Aëtius one should replace γόνος with σπέρμα, and next add a reference to the right ‘parts’, which I shall not attempt here.

34 Cens. 5.4, *illud quoque ambiguum facit inter auctores opinionem, utrumne ex patris tantummodo semine partus nascatur, ... an etiam ex matris, quod Anaxagorae et Alcmaeoni* [cf. below, n. 36] *neqnon Parmenidi* (28A54) *Empedoclique et Epicuro visum est*.

In concluding this overview we should not forget to mention the other lemma of Book 5 where human physiology is at issue; ch. 5.30.4, where old age is explained by ‘deficiency of heat’, a view paralleled by the explanation of sleep as a cooling off mentioned by Tertullian.<sup>35</sup>

As I have already said above, this interest in heredity and sex differentiation (as well as in a physicalist explanation of sleep and old age) is not anticipated by Parmenides’ predecessors in the field of physics.<sup>36</sup> There is no earlier medical evidence dealing with these subjects either. That Parmenides wrote about them is absolutely certain, for the comparatively rich A-fragments are confirmed by no less than two verbatim fragments, B<sub>17</sub> and B<sub>18</sub>. The uncertainties of the evidence as transmitted in the doxography<sup>37</sup> are irrelevant when set off against the occurrence of these doctrines as a set. The importance that this novel field of study held for Parmenides is moreover obvious from the fact that he used the differences between the sexes, sexual congress, and the ensuing generation of offspring metaphorically to describe the mixture of the elements and the formation of compounds in the cosmological lines B<sub>12.4</sub>–6.<sup>38</sup> The divinity directing this process then created Eros as first of all the gods (B<sub>13</sub>), doubtless to ensure that congress and generation would not fail.<sup>39</sup>

The theory concerned with sex differentiation, by providing what may well be an example of the author’s intention, may even suggest a clue for the evaluation of the second part of the Poem. Archeological evidence from Paestum, a town not far from Elea, has been cited for a popular belief that males are formed on the right side of the womb. A belief of this nature without a doubt belongs

35 Tert. *de An.* 43 (28A46b)—*typo de An.* 45 in DK: *Empedocles et Parmenides refrigerationem*. For Empedocles on sleep see ch. 5.24.2 and ch. 5.25.4; we may hypothesize that the Parmenides doxa preserved by Tertullian derives from a cousin writing of Aëtius with both these names in the relevant chapter(s).

36 Lesky (1950) 41 firmly believes in a Pythagorean precedent, but there is no evidence for Early Pythagorean views on sex differentiation and its *causes*. Alcmaeon’s view, according to which the predominance of the sperm of the male or female parent determines the sex of the child, is cited Cens. 6.4 (*ex quo parente seminis amplius fuit, eius sexum repraesentari dixit Alcmaeon*, 24A14). But he cannot count as a predecessor, for if, as is now quite generally assumed, the synchronism of Alcmaeon with Pythagoras at *Met.* A.5 986a29–31 is due to interpolation, there is no evidence for a *floruit* earlier than ca. 440 BCE, which makes him at least a generation later than Parmenides. He is a contemporary of the second group of Pythagoreans, discussed *Met.* A.5 986a22–26. In their turn these are not later or earlier than the first group discussed in the same chapter of *Met.* A, which includes Philolaus.

37 Discussed, but somewhat exaggerated, by Kember (1971); cf. above, n. 33 and text thereto.

38 Journée (2012) 290–296.

39 Eros borrowed from Hes. *Theog.* 116–122, as Aristotle, presumably using Hippias’ anthology, already noted (*Met.* A.4 983b23–27, ad 28B13), but used in a different and novel sense. The function of this Eros reminds one of the Young Gods of *Timaus*.

with the ‘human beliefs’ (δόξας ... βροτείας) of B8.51 and the ‘beliefs of mortals’ (βροτῶν δόξας) and ‘things that are believed’ (δοκούντα) of B1.30–31.<sup>40</sup> In Parmenides’ theory it is placed on a scientific footing and explained in a rational way, not only by combining the polar opposites left/right with the seed of both parents and its places of provenance and deposition, but in the first place by his appeal to the two physical elements. We encounter these elements also everywhere else in the second part of the Poem, so this may help explain the words ‘completely going through all things’ (διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα) of B1.32, assuming that this is the right reading with the right translation. As a matter of fact ‘all things’ (πάντα) have been called Light and Night’ (B9.1). The human  
 10 view of Eros is reinterpreted as well, and Eros is placed on a different footing, | as it takes on—just as the anonymous Goddess who created it—the role of (in Aristotelian terms) moving cause in relation to these elements. The anonymous Goddess, as we recall, ‘steers all things’ (πάντα, B12.3). The basic cosmological structure, widely valid till Plato’s *Timaeus* and beyond, is now in place: a set of elements and one or more Demiurges.

However this may be, it cannot be denied that Parmenides added another and most important part of scientific inquiry<sup>41</sup> to the more strictly cosmological and meteorological investigations of the Ionians and Xenophanes.<sup>42</sup> This can only mean that natural philosophy was practised by him in earnest.<sup>43</sup>

If we are right to believe that it was he, and not Thales, who was the first to argue that the light of the moon is borrowed from the sun (B14–15, A42), this foundational discovery in the field of astronomy is another sign of his commitment and empathy with nature.<sup>44</sup> If the reports about his identification of

40 For the offerings of fictile wombs with pronounced right ovaries in the temple of Hera at Paestum see the paper of P. Ebner (not accessible to me) cited Zeller—Mondolfo—Reale (2011) 278 n.: ‘si tratta di votivi offerti alla Dea per invocare il concepimento di un maschio’. For the association of left with female and right with male as very early Greek beliefs see Lloyd (1962).

41 This evaluation is the opposite of that of the great Eduard Zeller (1963) 719, ‘Was er über den Unterschied der Geschlechter und die Entstehung derselben bei der Zeugung sagte, ist unerheblich’. True enough, but Zeller was thinking of the actual content and failed to take the innovative aspect into account.

42 Cf. much later a subdivision of Stoic physics, D.L. 7.133: ‘in the first of its [sc. of etiology’s] investigations medical inquiries have a share, in so far as it involves the inquiry ... into semen and things similar thereto’ (μὲν δ’ αὐτοῦ ἐπισκέψαι ἐπικοινωνεῖν τὴν τῶν ἰατρῶν ζητήσιν, καθ’ ἣν ζητοῦσι ... περὶ σπερμάτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὁμοίων).

43 Kraus (2013) 2.496 rightly concludes that, notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of the evidence, the second part of the Poem ‘zweifelloso die avanciertesten naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien seiner Zeit in den verschiedensten Disziplinen bot’. But he fails to single out the physiology etc. qua entirely innovative contribution.

44 Inscription of the 1st cent. CE, first published Ebner (1962) 32 ff., with plate 6: Παρμεναί-

the Morning and the Evening Star (2.15.7\*, A40a) and of the earth's being round (A44) are reliable, further proof is provided of his pioneering study of the system of the heavens. The fact alone that these views came to attributed to him is proof of the high esteem he won as a student of nature.

It is not impossible that his association with the clan, or company, of doctors in Elea called Ouliadai, attested by a handful of inscriptions, inspired or at least stimulated this interest in the biological and physiological side of human nature. But this cannot suffice to explain *le miracle parméniéen*. The physics is as important a contribution to the development of philosophy and science as the ontology, and not merely because it inspired the systems of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and the Atomists.

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δης Πύρητος Ουλιάδης φυσικός. Note φυσικός, not ιατρός as in the other inscriptions of this group. See further Samama (2003) 544–545, Zeller–Mondolfo–Reale (2011) 278 n., Gambetti (2008), Schirren and Rechenauer (2013) 1.193, also for further references.

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### Appendix: The Aëtian Lemmata with Name-Label Parmenides<sup>45</sup>

¶ The following 4 lemmata are found in the final Book of the *Placita*:

ch. 5.30.4 (28A46a), ‘Parmenides; (says that) old age occurs from the deficiency of heat’;

ch. 5.11.2 (28A54), ‘Parmenides (says that), whenever the seed is separated out from the right part of the womb [?],<sup>46</sup> (resemblances) to the male ancestors (occur), but whenever this happens from the left side, (resemblances) to the female ancestors (occur)’;

ch. 5.7.1 (31A81), ‘Empedocles (says that) males and females are born through heat and cold. Hence it is recounted that the first males were born from the earth more in the east and the south, whereas the first females were born in the north’, + ch. 5.7.2 (28A53), ‘Parmenides the other way around; that the males grew in the north, for they share more in the dense element, the females in the south on account of their lack of density’;

ch. 5.7.4 (59A111 + 28A53), ‘Anaxagoras Parmenides (say that males are born) when the seed from the right parts (sc. of the body of the male parent) is deposited on the right side of the womb and the seed from the left parts (sc. of the body of the male parent) is deposited on the left side; but if the deposition is reversed, (then) females occur’.

¶ There are 7 lemmata in Book 4:

ch. 4.9.14 (28A50 + 31A95),<sup>47</sup> ‘Parmenides Empedocles (say) that desire (arises) 13 from a deficiency of food’;

45 The Greek texts with facing English translation are printed from chs. 1.3.13 to 5.30.4 at Coxon (2009) 146–155.

46 For problems connected with this phrase see above, nn. 28–34, and text thereto.

47 In our forthcoming edition with commentary of the *Placita* (J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia,

ch. 4.13.10 (28A48), 'Some inscribe Pythagoras to this doxa (sc. Hipparchus' doctrine, cited ch. 4.13.9, of visual rays issuing from the eyes) as well, since he is an authority for mathematics, and in addition to him Parmenides, who shows this through his Poem';<sup>48</sup>

ch. 4.9.1 (Pyth. – + Emp. – + 21A49 + 28A49 + 29A23 + 30A14 + 59A96 + fr. 54 Luria + 70A22 + Protag. – + Plato –), 'Pythagoras Empedocles Xenophanes Parmenides Zeno Melissus Anaxagoras Democritus Metrodorus Protagoras Plato (say that) the sensations are false';

ch. 4.9.6 (28A45 + 31A90 + Anaxag. – + Democr. fr. 437 Luria + Epic. – + Heraclides fr. 122a–b Wehrli, 63A–B Schütrumpf), 'Parmenides Empedocles Anaxagoras Democritus Epicurus Heraclides (say) that the particular sensations of their particular object occur in accordance with the matching-sizes of the pores, each of the sense objects corresponding to each sense';

ch. 4.5.12 (28A45 + 31A96 + Democr. –), 'Parmenides and Empedocles and Democritus (say that) intellect and soul are the same thing. According to them no living being could be without reason in the true sense of the word'.

ch. 4.5.5 (28A45 + Epic. 312 Us.), 'Parmenides (says that the regent part is) in the whole chest; as also does Epicurus';

ch. 4.3.4 (28A45 + 18.9 + T 460 Mouraviev), Parmenides and Hippasus and Heraclitus (say) that (the soul) is fire-like.

¶ There are only 3 lemmata in Book 3:

ch. 3.15.7 (28A44 + cf. 68A98, frs. 4, 379, 403 Luria), 'Parmenides Democritus (say that the earth) remains in equilibrium because it is equidistant at all sides [sc. from the surrounding heavens]; it has no ground for moving this way rather than that; because of this it is merely shaken, but it does not move';

ch. 3.11.4 (28A44a), 'Parmenides was the first to define the inhabited zones of the earth under the two tropic zones';<sup>49</sup>

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*Aëtiana* V) we argue that this lemma should be moved to ch. 5.28.2. In the present context this is not important.

48 See above, n. 11.

49 As Diels *DG* 162 already saw, this lemma should be moved to ch. 3.14.2.

ch. 3.1.4 (28A43a), 'Parmenides (says that) the whitish colour (of the Milky Way) is the result of the mixture of the dense and the rare (elements)'.

¶ There are no less than 13 lemmata in Book 2:<sup>50</sup>

ch. 2.30.5\* (28B28), 'Parmenides (says that the earthy appearance of the moon occurs) on account of the dark (component) having been mixed in with the fire-like (component) in it; for this reason the heavenly body is called 'falsely appearing'';

ch. 2.28.6\* (– + 28A42 + 31A60 + 59A77 + 70A12 DK cf. B14), 'Pythagoras Parmenides Empedocles Anaxagoras Metrodorus (say) likewise' [sc. that (the moon) is illuminated by the sun, just as Thales]; 14

ch. 2.26.2\* (28A42), 'Parmenides (says that the moon is) equal to the sun (in size), and that it is illuminated by it';

ch. 2.25.2\* (13A16 + 28A42 + T446 Mouraviev), 'Anaximenes Parmenides Heraclitus (say that the moon is) fiery';

ch. 2.20.3\* (13A15 + 28A41), 'Anaximenes Parmenides (say that the substance of the sun is) fiery';

ch. 2.20.15\* (28A41), 'Parmenides (says that) the sun and the moon have been separated off from the Milky Way, the former from the more rarefied mixture which is hot, the latter from the denser (mixture) which is cold';

ch. 2.15.7\* (28A40a), 'Parmenides orders the Morning Star, which is considered by him to be identical with the Evening Star, as first in the ether; after it the sun, beneath which he places the heavenly bodies (i.e. stars) in the fiery region, which he calls 'heaven'';

ch. 2.13.8\* (28A39 + 22A11), 'Parmenides Heraclitus (say that the heavenly bodies are) condensations of fire';

ch. 2.11.4\* (28A38 + 22A10 + fr. 84 Wehrli, 42 Sharples + *SVF* 1.116), 'Parmenides Heraclitus Strato Zeno (say that the heaven is) fiery';

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50 For the asterisks see above, n. 12.

ch. 2.7.1\* (28A37), 'Parmenides says there are bands wound around each other, the one made up of the rare, the other of the dense, while others between these are mixed from light and darkness. And that which surrounds them all is solid like a wall. || Below it is a fiery band. And the most central (part) is also (solid), around which there is again a fiery band. Of the mixed bands the most central is both the ⟨origin⟩ and the ⟨cause⟩ of all motion and coming into being for all the others. He also calls it directive *Daimôn*, Holder of the Keys, Justice and Necessity. And the air is what is separated from the earth, vaporized through the earth's stronger condensation, while the sun and the Milky Way are the exhalation of fire. The moon is a mixture of both, of air and fire. The ether encircles above everything else, and below it the fiery (part) is disposed which we call heaven, below which the earthly regions have their place';

ch. 2.4.5\* (21A37 + 28A36 + 30A9), 'Xenophanes and Parmenides and Melissus (say that) the cosmos is ungenerated and everlasting and indestructible';

ch. 2.1.2\* (11A13b + 51.3 + Emped. – + Ecph. – + 28A36 + 30A9 + 22A10 + 59A63 + Plato – + Arist. – + SVF 1.97), 'Thales Pythagoras Empedocles Ecphantus Parmenides Melissus Heraclitus Anaxagoras Plato Aristotle Zeno (say that) the cosmos is unique'.

15 ¶ There are, finally, only 3 lemmata again in Book 1:<sup>51</sup>

ch. 1.25.3 (28A26 + Democr. fr. 23, 589 Luria), 'Parmenides and Democritus (say) everything (happens) according to Necessity; (and that) Fate and Justice and Providence and world-creating are identical';

ch. 1.24.1 (28A29 + 30A12 + Zeno –), 'Parmenides Melissus Zeno abolished coming to be and passing away because they were convinced that the All is immobile';

ch. 1.7.27 (28A31), 'Parmenides says (that the god) is the immobile and limited spherical'.

## Parmenides on Sense Perception in Theophrastus and Elsewhere

### Abstract

Theophrastus' account at *De sensibus* 3–4 shows (1) that he did not find evidence for a detailed theory of sense perception in Parmenides and (2) that he did not include our fr. 28B7 in his overview. The tradition followed by Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius concluded from 28B7 that Parmenides rejected the evidence of the senses in favour of that of reason (*logos*). But *logos* in Parmenides means 'argument', and *glôssa* is not the organ of taste but of speech. If Theophrastus had interpreted the evidence of 28B7 in the manner of Sextus and Diogenes he would have been obliged to discuss Parmenides' triad of purported senses between Plato's two and Empedocles' five.

### Keywords

eyes ears tongue – poetry – communication – doxography – diaeresis – skepticism

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*For Nestor-Luis Cordero at eighty*<sup>1</sup>

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It is quite generally assumed still that Parmenides had a theory concerned with sense perception, and more particularly that he declared the senses and sensations to be untrustworthy, although arguments against this interpretation have

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<sup>1</sup> It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to Nestor-Luis Cordero, who has written that Parmenides is 'antérieure alle dicotomie che sorgeranno dopo il terremoto della sofistica', among which that between 'sensibile' and 'intelligibile'. And thanks are due as usual to David T. Runia for his scrutiny of the text. A version of this paper was read and discussed at the OIKOS antieke filosofie dag, Utrecht, February 10 2017.

been brought forward. This reading is already represented in a paragraph in the Aëtian doxography, where we find him in the company of ten purported adherents of an even more strongly expressed version of this view:

Pythagoras Empedocles Xenophanes Parmenides Zeno Melissus Anaxagoras Democritus Metrodorus Protagoras Plato (say that) the senses/sensations are false (ψευδεῖς εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις).<sup>2</sup>

In the scholarly literature the admonition of the goddess in a verbatim fragment of the Poem is often cited in support:

For never at all could you master this: that things that are not are. But as for you, keep your thought away from this road of investigation, and do not let much-experienced habit force you down onto this road to wield an aimless eye and an echoing ear, and tongue (ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἡχέουσαν ἀκουήν / καὶ γλῶσσαν)<sup>3</sup>—no, decide by argument [*logos*] the much-disputed refutation spoken by me.<sup>4</sup>

These lines were already cited to this end in antiquity. Sextus Empiricus says ‘he stipulates that one must not pay attention to the senses but to reason [*logos*],’ quotes the relevant lines, and continues with ‘this man, too, as is clear from his words, proclaimed the cognitive reason [*logos*] to be the canon of truth and abstained from caring about the senses.’<sup>5</sup> Diogenes Laertius says that ‘he made reason [*logos*] the criterion and said that the senses are not exact,’ and next cites these lines too.<sup>6</sup> As is abundantly clear from the wider context in both authors, Diogenes and Sextus must be indebted to the same tradition.<sup>7</sup> Sextus also emphasizes the contrast between reason and sense perception in his allegorical interpretation of the proem, not paralleled in Diogenes.<sup>8</sup>

2 Aët. 4.9.1 (Parm. 28A49 DK), echoed Phld. *Rhet.* fr. incert. iii.6–11, 2.169 Sudhaus (28A49 DK). For Aëtius I use Diels’ numbering in the *DG*.

3 LM (2016a) 551 has ‘une oreille et une langue / sonnantes’. See below, n. 49 and text thereto.

4 Parm. 28B7.3–5 DK at S.E. *M.* 7.111 and D.L. 9.22, transl. [19]D8 LM (2016b).

5 S.E. *M.* 7.114 (printed fr. 136 Coxon ad fin., not in DK or LM) καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασφαεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ ... ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως. Trans. Bury (Loeb), slightly modified.

6 D.L. 9.22 ([19]R40a LM) χρητήριον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε, τὰς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκριβεῖς ὑπάρχειν (Parm. 28A1, 1.218.9 DK). For both Sextus and Diogenes see also Zeller (1919) 700 and Barnes (1979) 297.

7 Proved by Rocca-Serra (1987) 261–264, who speaks of a ‘source commune’.

8 Tarán (1965) 20–21.

This interpretation only works when eye, ear and tongue are believed to represent the senses *stricto sensu*, an issue to which I shall return below. Let us look first at earlier presentations pertaining to this issue, namely those of Aristotle and Theophrastus, together with a well-known passage in Plato.

Aristotle in a chapter of his *On the Soul* (citing two fragments of Empedocles and a passage in Homer) posits that ‘the ancients’ believe that ‘thinking and perceiving are the same’ (τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτόν).<sup>9</sup> In a chapter of the *Metaphysics* (mentioning Empedocles and Democritus, and citing the same two fragments of Empedocles, one of Parmenides, an apophthegm of Anaxagoras, and an Homeric passage that does not correspond to our text) he similarly posits that some people subscribe to the naive and false idea ‘that sense perception is thought’ (or ‘understanding’, φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν), and that it amounts to an alteration (sc. of the body).<sup>10</sup> He also tells us that according to Democritus and, to a certain extent, according to Anaxagoras, ‘soul and mind are the same’ (ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν). Soul and mind are entities, or psychophysical faculties, sense perception and thought their activities.<sup>11</sup> This issue is

9 Arist. *de An.* 3.3 427a19–27, cf. Patzer (1986) 73. In the extant verbatim fragments of Parmenides a form of the verb occurs only at 28B16.3 φρονέει (see below). In those of Heraclitus forms of the verb occur twice (22B17 φρονέουσι, 22B113 φρονέειν) meaning ‘to think’ or ‘to understand’; the substantive φρόνησις ‘understanding’ occurs once (22B2 DK), and the adjective φρόνιμος ‘intelligent’ also once (22B64 DK). The instances in the verbatim fragments of Democritus too are about thinking and understanding, and there is no example in those of Anaxagoras. [Hipp.] *Morb.Sacr.* c. 17.3 at first sight appears to posit a distinction between sense perception by the *phrenes* and heart on the one hand and thought in the brain on the other (ἡ καρδίη αἰσθάνεται τε μάλιστα καὶ αἱ φρένες· τῆς μέντοι φρονήσιος οὐδετέρῳ μέτεστιν, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων ὁ ἐγκέφαλος αἰτιός ἐστιν), but *ibid.* c. 14.2 the author also places sight and hearing (!) and the emotions in the brain (τούτῳ [sc. τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ] φρονεῖται μάλιστα καὶ νοεῖται καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν κτλ.). In *Morb.Sacr.* the verb αἰσθάνομαι means ‘to perceive’ in the general sense of ‘to be aware of’, ‘to notice’: e.g. ‘the brain is the first organ to perceive the thought that is in the air’ (c. 17.4 τῆς φρονήσιος τοῦ ἡέρος πρῶτος αἰσθάνεται [sc. ὁ ἐγκέφαλος] τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνεόντων).

10 Arist. *Met.* Γ.5 1009b11–31, now including Parm. 28B16. See Mansfeld (1986) 18–19, Patzer (1986) 72–74, Cassin and Narcy (1987) 280–283, Mansfeld (1996) 160–169. The only rather precise echo of part of this interpretation of the ‘ancients’ in the *Placita*, restricted moreover to the early Atomists, is Aët. 4.8.5 (67A30 DK) ‘Leucippus and Democritus (say) that the sensations and the thought-processes are alterations of the body (τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἐτεροιώσεις εἶναι τοῦ σώματος)’. For Democritus cf. also below n. 32. Frede (1990) 236–238, discussing the Aristotelian passages cited in nn. 8–10 and text thereto, correctly argues that according to Aristotle the ‘ancients’ failed to distinguish ‘reason’, or *nous*, from ‘perception’, but forgets to add that this entails that they equally failed to distinguish sense perception from reason.

11 Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a8–9 (Democr. 68A101), 1.2 404a25–b3 (68A101, 59A100), *Resp.* 4 472a3–14 (68A106 DK), cf. Aët. 4.5.12 (Parm. 28A45, Emp. 31A96 DK, Democr. –), D.L. 9.44

taken up in Theophrastus' treatise *On the Senses*, who however only speaks of 'thinking and perceiving', not of the identity of soul and mind.

If sense perception is believed to be on a par with thought or understanding, thought or understanding will be on a par with sense perception. This purported interchangeability is based on the more general meaning of αἰσθάνομαι as 'to feel', 'to be aware', 'to notice', and of αἴσθησις as 'awareness',<sup>12</sup> which overlaps with φρονέω meaning 'to have sensations' or 'to be conscious of', 'to be in one's right mind',<sup>13</sup> and of φρόνησις as 'sense' or 'consciousness'.<sup>14</sup> In a passage of the *Phaedo* Plato uses both the general and the more restricted senses of these words: 'is it blood we sense/think with (ὃ φρονοῦμεν), or air, or fire, or is it none of these, and is it the brain that provides the senses/sensations (τὰς αἰσθησεις) of hearing and seeing and smelling, from which memory and opinion would arise, and from memory and opinion, which has become stable, knowledge?'<sup>15</sup> To be an alternative to the sensations via the brain, which so to speak constitute the matter for the specific psychic functions and capacities of memory, opinion, and knowledge, the cognitive capacity of the principles blood, or air, or fire should comprise not only thought, but *also* sense perception. We may call this 'hylesensism'. To translate ὃ φρονοῦμεν as 'we think' alone, without including sensation, is not good enough.

In his *On the Senses* Theophrastus does not follow Aristotle all the way. He first divides the pre-Aristotelian philosophers into two main groups, with on the one side of this diaeresis those who claim that sense perception occurs when like meets with like, and on the other those who claim that it occurs when unlike impacts on unlike.<sup>16</sup> In his proem he lists Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato as representatives of the 'by similarity' (τῷ ὁμοίῳ) doctrine, and Anaxagoras and Heraclitus as representatives of the 'by contrast' (τῷ ἐναντίῳ) doctrine.<sup>17</sup>

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(Democr. 68A1) and 9.22 (Parm. 28A1 DK; Diogenes attributes this to Theophrastus, an issue I cannot discuss here but deal with in the commentary to Aët. ch. 4.7a in the forthcoming edition of Aëtius' *Placita* by Mansfeld and Runia). Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, cites proof-texts supporting a distinction between perception and thought according to Democritus, see 68B11 at *M.* 7.138. On the conflicting evidence (cf. also 68B9–10, B125 DK) see Taylor (1999) 200–208.

12 E.g. Eur. *El.* 290–291, Thuc. 2.50; [Hipp.] *Morb.Sacr.* 17.4, see above n. 9. See the careful inquiry of Solmsen (1961) 241–247, and cf. Schirren's conclusion (1998) 261: the preplatonic *Wortfeld* is about a general sort of awareness of the things around us, or being affected in an elemental way. For his view on Parmenides see however below, n. 40.

13 E.g. [Hipp.] *Morb.Sacr.* 14.2, see above n. 9, S.E. *M.* 7.77 = Gorgias 82B3 DK.

14 E.g. [Hipp.] *Morb.Sacr.* 17.3–4, see above n. 9, Isocr. *Or.* 14.61.

15 Pl. *Phd.* 96b.

16 Viano (1993).

17 Thphr. *Sens.* 1, see Mansfeld (1996) and Baltussen (2000) 16–18. This distinction between



But he rejects Aristotle's view that sense perception equals thought for the early thinkers as a group, for according to his second diaeresis he opposes those who opt for a distinction between these two modes of cognition to those who fail to do so, just as Plato in the *Phaedo* passage distinguishes between the view of Alcmaeon and those of Empedocles *cum suis*.<sup>18</sup> And thirdly he also distinguishes his subjects from each other by applying the category of quantity, that is, by a classification according to the *number* of senses that are recognized. This criterion is perhaps more familiar from other Peripatetic contexts, for instance Aristotle's foundational diaeresis of the elements or principles according to substance and *number* in *Phys.* 1.2, followed by Theophrastus in the fragments (224, 225H, 226A, 227A, 228A FHS&G) which Diels influentially attributed to the *Physicorum Opiniones* (as he called the work) but which are more likely to derive from his *Physics*, or Aristotle's division of the elements of soul according to substance and *number* in *de An.* 1.2.<sup>19</sup> Before Aristotle a division according to *number* is already used by Isocrates.<sup>20</sup> The category of quantity is also used in the Aëtian *Placita*, not only in ch. 1.3 on the principles, but also e.g. in 1.23 on motion, in 4.4 on the parts of soul, and (more interestingly in our present context) in 4.10 on how many senses there are. Accordingly one of the criteria of the *On the Senses* survives as the special theme of this particular *Placita* chapter.

While Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato and Anaxagoras are discussed at appropriate length in what follows, the brief reference in the proem is the only mention of Heraclitus in the entire *On the Senses*. This reference has merely a symbolic value, for his inclusion in the 'by contrast' party is in no way exemplified or justified. As has been suspected, he is included simply because of

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the proponents of similarity and contrast echoes Aristotle's at *EE* 7.1, itself indebted to Pl. *Lys.* 213e–216a. Both are presumably indebted to earlier collections and expositions such as those of Hippias and Gorgias, cf. on the *ὁμόφυλα* Hippias 86B6 DK ap. Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 6.15.1, and on the contrasting views Gorgias' position at [Arist.] *MXG* 5 979a14–18. See now Mansfeld and Runia (2009) 1.154–157. On knowledge of τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ see also e.g. Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405b15, 1.5 409b26–28.

18 Sense perception and thought are said to be the same according to Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, but not the same according to Alcmaeon (*Sens.* 25, 24A5 DK, ὡς ἕτερον ὃν τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ταῦτόν), Clidemus and Diogenes (but see *Sens.* 39, where Diogenes with some hesitation is included in the similarity party), while Democritus opts for a compromise because he accepts both options. See Mansfeld (1996) esp. 188; also Mouraviev (1999) 159.

19 Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 184b15–22, *de An.* esp. 1.2 404b30–405a3, Thphr. *Phys. Op.* frs. 1–9, 13, 15, and 23 Diels.

20 Isocr. *Antid.* 268. A later instance is S.E. *M.* 7.1–20 on the number of the parts of philosophy. More examples at Mansfeld (1990) 3157–3161.

his famous view that everything is determined by opposites,<sup>21</sup> perhaps also because of his by this time traditional role as Parmenides' counterpart. No evidence for the assumption that for Heraclitus sense perception comes about 'by contrast' is to be found among his remains, and it is hard to believe that Theophrastus would have omitted to cite it if it had been available.

Parmenides' view that sense perception is 'by similarity', however, is discussed in two paragraphs following on after the proem. Theophrastus cites and discusses a proof-text in favour of his presentation of Parmenides as the first representative of the 'by similarity' doctrine of sense perception. This proof-text is fr. 28B16 DK,<sup>22</sup> cited, as we saw, by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* chapter in support of his contention that sense perception and thought are believed to be the same by earlier authorities. According to Theophrastus this still holds for Parmenides.<sup>23</sup>

Let us look at the opaque fragment in its context at *Sens.* 3–4:<sup>24</sup>

Parmenides did not define anything at all except that, the elements being two in number, knowledge is in accordance with the one that prevails (κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον). For when the hot or the cold dominates, the thought becomes different. The better and the purer one of two is the one produced by what is hot; but note that this one too requires a certain balance (or: matching, συμμετρίας):<sup>25</sup>

'For just as each time it possesses the mixture (κρᾶσιν) of the much-wandering limbs (μελέων), so too thinking (νόος) presents itself to humans: for what thinks (φρονέει) for men is the same as the nature of the limbs (μελέων φύσις), for all and each, for the full (or: 'the more'—τὸ ... πλέον) is what is thought (νόημα).'

For he speaks of sense perception and thinking (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν) as being the same (ὡς ταυτό); this is why, for him, both memory and forgetting come about from these elements, through their mixture

21 Müller (1965) 8–11, arguing against inclusion in the 'by contrast' party, shows to what extent the 'by similarity' principle is present in Heraclitus' thought.

22 Parm. [19]D51 LM, trans. below slightly modified.

23 Cf. Zeller (1919) 721.

24 Parm. 28A46 DK, [19]D52 LM, trans. modified.

25 Either between hot and cold, cf. e.g. the definition of health cited by Aristotle e.g. *Top.* 6.2 139b22, or that attributed to Alcmaeon (24B4 DK) in the Greek tradition of Aët. 5.30.1, and Thphr. *CP* 1.4.2 συμμετρίᾳ τινὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ, *HP* 5.9.2—or, on the other hand, between an element and its objects of perception (Fränkel (1955) 175, Laks (1990) 15–18, cf. *Sens.* 5 σύμμετρα μόρια τῇ ὄψει, *Sens.* 22 τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν πόρων, *Ign.* 42 ἡ ἀσύμμετρία τῶν πόρων). But see below, n. 29, n. 32 and text thereto.

(διὰ τῆς κράσεως).<sup>26</sup> However, he has in no way determined whether there will be (sensation/)thought (φρονεῖν) or not when they are equal in the combination (τῇ μίξει), or what the condition would be then. But the fact that he also explains sense perception (τὴν αἴσθησιν) by one of the contraries taken by itself is clear from the passage<sup>27</sup> in which he says that a corpse does not sense (αἰσθάνεσθαι) light, heat, and sound, because the fire has withdrawn, but does sense cold, silence, i.e. the contraries, and in general that everything that exists possesses some knowledge.<sup>28</sup> Thus by his manner of expressing himself he seems to have eliminated the problems attending his hypothesis.

That what ‘thinks’ (φρονεῖ) for men is the same as what our body is (composed of) shows that there is no distinction in principle between thought and sense perception.

Theophrastus lists three possible situations: (1) unequal mixtures of both elements, where knowledge (γνώσις) is determined by what predominates, with as a corollary that the understanding (διάνοιαν) through the hot is better; (2) an equal mixture, not mentioned in the Poem; (3) the presence of a single element so no mixture, for which he found only a proof-text (not cited verbatim) regarding the presence of the cold alone and not, it would seem, for the hot alone. This, or so I believe, implies that under all normal circumstances a portion of the hot will be mixed with a portion of the cold, and conversely: ‘note that this one (sc. the hot) too (οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην) requires a certain balance (or: matching)’, that is, not only the cold needs such a balance or matching, but the hot does so as well. That the hot should be singled out as requiring a ‘matching’ (συμμετρίᾳ) with its object of perception<sup>29</sup> is not stated or implied

26 As, by implication, these should come about from the single elements listed at Pl. *Phd.* 96b. Cf. Arist. *de An.* 1.2 404b8–11: ‘Those (sc. earlier philosophers) who have focused on the fact that it knows and perceives what is, identify the soul with the principles (τὰς ἀρχάς): those who posit more than one principle, those principles, and those who posit one principle, that principle’.

27 ἐν οἷς φησιν: not to be translated as a plural, cf. e.g. Gal. *PHP* 7.5.48, S.E. *M.* 7.8, Simp. *in Phys.* 171.1–2, and expressions such as ἐν οἷς ἔγγραψε or ἐν ἄλλοις φησιν.

28 For this phrase cf. the echo at Aët. 4.5.12 (28A45, 31A96 DK).

29 A retrograde interpretation of this kind may be responsible for the attribution at Aët. 4.9.6 (28A47, 31A90 DK) to Parmenides of the Empedoclean view that ‘the particular sensations of their particular object occur in accordance with the matching-sizes of the pores, each of the sensibles corresponding to each sense’. Compare Aët. 4.9.14 (28A50, 31A95 DK): ‘Parmenides Empedocles (say) that desire (arises) from a deficiency of food’. A similar case is that of the ascription by ‘some people’ of Hipparchus’ doxa of visual rays issuing from the eyes to Pythagoras ‘since he is an authority for mathematics’ and to ‘Parmenides, who

in the four lines quoted in support that follow, which on the contrary explain this matching as conditioned by the changing *mixture* of the bodily compound on the one hand,<sup>30</sup> and on the other by means of ‘the full’,<sup>31</sup> that is, by the presence of the ingredients together as ‘what is thought’. Theophrastus presumably means that the mixture should not get too hot—a matter of mental health.<sup>32</sup> As we know from elsewhere in the Poem and the doxography, as long as he is alive the human being consists of both hot and cold, portions of which have been passed on to the embryo by its parents. This ‘mixture of qualities must be preserved in due proportion (*temperies* ~ κράσις, συμμετρία)’ in order to ‘produce well-formed bodies’,<sup>33</sup> which, one may venture to add, includes well-formed minds. Falling asleep indicates the process of cooling down, old age a decrease of the hot,<sup>34</sup> while the full withdrawal of the hot from the compound, as we have seen, results in death.<sup>35</sup> I agree with André Laks that each element only perceives itself,<sup>36</sup> but believe that for the full and complete perception by a nor-

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shows this through his verses (διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων, 28A48 DK)’ at Aët. 4.13.10. One may feel sure that, if Parmenides really had shown this, Theophrastus would have noticed.

30 μελέων πολυπλάγκτων: here (as also most of the time in Empedocles) μέλας means ‘limbs’, i.e. the human ‘body’ (for various interpretations, the most implausible of which is ‘sense organs’, see Kraus 2013, 494). It only means ‘limbs’ in a cosmic sense at Emp. 31B35.11 DK, where the context is decisive. πολυπλάγκτων, ‘much wandering’, pertains to the oscillating or permanently changing balance of the ingredients of the mixture. Cf. 28B6.4–6, where the ‘wandering [i.e. unstable] mind’, πλαγκτὸς νόος, is (poetically) located in the chest; echoed Aët. 4.5.5. Diels (1897) 113 speaks of ‘die Mischungsverhältnisse in den Organen der Wahrnehmung und des Verstandes’, where ‘Organe’ is too precise but the mention of both perception and understanding is appropriate.

31 For ‘the full’ see e.g. Mansfeld (1964) 190, Müller (1965) 19–20 n. 17 (‘das Volle’, oder allgemeiner as ‘Vorhandene’, ‘Seiende’), and Laks (1990) 21, with references to earlier literature. The translation ‘the predominant’ (an interpretation apparently preferred by Theophrastus, followed by many) still presupposes the presence of both elements, but fails for perception by the cold alone.

32 Cf. Thphr. *Sens.* 58 on Democritus (68A135): ‘about thinking (τοῦ φρονεῖν) he only says that it occurs when the soul is balanced as to the mixture (συμμέτρως ἐχοῦσης τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν κράσιν—or ‘after the motion’, ms. μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν); when one gets too hot or too cold, a change [sc. for the worse] takes place; it was for some such reason that the ancients believed that the mind becomes unhinged (ἄλλοφρονεῖν)’. ‘Ancients’ refers to Homer as quoted in the same epistemic context at Arist. *de An.* 1.2 404a29–30 (68A101, cf. above. n. 11 and text thereto) and *Met.* Γ.5 1009b28–31 (cf. above, n. 10 and text thereto).

33 28B18.1–3 *femina virque simul Veneris cum germina miscet, / venis informans diverso ex sanguine virtus / temperiem servans bene condita corpora fingit*. Cf. Arist. *PA* 2.2 648a25–31 (28A52) and Aët. 5.7.2 and 5.7.4 (28A53).

34 Tert. *de An.* 43 (28A46b), Aët. 5.30.4 (28A46a).

35 See further Mansfeld (2015) 6–10.

36 Laks (1990) 12–13.

mal human being both are needed. What the corpse perceives is, so to speak, only half of such a normal perception, and when this happens (to state the obvious) you are no longer alive.

Theophrastus will nevertheless have felt justified in including and even *exemplifying* sense perception, because the objects of perception by means of the cold alone (sc. by the corpse), namely 'cold, silence, etc.' (e.g. darkness), clearly are what came to be called perceptibles, objects of *sense* perception. Their opposites are perceptibles as well. But this is the best he could find, and having studied the Poem he had to conclude that Parmenides fails to list the individual senses or to account for their functioning.<sup>37</sup> This unlike Plato, who as he believed at least treated two senses, sight and hearing,<sup>38</sup> and unlike Empedocles, who treated all five, though not all in an equally satisfactory way.<sup>39</sup>

Given his decision to list the protagonists of the 'by similarity' explanation in an ascending series according to the number of specific senses assumed, it becomes clear that, unlike the tradition represented by Sextus and Diogenes and their numerous modern followers,<sup>40</sup> he did not regard the lines about 'the unseeing eye and echoing ear and tongue'<sup>41</sup> as conveying information about Parmenides' view of sense perception. If he had, he would have told us that Parmenides posited *three* senses, and would have discussed these between Plato's two and Empedocles' five. It is also clear that Theophrastus does not argue that according to Parmenides the senses are inexact, let alone false, and that another cognitive function is to be preferred. Quite the contrary, for sense perception and thought, or even 'knowledge' (γνώσις), are the same.

Diogenes Laertius not only quotes a source shared with Sextus Empiricus, but also two lines of the early Pyrrhonist Timon of Phlius to the effect that

37 Thphr. *Sens.* 3, Laks (1990) 10–11.

38 Thphr. *Sens.* 5–6. I cannot deal here with this unsatisfactory treatment of Plato, for which see Long (1996), and Baltussen (2000) esp. 136–139. Note that Plato *Tim.* 64a ff. first discusses the various aspects of touch (without using its name, though he does so at *Resp.* 523e and *Tht.* 180b) as belonging 'to the body as a whole', which in its way is reminiscent of the body as locus of perception in Parmenides. After taste and smell he lists hearing as the 'third' (*Tim.* 67a τρίτον) and sight as the 'fourth' (67c τέταρτον) 'perceiving part' (αἰσθητικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν μέρος), without concluding with a fifth. As Beare (1906) 187–188 and Baltes (1972) 155 point out, matters are redressed in *Ti.Locr.* 50–59 (touch at 52–55); update also in Alcin. *Did.* chs. 18–20. For the expression κατὰ μέρος αἰσθήσεις and its synonyms see e.g. Thphr. *Sens.* 2, 17, Aët. 4.9.6.

39 *Sens.* 7, 9.

40 A *communis opinio* still accepted by Kraus (2013) 449 'B 7: ... Warnung vor den Sinnen (3–5)', 478 'scharfe Verurteilung des Zeugnisses der Sinne'. Similarly Schirren (1998) 189 'entschiedene Ablehnung der Sinne'. Some earlier views are cited Mansfeld (1999) 331 n. 18.

41 Above, text to n. 4.

Parmenides ‘withdrew his thoughts from the deceit of appearance’.<sup>42</sup> And as a matter of fact we found him in a paragraph in the Aëtian doxography, as a member of a group of philosophers the Pyrrhonists and Academics liked to enlist among their predecessors.<sup>43</sup> In order to include Parmenides these people could not use the evidence and interpretation of Theophrastus, but had to look elsewhere. The contrast in fr. 28B7 between ‘sight, hearing and tongue’ on the one hand and *logos* (‘argument’) on the other induced a knee jerk reaction, for ‘sight’ etc. were so to speak automatically interpreted as representing the senses and sense perception as soon as *logos* was understood as ‘reason’.

There is only a single earlier passage that could be thought to have played a part in this context, because it contrasts sense perception with reason. Aristotle tells us that Parmenides was ‘constrained to follow the phenomena’, and accordingly posited that ‘the One is according to reason [*logos*], and more (than one, sc. two physical principles) according to sense perception [*aisthêsis*].’<sup>44</sup> But he does not cite chapter and verse: the point about sense perception is an inference of Aristotle, who believes that one should translate the obscure words of the early philosophers into cognitive language.<sup>45</sup> This comment about sense perception is not critical but meant as a compliment, and Aristotle’s interpretation enables him to cite Parmenides’ physical tenets without expressing a caveat.<sup>46</sup> His contrast between reason (limited) and sense perception (approved) cannot be based on that between the recommendation of *logos* and the warning against improper use of sight, hearing and tongue in fr. 28B7.

The interpretation of the lines about the ‘aimless eye and echoing ear, and tongue’ as pertaining to the senses, though comprehensible from the point of view of later developments in Greek philosophy,<sup>47</sup> is in my view (and not in mine only) not sound. At a first glance it is not implausible for eye and ear, but

42 Timon fr. 4.2 Wachsmuth (818 SH) at D.L. 9.23 ὅς ῥ’ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νόσεις, cf. fr. 5 W. (819 SH) at D.L. 9.25 on Zeno and Melissus.

43 Above, text to n. 2. For these purported predecessors see n. 41 above and e.g. Cic. *Luc.* 73–74, *Ac.Po.* 30–31, *Ac.Po.* 44–45; [Plu.] *Strom.* 4 ap. Eus. *PE* 1.8.4, *Strom.* 5 ap. Eus. *PE* 1.8.5, *Strom.* 6 ap. Eus. *PE* 1.8.6; Aristocl. fr. 7 Chiesara ap. Eus. *PE* 14.17.1; and S.E. *M.* 7.89–90, *M.* 7.122, *M.* 8.56. Cf. Barnes (1979) 296–297.

44 Arist. *Met.* A.5 986b31–34 (28A24 DK, [19]R12 LM) ἀναγκαζόμενος δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις, καὶ τὸ ἐν κατὰ τὸν λόγον πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὑπολάμβανων εἶναι κτλ.

45 Arist. *Met.* A.4 985a4–10, A.10 993a11–25, *Cael.* 3.3 303a9–10.

46 See above ch. 7, pp. 186–188.

47 Barnes (1979) 297 argues that the lines of 28B7 ‘do not argue for scepticism’ (for which see above, nn. 41–42), but *ibid.* 298 adds ‘I do not deny that Parmenides was an enemy of the senses and that he ‘hurled the senses out of truth’ (pseudo-Plutarch)’—i.e. [Plu.] *Strom.* 6 ap. Eus. *PE* 1.8.6, and concludes that ‘the enmity is left implicit in the poem’. This verdict is

most unlikely for the tongue qua organ of gustation, and certainly so in early poetry. Its advancement to one of the *five* senses as the organ of taste was an epoch making discovery of Empedocles.<sup>48</sup> It makes more sense to understand the tongue (emphatically placed at the beginning of Parmenides' next line) as the organ of speech<sup>49</sup> qua primary means of communication and information, and then the ear as in the first place that of speech as heard. In Greek poetry eyes and ears, sight and hearing, seeing and listening are widely found denoting the primary means of information and evaluation at one's disposal.<sup>50</sup> What therefore according to the goddess our poet (and whoever wants to follow him) should avoid is to accept uncritically what one is told, or has been told, by one's fellow men (and poets such as Hesiod, or people like Anaximander), or to speak like them, or to look at things the way they do. These people see but do not perceive, and hear but do not understand. In another fragment, which should be placed before 28B7, those in possession of unseeing eyes and echoing ears are even called 'both deaf and blind', and, if this translation is permitted, 'speech-

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not far from that of Zeller, see below, n. 53. Also cf. Cordero (1984) 157, who argues against 'une antithèse du type 'sens vs. raison'', but still adds '[l]es sens, évidemment, doivent être rejetés'.

- 48 Emp. 31B3.9–14 DK. See also Alcmaeon (who according to the report of Theophrastus failed to include touch, thus positing only four senses) at Thphr. *Sens.* 25 = 24A5 DK on the tongue as the organ of taste.
- 49 E.g. Mansfeld (1964) 43, Mourelatos (1970 = 2008) 77 n. 6 (doubting), Coxon (1986) 182 'the tongue echoes the confusion of the eyes and ears', Conche (1996) 121 (who *ibid.* 115 however still translates *logos* as 'raison'), and above n. 3; Mansfeld (1999) 332. Against this view Vlastos (2008) 372–373 n. 19, the first of whose parallels for the tongue as the organ of taste is (of course) Emp. 31B3.9–14 DK, where this meaning is indeed beyond doubt. For γλώσσα as the organ of speech or associated with speech see the numerous examples at *LSJ* s.v. (I)b and II; e.g. Hom. *Il.* 20.248–250 (where also ἐπακούσας), *Od.* 19.175, Sol. fr. 11.7, Theogn. 1.96, Aesch. *Supp.* 648–649 (σαφή δ' ἀκούεις ἐξ ἐλευθεροστόμου / γλώσσης), Aesch. [?] *Pers.* 406. Interesting [Hipp.] *Morb.Sacr.* 6.xiv.18–19 Littré = xvii.22–24 Jones (excerpted [Hipp.] *Epist.* 9.19.6–7 Littré, where Smith 1990, 95 translates γλώσσα as 'speech') τήν τε γλώσσαν τοιαῦτα διαλέγεσθαι οἷα ἂν βλέπη τε καὶ ἀκούῃ ἐκάστοτε (sc. during a spell of madness).
- 50 E.g. Hom. *Il.* 3.277 cf. *Od.* 11.109 = 12.323, *Il.* 5.632, *Od.* 3. 93–94; Hes. *Th.* 700–703; Thgn. 91–92, 1163–1164; Eur. *Hipp.* 612; and Pl. *Crat.* 422e. Cf. van Unnik (1973), Mansfeld (1999) 332. Aristotle's *De anima* concludes with a remarkable passage (3.14 435b19–26) on the higher purpose (ἔνεκα ... τοῦ εὖ) of the senses/sense organs for the animal (he is thinking of man): 'it has ... hearing that it may have significant sounds made to it, and a tongue that it may make significant sounds to some one else' (ἀκοὴν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνηται τι αὐτῷ, γλώτταν δὲ ὅπως σημαίνει τι ἑτέρῳ). Torstrik (1872) 224, followed by some, oddly argues 'linguae in recensendis sensibus locus non est' and brackets γλώτταν ... ἑτέρῳ. Themistius in *De an.* 126.20–21 adds tasting: γλώτταν δὲ δοῖν ἔνεκεν καὶ πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σημαίνειν ἑτέρῳ.

less' (they have, so to speak, lost their tongue).<sup>51</sup> This does not, of course, mean that they are blind, deaf and tongue-tied in the everyday sense of these words, but describes their condition from the vantage point of the implications of the 'much-disputed refutation' of fr. 28B7. Parmenides, communicating with his goddess, is urged to 'listen to' a different kind of 'speech', 'to look at' things in a different way, and to spread the word.<sup>52</sup> As we know he did so as a poet, who is someone cognitively privileged over other men.

We may perhaps assume a relation between the two interpretations, or receptions, of Parmenides in antiquity discussed above, echo answering echo. The skeptical interpretation and proof-text may well have been intended as alternatives to those of Theophrastus. The great Eduard Zeller, always well-documented and acutely conscious of the difficulties involved in interpreting early thought, was clearly bothered by this contrast, but attributed the inconcinnity to Parmenides himself, and apologized for it as being due to a lack of sophistication and precision. Referring to the Theophrastean interpretation and fr. 28B16, he said that Parmenides did not yet distinguish sense perception and thought according to their origin and formal character, however much (and here he must have fr. 28B7 and its skeptical interpretation in mind) he recognized the precedence of rationality over perception via the senses.<sup>53</sup> *Quod non*, as I have tried to argue. For though one may readily accept the first part of Zeller's observation, its corollary regarding sense perception is not supported by the evidence.

51 Parm. 28B6.7 DK κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, and τεθηπότες. The phrase 'both deaf and blind' seems to be proverbial, cf. e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* 3.1.19, Pl. *Phdr.* 126b, Strato fr. 112 Wehrli (= 62 Sharples) ap. Plu. *Soll.An.* 961a (quoting [Epich.] 23B12 DK = 214 Kassel—Austin). ML [19]D7 LM (2016b) translate τεθηπότες as 'stupefied', (2016a) 549 as 'ahuris', which is about the same thing as 'speechless'. Cf. *Od.* 1.356–361, where Telemachus asks his mother to go to her chambers, for 'speech shall be for men (μῦθος δ' ἀνδρεσσιν μελήσει)', and she leaves without replying, 'stunned' (θαμβήσασα), 'heeding her son's wise words' (παίδος γὰρ μῦθον πεπνυμένον ἔνθετο θυμῷ). For those who see without perceiving and hear without understanding cf. Heracl. fr. 22B107 DK and Mark 4:11–12.

52 The poet should 'take care of the words' he is to hear (28B2.1–2 εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας) and at the goddess' behest 'look at' what is absent as being present (28B4.1 λεῦσσε).

53 Zeller (1920) 721: 'Wir sehen ... daß auch er [sc. Parmenides] noch nicht darauf ausgeht, die Wahrnehmung und das Denken nach ihrem Ursprung und formalen Charakter zu unterscheiden, so sehr er auch den Vorzug der vernünftigen Rede [i.e. *logos*, JM] vor der sinnlichen Anschauung anerkennt'.



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# Heraclitus on Soul and Super-Soul

*With an Afterthought on the Afterlife*

## Abstract

This chapter is about the reception of Heraclitus' views on the human soul in its cosmic context. Those views were updated by later thinkers, and their extensive evidence on the matter is scrutinized in detail. A World Soul and various forms of immortality came to be attributed, while soul stuff was said to be inhaled from the environment. An appendix considers the quite general opinion that Heraclitus posited some sort of afterlife for human souls. It is argued that fragments held to support this interpretation are better otherwise construed.

## Keywords

Afterlife – exhalation – cosmos – Heraclitus – soul

## 1

The name-label Heraclitus occurs a mere three times in the psychological section of the Aëtian *Placita physica*, chs. 4.2–23, namely twice in ch. 4.3, entitled 'Whether the soul is a body and what is its substance', and once in ch. 4.7, entitled 'On the indestructibility of soul'. For the most part the information provided is not what someone coming from the verbatim Heraclitean fragments dealing with *psychê* would expect. To be sure, at Aët. 4.3.4 Heraclitus is coupled with (at a first glance a bit surprisingly) Parmenides and (as elsewhere) Hippasus<sup>1</sup> for the view that the *psychê* is 'fire-like' (*purôdê*). Since the verbatim fragments 22B36 and B31 DK imply that the position of *psychê* in cycles of elemental transformation is equivalent to that of fire,<sup>2</sup> this tenet can be accom-

1 As at Tert. *de An.* 5.2 (18.9 DK); on mistaken names in this context (Hipparchus for Hippasus, Heraclides for Heraclitus) see Waszink (1947), 127–128; cf. below, text to n. 65.

2 Kerschensteiner (1962), 110–111, Nussbaum (1972a), 6, and (1972b), 154–155, Schofield (1991),

modated. But Aët. 4.3.12 attributes a World Soul and 4.7.2 a Soul of the All to him, notions for which no immediate | equivalent is available in fragments that have been transmitted *ad litteram*.<sup>3</sup> In the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 22A15 to A17 DK, the two Aëtian lemmata come immediately before and after the long passage from Sextus Empiricus also attributed to Heraclitus, on inhaling the divine reason surrounding us as air, which makes us rational beings as long as we stay awake.<sup>4</sup> Though according to the verbatim fragments of Heraclitus there is something out there that is both dominant and rational (e.g. 22B32, B64 DK), the uninhibited use of the concept of a World Soul, of which the souls of humans are parts, shows the mark of a later *interpretatio*.

We may translate these two lemmata as follows:

TI Heraclitus (says that) the Soul of the cosmos is an exhalation (*anathymiasis*) from the moistures (that are) in it (sc. in the cosmos), and (that) the soul in living beings (derives) from the exterior exhalation as well as from the exhalation that is in them (sc. the living beings), (and is) of the same kind.<sup>5</sup>

19–20. For the different views of Kahn, Betegh and Mouraviev see below, n. 122 and text thereto. Parmenides' tenet has been simplified.

3 See Pradeau (2004), 284 on Aët. 4.3.12 (he omits to mention ch. 4.7.2).

4 S.E. M. 7.126–134. Long associated with Aenesidemus; see e.g. already Diels (1879), 209–210, Zeller and Nestle (1920), 885–886 with n. 4, now Schofield (2007), 323–325 with references. Marcovich (1978), 399, states that it is a 'pura falsificazione di Enesidemo e non ha alcun valore come fonte eraclitea'. Kahn (1979), 294–296, points to the Stoic ingredients and argues that the interpretation of Heraclitus is arbitrary. Reinhardt (1926), 192–208, argues for Posidonius as the main source (see also Sedley 1992, 31–32 n. 27), adding that he influenced Aenesidemus. Betegh (2007), 24–26 is in favour of accepting the evidence for Heraclitus to some extent. See further below, Section 4.

5 Ἡράκλειτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δ' ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ (Aët. 4.3.12, 22A15 DK). Not in Stobaeus; virtually identical parallel at Nem. NH c. 2, 16.19–21 Morani (cf. Marcovich ad fr. 66 (f3); T 866 Mouraviev). Theodoret goes further than ps.Plutarch in adding ὁμοούσιον, 'con-substantial'; to ὁμογενές, 'of the same kind' The word ὁμοούσιος does not occur before the 1st cent. CE; it is not uncommon in Irenaeus and Origen, and may be supposed to belong with bishop Theodoret's theological vocabulary. But it occurs in a comparable way in Plot. Enn. 4.7[2].10.19, 'through same-kindness and consubstantiality (of the soul with the gods)', διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς θεοῖς), so could have entered the open *Placita* tradition before Theodoret's time. According to Capelle (1924) the information is valid for Heraclitus, but Reinhardt (1926), 213 n. 2, is nearer the mark in discerning 'Spuren des Poseidonios', i.e., Stoic influence (see further below).

T II Heraclitus (says that) on departing from the body (the soul) returns to the Soul of the All, (which is) of the same kind.<sup>6</sup>

- 64 They are complementary; Diels could have combined them in a single A-fragment. The expressions ‘Soul of the cosmos’ and ‘Soul of the All’ are equivalent. Both times we are told that the Soul of the cosmos, or the All, and the (animal or human) soul(s) are ‘of the same kind’ (*homogenê, homogenes*).<sup>7</sup> T I is concerned with the soul’s material substance, or rather both with what it is constituted of and what it derives from, while T II deals with what happens to it when it leaves the body.

Yet there are important differences. The soul ‘in living beings’ in T I derives from both the external and an internal exhalation, while the World Soul derives from what we may call such an internal exhalation only (we do not hear about anything inhaled from beyond the cosmos).<sup>8</sup> How the soul in living beings manages to assimilate parts of this cosmic exhalation we are not told, but may safely assume that this was believed to happen through respiration.<sup>9</sup> In T II the soul on leaving the body ‘returns to’ the Soul of the All. This entails that it has originally been separated off from this Soul (*regressus* presupposing *exitus*), an idea that goes much further than the to some extent shared origin we find in T I, and we should think of incarnation rather than respiration. Here we are close to Stoic thought.<sup>10</sup>

I wish to argue that what we have here are two not entirely but still sufficiently different attempts to make sense of Heraclitus’ opaque utterances<sup>11</sup> about the relation of the human soul to the Fire that, as he claims, dominates the cosmos. One should try to make sense of these lemmata not only in the context of the *Placita* chapters where they occur, but also attempt to explain them against the wider background of the philosophical traditions that may

6 Ἡράκλειτος ἐξιοῦσαν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές (Aët. 4.7.2, 22A17 DK).

7 See already Diels’ remarks (1879), 210 n. 2, 392a in app.

8 As in the Pythagorean doctrine dealing with the void cited Arist. fr. 201 <sup>3</sup>Rose *ap.* Stob. *Anth.* 1.18.1c, 156.11–15 Wachsmuth and *Phys.* 4.6 213b22–24 (58.30 DK, 2nd and 1st texts).

9 Cf. Polito (2004), 147, who however seems to suggest we inhale the Cosmic Soul instead of some part of the exhalation that produces it.

10 According to Gigon (1935), 114, ‘rein stoisch und wertlos für Heraklit’, cf. Kahn (1979), 334 n. 372; but accepted by e.g. Müller (1965), 9, ‘Rückkehr zum verwandten Urfeuer’. Kirk (1949), 389 argues that certain souls ‘rejoin the mass of pure fire in the world’, cf. his discussion at Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1982), 207–208. See further below, Appendix.

11 One of the first statements explicitly concerning the problem of interpreting Heraclitus is Pl. *Symp.* 187a (fr. 27 (b) Marc.), ‘as apparently Heraclitus, too, means to say, provided we take into account that with his words he does not express himself well’.

have contributed to their contents. This approach entails that I shall be more concerned with the fringes than with the core of Heraclitus' psychology.

The entire concept of the World Soul hardly occurs in the *Placita*, and thus it is a bit of a surprise when it suddenly appears in Book IV. All one can find elsewhere is the doxa on the Soul of the cosmos (*kosmou psychê*) of Diogenes, Cleanthes and Oenopides at Aët. 1.7.17.<sup>12</sup> In Book II there is a chapter on the ensoulment and providential administration of the cosmos, but without the expression World Soul. We may perhaps include Archelaus at Aët. 2.4\* and the Plato doxa in Aët. 2.6\*.<sup>13</sup> But basically the concept does not appear in Book II. Clearly it is not a key concept for the doxographer but is associated with a limited number of doxai for reasons such as I attempt to give. The chapter on the ensoulment of the cosmos surprisingly does not list those in favour, but simply states, in its first lemma: 'all the others (say) that the cosmos is ensouled and administered by providence'. No mention of Plato, or the Stoics, for instance, but next a lemma for the opponents (Leucippus Democritus Epicurus), and then one for Ecphantus followed by one for Aristotle, because of the peculiar and compromise nature of their doxai. Heraclitus, to be sure, cannot be excluded from 'all the others' who say that 'the cosmos is ensouled'. Even so, the explicit reference to a World Soul in the lemmata 4.3.12 and 4.7.2 is exceptional.

65

## 2

The earliest authority to speak of *anathymiasis* ('exhalation') with regard to Heraclitus' concept of soul is Aristotle. In his interpretative overview of views

12 See below, n. 15. I refrain from adducing Anaximenes at 1.3.4, because the wording is late, cf. above, ch. 5. Reinhardt (1926), 209–212, interestingly argues that its analogy between soul inside and outside air shows the influence of Posidonius (i.e., of Stoicism).

13 The asterisks refer to the edition of Aët. Book 2 in Mansfeld and Runia (2009). Aët. 2.3\*, heading 'Whether the cosmos is ensouled and administered by providence' (on this chapter see Mansfeld and Runia 2009, 337–346), with its first lemma answering this question positively for 'all the others', i.e. except Democritus, Ecphantus, and Aristotle cited in the next lemmata. It has not been seen that the gist of this ch. is given at Thdt. CAG 1.63, 'some say the All is ensouled, others that it is soulless'. According to the Aristotle doxa at Aët. 2.3.4\* the cosmos is 'not ensouled through and through', as only the heavenly realm contains 'ensouled spheres'. See further Aët. 2.4.4\* (60A14 DK) 'Archelaus (says) that the cosmos has been produced through the agency of warmth and ensoulment' (ἐμψυχίαις Diels, ἐμψυχρίας Meineke Wachsmuth) and the standard Plato doxa in Aët. 2.6.4\*, 'the soul is prior, and after it there is the corporeal part'. For Thales at Aët. 1.7.11 see below, text to n. 22.

concerned with the nature and defining properties of soul, he groups Heraclitus with Diogenes of Apollonia (and others like Diogenes) and Alcmaeon, strategically | discussing him in between.<sup>14</sup> Diogenes, Aristotle says, held the soul to be Air, because this is finest and a principle (*archê*). Qua first principle, from which all other things derive, it knows, and qua what is finest it causes motion.<sup>15</sup> This information on Air as principle and cognitive is confirmed in the verbatim fragments of Diogenes preserved by Simplicius, where we even learn that Air as breathed in is ‘the soul and intelligence of men and the other living beings’.<sup>16</sup>

Aristotle continues:

Heraclitus, too, says that the principle (*archê*) is soul, since it is the exhalation (*anathymiasis*) from which he constructs the other things; this is what is most incorporeal and forever in flux; the moving is known by the moving, and like the majority he too believes that what is, is moving.<sup>17</sup>

Aristotle’s claim (made only here) that the soul *is* an exhalation is noteworthy, just as his further claim that this exhalation is Heraclitus’ (first) principle. Elsewhere he unambiguously declares that his ultimate principle is ‘fire’ (*pur*),<sup>18</sup> and the ancient commentators on the *De anima* passage argue that what is meant is actually fire, or at least the warm and dry exhalation.<sup>19</sup> Aristotle fails

14 Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a21–b1 (64A20 = Diog. T5a Laks, + 22A15 + 24A12 DK). Discussed by Buchheit (2005), 174–175 and *passim*, but not in its context in the *De anima* chapter. On Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a8–b1 as concerned with the similarity between Democritus, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon as to ‘l’âme considérée comme motrice’, see the illuminating pages of Festugière (1945) at (1971), 432–435.

15 The Diogenes at Aët. 1.7.17 = Diog. S2 Laks (‘Diogenes and Cleanthes and Oenopides say God is the Soul of the cosmos’) is usually assumed to be the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (Diels 1879, 676; SVF 3 Diog. 31), perhaps because one of his associates in the lemma is Cleanthes (though the other one is Oenopides of Chios, 41.6 DK). But it could equally well be Diogenes of Apollonia, whose Air, like Heraclitus’ soul/*anathymiasis*, came to be interpreted as a full-fledged World Soul. Laks (2008), 237, does not exclude this *interpretatio stoica*.

16 Frs. 64B4 and B5 DK (= Diog. frs. 8 + 9 Laks). Also cf. ps.Plutarch at Aët. 5.20.5 (64A30 DK = Diog. T11 Laks), which explains why animals, though ‘participating in the intelligible and the air’, cannot think. There are at least twenty references in the *Placita* to Diogenes of Apollonia, which shows that his views still counted.

17 Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a25–29 (22A15 DK).

18 Arist. *Met.* A.3 984a7–8 on Hippasus and Heraclitus (cf. Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 1 Diels = fr. 225 FHS&G *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 9.23–24, and Aët. 1.3.11, all at 22A5 DK), *Met.* K.10 1067a4–5 = *Phys.* 3.5 205a3–4 (22A10 DK).

19 Them. *in de An.* 13.26–28 (Heracl. T 764 Mour.), Simp. [Prisc.?] *in de An.* 31.27–31 (T 955



to tell us what this exhalation is an exhalation *of*. Also noteworthy is that this soul-as-prin|ciple is the material principle of ‘the other things’. But no immediate suggestion follows that the concept of soul according to the next physicist treated, Alcmaeon, includes a Super-Soul, for it is said to be ‘immortal because it resembles the immortals’, which can properly only be said of the human soul—unless, perhaps, one reads the identification of these immortals as ‘the moon, sun, stars and the whole heaven’ as willy-nilly hinting at the World Soul of the *Timaeus*.

67

A more modest presence of elements of soul in the environment is attributed by Aristotle at the beginning of this chapter to Democritus and Leucippus, and ‘some’ Pythagoreans.<sup>20</sup> The Atomists argue that we breathe in soul-atoms, which move around like ‘motes in the air’, the Pythagoreans that these motes, or what moves them, are soul.

In a chapter further down Aristotle is more explicit, though in a quite cautious way:

Some think that it (sc. soul) is intermingled in the universe, and it is presumably for this reason that Thales thought that ‘all things are full of gods’.<sup>21</sup>

His reference to the apophthegm attributed to Thales provides an argument rather than a proof. The vague term ‘intermingled in’ (*memichthai*) fails to turn this picture into that of a full-blown World Soul. No such hesitation is found in the Thales lemma in the Aëtian chapter entitled ‘Who is the deity’: ‘Thales (says) that the intellect of the cosmos is God, and that the All is ensouled [thus, presumably: a World Soul] and at the same time full of daemons; and that his [sc. the god’s] divine kinetic power pervades the elemental moisture’.<sup>22</sup> This is a Stoicizing blow-up of Aristotle’s suggestion (the word *diêkein*, ‘pervade’, gives

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Mour.), Phlp. *in de An.* 87.9–12 (T 972A Mour.). Conversely, Buchheit (2005), 179, argues that the principle of ‘fire’ attributed by Aristotle to Heraclitus is in fact the *anathymiasis*.

20 *De An.* 1.2 403b31–404a19 (67A28 + 58.40 DK). For their Democritus ch. Diels and Kranz prefer another passage, *Resp.* 4 471b30–472a18 (68A106 DK).

21 *De An.* 1.5 411a7–8 (11A22 DK). In what follows Aristotle argues against, see below, n. 71.

22 Aët. 1.7.11 at Stob. *Ecl.* 1.29b, 34.8–10 Wachsmuth (11A23 DK, cf. Cic. *ND* 1.25 also cited there), Θαλής νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐμψυχὸν ἅμα καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρες· διήκειν δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦ στοιχειώδους ὕγροῦ δύναμιν θείαν κινητικὴν αὐτοῦ. Also D.L. 1.27 (11A1 DK) on Thales: ‘the cosmos is ensouled and full of daemons’; same excerpt in *Schol. in Plat. Resp.* 600A1–10 (Thales fr. 578 Wöhrle). Further parallels listed by Wöhrle (2009), 52, commenting on his Thales fr. 32. Cf. Alc. *Did.* 15.1, ‘there are also other daemons ... in the aether and the fire and the water, so that no part of the cosmos fails to share in soul’, etc.

the shift away).<sup>23</sup> Remarkably enough, the apophthegmatic utterance has also found a place in the general section of the doxography of Heraclitus at Diogenes Laërtius 9.7, | though again in a revised form: ‘all things are full of souls and daemons’.<sup>24</sup> That gods are replaced by daemons, as in the Aëtian lemma on Thales’ theology, need not be significant, but the omnipresence of souls, though at a first glance perhaps innocuous against the background of a rather widely shared belief,<sup>25</sup> acquires additional weight when we recall the exhalation and the Soul and souls of Aët. 4.3.12, with the same name-label Heraclitus.

A view similar to that of Democritus and some Pythagoreans is in the later chapter (*de An.* 1.5) attributed to the Orphic poems, which speak of souls being borne upon the winds and breathed in.<sup>26</sup> But this, again, does not amount to the assumption of a World Soul. We may however realize that this purported evidence about soul ingredients or even souls inhaled from outside does provide a background for the doctrine at Aët. 4.3.12, according to which the exterior exhalation constitutes one of the sources of the souls in living beings, though this process of inhalation, as noted, is not claimed for Heraclitus by Aristotle.

A closer parallel to this Aëtian lemma is provided by a paragraph in the Peripatetic *Problemata*:<sup>27</sup>

Why, when one eats garlic, does one’s urine smell of it, whereas this does not happen when other things are eaten that have a strong smell? Is it because, as some followers of Heraclitus (*tines tôn Hêrakleitizontôn*) say, ‘exhalation takes place in the body just as in the universe’, and then, when cooling down occurs, what is concentrated there [sc. in the universe] is moisture and (what is concentrated) here [sc. in the body] is urine, so that the exhalation from the food, when it mingles, causes the smell?

23 See Kerschensteiner (1955), 339, Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 2.1.87, 178–179. Reinhardt (1926), 209, attributes this colouring to (of course) Posidonius.

24 καὶ πάντα ψυχῶν εἶναι καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη.

25 E.g. Arist. *de An.* 1.5 410b26–30 (below, text to n. 26), *Pythag. Hypomn.* at Alex. Polyh. fr. 9 Giannatasio Andria (Pythagorei 58B.1a DK, Anonymus Alexandri 236.15–16 Thesleff) *ap.* D.L. 8.32. ‘the whole air is full of souls’, Arius Did. fr. 39.4 Diels (*DG* 471.13, *ap.* Eus. *PE* 15.20.4; *SVF* 2.821) souls ‘in the atmosphere’ (ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι), S.E. *M.* 9.71–73 (*SVF* 2.812). Useful collection of parallels at *Orph.* 436 F Bernabé.

26 *De An.* 1.5 410b26–30 (1B1 DK, *Orph.* 421 F (I) Bernabé). The date of *Orph.* 422 F and 426 F Bernabé *ap.* Vett. Val. *Anth.* 9.1, ‘the soul for humans has its roots in the aether’ (ψυχὴ δ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ἅπ’ αἰθέρος ἐρρίζωται), and ‘inhaling the air we gain possession of the divine soul’ (ἄερα δ’ ἔλκοντες ψυχὴν θεῖαν δρεπόμεσθα), is uncertain. I suppose these lines express the Stoicizing notions studied below, Section 3.

27 [Arist.] *Probl.* 13.6 908a28–34 (fr. 66 (f<sup>3</sup>) Marc.).

We must separate the Heraclitean from the Peripatetic ingredient. The persistent smell of garlic is not a Heraclitean theme.<sup>28</sup> According to Peripatetic doctrine exhalations, both those in the cosmos and the physiological sort, are twofold, viz. dry and wet.<sup>29</sup> According to the Heracliteans cited here the exhalations are | wet. The explicit connection between internal and external exhalation they put forward is not found in the verbatim fragments of Heraclitus, but we do find the internal exhalation there. Though doubts have often been expressed, there is no sufficient reason to withhold recognition from the sentence 'souls too are nurtured by exhaling from the moistures', transmitted via Zeno and Cleanthes to Arius Didymus to Eusebius and so to us, and so to reject the idea of internal exhalation as unHeraclitean.<sup>30</sup> These souls will be human souls. But the Heraclitean evidence for cosmic exhalation is a bit more tenuous, as we shall see.

69

Let us first note that Heracliteans are also cited in a passage further down in the *Problemata*:<sup>31</sup>

Some followers of Heraclitus (*tines tôn Hêrakteitizontôn*)<sup>32</sup> say that stones and earth are formed from the drying and solidifying of drinkable water, and that the sun is nourished by exhaling from the sea<sup>33</sup> (ἐκ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης τὸν ἥλιον ἀναθυμιάσθαι).

Here the Heracliteans provide information about elemental transformation that goes in some respects beyond what is found in the verbatim fragments.

28 *Probl.* 1.48 and 20.30, too, are about issues concerned with the smell of garlic, and Books 12 and 13, respectively, deal with pleasant and unpleasant smells.

29 Evidence at Bonitz (1870), *Ind.* v. ἀναθυμιάσις.

30 Heracl. 22B12 DK. Kirk (1962), 369–372, and Kahn (1979), 259–260, argue against authenticity; Dilcher (1995), 63, Buchheim (2005), 186–188, and Betegh (2007), 21, accept the fragment. An argument in favour is that Zeno and Cleanthes were apparently incapable of finding a better proof-text.

31 [Arist.] *Probl.* 23.30 934b33–36 (Heracl. T31 Mour., Antisthenes 70.2 DK).

32 The verb ἡρακλειτίζειν occurs only five times, viz. in these two passages from the *Problemata*, and for the first time at *Met.* Γ.6 1010a11–12, 'the most extreme of the views cited, that of professed followers of Heraclitus, such as was held by Cratylus'; and many centuries later at *Syr. in Met.* 160.30 and *Ascl. in Met.* 278.9, the latter commenting on the passage in *Met.* Γ. Verbs on -ίζω derived from proper names (cf. Ἀριστοτελείζειν, Πλατωνίζειν) signify the acceptance of a role model: 'Ita Πυθαγορίζειν, ut hoc utamur, proprio et notivo sensu pertinet ad significandam ipsam vitae agenda rationem pythagoricam (i. e. continentem ac sobriam) 'pythagorice vivere', speciali autem sensu valebit 'Pythagorae exemplum imitari', Meerwaldt (1928), 412.

33 Wrong translation into English, German, or French in the editions of the *Problemata* I have seen; correct at Mouraviev (1999), 18.

That water changes in part into earth is clear from a clause in fr. 22B31 DK, 'of sea half (turns into) earth' (θαλάσσης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ γῆ). The difference is that Heraclitus speaks of the sea, the Heracliteans of fresh water. That water changes in part into fire may be deduced from the clause at the beginning of this fragment: 'turnings of fire: first sea' (πυρὸς τροπαὶ πρῶτον θάλασσα), if we may accept (I do) that the process is reversible in the opposite direction, and if we may believe that the *prêstêr* into which the sea changes for the other half (τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ πρηστήρ) represents fire.

- 70 That the *sun* is nurtured by the exhalation from the *sea* (a process representing a change of water into fire) is not paralleled in the verbatim fragments either. The doxographical reports with name-label Heraclitus about the sun, the moon, and the heavenly bodies in general as being nurtured by exhalation are inconsistent, since one of them (22A11 DK) speaks of the nurture of the heavenly bodies by exhalation from the earth, a second one (22A12 DK) says that the sun according to Heraclitus and Hecataeus<sup>34</sup> is an ignited intelligent mass from the sea, a third one (also 22A12 DK) posits a nurture of sun, moon and stars by a moist exhalation without further specification, while the account in Diogenes Laërtius, which speaks of dark and light exhalations, is unclear.<sup>35</sup> But useful information may be gathered from Aristotle's discussion of the ideas of the physicists concerned with the explanation of the saltiness of the *sea* in *Meteorology* Book Two, chapters 2 and 3. He points out that 'all earlier thinkers who supposed that the sun is nourished by moisture are ridiculous'. Heraclitus must be included, and in fact makes his appearance: he should not have said that 'the sun is new every day', but 'always and continuously new'. In the context of these two chapters this can only mean that Heraclitus, too, claimed that the sun is nurtured from the sea.<sup>36</sup>

The view of the Heracliteans that the sun is nurtured by exhalation from the sea agrees with the Aëtian lemma with name-labels Heraclitus and Hecataeus that it is ignited from the sea. This theory about the sustenance of the sun and the other heavenly bodies is familiar as a Stoic doctrine. The sun as an intelligent 'ignited mass' (*anhamma*) from the (large) sea is found in doxographical fragments pertaining to Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and the Stoics in gen-

34 Aët. 2.20.6\*. Hecataeus of Abdera according to 73B9 DK.

35 D.L. 9.9–10 *ap.* 22A1 DK (unclear), Aët. 2.17.1\* (22A11 DK) τρέφεσθαι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἐκ τῆς ἀπὸ γῆς [or: ἐπιγείου] ἀναθυμιάσεως, Aët. 2.20.6\* (22A12 + 73A9 DK + SVF 1.501) 'Ἡράκλειτος Ἐκαταῖος Κλεάνθης ἀναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάττης εἶναι [sc. τὸν ἥλιον], Aët. 2.28.7\* (22A12 DK) ταῦτον πεπονθέναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην. σκαφοειδεῖς γὰρ ὄντας τοῖς σχήμασι τοὺς ἀστέρας, δεχομένους τὰς ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως αὐγάς κτλ.

36 *Mete.* 2.2 354b33–34 plus 355a11–15 (22B6 DK).

eral.<sup>37</sup> The moon according to the Stoics in general is said to be ignited and fed by (fresh) water | from sources etc.<sup>38</sup> The formula ‘intelligent ignited mass’ (*anhamma noëron*) in the lemma on the sun of Heraclitus plus Hecataeus is absolutely Stoic. The Heraclitean sun, when taken over by the Stoics, becomes ‘intelligent’ (*noëron*), just as the Heraclitean souls become ‘intelligent’ (*noërai*) when interpreted by Zeno and Cleanthes.

71

The view of some Heracliteans that fresh water, and not water in general on the way down, changes into earth and stones, however, is peculiar, and I have found no parallel among the Stoic or Heraclitean *reliquiae*.<sup>39</sup>

Diogenes Laërtius’ report of the cycle of cosmic transformations, from fire to water to earth or the way down, and from earth to water and from water to ‘the rest, as he [sc. Heraclitus] reduces almost everything to the *anathymiasis* from the sea’,<sup>40</sup> or the way up, is remarkably close to fr. 21B31 DK: only three states of matter,<sup>41</sup> first fire, water, and earth, then earth, water, and ‘the exhalation from the sea’ which obviously represents the *prêstêr* from the sea of the verbatim fragment, and so supports the suspicion that *prêstêr* and exhalation occupy the position of elemental fire. We may also note that the ‘exhalation to which almost all things are reduced’ very much resembles Aristotle’s presentation of exhalation as Heraclitus’ principle ‘of the other things’, though Diogenes Laërtius does not mention soul in this context. Yet according to the process-in-stages of elemental conversion as described in fr. 22B36 DK, a soul coming to be from water occupies the place of the *prêstêr* from the sea in fr. 22B31, and of the *anathymiasis* from the sea at Diog. Laërt. 9.9. Although no explicit identification is provided and the evidence is mixed, that is, is in part doxographical, we do have a set of equivalences, each in a different setting: fire at the beginning

37 Sun: SVF 1.121 (*Etymol.Gud.* 241.41 Sturz, ἀναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ τοῦ θαλάσσης (ἀναθυμιάματος)), 1.501 (Κλεάνθης ἀναμμα νοερὸν τὸ ἐκ θαλάττης), 2.652 (Arius Did. fr. 33 Diels, *DG* 467.12–13 ap. Stob. 1.25.5, ἔξαμμα νοερὸν ἐκ τοῦ τῆς θαλάσσης ἀναθυμιάματος), 2.650 (D.L. 7.144, ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης θαλάττης νοερὸν ὄντα ἀναμμα), 2.655 (Aët. 2.20.6\*, ἀναμμα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάττης), 2.656 (*Comm. in Dion.Thr.* 121.12–13, ἀναμμα νοερὸν θαλασσίων ὑδάτων), 2.663 (Plu. *Is.* 367E, ἐκ θαλάττης ἀνάπτεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι), An.Lond. *Iatr.* xxx.19–22 Manetti, τῷ ἀναμ]μα νοερὸν ἐκ θαλάσ[σης εἶναι ἀπὸ] τοῦ νοστήμου τοῦ κ(ατὰ) τὴν θ[άλασσαν] τρέ[φ]εται κτλ. (not in SVF).

38 Moon: SVF 2.650 (D.L. 7.144 again, ἐκ ποτίμων ὑδάτων), 2.665 (Plu. *Is.* 367E, τὰ κρηναῖα καὶ λιμναῖα νάματα γλυκεῖαν ἀναπέμπειν καὶ μαλακὴν ἀναθυμίασιν).

39 Stones as products of cosmic transformation (but via earth, not directly) can only be paralleled at Anaximen. 13A5 DK (Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 2 Diels, 226A FHS&G) and Anaxag. 68B16 DK, echoed at Meliss. 30B8.3 DK.

40 πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὕδωρ γίνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ, σχεδὸν πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἀνάγων τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης.

41 Anachronistically: gas, liquid, solid, and conversely.

of the cycle of transformation, and at a subsequent stage: soul from the water, or *prêstêr* from the sea or *anathymiasis* from the sea.

72 3

In the two passages of the *Problemata* where we find them, the ‘followers of Heraclitus’ are concerned with explaining certain details of the process of cosmic transformation. The Heraclitus they present us with is a *Heraclitus interpretatus*. Since *Heraclitei non sunt multiplicandi praeter necessitatem*, I trust that the same people are meant both times, and I further believe that they may be dated to ca. 350–280 BCE. Their emphasis on the parallel between external, or cosmological, exhalation and condensation on the one hand and internal, or physiological, exhalation and condensation on the other, and their explicit view that the sun is sustained by exhalation from the sea have them anticipate standard Stoic doctrine a bit more clearly than the evidence attributable to Heraclitus himself. I actually have toyed with the idea that the designation *Hêrakleitizontes* indicates the early Stoics (*si perpauca mutavissent ...*), for it is of course agreed that there is much in Stoicism that is, in this sense, Heraclitean.<sup>42</sup>

Cosmic exhalation, viz. the exhalation sustaining the heavenly bodies according to the Stoics, has been briefly discussed above. That the human soul too is sustained by exhalation from moistures is a Stoic doctrine too, attested from Zeno to Diogenes of Babylon and beyond.<sup>43</sup> Of primary importance is the fragment of Arius Didymus citing Cleanthes explaining Zeno on Heraclitus’ phrase (already cited above) ‘souls too are nurtured by exhaling from the moistures’ (22B12 DK):<sup>44</sup> such a soul according to Zeno is a ‘percipient exhalation.’<sup>45</sup> In a similar passage dealing with cognition according to the Stoics, Plutarch says that ‘the nature of the soul is exhalation’, and that its ‘nutriment

42 Think of πολλὸν ... τὸ Ἀριστοτελίζον in Posidonius according to Strab. 2.3.8 (T 85 E.-K.). Kahn (1979), 334 n. 372, posits that these Heracliteans ‘have obviously gone far beyond their master in working out a detailed physical theory’.

43 On this connection in Stoic thought between microcosm and macrocosm see Tieleman (1996), 90–96; evidence for the microcosm is cited *ibid.*, 90 with n. 95.

44 Arius Did. fr. 39.2–3 Diels (*DG* 470.25–471.9, *ap. Eus. PE* 15.20; *SVF* 1.141, 1.519). For 22B12 DK cf. above, n. 30 and text thereto.

45 αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν: Wellmann’s simple conjecture, rejected by Mouraviev, is certain because of what follows: ‘Zeno declares the soul to be an evaporation in the same way as Heraclitus, and that it is percipient he says in the following way’ etc. (ἀναθυμίασιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων, αἰσθητικὴν δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο λέγει

and origin are from the moistures'.<sup>46</sup> A fragment of Diogenes of Babylon quoted verbatim by Galen tells us that our voluntary motions are caused by a 'psychic exhalation, and that every | exhalation arises from nutriment'.<sup>47</sup> This exhalation is of course internal, just as in a passage in ps.Plutarch *de Homero* 2.<sup>48</sup> Elsewhere Galen states that those who posit that the soul is *pneuma* (the Stoics cannot of course be excluded) hold that it is sustained both by exhalation of the blood and air inhaled from outside.<sup>49</sup>

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The series of excerpts constituting the Arius Didymus fragment continue by informing us that according to the Stoics

- (a) there is a Soul in the Whole, which they call ether and air in a circle around land and sea, and exhalations from these. The other souls are attached to this (Soul), all those that are in living beings as well as those in the atmosphere; for the souls of the dead persist for some time.
- (b) Some hold that the Soul of the Whole is eternal, and that in the end the other (souls) are combined with it.<sup>50</sup>

This passage is explicit about the relation between individual souls and World Soul, and ascribes the idea of a reunion after death with the latter of all souls to at least a Stoic faction, viz., presumably, Cleanthes and his followers.<sup>51</sup> The first

κτλ.) Cf. [Plu.] *Hom.* 2 c. 127 l. 1407 Kindstrand, ἀναθυμιάσιν αἰσθητικὴν, cited below, n. 48. For Zeno and Cleanthes see also *SVF* 1.139, 1.520.

46 Plu. *CN* 1084F (*SVF* 2.847).

47 Gal. *PHP* 2.8.44 (*SVF* 3 Diog. 30), 'τό' φησι 'κινεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἀναθυμίασις, πᾶσα δὲ ἀναθυμίασις ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς ἀνάγεται' κτλ.; see Tieleman (1996), 87–90.

48 [Plu.] *Hom.* 2 c. 127, ll. 1406–1408 Kindstrand, 'the Stoics define the soul itself as connate *pneuma* and percipient evaporation, ascending from the moistures in the body' (αὐτὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οἱ Στωικοὶ ὁρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς καὶ ἀναθυμιάσιν αἰσθητικὴν, ἀναδιδομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγρῶν). Not in *SVF*.

49 Gal. *Hipp.Epid.* 6, 17B246.14–247.3 K. (*SVF* 2.782).

50 Arius Did. fr. 39.4–5 Diels (*DG* 471.13–16, *ap.* Eus. *PE* 15.20; *SVF* 2.821), εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ φασιν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα καὶ ἄερα κύκλῳ ἥπερ τὴν γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμιάσεις· τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζώοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχὰς. || ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν μὲν τοῦ ὅλου αἰδίον, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς συμμίγνυσθαι ἐπὶ τελευτῇ εἰς ἐκείνην (Diels *DG* ad loc. conī. περιέχοντας) et ἀναθυμίαθ(έντας), von Arnim *ap.* *SVF* περιέχουσιν et ἀναθυμίαθει(αν)). The (b)-section is not discussed by Hoven (1971). I translate the text as transmitted; with von Arnim's plausible emendations (accepted by Bernabé ad Orph. 437 F) one gets: 'a Soul in the Whole, which they call aether and air, surrounding in a circle land and sea and exhaled from these'.

51 According to Cleanthes all souls survive until the *ekpyrōsis*, while Chrysippus awarded this

paragraph, (a), provides a parallel for the family relationship (the fact of their being *homogenê*) between souls and Soul at Aët. 4.3.12, but not for the external exhalation's nourishing of the soul in living beings. The second paragraph, 74 (b), confirms | this family relationship (movement towards the *homogenes*), but also provides a parallel for Aët. 4.7.2, the soul's return after death to the Soul of the All.<sup>52</sup>

According to Stoic doctrine the souls of humans are parts of the divine Logos, or World Soul. That 'the Soul of the Whole of things is immortal and those in living beings are parts of it' is, for instance, stated in the Stoic doxography in Diogenes Laërtius.<sup>53</sup> 'The cosmos is ensouled, as is clear from the fact that our soul is a piece torn off from there'.<sup>54</sup> According to Seneca, our 'reason is a part of the divine spirit concealed a human body',<sup>55</sup> while our soul 'remains close to its origin, depends upon it, looks at it and strives towards it'.<sup>56</sup> Or listen to Manilius: 'we perceive our creator, of whom we are a part, and rise to the stars, whose children we are. Can one doubt that a divinity dwells within our breasts and that our souls return to the heaven whence they came?'<sup>57</sup> Manilius on the return of souls agrees with the Stoic faction cited by Arius Didymus.

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privilege only to the souls of the wise: D.L. 7.157 (*SVF* 1.522 = 2.811); cf. also below, n. 101 and text thereto.

52 On this and other destinations of the returning soul see Dörrie and Baltes (2002), 190, 416–417.

53 D.L. 7.156 (*SVF* 2.774). A somewhat different view, closer to that attributed to Heraclitus at Aët. 4.3.12, is formulated by Alexander of Aphrodisias in *Phys.* lib. 4, schol. 47\* Rashed (2011), 'the Stoics ... said that the mind is the subtle *pneuma* that pervades all things and holds all things together; they called this 'Soul of the cosmos', and (said) that there are several souls in each individual, one as nature and part of the Soul of the All, another one (being) each individual's own soul' (οἱ Στωικοὶ ... τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἔλεγον εἶναι τὸ λεπτομερές πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ πάντων διήκον καὶ συνέχον πάντα· ὃ δὴ καὶ ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἔλεγον καὶ πλείους ψυχὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, μίαν μὲν τὴν ὡς φύσιν καὶ μέρος τῆς τοῦ παντός ψυχῆς, ἄλλην δὲ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστου).

54 D.L. 7.143 (*SVF* 2.633), cf. Epict. 1.14.6, etc.

55 Sen. *Ep.* 66.12, cf. *Ep.* 92.30, *Ep.* 120.14.

56 *Ep.* 41.6, cf. *Ep.* 79.12.

57 Man. 4.881–887. A parallel is provided at *Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum* 290.18–22 Usener (scholion on Luc. *Phars.* 9.6[–9]): 'A blend of Stoic and Platonic doctrine. They hold that the souls of brave men in the manner of stars wander in the air (*virorum fortium animas existimant in modum siderum vagari in aere*) and are immortal in the sense that they do not die but are dissolved; according to Plato they are not even dissolved'. Also cf. *ibid.* 291–2, 'Pythagoras said that the souls of brave men are transformed into stars', 291.3–4, 'the philosophers teach that the souls consist of divine fire'.



One of the questions Seneca would like to be certain of is 'whether the claim is true (by which it is proved that men are from the divine spirit), that a part and, so to speak, some sparks of stars (*scintillas astrorum*) have leapt down to earth and adhered to a location that is foreign (*alieno loco*).<sup>58</sup> This origin is | 75 expressed by Manilius with the words 'the stars, whose children we are' (*genitique astris*), as our descent is from the stars, or that of the souls that came forth from heaven and will return there.<sup>59</sup> That the body constitutes a 'foreign location' is strong language. Seneca's view that the parts of the divine spirit, or astral sparks, are so to speak exiled to human bodies sounds almost Gnostic, or at least Platonic, or Pythagorean, rather than Stoic, but is here integrated into Stoic doctrine. Excellent parallels for such a sojourn in a foreign country are to be found, for instance, in an exegetical passage of Philo of Alexandria,<sup>60</sup> or in Plutarch's interpretation of the famous 'fugitive from god and wanderer' (φυγάς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης) of the Empedoclean *Katharmoi*: our souls are fugitives and strangers in a foreign country; later, of course, in Plotinus, Porphyry and others.<sup>61</sup> We may compare the | allegorical interpretation of the *Odyssey*, a quite 76

58 Sen. *de Ot.* 5.5. Cited Tardieu (1975), 254. This 'foreign place', *locus alienus* (Greek: *topos allotrios*), may be contrasted with the 'proper place' (*oikeios topos*) of [Pl.] *Ax.* 365e, 'once the compound is dissolved and the soul has been settled in its proper place, the body which remains ... is not the human person' (tr. Hershbelt), and compared with Cic. *Tusc.* 1.51, 'in what condition the soul is in the body as in a strange home'. This *oikeios topos* also occurs in the passage of Flavius Josephus quoted below, n. 61. Information not found in the more famous study of Courcelle (1974–1975) is available in Husner (1923), 60–76, though he missed the *de Ot.* passage.—As PierLuigi Donini reminds me *per litt.*, the affinity between souls and stars is formulated in Aristotelian terms by Cicero's (Antiochean) Varro at *Ac.* 1.26, 'the fifth kind [i.e., element], of which stars and minds would consist'.

59 'astris dativus est, cum verbo accedimus iungendus et ablativus audiendus post *geniti*', van Wageningen (1921), 259.

60 Philo, *Agr.* 65 (on Gen 47:4, παροικεῖν, οὐ κατοικεῖν ἡλθομεν, 'we have come to dwell as strangers, not as inhabitants'—not a literal quotation): 'in reality each soul of a wise man has won heaven as its fatherland and been given earth as a foreign country, and it regards the house of wisdom as its own but the body as foreign, believing it dwells there as in a foreign country'; also cf. *Her.* 267–268. For the reception of Emp. 31B15 DK see already Philo, *QG* 1.70–76, on Cain's exile, cf. Mansfeld (1985), 133–135, 138; the word triggering this exegesis is Gen 4:14 ἐκβάλλεις. On 'Adam's banishment from the ruler of the universe' see Philo, *Post.* 10; cf. also below, n. 61 *ad fin.*

61 Plu. *Ex.* 607C–D (explaining lines of Emp. fr. 31B15 DK): 'we are strangers and fugitives ...; as the soul has come here from elsewhere he euphemistically calls its birth a 'journey to a foreign country''. Cf. *Fac.* 943C, the good souls sojourning for a while in the 'meadows of Hades' purge away the pollution of the body 'as if brought to their home country from banishment in a foreign country' (ἀποπνεῦσαι <τοὺς> ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ... μiasμούς ... οἷον ἐξ ἀποδημίας ἀνακομιζόμεναι φυγαδικῆς εἰς πατρίδα). An entirely different view is found at *Tranq.* 477C, where the wise man 'despises those who bewail life as a place of evils or a

common motif in Middle Platonist and Neoplatonist philosophy, Odysseus being interpreted as the human soul, which after its wanderings finally comes home to where it belongs.<sup>62</sup>

Seneca's *scintillae astrorum* also remind us of Heraclitus' definition of the soul's substance in Macrobius' overview of the doxai of philosophers and doctors on this issue: 'Heraclitus the physical philosopher (says the soul) is a spark of stellar substance' (*Heraclitus physicus* [sc. dixit animam] *scintillam stellaris essentiae*).<sup>63</sup> The parallel is virtually complete. Macrobius' formula 'a spark of stellar substance' certainly fits the (Neo)Platonist background of his commentary on the *Somnium Scipionis*.<sup>64</sup> Heraclitus' doxa has, so to speak, been updated, while that of Hippasus (Macrobius has the standard error Hipparchus), as a rule combined with Heraclitus as representing the same

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place of exile (φυγαδικὸν τόπον) for our souls'. Giesecke (1891), 98–99, is unaware of parallels for the first of these passages. The Empedoclean exile is famously quoted in a cento concerned with the descent of soul at Plot. *Enn.* 4.8.[6].1.11–50, cf. *ibid.* 5.5 'the Empedoclean banishment from God and wandering'; cf. further Porph. *Abst.* 1.30.2, *Marc.* 6.6–10 'there is no other way to return to the country up there for those who may 'remember to return' (*Od.* 3.142) from the alien residence here below'. Also see Macrob. *in Somn.* 1.21.34, 'that Cicero says 'there is nothing' divine 'below' the moon 'except the souls given to the human race by the favour of the gods'; ... the origin of the souls is in heaven, but legally living for a time in a foreign country they are exiles here'. Also ps.Hegesippus *Hist.* 5.53, 409.29–410.2 Ussani, 'while we are in the body our soul is a slave and suffers a miserable servitude, (our soul) who is an exile from paradise and wanders about far from its originator' (*dum enim sumus in corpore, servit anima nostra ac miseram quidem servitutem quae de paradiso exulat et a suo principe peregrinatur*), cf. Flavius Josephus *B.J.* 7.343–344, 'that to live is the misfortune for humans, not death, for death sets the souls free and sends them off to the proper and pure place'. Ps.Hegesippus cites *inter alia* (in Latin) 2 Cor 5:6, 'therefore (we are) always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent [are abroad] from the Lord', often quoted e.g. by Origen, and by Latin Church Fathers as 'when we are in the body we are away abroad from the Lord' (*cum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino*). On the ps.Hegesippus passage compared with its origin in Flavius Josephus *B.J.* 7.343–352 see Husner (1923), 74–75.

62 See Mansfeld (1985), 139, and (1996), 152–153, with references, and Porph. *Marc.* 6.6–10, quoted above, n. 61.

63 Cited Tardieu (1975), 249. Macr. *in Somn.* 1.14.19, placed by Diels at 22A15 DK between Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a25–29 (cf. above, text to n. 17) and our lemma Aët. 4.3.12. Macr. *in Somn.* 1.14.19–20 belongs with the doxographical tradition concerned with this topic, just as Aët. 4.3. Tert. *de An.* c. 5, Hermias *Irr.* c. 2, etc. See Diels (1879), 211–214; in more detail Mansfeld (1990), 3065–3179.

64 Macr. *in Somn.* 1.12 deals with the astral origin of the soul, its descent to earth and (summarily) its return, and comments on Cicero's words *Somn.* 3.1 'from there departed we return to there' (*hinc profecti hunc revertuntur*); cf. *Tusc.* 1.72, to virtuous souls 'an easy way of return to those from which they had departed lies open' (*ad illos a quibus essent profecti reditum facilem patere*).

doxa<sup>65</sup>—soul fire or fire-like—has remained unchanged: ‘Hipparchus (says it is) fire’ (*Hipparchus ignem*).<sup>66</sup>

Cicero, in his Platonizing rather than Stoicizing account of Scipio’s dream, posits that ‘that the soul has been given to men out of those eternal fires you call heav[enly] bodies and stars, ... which are animated by divine minds’.<sup>67</sup> It is precisely this passage, quoted and explained by Macrobius,<sup>68</sup> which is followed by his overview of the doxai on the nature of the soul from Plato to Epicurus, which mentions Heraclitus, Hipparchus and Heraclides *disertis verbis*.<sup>69</sup>

There certainly is precedent for an association between souls and stars in Plato. To create the part of the human soul that may be called divine and is to rule over those who are virtuous, the Demiurge mixes the same ingredients as those constituting the World Soul, but these ingredients are ‘second or third in degree of purity’. The souls of humans are equal in number to the stars, and the soul of one who has lived the life of virtue goes back to ‘the dwelling-place of its companion star’. Those who have been less virtuous do not go back there. Though the family resemblance between the divine parts of the souls and the stars is made clear, the latter are not said to be the source of the former.<sup>70</sup> To find this derivation in Plato one needs a rather generous interpretation. And Aristotle, discussing life and soul in a famous passage of the *On Generation of Animals*, only says that the ‘so-called hot’ (*to kaloumenon thermon*) or life-

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65 Above, n. 1 and text thereto.

66 The eulogy of the real Hipparchus in *Nat.* 2.95: ‘no one having done more to prove that man is related to the stars and that our souls are a part of heaven’ expresses what Pliny believes, not what Hipparchus said. Of course this view of the benefits of the study of astronomy derives from Plato, *Tim.* 46e–47b.

67 Cic. *Rep.* 6.15; cf. *Cat.* 78, *Tusc.* 5.38–39, *Div.* 1.110. Also Verg. *Aen.* 6.724–731 esp. ‘the mind, pervading the limbs, activates the whole mass and blends with the vast body ... fiery is their force and heavenly the origin for the seeds’. The platonizing interpretation (cf. *Phil.* 29a–30b, paralleled Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.8) of Servius Auctus in *Aen.* ad 6.724 ‘God is a kind of divine spirit, who pervades the four elements and produces everything ... but let us see, what in us is from God and what from the four elements? As far as we are able to understand, we have the body from the elements and the mind from God’ remains close to Stoic thought, see Setaioli (1995), 4. Also compare the comments of the *Commenta Bernensia in Lucanum* 290.26–28 Usener (incomplete at *SVF* 2.775), Lact. *Inst.* 7.3.3–4 (incomplete at *SVF* 2.1041), Hieron. in *Ephes.* MPL 26.529A, in *Isai.* MPL 24.558AB, all of whom (quoted Setaioli 1995, 3 n. 6) are aware that the doctrine cited by Virgil is Stoic, and Aug. *CD* 14.3, according to whom however it is Platonic: ‘with these splendid lines he appears to explain Plato’s view’. For the Stoicizing doctrine see also *Georg.* 4.219–227, on the bees.

68 Macr. in *Somn.* 1.14.16 and 18. He adds that the souls we are endowed with do not derive from the corporeal fire of the stars but from their minds.

69 Cf. above, n. 63 and text thereto.

70 Pl. *Tim.* 41d–42b, cf. Alc. *Did.* c. 16; see Gottschalk’s comment (1980), 105.

giving *pneuma* in the semen is ‘analogous’—an analogy, by the way, that is far from clear—‘to the element of the heavenly bodies’ (*analogon ... tōi tôn astrōn stoixeiōi*), not that it is the same, let alone that derives from them.<sup>71</sup>

- 78 In the Bible of late Platonism, the *Oracula Chaldaica*, we have the slightly different metaphor of the ‘psychic spark’ (*psuchaios spinthēr*), and among early and later Gnostic authors that of the ‘spark of life’ (*spinthēr zōês*, explained as ‘supposedly the soul’).<sup>72</sup> The simplest assumption is that the ‘fire-like’ soul, attributed to Heraclitus in the much earlier *Plac.* ch. 4.3, the contents of which are fully parallel to the second half of Macrobius’ overview of the doxai, was interpreted *more Platonico* (just as the fiery Stoic soul in Seneca) as a spark of stellar fire, which entails that the soul’s definition came to include its celestial origin.

In this context we should also place Galen’s interpretation of Fr. 22B118 DK.<sup>73</sup>

Should we not also grant that dryness is a cause of intelligence, ⟨like⟩ Heraclitus? He actually said ‘beam (*augê*) dry soul wisest’, once more claiming that dryness is a cause of intelligence (indeed, the word *au-gê* demon-

71 Arist. *GA* 2.3 736b29–737a12, see e.g. Moraux (1963), 1204. Cf. the somewhat different note *ibid.* 3.11 762a18–21 explaining spontaneous generation: ‘animals and plants are formed in the earth and in the water because in earth water is present and in water *pneuma* is present and in all *pneuma* soul-heat is present, so that in a way all things are full of soul’ (tr. Peck LCL). Note that at *de An.* 1.5 411a7–11 he argues against the idea that soul is ‘intermingled in the universe’ (see above, n. 21 and text thereto): ‘This theory contains many difficulties; for why does not soul make an animal when it is in air or in fire, but only when it is in a mixture of elements, and that too though it seems to be in a purer form in the first case?’ etc. (tr. Hett, LCL).

72 *Or. Chald.* fr. 44.1 des Places; e.g. Saturnilus *ap. Epiph. Pan.* 1.249.12–13. See Waszink (1947), 298–299. Overview of Gnostic and other material in Tardieu (1975), whose evidence for the Platonic origin of the *scintilla animae* consists of Proclus’ interpretation of the souls as stars in the myth of Er. The earliest passage showing sparks flying from a star is Hom. *Il.* 4.75–77, ‘the son of wily Cronos dispatched a star, ... from which numerous sparks jump forth’. But these, of course, have nothing to do with souls (and neither, I suppose, have the shooting stars of Anaxagoras or Pliny adduced by Tardieu (1975), 253–254).

73 Gal. *QAM* c. 5, *Scr. Min.* 2.47.9–18 Müller (Heraclitus fr. 68 (*a<sup>8</sup>*) Marc.; also at *SVF* 2.788, but text after the ed. Bas.), ἀλλ’ οὐ καὶ ξηρότητα συγχωρήσομεν αἰτίαν εἶναι συνέσεως (ὥσπερ) οἱ γ’ {μὴν} ἀμφ’ Ἡράκλειτον; καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος εἶπεν ‘αὐγὴ ξερὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη’ τὴν ξηρότητα πάλιν ἀξιών συνέσεως εἶναι αἰτίαν (τὸ γὰρ τῆς αὐγῆς ὄνομα τοῦτ’ ἐνδείκνυται)· καὶ βελτιονά γε δόξαν ταύτην νομιστέον ἐννοήσαντας τοὺς ἀστέρας αὐγοειδῆς θ’ ἅμα καὶ ξηροὺς ὄντας ἄκραν σύνεσιν ἔχειν. I have preserved the phrase ‘for ... this’, rejected by Müller (who is followed by Mouraviev at T 578) as a gloss; see next n. For the fuller version of this fragment see below, nn. 123–124 and text thereto. For the rare formula αὐγοειδῆς τε καὶ αἰθερωδῆς linked with soul by Galen elsewhere see below, n. 77.

strates this).<sup>74</sup> We should surely consider this view to be the better one, considering that the stars, which are both luminous (*augoeideis*) and dry, have a high form of intelligence.

In itself this 'beam' of light, *augê*, need not refer to a natural phenomenon that should in some way be identified with soul.<sup>75</sup> It is simpler to understand it as | directly referring to the human soul according to the witnesses who quote this version of the fragment, that is to say, to a kind of soul which is equally capable of being less dry and wise, so less luminous.<sup>76</sup> And Galen does not argue that (according to Heraclitus) human souls derive from the stars, but merely that (according to Heraclitus) certain souls in a specific condition are analogous to the stars. This is a weak echo of the doctrine cited by Cicero & *alii* studied above. Galen compares this view with another one, according to which not dryness but the symmetry of the mixture (of the bodily components) is the cause of intelligence, and it is to this view that he declares it to be superior. But also other views concerned with the soul should be considered, and are, and the only conclusion to be drawn is that the soul is influenced by the condition of the body. Galen, as we know, is an agnostic where the substance of the soul is concerned.<sup>77</sup>

79

A further relevant parallel is found in chapters in other late authors that can be placed next to Macrobius 1.14.19–20 and Aët. 4.3, viz. the soul defined 'according to some' as 'a power streaming from the stars' (*dynamis apo tôn astrôn rheousan*).<sup>78</sup> In these chapters the doxai are anonymous: 'some, ... oth-

74 An etymology of the type attested for e.g. the grammarian Philoxenus: *au-os* (αὔος) means 'dry'.

75 As claimed by Betegh (2007), 13, 24. It may represent the light of e.g. a fire, or the 'light of the soul' (Pl. *Rep.* 540a, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν) directed by the philosophers to the Form of the Good. The eye of the soul emits effluences, just as the eyes of the body (*Tim.* 45b–d, Aët. 4.13.7). αὐγὴ is a kind of fire that does not burn (for light and soul see further below, Appendix *ad finem*).

76 I may say here that I see no objection to the assumption of 'wet fire' for Heraclitus, whose Fire is not only something that may burn, but also something like vital heat. For wet fire and dry moisture, that is, for 'fire in which there is some moisture' and conversely see [Hipp.] *Vict.* 1.4 and 1.35. Joly (2002), 30, 235, posits that this derives from Anaxagoras (cf. 59B8 DK), but I am not so sure.

77 Gal. *Propr. Plac.* ch. 3, etc. Cf. *PHP* 7.7.25, where the choice is between the soul as incorporeal substance or as 'a sort of light-like and aetherial body, a view at which the Stoics and Aristotle arrive by implication even if they do not want to' (τὸ οἶον αὐγοειδὲς τε καὶ αἰθερώδες σώμα λεκτέον αὐτήν, εἰς ὃ καὶ μὴ βούλονται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται Στωικοὶ τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης), tr. Sharples (2010), 236.

78 Herm. *Irr.* 2, [Iust.] *Coh.* 7.2.

ers'. The name-labels added *in margine* of the mss. of Hermias have been rejected by the editors of his text. Before the definition just cited there are two others which also are of interest in our context: 'some say it is the movement (*kinêsin*), others the exhalation (*anathymiasin*)'. The ultimately Aristotelian background of these terse descriptions will be the account of Heraclitus' soul as exhalation and as what is moving at *de An.* 1.2,<sup>79</sup> which has evolved into the doctrines of two different groups.<sup>80</sup> The exhalation doctrine, naturally, is also able to accommodate the Stoics. In view of Macrobius' *scintilla stellaris essentiae* and of Seneca's *scintillas astrorum* one may be tempted to believe that a third reference to Heraclitus and/or a second to the Stoics is implied by the 'power streaming from the stars', but it seems preferable to place this definition in the context of the general Platonic or Platonizing tradition and approach to which Macrobius' and Seneca's formulas belong as well, and so to accept its anonymity.<sup>81</sup> Both our Christian authors are looking for differences of opinion among their adversaries, and are not really interested in a precise account or evaluation of the doxai themselves.

## 4

It is time to return to another passage *disertis verbis* linked with Heraclitus, namely the passage in Sextus Empiricus about the inhalation of the 'common and divine Reason' (*ton de logon ... ton koinon kai theion*).<sup>82</sup>

This 'common and divine reason' has a Stoic background, although the exposition is squarely based on fr. 22B2 DK, quoted by Sextus, or rather his source, as proof-text.<sup>83</sup> The 'atmosphere is rational and in its right mind' (*to perie-*

79 Above, text to n. 17.

80 In Hermias the notes *in margine* add the name-labels Heraclitus for the movement and Plato (!) for the exhalation, while the power from the stars remains without a name-label.

81 For more conventional attempts at identification see Marcovich (1990) *ad loc.*, and Riedweg (1994), 270–271. The latter quotes Hippol. *Ref.* 6.25.4, 'Pythagoras says ... that the souls of living beings are carried from the stars' (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων φέ(ρ)εσθαι). The ascription to Hippolytus' Platonized Pythagoras confirms the general nature of the doxa.

82 Above, n. 4 and text thereto. The technique, viz. the creative interpretation of a selection of verbatim fragments, recalls e.g. Hippolytus on Heraclitus at *Ref.* 9.8.1–10.8. Polito (2004), 165–166, who has noticed this technique, thinks of an originally Stoic 'word-by-word commentary on Heraclitus' as Aenesidemus' source.

83 'Which is why one must follow what is common; but although the *logos* is common, the many live as if they have an understanding of their own'. The formula *koinos logos* is not so common; cf. *SVF* 1.521.12 (hymn of Cleanthes), 2.599 (Arius Did. fr. 37 Diels, *DG* 469.12), 3.112 (D.L. 7.87).

*chon*<sup>84</sup> *hēmas logikon te on kai phrenēres*). We are dependent on this external supply, for ‘according to Heraclitus it is by drawing in this divine reason through inspiration that we become intelligent’;<sup>85</sup> become *noëroi* (i.e., just as the souls according to | the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus B12 become *noërai*, or the sun according to the Stoic interpretation of Heraclitus’ sun becomes *noëron*).<sup>81</sup> When we are asleep we virtually lose this rationality because the pores of perception are closed, but when these are functioning the ‘being of the same kind’ of the portion in us and the whole is restored.<sup>86</sup>

That sustenance is drawn from outside is paralleled in the lemma at Aët. 4.3.12, where we not only found a full-fledged cosmic Soul, but also souls not only nurtured by the internal exhalation but also, like the cosmic Soul, by the external exhalation. The difference between these two accounts is substantial, but what they have in common, viz. a dependence on external supplies, is significant. I have argued elsewhere that Aenesidemus’ Heraclitus is ‘a calque of Aristotle’s Democritus’ (in *de An.* 1.2), according to whom soul atoms are breathed in and who posits that soul and intellect are the same, and have also adduced there the Pythagorean doctrine cited *de An.* 1.2, and the Orphic doctrine cited *de An.* 1.5.<sup>87</sup> What I should have done is include the view of Diogenes of Apollonia that the air we breathe in constitutes our soul and intellect.<sup>88</sup>

This combination of views of Diogenes and Democritus (etc.) and Heraclitus is prefigured in Aristotle, who as we have seen above discusses Democritus’ inhalation of soul particles, and then in succession Diogenes’ view of the Soul

84 I do not know that Polito (2004), 150, is right in supposing that ‘any reader in antiquity would have understood it [sc. the rational *periechon*] as referring to the cosmic soul’, but the (Stoic) cosmic Soul can be glimpsed behind the scenes.

85 S.E. *M.* 7.129. For human dependence cf. S.E. *M.* 8.286 (Marcovich 1978, 395), ‘Heraclitus says *disertis verbis* that man is not rational, and that only the atmosphere is in its right mind’; parallel at Tert. *de An.* 15.5 (Heracl. fr. 116 (a<sup>1</sup>) Marc.), ‘this regent part is active outside according to Heraclitus’ (*extrinsecus agitari ... principale istud secundum Heraclitum*). Polito (2004), 153, is certainly wrong in claiming that ἔμφορες and λογικοί pertain to a higher stage of rationality than νοεροί. The main idea is paralleled at Calc. c. 251 (22A20 DK, fr. 116 (c) Marc.), ‘with the consent of the Stoics Heraclitus connects our reason with the divine reason that guides and moderates what is in the cosmos’ (*Heraclitus vero consentientibus Stoicis rationem nostram* [cf. νοεροί/ ἔμφορες/ λογικοί] *cum divina ratione* [cf. θεῖον λόγον] *conectit regente ac moderante mundana*). Calcidius’ reference moreover shows that an *interpretatio stoica* is involved.

86 S.E. *M.* 7.130, ἡ ... μοῖρα ... ὁμοιοειδὴς τῷ ὅλῳ καθίσταται. Marcovich (1978), 398 n. 8 compares Aët. 4.3.12, ὁμογενή and 4.7.2, ὁμογενές, cf. above, nn. 5–6 and text thereto.

87 Mansfeld (1990), 3066–3067, with n. 18, and especially 3164, with n. 317. Cf. above, n. 20, n. 26 and text to these notes.

88 Cf. above, n. 16 and text thereto, and Marcovich (1978), 399.

as principle and air and Heraclitus' view (as he formulates it) of the Soul as principle and exhalation. We should note that the order Diogenes—Heraclitus is not chronological (the relative chronology of *Met. A.3* implies that Aristotle placed Diogenes after Heraclitus), but systematic: Aristotle is concerned with similarity of doctrine.<sup>89</sup> Yet, though air and vapour qua natural entities certainly resemble each other, Aristotle does not attribute air as a principle to Heraclitus, and he is silent about breathing in connection with Diogenes (though, as we saw, he mentions it in connection with Democritus & *alii*). The Aenesidemean account in Sextus has its Stoicized Heraclitus absorb the Democritean and Diogenean doctrine,<sup>90</sup> and the Stoicizing modernization facilitates this assimilation because of the Stoic notion of a World Soul. We may call this retrograde syncretism.

Another element in the Aenesidemean synthesis is also relevant. The part of the common and divine logos that has successfully been breathed in is called 'the portion of the atmosphere that resides *as a stranger in our bodies*'.<sup>91</sup> This not only recalls Seneca's statement 'reason is a part of the divine spirit concealed a human body', but also his remark about the 'stellar sparks (*scintillas astrorum*) that have leapt down to earth and adhered to a location that is *foreign (alieno loco)*'.<sup>92</sup> I have cited Platonizing parallels for this idea that the soul resides in the body as a stranger, or exile.<sup>93</sup> The question of whether, in our Aenesidemean account, this stranger is Platonic or Stoic is not so relevant.

I cannot enter here into the contrary views (all capable of being buttressed by verbatim Heraclitean fragments) found in this passage, e.g. the rejection of sense-perception on the one hand and the indispensability for our mind of the functioning of the sensory passages on the other, or the fact that what appears to an individual is false while what appears in common is reliable, although all breathe in the same substance. My impression is that such inconsistencies are what a Skeptic would be interested in, and that the Heraclitus who is appreci-

89 To be sure, in *de An.* 1.2 Thales is mentioned before Diogenes, but not for the apophthegm that 'everything is full of gods' (which follows only at *de An.* 1.5), but because he made soul a principle of motion.

90 Diller (1941), 374–375 (= Diller 1971, 179), taking the account au  *pied de la lettre*, believed that Diogenes had been influenced by the historical Heraclitus; but at least he noticed the connection.

91 S.E. *M.* 7.130, ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα. Cf. Clem. *Strom.* 4.165.2, 'the soul of the wise man-and-gnostic, in the body (so to speak) as in a foreign country' (ἡ τοῦ σοφοῦ τε καὶ γνωστικοῦ ψυχὴ, οἷον ἐπιξενουμένη τῷ σώματι ...).

92 Above, n. 55, n. 58, and text thereto.

93 Above, n. 55, nn. 58–59, and text thereto.



ated by the Stoics as a sort of *archêgetês* is refuted.<sup>94</sup> Aenesidemus apparently concocted a parody of the genuine Stoic thought attested in a paragraph of Marcus Aurelius:<sup>95</sup>

No longer merely breathe with the air that surrounds you (τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι), but now think also with the intelligence that surrounds all things (τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ). For the intelligent power (ἡ νοερὰ δύναμις) is as much poured out everywhere and distributed for him who is willing to absorb it, as the aeriform power for him who is able to respire it.

Absorbing the external intelligence is merely analogous to breathing the air, and itself not a matter of breathing, but of thinking. 83

The fragments quoted *ad litteram* are of course indispensable, but their Aenesidemean interpretation does not contribute much to our understanding of Heraclitus, or so I believe.<sup>96</sup> Which does not imply that it should be rejected *in toto*, for it is of some interest to understand how this interpretation came about, and to notice its relation to, perhaps even dependence upon, attempts at making sense of the opaque utterances of Heraclitus such as we find in the two Aëtian lemmata studied above, or as attested by Macrobius' 'stellar spark'.

## 5

I end with a note on the two Aëtian lemmata in the context of the chapters where they are found. Lemma 4.3.12, on the Soul of the cosmos as an exhalation from the moistures that are in it, and on the origin of the soul in living beings from the exterior exhalation as well as from the one within, is the last of its chapter.<sup>97</sup> This position is often reserved for views that do not fit, or do not

94 I need not deal here with the Heraclitus who was acceptable to Aenesidemus (thanks to his *interpretatio sceptica*), for which see the reconstruction of Schofield (2007), 322–338.

95 *Med.* 8.54, tr. Farquharson, slightly modified. *Marcus Aur. Med.* 8.54 and *S.E. M.* 7.126–134 are helpfully printed as Posid. fr. 352 and 353 in Theiler (1982), 1.266–268. One does not have to share his interpretation *ibid.* 2.247–251, but his knowledge of the literature, both primary and secondary, is enormous, so there is always something to be learned.

96 Cf. e.g. Laks (2008), 14.

97 In my not yet published reconstruction of the chapter, not in that of Diels in the *DG*. The Heraclitus lemma is the last corporeal tenet in both ps.Plutarch and Nemesius. Thdr. *CAG* 5.18 *ad finem* after Empedocles and Critias (lemmata not paralleled in ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus, and placed by Diels after the Heraclitus lemma) mentions 'others' without providing details. Nemesius has a Critias lemma near the middle of his series.

easily fit, the main diaeresis of a chapter, and it would indeed be hard to say where on the gliding scale of the material substances of which souls are constituted according to the philosophers listed at ch. 4.3 one would have to place the *anathymiasis*. (According to Aristotle, we recall, it is 'extremely incorporeal'). The presence of the Soul of the cosmos, exceptional (because paralleled only at ch. 4.7.2) in the *Placita* chapters devoted to human psychology, is another reason for placing the lemma in final position. That the doctrine was important enough to be included by ps.Plutarch and Nemesius may be explained by its affinity with Stoic and (Neo)Platonist ideas. Why it is lost in Stobaeus is not immediately clear. Perhaps the reason is that the final lemma of the Aëtian chapter in Stobaeus, with name-label Epicurus, is followed by a brief quotation from Plato and a short abstract as well | as a series of substantial ones from Hermetic literature,<sup>98</sup> which may have made the Heraclitus lemma seem superfluous.

The lemma ch. 4.3.12 is a descendant (modified *more Stoico*) of Aristotle on Heraclitus in *De an.* 1.2<sup>99</sup>—just as 4.3.5 on Democritus, 4.3.8 on Diogenes, 4.3.9 on Hippo, and 4.3.14 on Critias are descended from Aristotle's discussion of these figures. The order of the name-labels from Democritus to Critias, though interrupted by the insertion of other lemmata, is the same as in Aristotle. Why Heraclitus' doxa left its Aristotelian position and comes last has been explained above.

Ch. 4.7 is concerned with various opinions concerned with the destructibility, or not, or in part, of the soul. Lemma 4.7.2, on the soul's return to the Soul of the All after its departure from the body, can only be reconstructed because a part of the lemma lost in ps.Plutarch is preserved in Theodoret. We may note that the composite lemma now found in ps.Plutarch makes perfect sense from a Platonist and Neopythagorean point of view: 'Pythagoras Plato (say that) the soul is indestructible, for departing towards the Soul of the All it returns to what is of the same kind'.<sup>100</sup> In the Aëtian text as reconstructed and reconstructible the lemmata 4.7.2 and 4.7.3, name-labels Heraclitus and the Stoics, constitute a standard doxographical twin, as the tenets are to some degree similar and yet sufficiently distinct. This similarity is so to speak intimated by verbal correspondence, Stoic 'on departing from the bodies' echoing Heraclitean

98 *Anth.* 1.49.1b = first sentence of *CH* fr. xix; 1.49.2 = Pl. *Phdr.* 247c; 1.49.3 = *CH* fr. xx; 1.49.4 = *CH* fr. xvii; 1.49.5 = *CH* fr. iii; and 1. 49.6 = *CH* fr. xix Nock and Festugière.

99 Above, text to n. 17.

100 lemma permixtum [Plu.] 4.7.1(+2) Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων ἀφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξιοῦσαν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές.

'on departing from the body'.<sup>101</sup> The Stoic lemma lists the well-known view of Chrysippus and others that some souls are dispersed quite soon while others last until the *ekpurōsis*.<sup>102</sup> Other sources tell us that these souls then return to God, or (as Arius Didymus) to the World Soul. The Heraclitus lemma tells us that the souls return to the Soul of the All, so there is agreement between Stoics and Heraclitus in this respect. But | it fails to tell us when this happens— 85 immediately, or after some time, or at an *ekpurōsis*?

Olympiodorus,<sup>103</sup> remembering the Stoic view of what happens to souls when bodies die, formulates this view in such a way that it comes quite close (also verbally) to Aët. 4.7.3. He adds: 'Heraclitus was of this opinion too'. It would seem that he remembered both 4.7.2 and 4.7.3 because they were so near to one another, and in the process turned Heraclitus into an even more satisfactory anticipator.

The evidence pertaining to the (temporary?) fate of souls *post mortem* in the verbatim Heraclitean fragments is ambiguous.<sup>104</sup> The Heraclitus *placitum*—in contrast to 4.7.1, where a handful of name-labels are marshalled in favour of the indestructibility of soul—at 4.7.2 posits (just as the Stoic *placitum* at 4.7.3) that the soul is destructible, but as it would seem the *modus quo* of its eventual disappearance is not unpleasant. The doxa fits the overall diaeresis on a gliding scale of the chapter: §1 soul indestructible, §2 soul eventually destroyed by absorption into Soul, §3 some souls soon destroyed, others eventually by absorption into Soul, §4 souls soon destroyed, §5 compromise: a part of soul indestructible, another part destructible.

101 Aët. 4.7.2 'Hράκλειτος ἐξιούσαν τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀναχωρεῖν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές (tr. above, text to n. 6); 4.7.3 (SVF 2.810, with new readings) οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξιούσαν ἐκ τῶν σωμάτων οὕτω φθείρεσθαι· τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι {γίνεσθαι}, ταύτην δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν· τὴν δ' ἰσχυροτέραν, οἷα ἐστὶ περὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, καὶ μέχρι τῆς τοῦ παντός ἐκπυρώσεως (διαμένειν) ('The Stoics (say) that (the souls) on departing from the bodies do not yet perish; the weaker soul (perishes) together with the compounds (i.e., the bodies), the stronger soul—such as it is with the wise—even (persists) until the total conflagration').

102 Cf. above, n. 51 and text thereto.

103 Olymp. in *Phd.* 10.2.11–14 (not in SVF or DK, = [dubia et spuria] fr. 117 (a) Marc.): 'the third (false) opinion (concerning the soul) is the one claiming that the uneducated soul upon departing from the body perishes quickly, while the educated soul, hardened by the virtues, endures until the conflagration of the whole cosmos, of which opinion was also Heraclitus' (τρίτη [sc. ψευδὴς περὶ ψυχῆς] δόξα ἢ λέγουσα τὴν μὲν ἀπαιδευτὸν ψυχὴν ἐξιούσαν τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς φθείρεσθαι, τὴν δὲ πεπαιδευμένην στομωθεῖσαν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἐπιμένειν τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν τοῦ παντός κόσμου, ἧς δόξης ἦν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος).

104 Heracl., 22B20, B25, B27, B63 DK.

Just like ch. 4.3.12, our lemma 4.7.2 is included because of its relevance in a Stoicizing and Platonizing context. As an attempt at interpreting the opaque utterances of Heraclitus it is perhaps less successful. Birth and death, in Heraclitus' *ipsissima verba*, mean turning into something else. Dying, the soul turns into water. There appears to be no room for a soul (whatever its matter) returning to very much more of the same.

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### Appendix: 'They Rise Up'

The quite general view that Heraclitus posited some sort of afterlife for human souls (or some human souls) depends for the main part on the interpretation of six fragments. I shall discuss these one after the other, and for reasons of space | 86  
can only do so briefly, noting to begin with that the difficulty of reconciling (personal) survival with the unceasing cosmic cycle of elemental transformations has of course been noticed.<sup>105</sup>

The first of these texts is fr. 22B63 DK, transmitted by Hippolytus (only): '†to him [or it], being there, † they rise up and become guardians, wakefully, of living and dead'.<sup>106</sup> Hippolytus posits that this utterance (I do no attempt to fathom

105 Kahn (1979), 253, Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), 208.

106 Hippol. *Ref.* 9.10.6, λέγει δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ταύτης (τῆς) φανεράς, ἐν ᾗ γεγενήμεθα, καὶ

its corrupt first words)<sup>107</sup> pertains to the resurrection of the flesh.<sup>108</sup> Modern opinion is certainly correct in holding that the words one is able to understand pertain intertextually to Hesiod's picture of the destiny of the golden race of humans, who after their demise become 'thirty thousand immortal guardians of mortal men, keeping watch over judgments and cruel deeds'.<sup>109</sup> One can understand Heraclitus referring to their watching over the living, but how is one to interpret watching over the judgements and deeds of the dead? One can only sympathize with Nussbaum, who preferred to believe that the words 'and dead' are an addition, *more christiano*, by Hippolytus.<sup>110</sup> But I believe that it is a better option to abandon altogether the almost irresistible suggestion of Hippolytus that the 'guardians' are *humans*, for he points us in the wrong direction. I posit that the role of cosmic police should be left to the Erinyes, just as in fr. 22B94 DK, where they, the 'helpmates of Dikê', are said to intervene 'if the sun oversteps its measures'.<sup>111</sup> The Erinyes are guardians both of the dead, who under certain circumstances are avenged by them, and of the living, who under similar circumstances are punished by them. (To mention a familiar example, they avenge Clytemnaestra and punish Orestes.) More generally they

87 watch over behaviour | that transgresses the norm, as apparently when they silence Achilles' horse Xanthos.<sup>112</sup> According to common belief they actually 'rise', either from blood or from the world below.<sup>113</sup> Note that the verb ἐπανίστασθαι includes an aggressive undertone, 'to rise up against', or insurrection not resurrection, see the dictionaries *sub voce*.

τὸν θεὸν οἶδε ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἴτιον οὕτως λέγων· 'ἦνθα δ' ἐόντι† ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν' (transl. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), 207).

107 Overview of attempts at emendation at Mouraviev (2006), 156–157. His own suggestion, ἐν θά(πῳ) δ' ἐόντι (/εστ' ?) ἀνίστασθαι, or (2011): 5 ... (ἐστίν) ἔτι ἀνίστασθαι, transl. *ibid.*: 6 as 'ce qui est dans la tombe (du corps?) peut encore resurgir', begs the question.

108 This reading entails that the guardians cannot be those who 'rise up'. Hippolytus understands something like 'they [sc. the dead humans] rise up, and there will be (others as) guardians of the living and the dead'.

109 Hes. *Op.* 252–254, τρεῖς γὰρ μύριοι εἰσιν ... / ἀθάνατοι ... φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, / οἳ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα.

110 Nussbaum (1972b), 167.

111 In Plu. *Ex.* 604A, 'ἥλιος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα' φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· 'εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπικούροι ἐξευρήσουσιν'. Cited rather differently *Pap.Derveni* col. iv.7–9 (T 93 Mour.), with οὔ]ρους for μέτρα according to Kouremenos & *alii* (2006), 69, cf. Plu. *Is.* 370D (fr. 52 (a<sup>2</sup>) Marc.) τοὺς προσήκοντας ὄρους. For the cosmic police cf. Kahn (1978), 163.

112 Hom. *Il.* 19.404–418, see Marcovich (1978), 196, with references, but cf. Dietrich (1965), 232–239, on Erinyes in Homer, who advises against over-interpretation.

113 On the Erinyes in general see Dietrich (1965), 91–98. Cf. Cornutus *ND* 10.1–2 'the so-called Erinyes ... are investigators of crimes ... Really August and Well-disposed these goddesses



Confirmation for this interpretation is forthcoming from the ninth pseudo-Heraclitean *Epistle*, which like the others in this corpus contains echoes from the lost book. Here we read: 'Are Dikē's Erinyes, guardians of crimes, numerous? Hesiod was wrong when he said there are thirty thousand; there are (only) a few, and they are not sufficient for the world's evil; there is much wickedness'.<sup>114</sup> The reference to Hesiod, whose members of the golden race are (surprisingly and uniquely) interpreted as Erinyes, is telling, and one surmises that in the lost book of Heraclitus an (unsurprising) criticism of Hesiod<sup>115</sup> was present in the context of fr. 22B63 DK. In his cheaply moralizing way the author of the *Epistle* rewrote this passage.

This interpretation helps to make better sense of the next fragment too, viz. of 22B24 DK, 'gods and men honour those who are slain in war'.<sup>116</sup> In itself this provides no evidence for a survival of souls rather than reputation. That men habitually honour those slain in war is well known, but in what way do the gods honour them? I suggest that, unlike people that are murdered, those killed in battle may | be honoured even by their enemies. Think also of the gods who send his mother to Achilles in order to persuade him to honour the dead Hector. Those killed in war do not need to be avenged in the same way as those who are foully murdered. Therefore those who killed them need not fear divine punishment.<sup>117</sup>

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are, for according to nature's goodwill towards humans it has been decreed that wickedness will be punished' (αἰ λεγόμεναι Ἐριννύες ... ἐρευνήτριαι τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων οὐσαι ... Σεμναὶ δ' ὄντως αὐταὶ αἱ θεαὶ καὶ Εὐμένιδες εἰσὶ· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εὐμένειαν τῆς φύσεως διατέτακται καὶ τὸ τὴν πονηρίαν κολάζεσθαι).

114 [Heracl.] *Ep.* 9.3, πολλὰ Δίκης Ἐρινύες, ἀμαρτημάτων φύλακες; Ἡσίοδος ἐψεύσατο τρεῖς μυριάδας εἰπὼν ὀλίγαι εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἄρκοῦσι κακίᾳ κόσμου· πολὺ ἐστὶ πονηρία. After φύλακες editors put a full stop; Westermann's diagnostic conjecture (οὐ) πολλαὶ is helpful, but a question mark instead of a full stop will suffice. For the 'thirty thousand' guardians in Hesiod see above, n. 109 and text thereto. The first colon, πολλὰ ... φύλακες is printed as fr. 52 (b)? Marc., so Marcovich thinks it may pertain to 22B94 rather than B63 DK. Mouraviev prints the *Letter* as T 372d, italicizing both Δίκης Ἐρινύες as well as φύλακες as verbatim reminiscences, cf. already Bernays (1869), 104–105. But Bernays, who as far as I know has been generally followed, believed that the author of the *Letter* just happened to think of the passage in Hesiod, presumably because of the presence of the word φύλακες. Attridge (1976), 17, citing Oenomaus at Eus. *PE* 5.36.1–2, believes the reference to the Hesiodic lines is typically Cynic.

115 Frs. 22B40 and B57 DK.

116 In Clem. *Strom.* 4.4.16.1 εἶτα Ἡράκλειτος μὲν φησιν ἄρηιφάτους θεοὶ τιμῶσι καὶ ἄνθρωποι.

117 The argument of Kirk (1949) that the souls of those who are killed 'in battle' (his transl.) depart from the body in a fiery state and so are able in some sense to survive (still endorsed by Graham 2010, 193) is no longer supported by the evidence after West (1968) proved that fr. 22B136 DK is to be discounted (still printed at Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 207, and

Two further fragments that have been believed to support the idea of a Heraclitean afterlife cannot be used as independent evidence in favour, since (as has often enough been realized) they are equally compatible with a reading pertaining to life on earth. I refer to fr. 22B27 DK, 'men do not expect or believe what awaits them when they die', and B25 DK, 'greater deaths receive greater parts'.<sup>118</sup> Or: 'do not count on an afterlife', and 'some people achieve fame'. This is not to deny that they theoretically may be interpreted as in some way alluding to the, or an, afterlife, but this, surely, is only feasible after it has been established that Heraclitus actually did speak of some form of afterlife.

The fifth fragment which may be adduced as referring to an afterlife is 22B98 DK, 'souls smell in Hades', cited by Plutarch in the eschatological myth of the *De facie*.<sup>119</sup> We do not know that this microtext is quoted verbatim, or what can have been its context in Heraclitus. It may represent a thought experiment, just as the fragment quoted (not *ad litteram*, on supposes) by Aristotle, on the 'noses' that would be able to 'distinguish things from each other if everything were to turn into smoke'.<sup>120</sup> Kahn argues that 'Plutarch's account in the myth of Hades' as air in the *De facie* is 'largely Heraclitean',<sup>121</sup> since in his view the Heraclitean *psychê* is 'an atmospheric principle like breath or air, produced from water by evaporation or 'exhalation' (*anathymiasis*), tending upwards and aspiring to the condition of the | luminous sky or upper air'.<sup>122</sup> This, of course, means that he rejects the evidence in favour of the fiery nature of the soul and neglects that for the attribution of a Hades above the earth to Heraclides of Pontus.<sup>123</sup>

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Mouraviev 2006, 339 and 2011, 5, but not included by Graham 2010). See also Marcovich (1978), 353.

118 In Clem. *Strom.* 4.144.3, καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ... δι' ὧν φησι ... 'ἀνθρώπους μένει ἀποθανόντας ἄσσω οὐκ ἔλπονται οὐδὲ δοκέουσιν', and *ibid.* 4.49.3 'μόροι γὰρ μέζονες μέζονας μοίρας λαγχάνουσι καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος'.

119 In Plu. *Fac.* 943E, καλῶς Ἡράκλειτος εἶπεν ὅτι 'αἱ ψυχαὶ ὁσμῶνται καὶ Ἄϊδην'. Hershbell (1977), 192 cites this text among the cases 'where Plutarch shows no great regard for exegesis of Heraclitus' sayings'.

120 Fr. 22B7 at Arist. *Sens.* 5 443a23–24. Kahn connects these texts with each other (1978), 78, 256–259. For a plausible interpretation see Osborne (2011), 426–432; for that of fr. 22B55 (which Osborne 2011, 431 with n. 47, hesitates to connect with B7) see Mansfeld (1999), 335–338.

121 Kahn (1979), 257–259, quot. 258.

122 Kahn (1964), 199, (1979), 249–250. See further Betegh (2007), Mouraviev (2008), 318–326.

123 See above, n. 2 and text thereto, and for Heraclides Gottschalk (1980), 100–101, Kupreeva (2009), 103–108.

What has not been noticed is that Plutarch a few lines up says that the souls near the moon 'in appearance resemble a ray of light' (an *aktis*).<sup>124</sup> This brings us to the sixth and last fragment to be mentioned, another text that without eventual support from other fragments cannot be used to prove that Heraclitus spoke of the afterlife, viz. 22B118 DK: 'gleam dry soul wisest and best', ἀγλή ξηρή ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.<sup>125</sup> Kahn (preceded and followed by others) argues that this version is the genuine one, since it is found in the majority of witnesses and is the only one capable of explaining the existent *variae lectiones* (like an archetype). The soul qua 'gleam' supports his interpretation of the Heraclitean backdrop of Plutarch's myth. But how is one to read the text? A 'dry gleam' according to Kahn does not make sense, so 'dry' has to be connected with 'soul', which gets us 'a dry soul is a beam of light' as well as 'a dry soul is wisest and best'.<sup>126</sup> This over-interpretation goes against the obvious ways of reading these words, viz. as the uncomfortable 'dry gleam' etc., or as 'gleam: dry soul, wisest and best', which sounds more like an entry in a lexicon than as an example of poetic prose. What is more, this identification of soul and 'gleam' recalls the *scintillam stellaris essentiae* and *scintillas astrorum* discussed in Section 3 above. The placing on a par of soul and *augê* is paralleled by the soul's resemblance to an *aktis* in Plutarch's myth<sup>127</sup> referred to above, and this identification and analogy belong with the Platonizing and Stoicizing context that is to be assumed for the Latin terminology.

The only other (and, as far as I know, in this context never mentioned) parallel for the 'light' metaphor is the ascription to Heraclides of Pontus of the idea that the substance of the soul is 'light-like', *phôtœides*, or that it is a 'light', *lux* | or *lumen*.<sup>128</sup> Moreover several sources attribute to this early Platonist the idea that the souls are immortal and descend towards the bodies, and that the bet-

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124 Plu. *Fac.* 943D, ἀκτίνι τὴν ὄψιν ἐοικυῖαι. Cf. the simile at [Alex.Aphrod.] *Probl.* 2 proœm.24–25, 'the soul is in the body like a beam of sunlight in very pure water' (οὕτως ἐν σώματι ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἐν ὕδατι καθαρωτάτῳ ἀκτὶς ἡλιακή).

125 The text is sometimes transmitted with αὔη instead of ἀγλή. Since Stephanus editors use to emend ἀγλή to αὔη and (plausibly) to interpret ξηρή as a gloss, see the explanation of the corruption in Marcovich (1978), 264. Diels and Kranz print both versions and prefer that with αὔη. For an etymology of ἀγλή in Galen see above, n. 74 and text thereto.

126 Kahn (1979), 246–247.

127 And elsewhere, see n. 128.

128 Aët. 4.3.6, Tert. *de An.* 9.5, Macr. *in Somn.* 1.14.19 = Heraclides frs. 98A–D Wehrli, 46A–D Schütrumpf. Philoponus *in de An.* 9.5–7 (fr. 99 W., 47 Sch.) speaks of an 'aetherial body'. A different context for the relation between 'soul' and 'light' is at Plu. *Aet.Rom.* 281A–B, where the soul is the cognitive light in the lantern of the body, or Plu. *Lat. Viv.* 1130B (Heraclides fr. 100 Wehrli, 48 Sch.), where according to 'some philosophers the soul's substance is light' because it dislikes ignorance and darkness. Cf. the simile at [Alex.Aphrod.] *Probl.*

ter among them return to the luminous Milky Way.<sup>129</sup> This possibly implies that the luminous substance of the soul is also that of which the stars in the Milky Way are constituted.<sup>130</sup> But we should not follow the example of some among our ancient authorities and confuse Hêraklei-tos with Hêraklei-dês.

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2 proœm.24–25 cited above, n. 124. For the uncertainties concerned with the evidence for Heraclides' views see Kupreeva (2009), 116–133.

129 Iambl. *de An.* ap. Stob. 1.49.39 (fr. 97 W., 50 Sch.), Phlp. *in Mete.* 117.9–12 (fr. 96 W., 52 Sch.). See Gottschalk (1980), 98–105. But this much later evidence is less neutral than that cited in n. 128.

130 As claimed by Gottschalk (1980), 105.

# Alcmaeon and Plato on Soul

## Abstract

The rather common view that Alcmaeon influenced Plato's doctrine of the soul's self-motion is false. In the doxography self-motion has spread from Xenocrates and Plato to their predecessors Thales, Alcmaeon and Pythagoras.

## Keywords

doxographical context – pastiche – eternal motion – Aristotle

## 1

The study of the fragments and testimonies to be found in our collections of Presocratic *reliquiae* quite often generates surprising combinations and spectacular explanations. The return to the sources, that is, the study of the works from which these texts derive and above all of the traditions to which these works, or elements in these works, belong, may produce much more modest or even disappointing results. Using Alcmaeon's purported influence on Plato's theory of soul as an example, I shall sketch a tradition that has its origin in Aristotle's *De anima*, and try to find out to what extent subsequent efforts to update this original information have in various ways modified our evidence.

That Alcmaeon had a decisive influence on Plato's view that soul is self-moved, and therefore also the ultimate cause of motion for other entities,<sup>1</sup> seems to be a majority view.<sup>2</sup>

1 Pl. *Phdr.* 245c–246a.

2 Döring (1903) 144–149, Diels (1912) at Alcmaeon 14A10 <sup>3</sup>DK = 24A12 <sup>5</sup>DK, Zeller and Nestle (1920) 599 n. 1, Capelle (1935) 109 n. 1, Skemp (1942) 36–51, Hackforth (1952) 68 with reservations, Guthrie (1962) 351, Skemp (1976) 134–140, Barnes (1979) 116–117, Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983) 347, Rowe (1986) 174, Dumont (1988) 1258 n. 10, Kalogerakos (1996) 159, Hankinson (1998) 33, Horn (2005) 154–168. Cautious: Huffman (2013) sect. 2.5. Eternal movement only: Stella (1939) 276–277, Festugière (1945) 64–65 = (1971) 434–435, Yunis (2011) 136. Against: Burkert (1972) 296 with n. 97.

Plato's first contention is that soul is 'immortal' (ἀθάνατος) because it is something that is 'always-in-movement' (ἀεικίνητον)<sup>3</sup> and because what is always in movement is immortal—a neat syllogism. Further, the condition that has to be satisfied for being always in movement is to be something that 'moves itself' (τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν), for only such a thing will not only never 'abandon itself', or cease moving, but will also be the 'source and beginning' (πηγή καὶ ἀρχή) of movement for the other things that move. | The introduction of the term *archê* leads to a further argument, viz. that (such) a 'beginning' must be without a beginning itself and so 'ungenerated' (ἀγένητον), which entails that it is 'indestructible' (ἀδιάφθορον) as well. We notice that *archê* here begins to acquire and include the sense of 'principle', thanks to the addition of the word πηγή, 'source'.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, what moves itself is the principle—to use the acquired and fuller sense of *archê*—of movement, which can neither perish nor come to be, or else the whole heaven and the whole earth would fall apart and come to a halt and never again have something that will set things in motion. (The idea underlying this counterfactual seems to be that if the principle were perishable things could or would or should have vanished by now or even long ago, the familiar *warum gibt es überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts* issue). Thus, soul, i.e. 'what of itself moves itself' (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν), is necessarily ungenerated and immortal. *Q.e.d.*

This passage, with its alliterations and vowel rhymes, its recurrent words, its short and repetitive cola and its repeated use of ring composition, reminds one of the relentless advance of Presocratic prose, such as that of Anaxagoras and Melissus,<sup>5</sup> or even of the (prosaic) poetry of the great ontological fragment of

3 The reading αὐτ[οκ]ίνητον in *Phdr.* 245c of the *prima manus* at POxy 1017 col. xx.5–6, accepted by Robin in the Budé ed. of the dialogue, was corrected by the *secunda manus* to ἀεικίνητον. In his commentary on the papyrus Haslam (1999) 265–267 once and for all proves the *diorthôtês* to be right. The word αὐτοκίνητος occurs for the first time at Aristotle *Phys.* 8.5 258a2, and is a *hapax* in his oeuvre. It occurs twice in the present ch. 4.2 (and is cited from this ch. at 4.3.1), but not elsewhere in the *Placita*. An overview of occurrences of this term and related expressions is at Mansfeld (1971) 38–40. The word ἀεικίνητος occurs for the first time at Plato *Phdr.* 245c, and is a *hapax* in his oeuvre; on its special character see Dover (1997) 103–105. It does not occur in Aristotle.

4 A 'beginning' may be followed by something else, a 'source' produces what is in it.

5 Anaxagoras 59B12, see Denniston (1952) 3–5; Melissus 30B7 and B8, Parmenides 22B7–8 DK. See Kahn (1958) 24, 'Plato's style in the *Phaedrus* proof tries to recapture the solemn, archaic tone of the old Ionian philosophy'. He further argues that this Melissus fragment as well as Pl. *Phdr.* 245d–e and Arist. *Phys.* 3.4 203b4–15 derive from a (lost) argument of Anaximander about *archê* as *archê*-less (cf. also Kahn (1960) 238), but one may doubt that the word *archê* is an original ingredient in the evidence about Anaximander's principle rather than a Peripatetic technical term; above ch. 3, pp. 137–139.

Parmenides. As a matter of fact Charles Kahn has demonstrated that Plato's proof concerned with the 'beginning' (*archê*) that cannot have a 'beginning' (*archê*) is in some way related to a foundational argument of Melissus on what has 'neither beginning (*archê*) nor end (*teleutê*)'.<sup>6</sup> Plato's phrase 'a beginning does not come into being; for what comes into being necessarily comes into being from a beginning, but the beginning itself not from anything at all'<sup>7</sup> is quite close Melissus' 'it has no beginning ... for if it came to be, it would have a beginning'.<sup>8</sup> But as Kahn notes Melissus in contrast to Plato (of course) does not argue that what he is talking about *is* an *archê*.

For all its seriousness and importance, from a stylistic point of view Plato's homage to Presocratic thought is a pastiche, and not the only example in his oeuvre, even if we exclude (as probably we should not) the speech of Lysias in the same dialogue.<sup>9</sup> What makes it especially interesting is that it derives an entity's (i.e. soul's) being ungenerated and indestructible from it's being always in movement, whereas according to the Eleatics an entity's (i.e. Being's) ungeneratedness and indestructibility make it immobile and changeless. A combination of eternal mobility on the one hand and being both ungenerated and indestructible on the other was of course investigated by the | Atomists 3 and, to a lesser extent, Empedocles. A certain affinity between this Platonic soul and Anaxagoras' *noûs*-qua-moving-cause cannot be denied either. But Plato's virtuoso performance brings something new, which makes the question of the possible relation of his argument to one of Alcmaeon the more intriguing.

## 2

The evidence on which the claim for Alcmaeon's influence has been based by scholars consist of the following six items,<sup>10</sup> which with one exception (the

6 Melissus 30B2 DK, see Kahn (1958) 22–24.

7 Pl. *Phdr.* 245d ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μὴδ' ἐξ ἐνόος.

8 Meliss. 30B2 ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει ... εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀρχὴν ἂν εἶχεν.

9 *Phdr.* 230e–234c. Think of the so-called myth of Protagoras, or of the speech of Aristophanes in *Smp.*

10 The evidence of the commentators on *de An.* 1.2 405a29 may be ignored, as they no longer had Alcmaeon's text (or the monograph Πρὸς τὰ Ἀλκμαίωνος α' listed in the Aristotelian catalogue at D.L. 5.25). See Philp. in *de An.* 88.14–16, 'the writings of these men are not accessible to us and Aristotle provides no further information' (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πρόχειρα ἡμῖν εἰσιν οὔτε ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πλεόν τι τούτων ἰστόρησε), and Simp. (Prisc.?) in *de An.* 32.6–7 'as one may infer from these words he seems to have been

Boethus passage mentioned in the addenda) have been conveniently gathered in the Alcmaeon chapter of Diels-Kranz:<sup>11</sup>

I. (Aristotle): 'Alcmaeon seems to have held a similar view about the soul as those men [sc. Thales, Diogenes and Heraclitus, briefly described by Aristotle before]; for he says that it is immortal because it resembles the immortals; this resemblance holds of it as a consequence of its being always in movement; for all the divine beings, too, are always in continuous movement, sun, moon, the stars and the whole heaven'.<sup>12</sup>

II. (Aëtius): 'Alcmaeon (says) that it [sc. the soul] is a nature that is self-moved according to eternal motion, and for this reason he assumes that it is immortal and resembles the divine beings'.<sup>13</sup>

III. (Cicero): 'But Alcmaeon of Croton, who ascribed divinity to sun and moon and all stars and on top of that to the soul, failed to realize that he ascribed immortality to mortal things'.<sup>14</sup>

IV. (Boethus): 'with regard to which [sc. not only to the continuity and perpetuity of the movement which the soul produces in us, but also those of the soul's mind] the natural philosopher from Croton said that it [sc. the soul] is immortal and because of its nature avoids every form of rest, just as those bodies which are divine'.<sup>15</sup>

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an excellent philosopher, for he says that the soul is immortal because it resembles the immortals' (ἔοικε δὲ ἄριστα φιλοσοφεῖν, ὥς ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων τεκμαίρεσθαι· ἀθάνατον γὰρ λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς εἰκυῖαν τοῖς ἀθανάτοις).

11 The item in Eusebius is at I p. 495.46–47, that in Diogenes Laertius at 24A1, the others are at 24A12 DK.

12 Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a29–b1 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ Ἀλκμαίων ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ ψυχῆς· φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ εἰκέναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις· τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς αἰεὶ κινουμένη· κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς αἰεὶ, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅλον.

13 Aët. *Plac.* 4.2.2 Ἀλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ αἶδιον κίνησιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμφερῆ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπολαμβάνει. Preserved in Stobaeus and Theodoret, not in ps.Plutarch.

14 Cic. *ND* 1.27 *Crotoniates autem Alcmaeo, qui soli et lunae reliquisque sideribus animoque praeterea divinitatem dedit, non sensit sese mortalibus rebus immortalitatem dare.*

15 Boethus *ap.* Porph. *ap.* Eus. *PE* 11.28.8–9 τὸ μέντοι τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμοιότερον μὴδὲν γενέσθαι θεῶν ψυχῆς, οὐ πολλῆς ἂν τις δεηθεῖς πραγματείας πιστεύσειεν, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ ἄπαυστον τῆς κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐνδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὴν νοῦ. εἰς ὅπερ ἀπιδῶν καὶ ὁ Κροτωνιάτης φυσικὸς εἶπεν ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ πάσαν ἡρεμίαν φύσει φεύγειν, ὥσπερ τὰ θεῖα τῶν σωμάτων.



V. (Clement of Alexandria): 'For Alcmaeon of Croton was convinced that the stars are gods, as they are ensouled'.<sup>16</sup> 4

VI. (Diogenes Laërtius): 'he further said that the soul is immortal and moves continuously like the sun'.<sup>17</sup>

Evidence of the kind exemplified in testimonia II to VI has generally been linked with Theophrastus according to the well-known Usener–Diels hypothesis (not shared by the author of the present paper), which has allowed scholars to place these testimonia on one and the same level. They have also been placed on the same level as Aristotle's testimony.<sup>18</sup> This, again, has facilitated the interpretation of the latter in the sense of one or more of the former. That these texts are all about the same theme cannot, of course, be denied, but the chronology and eventual *parti pris* of their source authors must also be taken into account. Cicero's spokesperson in text III is a critical Epicurean, to whom the notions that the heavenly bodies are gods or the soul immortal are anathema. So his claim that Alcmaeon ascribed divinity to the soul as well, not paralleled in the other testimonies, is meant as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The resemblance between soul and stars is not expressed explicitly, but is of course there: all are divine. The testimony of Boethus (of Sidon; the Peripatetic, I presume), text IV, is very close to that of Aristotle, text I: implicit resemblance between a soul which never rests and divine bodies that do not rest either. A difference is that Boethus seems to include cognitive activity in the movement of soul, which is not paralleled in the other testimonies. Text V, Clement's cavalier note, endows the stars with souls, a view not paralleled in the other testimonies. Omitting the part about the souls resembling the stars it encapsulates the souls in the stars. The brief note in Diogenes Laërtius, text VI, preserves the main ingredients found in the majority of the other testimonies, viz. the soul, a heavenly body (surely *exempli gratia*) and continuous movement, the resemblance between soul and star being implied. This phrase, as has been seen, is close to Aristotle's testimony, text I.<sup>19</sup>

16 Clem.Alex. *Protr.* 5.66, ὁ γὰρ τοι Κροτωνιάτης Ἀλκμαίων θεοὺς ᾤετο τοὺς ἀστέρας εἶναι ἐμψύχους ὄντας.

17 D.L. 8.83, ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν συνεχῆς ὡς τὸν ἥλιον.

18 E.g. Guthrie (1962) 350 on texts II, III and V; Barnes (1979) 117: 'We must ... rely primarily on Aristotle and the doxographers for the reconstruction of Alcmaeon's argument'; Horn (2005) 154–158.

19 'Cette brève doxographie sur l'âme semble très dépendante d'Aristote, *De l'âme*, I 2, 405a29–b1' writes J.-F. Balaudé ad loc., in Goulet-Cazé (1999) 1009.

Understandably scholars have scoured this body of evidence for a feasible argument concerned with the immortality of soul. Some among them have concluded that the evidence as (so to speak) formulated in the Aëtian lemma is the clearest, if not the only one.<sup>20</sup> This text contains the term 'self-moved', which allows one to reconstruct a feasible chain of reasoning from the soul's motion to its immortality. It is lacking in the 'unimpressive analogy'<sup>21</sup> of the Aristotelian passage and also in the other testimonies.

- 5 But these scholars have omitted to look at this later piece of evidence in the context of the Aëtian chapter from which it derives.<sup>22</sup> This chapter, capped with the short heading 'On the soul', deals with the category of substance, and only lists doxai that make the soul incorporeal, as is also clear from the summary of its contents in the first lemma of the next chapter.<sup>23</sup> Now the first five lemmata, dealing with Thales, Alcmaeon, Pythagoras, Xenocrates and Plato, are all about souls that are self-moved. The doxographer has taken care to express this recurrent idea by means of stylistic *variatio*: Thales's soul is 'a nature that is ever-moving, or rather self-moved' (φύσιν ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον), Alcmaeon's soul 'a nature that is self-moved according to eternal motion' (φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ αἰδίδιον κίνησιν), Pythagoras' soul 'a number moving itself' (ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινεῶντα), Xenocrates' soul 'similarly' sc. to Pythagoras' (ὁμοίως),<sup>24</sup> and Plato's soul 'an intelligible substance, moved from itself' (οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν).<sup>25</sup>

Obviously the doxai attributed Thales and Pythagoras, the founding fathers of the Ionian and Italic *Diadochai*,<sup>26</sup> are un-historical and interesting solely from the point of view of reception. The Plato doxa (for text and references see below, Appendix) summarizes the doctrine of the *Timaeus* without excluding

20 Barnes (1979) 117, Hankinson (1998) 31–32.

21 Dixit Hankinson (1998) 31.

22 For a preliminary reconstruction of the text plus a translation of this chapter see below, Appendix, and for a preliminary discussion Mansfeld (1990) 3065–3082, 3089. Horn (2005) 155 wonders what 4.2.2 αὐτὴν refers to, so should have looked at the chapter heading Περὶ ψυχῆς, see Mansfeld and Runia (2009) 199–201 (Horn infers that the soul is meant from Aristotle's testimony).

23 Aët. 4.3.1 'All those arrayed previously assume that the soul is incorporeal' (οἱ πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται κτλ.).

24 Lemma preserved in Stobaeus and Theodoret, not in ps.Plutarch.

25 The Plato doxa (lemma 4.2.5 preserved in ps.Plutarch and Theodoret, not in Stobaeus) is paralleled in the chapter on the soul's motion with lemmata only for Plato and Aristotle: Aët. 4.6.1, 'Plato (says that) the soul is ever-moving' (Πλάτων ἀεικίνητον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν), lemma in ps.Plutarch partly paralleled in Stobaeus. We note the presence of ἀεικίνητον not αὐτοκίνητον.

26 Aët. 1.3.1, 1.3.7, see Mansfeld and Runia (2009) 73–96.

passages in other dialogues. The Xenocrates doxa is quite frequently paralleled elsewhere.<sup>27</sup> Both Plato and Xenocrates in fact attributed self-motion to soul, so these two lemmata are acceptable from a historical point of view. But the soul's self-motion has spread from Xenocrates to Pythagoras, rather than conversely as the doxography would have us believe. The Thales doxa has been enriched with the two concepts of everlasting motion and self-motion (the latter even being preferred to the former) that for the first time occur together at Plato, *Phaedrus* 245c–e. The emphasis on the concept of self-motion throughout the first part of the chapter and its spreading to the doxai of Thales and Pythagoras suggest that the presence of self-motion in the Alcmaeon doxa is also a matter of *interpretatio* and encroachment. I submit that this becomes certain as soon as one realizes that this lemma (in the abridged format typical of the *Placita*) is a calque of the passage of Aristotle I have quoted as text I.<sup>28</sup>

The main ingredients are there both times: we have the term 'immortal' (ἀθάνατον); we have the 'resemblance with the things divine', as Aëtius' προσεμφερῇ τοῖς θείοις corresponds with Aristotle's τὸ εἰκένειναι τοῖς ἀθανάτοις and τὰ θεῖα πάντα; and we have the 'eternal movement', as Aëtius' κατὰ αἰδίον κίνησιν corresponds with Aristotle's αἰεὶ κινουμένη· κινεῖσθαι ... συνεχῶς αἰεὶ. The inference from eternal motion to immortality is the same as well. Indeed, only Aëtius' term 'self-moved' is not paralleled in Aristotle. 6

The conclusion must be that the Aëtian testimony has no value beyond what it shares with Aristotle. And Aristotle clearly speaks of the human soul, not of the World Soul,<sup>29</sup> for to declare that the soul is immortal because of the resemblance of its motion to the motion of the divine beings (heavenly bodies and heaven itself) only makes sense if this soul is something else than those divinities. The chapters on the soul in Aëtius Book 4 are almost all about the human soul, references to a World Soul or Soul of the Cosmos being the exception.<sup>30</sup>

Plato may have found the concept of eternal motion in Alcmaeon, but the concept of self-motion was not to be found there. This conclusion is the result of our inquiry into the ramifications of the traditions of doxography and Aristotelian dialectic. No spectacular discovery of self-motion for Alcmaeon, and

27 Texts at Xenocrates frs. 60–65 Heinze, FF 85–118 <sup>2</sup>Isnardi Parente.

28 Above, n. 12 and text thereto. For further examples of Aëtian lemmata deriving from Aristotle see e.g. Mansfeld (2005) 28–37 plus 41–42 = Mansfeld and Runia (2010) 482–491 plus 496–497, on Aët. 3.1–2, 3.5–6, 3.3.4, 3.3.7.

29 As believed by Horn (2005) 157.

30 The entire concept of the World Soul hardly occurs in the *Placita*. All one can find elsewhere is the doxa on the Soul of the cosmos (*kosmou psychê*) of Diogenes, Cleanthes and Oenopides at Aët. 1.7.17, while Aët. 4.3.12 attributes a World Soul and 4.7.2 a Soul of the All to ... Heraclitus (for the latter issue see now above, ch. 9).

thus a perhaps disappointing reduction of the significance of the evidence concerned with the continuous movement of his 'soul'. But I cannot find that the attribution of this discovery to Plato himself is really disappointing.

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## Appendix

Aëtius, *Placita* ch. 4.2

**Titulus** β' Περι ψυχῆς

- § 1 [1] Θαλῆς ἀπεφήνατο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν φύσιν  
[2] ἀεικίνητον ἢ αὐτοκίνητον.
- § 2 [1] Ἀλκμαίων φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον κατὰ αἰδίων κίνησιν,  
[2] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμφερῆ τοῖς  
[3] θεοῖς ὑπολαμβάνει.
- § 3 [1] Πυθαγόρας ἀριθμὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, τὸν δὲ ἀριθμὸν  
[2] ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαμβάνει.
- § 4 [1] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτης.
- 9 § 5 [1] Πλάτων οὐσίαν νοητὴν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινήτην κατ' |  
[2] ἀριθμὸν ἑναρμόνιον κινουμένην.
- § 6 [1] Ἀριστοτέλης ἐντελέχειαν πρῶτην σώματος φυσικοῦ,  
[2] ὁργανικοῦ, δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος· τὴν δ' ἐντελέχειαν  
[3] ἀκουστέον ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας.
- § 7 [1] Δικαίαρχος ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων.
- § 8 [1] Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἱατρὸς συγγυμνασίαν τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

§ 1 Thales 11A22a DK; § 2 Alcmaeon 24A12 DK; § 3 Pythagoras—; § 4 Xenocrates fr. 60 Heinze, fr. 90 <sup>2</sup>Isnardi-Parente; § 5 cf. Plato *Phdr.* 245c, *Tim.* 35a–36b, 41d, ps.Plato *Def.* 411c; § 6 cf. Aristoteles *An.* 2.1.412a27–b1; § 7 Dicaearchus fr. 12(a–c) Wehrli, cf. ad fr. 21A Mirhady; § 8 Asclepiades –

### 2 On the soul

- § 1 Thales was the first to declare that the soul is a nature that is ever-moving, or rather self-moved.
- § 2 Alcmaeon (says that it is) a nature which is self-moved according to everlasting motion, and for this reason he assumes that it is immortal and resembles the divine beings.
- § 3 Pythagoras (says that it is) a number moving itself; he takes number as denoting Mind,
- § 4 and similarly Xenocrates (says this) as well.
- § 5 Plato (says that it is) an intelligible substance, moved of itself, in motion according to a numerical harmony.
- § 6 Aristotle (says that it is) the first entelechy [i.e. ‘actuality’] of a body that is natural, functional, organic, and potentially possessing life; and this entelechy must be understood to denote form and activity.

- § 7 Dicaearchus (says that it is) a harmony of the four elements.
- § 8 Asclepiades the physician (says that it is) a common exercising of the senses.

# The Body Politic

## *Aëtius on Alcmaeon on Isonomia and Monarchia*<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

The occurrence of political terms in the context of a medical doctrine, attributed in a sentence of Aëtius to Alcmaeon of Croton, is an instance of the broader application of political terms. The use of these metaphors has generally been explained as the result of direct influence upon Alcmaeon's thought of the terminology connected with the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes at Athens and/or his reception of the notion of cosmic equilibrium often attributed to Anaximander. I argue that it is a reflection of the famous discussion regarding the best political constitution in the historian Herodotus.

### Keywords

Ps.Plutarch – Stobaeus – health and disease – qualities – reception – Erasistratus – Herophilus

### 1

79 Famous definitions of health and disease are attributed to Alcmaeon<sup>2</sup> in the first section of the first lemma<sup>3</sup> of the final chapter of Aëtius' *Placita*, | 'On

1 The history of political philosophy is for the most part beyond the horizon of my competence, but I have always followed Malcolm Schofield's contributions to the subject with admiration and profit. The only contribution to his *Festschrift* I can manage is a modest inquiry into the metaphorical use of two terms of political provenance in a chapter of a late compendium. Thanks are due to Josine Blok, David T. Runia, Mario Vegetti and members of the Cambridge corona for criticism and advice; mistakes are mine.

2 If, as is now generally assumed, the synchronism of Alcmaeon with Pythagoras at Arist. *Met.* A.5 986a29–31 is due to interpolation, there is no evidence for a date earlier than ca. 440 BC. Alcmaeon is a contemporary of the second group of Pythagoreans discussed by Aristotle in this chapter of the *Metaphysics*. In turn these are not later or earlier than the first group discussed in the same chapter, which includes Philolaus; see Huffman (1993), 143.

3 The lemma is extant as a continuous text at [Plu.] *Plac.* 911A, and in a more complete form



health and disease and old age'. These are believed by a majority of scholars to represent to some extent his genuine wording. Though it has long been seen that the terminology of the lemma is doxographical and rather late,<sup>4</sup> an exception is often made for the two early attested terms *isonomia* and *monarchia* in its first section,<sup>5</sup> which are exceptional in a medical context. I wish to argue against this privileged status for *isonomia* and *monarchia*, and shall start with an inquiry into the history of comparable contrasting terms. Let us look at the text first:

Alcmaeon (declares that the) containing (cause, *sunektikên*) of health is the equity of the qualities (*tôn dynamôn*), (viz. the) wet, dry, cold, hot, bitter, sweet, and the rest; but *predominance* among these is (the) active (cause, *poiêtikên*) of disease; for (the) predominance of either (opposite) produces destruction.<sup>6</sup>

The concept of a sustaining, or containing, cause (*sunektikê aitia*) is originally Stoic,<sup>7</sup> while, after Aristotle, the term *poiêtikon* (ποιητικόν, or ποιούν, or δραστήριον) is in general use for the efficient, or active, cause, so also among the Stoics.<sup>8</sup>

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in the Arabic translation of Qusṭā ibn Lūqā and in Psellus, *Solut. div. quaest.* 66.18–28 Boiss. Stobaeus cut it into two parts, citing the second section first, in his chapter on disease, *Ecl.* 4.36.30, and the first section second, in his chapter on health, *Ecl.* 4.37.2. For a preliminary text of the chapter see Runia (1999b) at Mansfeld and Runia (2010), 573–574.

- 4 Already Diels *DG* 223–224, followed by e.g. Zeller (1892) at (1920), 1.601 n. 1, Guthrie (1962), 345; cf. von Staden and Jouanna at Flashar and Jouanna (1997), 148–149, Huffmann (2008), 5.
- 5 E.g. Guthrie (1962), 345–346, Lloyd (1964), 94, Dörrie (1970), 24, Lonie (1981) 260, Jouanna ed. (1999) 327, Nutton (2004), 48. The words *μόναρχος* and *μοναρχία* occur early enough (Solon fr. 9.3 West, Alcaeus fr. S271a5 Page), but an equally early attestation for *ἰσόννομος* and *ἰσονομία* is problematic.
- 6 Aët. 5.30.1 (lacking in ps.Galen) = Alc. 24B4 DK = 310 KRS: 'Ἀλκμαίων τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ ξηροῦ ψυχροῦ θερμοῦ πιχροῦ γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τὴν δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικὴν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχία. Littré (1839), 532 translates *ἰσονομία* as 'égale répartition'. In the Arabic translation the final chapters of the *Placita* are better preserved than in the Greek tradition. The second part of Aët. 5.30.1 is attributed to Herophilus by Qusṭā ibn Lūqā; see Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 157, to be preferred to Runia (1999b) at Mansfeld and Runia (2010), 575 (it is this part in particular which is responsible for Alcmaeon's medical reputation). Alcmaeon is also found in the company of Herophilus at Calc. in *Tim.* 246 = 24A10 DK. For other cases where Qusṭā's different text is better see e.g. Aët. 5.19.5 (confirmation of Diels' conjecture *στοιχείων* for the impossible *ἁμοίων*) and 2.20.13 (where we should emend to *ἄλυμπον*, 'heaven').
- 7 Gal. CC 1.1–2.4 = 55f L.-S., Clem. *Strom.* 8.9.1–4 = SVF 2.346, S.E. P. 3.15; see Duhot (1989), 153–167; as cause of disease not health e.g. [Gal.] *Def. Med.* 19.393.5–10 K.
- 8 See Frede (1980) at (1987), 126–138.

The term δυνάμεις, literally 'powers' or 'forces', on this open-ended list is equivalent to ποιότητες, 'properties' or 'qualities'.<sup>9</sup> The word φθοροποιός, 'destructive' often found in Philo of Alexandria, is not early either, and the phrase containing it is an instance of the explanatory gloss encountered more often in the *Placita*.<sup>10</sup>

- 80 The metaphorical use of the two political concepts in the Alcmaeon lemma is remarkable. A comparison not of the human person, or soul, but of the *body* with a *politeia*, or *polis*, is found only rarely, and is seldom discussed in the secondary literature. One may think of the Aesopian fable of Menenius Agrippa, who according to our sources persuaded the *plebs* to end its *secessio* in 494 BCE.<sup>11</sup> There is an undeniable affinity, but the bodily parts in the fable are members such as feet and belly, not elemental constituents.

The only undoubtedly early text where precisely the two words, *isonomia* and *monarchia*, are contrasted with each other (and with *oligarchia*, irrelevant for our lemma) is the famous discussion about the best political regime among the seven Persian noblemen at Herodotus 3.80–83.<sup>12</sup> There must be a connection. The difference is that in Herodotus the two words are used *sensu proprio*, while in the Aëtius lemma they constitute a metaphor. Words or expressions need to be well known in their literal sense if they are to be used to explain or depict something in a metaphorical way, and becoming familiar takes some time. A metaphor works only if it refers from less known to better known terms. The problem is that there is no good pre-Herodotean evidence for *isonomia* even in its literal sense.

9 Van der Eijk (2000–2001), 105 (Diocles fr. 51b) translates 'formative properties'. In the *Corpus Hipocraticum* the term is used *inter alia* for the qualities of elemental constituents, see *Ind. Hipp.*, v. δύναις, I 'vis', sc. I.4. 'elementorum in homine'. For the *Placita* cf. 5.13.3 δυνάμεις τε καὶ ποιότητας.

10 See Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 1.87 on Aët. 1.7.13 Diels, 212–213 on 3.18.1 (phrase bracketed by Diels), 214 on 5.14.1 (phrase expunged by Diels), 216 on 1.3.4 *ad finem* (phrase bracketed by Diels).

11 For the fable, perhaps best known from the first act of *Coriolanus* or La Fontaine's *Les membres et l'estomac* (*Fables* 3.2) see e.g. Liv. 2.32.8–12, D.H. 6.86.1–3 (ἔοικέ πως ἀνθρωπείῳ σώματι πόλις κτλ.) used by Plu. *Coriol.* 6.4, Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.19, and D.C. Book 4 *ap.* Zonar. 7.14; cf. Nestle (1926), Adrados and van Dijk (2003), 170–172 esp. for references. For the affinity see Allers (1944), 341, van Dijk (1997), 312. Comparisons in general terms between body and *polis/politeia* are at Pl. *Rep.* 464b, *Leg.* 906c, between living being and *polis* at Arist. *MA* 11 703a29–b2, between body and *rei publicae corpore* at Cic. *Phil.* 8.15 (see further Béranger 1953, 224–237, also for the Greek background).

12 See Asheri & al. (2007), 471–475. There are six instances of μουναρχήη, ten of μουναρχός, three of the verb μουναρχέω and four of ἰσονομίη in Herodotus. The verb δυναστεύω occurs six times and the substantive δυνάστης once.

Scholars dealing with Alcmaeon for the most part seem to have limited the inquiry to the words *isonomia* and *monarchia*, or even to *isonomia* alone.<sup>13</sup> But what one should do is take into account the contrast between concepts for on the one hand a kind of dominance, or exclusiveness, and on the other a kind of equality, or sharing. Such concepts are expressed by a plurality of words,<sup>14</sup> and such words may, but need not, derive from | the domain of politics (see also below, Section 3). At Herodotus 3.80–83, where *isonomia* and *monarchia* are opposed to each other, the words *mounarchos* and *tyrannos* are used interchangeably (3.80.2–4), and *isonomia* is also opposed to *basileus*, ‘king’ (3.83.3). In another Herodotean passage a *tyrannis* is abolished and *isonomia* installed in its place.<sup>15</sup> In two passages in Thucydides the contrast is between *isonomia* (oligarchic or democratic) and a word that is roughly equivalent to *monarchia* and *tyrannis*, viz. *dynasteia*, ‘domination’.<sup>16</sup> The political terminology of Thucydides is paralleled at Plato, *Menexenus* 238e–239a, *tyrannides* and *oligarchiai* over against *isonomia*.

81

Two versions of a well-known *skolion* celebrate Harmodios and Aristogeiton, the two ‘tyrannicides who made Athens equitable’ (... τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην / ἰσονόμους τ’ Ἀθήνας ἐποίησάτην), thus opposing the adjective *isonomos* to the substantive *tyrannos*. Their date is uncertain, and may well be later than Alcmaeon’s.<sup>17</sup>

13 Good overview concerned with *isonomia* at Farquharson (1944), 2.459–460, see also Pease (1955), 1.324–326, Baltes (1972), 129, Raaflaub (2004), 93–95, Asheri & al. (2007) 474.

14 Wachtler (1896), 77 n. 3 points out ‘[p]ro ἰσονομία alibi dicitur σύμμετρος κράσις, συμμετρία, ἰσότης, συμφωνία, ἰσομοῖρα, ἀρμονία etc.’ (add e.g. ὁμολογία, ὁμονοία, εὐταξία, μετρίως ἔχειν, ἰσάζειν, εὐκρότως διακεῖσθαι), but fails to present something similar for μοναρχία (e.g. ὑπερβολή, ἀνωμαλία, ἐπικρατεῖν βιαίως, κρατέεσθαι, δυναστεία, στασιάζειν, ἀσυμμετρία, ἄνισον). Noë (1979), 21–75 provides a useful overview of *stasis* and its opposites in Greek history and historiography, esp. in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. A wealth of evidence from the *Corp.Hipp.* about conflict among elemental forces, bodily functions, and environmental factors is at Vegetti (1983), who posits that the egalitarian ideology of the polis purportedly found in the Alcmaeon lemma (see below, nn. 47–48) failed to influence Hippocratic medicine. The vocabulary of *stasis* versus *harmonia/homonoia* and related pairs of terms is studied by Loraux (1987).

15 Hdt. 5.37.8.

16 Thuc. 3.62.3, 4.78.3. Thucydides may well be the earliest author to use the word in this sense; it is also found Soph. *OT* 593 (performed 429 BCE), where the meaning is more neutral.

17 There are four versions, *PMG* 893–896 Page (all transmitted in Athenaeus), of which the first and last have ἰσονόμους τ’ Ἀθήνας ἐποίησάτην as final line. The precise date uncertain: *t.p.q.* is the murder of Hipparchus 514 BCE, while (as Josine Blok points out to me) the quotation at Ar. *Lys.* 632–633, performed 411 BCE, fails to provide a *t.a.q.* for the last line because only a first line is quoted. For the oral tradition of sympotic poetry and

For the metaphorical application of terms such as these we have formulas used by doctors. That of the early Hippocratic treatise *Airs Waters Places* does not occur in the immediate context of health and disease; it provides an explanation of the temperate climate ('blending of the seasons')<sup>18</sup> of Asia:

Growth and freedom from wildness are most fostered when nothing is forcibly predominant (*biaiôs epikrateon*),<sup>19</sup> and equality of sharing reigns supreme in every respect (*isomoiria dynasteuêi*).<sup>20</sup>

The surprising and unparalleled oxymoron *isomoiria dynasteuêi*<sup>21</sup> shows that the political analogy involved was not unfamiliar to the doctor's public.

82 According to the author of *Regimen* what matters is:

whether food overpowers exercise, whether exercise overpowers food, or whether the two are duly proportioned, for it is from the overpowering (*krateesthai*) of one or the other that diseases arise, while from their being equal to each other (*isazein*) comes good health.<sup>22</sup>

He explains health and disease as the result of the interaction of exercise and diet, not of opposites such as sweet and bitter. But the contrast between equality and dominance is comparable to what is found in the Alcmaeon lemma and in *Airs Waters Places*.

These ideas occur in Plato too. The vocabulary is different; note that *homonoiia* plays an important part in political discussions from the late fifth century.<sup>23</sup> The function of medicine according to the eclectic physician Erixy-machus in the *Symposium* is:

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instances of deliberate textual modification for political reasons see Lardinois (2006). On Alcmaeon's date see above, n. 2.

18 [Hipp.] *Aër.* 12.3, 2.52.19 L., ἡ κρησις τῶν ὥρέων; see further Jouanna (1996), 294–295. Echoed in the Hellenistic *Pythagorean Hypomnemata* at D.L. 8.26, where moreover we read that hot and cold and dry and wet are among the ἰσομοιρά ... ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ.

19 For *epikratein* cf. below, n. 64.

20 [Hipp.] *Aër.* 12.4, 2.54.1–3 L.; Littré translates 'où rien ne prédomine avec excès, et où tout se balance exactement'; Diller (1970), 55 'wenn über alles Ausgeglichenheit waltet'; Jouanna 'quand rien n'est prédominant avec violence mais que règne en tout l'égalité'. Cf. Cambiano (1983), 448, Jouanna (1996), 295–296.

21 Cf. Jouanna (1996), 295.

22 [Hipp.] *Reg.* 3.69, 6.606.7–9 L.; compared with the Alcmaeon text by Jouanna (1999). 327–328.

23 See Nestle (1926) 353, who refers *inter alia* to Antiphon's Περὶ ὁμονοίας, Gorgias 82B8a DK, and the occurrences of the term in the orators. For its importance in Dionysius' political

to make the things in the body that are most hostile (*echthista*) to each other into friends (*phila*), and make them love (*eran*) one another. The things that are most hostile to each other are those that are most opposed (*enantiôtata*), cold to hot, bitter to sweet, dry to wet, and so on. It was because he knew how to impart love and unanimity (*homonoia*) to these that our ancestor Asclepius, etc.<sup>24</sup>

*Phila*, *eran*, and *homonoia* over against *echthista* and *enantiôtata*, just as *isonomia* is opposed to *monarchia*. A few lines later we read that something like this, perhaps, is what Heraclitus meant with regard to music, though he failed to speak with sufficient clarity. Eryximachus elegantly misquotes part of Heraclitus 22B51 DK: ‘The one being at variance with itself is in agreement, like a harmony of bow and lyre’.<sup>25</sup> In Section 5 below we shall see comparable passages where a Heraclitean (mis)quotation is also *de rigueur*.

## 2

Going back to the chapter in Aëtius, we should briefly look at the next two lemmata according to Diels’ numeration, with name-labels Diocles and Erasistratus. Aëtius 5.30.2 tells us that:

Diocles (declares) that most diseases come about through a variability (*anômalia*) of the elements (*stoicheia*) in the body and of the constitution of the air.<sup>26</sup>

thought see Gabba (1991), 202–208; there are twenty-six occurrences in the *Antiquitates*, four of which occur in opposition to *stasis*.

24 Pl. *Smp.* 186d5–e2, tr. Rowe (1998); for the qualities cf. also *Smp.* 188a3–4, where sweet and bitter are lacking because the seasons are at issue, not the body (see below, n. 56). The emphasis is on *erôs* because of the *skopos* of the dialogue (Arist. *Pol.* 2.4 1162b11, ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι). On this passage and its influence see Strohm (1952), 153–157; cf. below, n. 74 and text thereto.

25 Pl. *Smp.* 187a4–6 (= Heracl. fr. 27 (b) Marc.): τὸ ἐν added (cf. 22B10 DK, below, n. 61), πάλιν-τροπος or -τονος omitted, and αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμφέρεσθαι (cf. *Sph.* 242e23 = Heracl. fr. 27 (c) Marc.) instead of ἐαυτῷ ὁμολογέει for ‘agrees with itself’. For the art of misquotation see Whittaker (1989).

26 = Diocl. fr. 51 van der Eijk, Διοκλῆς τὰς πλείστας τῶν νόσων γίνεσθαι δι’ ἀνωμαλίαν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στοιχείων καὶ τοῦ καταστήματος ἀέρος. I have added γίνεσθαι and (like Runia, above n. 3) ἀέρος, found in both ps.Galen and Qusṭā ibn Lūqā; where these two sources agree with each other against the Byzantine tradition of ps.Plutarch their readings should as a rule be accepted. For *stoicheia* cf. below, n. 29, text to n. 64, to n. 75; for their *anômalia*

It is clear that the ‘variability of the elements’ attributed to Diocles corresponds with the ‘predominance among the qualities’ attributed to Alcmaeon in the first lemma.<sup>27</sup> The opposed concept, not expressed *totis litteris*, is of course implied. The formula, though less picturesque than its Alcmaeonian counterpart, is equally effective.

The next lemma, 5.30.3, is about another famous physician:

Erasistratus (declares) that the diseases come about through abundance (*plêthos*) of food, because this is not digested and goes bad; but orderly behaviour (*eutaxia*) and taking what is sufficient (*autarkeia*) is health.<sup>28</sup>

Here the opposition is no longer between the balance and imbalance of impersonal natural forces, but between two ways of behaving and their consequences. But overeating and its effects bring about a disturbance of the normal condition of the constituents of the body. Several leading physicians saw overeating and bad digestion as the main cause of disease, or at least an important one. The contrast between on the one hand the first part of Aëtius 5.30.1 (Alcmaeon) plus 5.30.2 (Diocles) and on the other 5.30.3 (Erasistratus) is equivalent to the diaeresis (‘disagreement’, *στάσις*) of doctrines in *Anonymus Londinensis*.<sup>29</sup> Erasistratus’ *eutaxia* and *autarkeia* | belong to the same side of the coin as *isonomia*, as is indeed suggested by the diaeretic arrangement of this series of to some extent comparable *doxai* about disease and health on a gliding scale in our *Placita* chapter.<sup>30</sup>

e.g. *An.Lond.* xx.12–14 Manetti (Petron of Aegina); for the melancholic temperament as *ἀνώμαλος* see [Arist.] *Probl.* 30.1 954b8–9.

27 Thus van der Eijk (2001), 112–113, who rightly adds that the report may be ‘the result of considerable doxographic simplification’.

28 = Erasis. fr. 168 Garofalo, ‘Ερασίστρατος τὰς νόσους διὰ πλῆθος τροφῆς καὶ (δὲ) ἀπεψίας καὶ φθορᾶς, τὴν δ’ εὐταξίαν καὶ αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι ὑγείαν. This is ps.Plutarch’s text; Stobaeus’ is garbled.

29 *An.Lond.* iv.26–28 Manetti, οἱ μ(ὲν) γ(άρ) εἶπον γί(νεσ)θ(αι) νόσους παρὰ τὰ περισσώ|ματα, (*perissómata*) τὰ γινόμενα ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς, | οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα (*stoicheia*, cf. above, n. 26, below, n. 64 and text thereto, text to n. 67, text to n. 75). See further Manetti (1999) 104, 105, 113, 125, for *plêthos* and its effects.

30 See now Mansfeld and Runia (2009), 1.6–7, 29–30, 87.

## 3

In connection with the inquiry into the Aëtian/Herodotean terminology scholars have argued that Herodotus was inspired by traditions concerned with the struggle against the Athenian tyrants remembered in the *skolion* mentioned in the previous section,<sup>31</sup> and even with the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes (508/7 BCE.).<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, it is argued that Alcmaeon may well have heard about these events,<sup>33</sup> or else may even have been inspired by similar struggles in his home town of Croton.<sup>34</sup> The coincidence that Cleisthenes is an Alcmaeonid may have impressed the scholarly subconscious.

That a doctrine of some kind of equilibrium and disturbance is attributed to Alcmaeon is clear. We should, however, keep in mind that isonomic *dynameis* ‘while combined in the organism never completely lose their peculiar character’.<sup>35</sup> The tenet is made to anticipate a doctrine we have already found in several Hippocratic physicians, who posit that health is a matter of equality and disease a matter of disruption. This kind of explanation of disease became widespread.<sup>36</sup> *Anonymus Londinensis* cites the views of Menecrates, Petron of Aegina, and Philistion. According to e.g. Menecrates, the body consist of four constituents; ‘when these are not at odds with each other (μὴ στασιάζοντ(ων))—note the political metaphor) but are in a state of harmony (εὐκρό-]τως διαχειμύν(ων)), the body is healthy; when not, it is diseased’.<sup>37</sup> Many more examples could be cited, though often the concept of blending, or mixing (*krâsis*, *mixis*, etc.), also comes in, which is an innovation compared with the notions that

31 Above, n. 17 and text thereto.

32 See below, n. 47.

33 E.g. Frei (1981), 219.

34 Wachtler (1896), 77 n. 3: ‘eis enim illum [sc. Alcmaeonem] vixisse temporibus quibus maxime optimates et populares de summa rerum contenderent’; Guthrie (1962), 346: the two words *isonomia* and *monarchia* ‘would spring to the mind of one who lived when rivalry between popular and despotic factions was a familiar feature of city-state life’; cf. Thivel (1981), 344–345. This is admitted as possible by Sassi (2007), 198–199, but there is no evidence (in 498 BC Marcus Valerius at D.H. 5.65.1 refers to Solon, Appius Claudius *ibid.* 5.67.3 to Greek cities in general, but this is fiction not history).

35 Tracy (1969), 23.

36 Cf. Galen, below, n. 40; Lloyd (1966), 20, who speaks of a ‘commonplace of Greek medical theory’; Lonie (1981), 260, Longrigg (1993), 53. See e.g. the passages from the *Corp.Hipp.* assembled at Keus (1914), 60–63, who cites Almaeon last, and those quoted by Longrigg (1998), 31–33; cf. Wehrli (1951) at (1972), 182–186, Cambiano (1983), 449–451, Schubert (1997), 124–125, 129–130, Jouanna (2002), 50–52, 325–328.

37 *An.Lond.* xix.22–29 Manetti, text in part conjectural; on these three physicians see Tracy (1969), 26–31.

85 are | attributed to Alcmaeon.<sup>38</sup> Plato and Aristotle are familiar with this standard definition.<sup>39</sup> There is a Stoic parallel too, which is conceptually and even as to part of the wording very close to Alcmaeon but again includes the notion of *krasis*. A couple of short abstracts quoted verbatim by Galen from Book IV of Chrysippus' *Peri Pathôn* are concerned with the analogy between soul and body argued by Zeno:

“Disease of the body is said to be the lack of symmetry (*asymmetria*) of what is in it, hot and cold, dry and wet”. And a little later: “Health in the body is a kind of good blending (*eukrasia*) and symmetry (*symmetria*) of the aforesaid”. [...] “Symmetry or lack of symmetry (*asymmetria*) in the hot and cold and wet and dry is health or disease”.<sup>40</sup>

The more neutral terms *eukrasia* and *symmetria* correspond with the political term *isonomia*, and the more neutral *asymmetria* with the political term *monarchia*. The Alcmaeonian qualities wet, dry, cold, and hot are precisely paralleled by Chrysippus' hot and cold, dry and wet, though these are listed in a different order.

There is also a parallel in same chapter, although this, too, involves *krasis*. For the formula ἰσονομία τῶν δυνάμεων is *ad sententiam* paralleled Aëtius 5.30.1 *ad finem*, viz. by the expression τὴν σύμμετρον τῶν ποιῶν κράσιν, ‘the symmetrical mixture of the qualifieds’, also defining health.<sup>41</sup> When applied to Alcmaeon this phrase needlessly duplicates the formula ‘equity of the qualities’, and so gets out of tune with the proverbial terseness of the *Placita* lemmata.<sup>42</sup> To some extent it is also paralleled by 5.22.1, τῶν ἴσων τῇ κράσει τεττάρων στοιχείων: the

38 Jouanna ed. (1999), 328, citing *NH* 4 and *VM* 14; also Lloyd (1966), 20–21, Tracy (1969), 35–51.

39 *Pl. Smp.* 186d5–e2, *R.* 444d3–6, *Phlb.* 25e7–8, *Ti.* 81e5–82a3, cf. above, text to n. 24, and Tracy (1969), 119–156, also for Plato's relation to the medical writers; *Arist. Phys.* 7.3 246b4–6, *Top.* 6.2 139b20–21, 6.6 145b8, see further Tracy (1966), 158–162.

40 *Gal. PHP* 5.2.31–33 = *SVF* 3.471, also cited Jouanna (1999), 328. Cf. *PHP* 5.3.12–15 = *SVF* 3.472 (also printed in *DK* 40.3), where Galen interprets the symmetry of the qualities as the ‘symmetry of the elements’, and *PHP* 5.3.18, where he argues that in spite of differences of vocabulary and principles everybody, from Asclepiades via Epicurus, Anaxagoras, Chrysippus and all the Stoics, Aristotle and Theophrastus, to Plato and Hippocrates, is in agreement: ‘For all these men the symmetry of the elements produces health’. Also see *Hipp., Epid. I*, 17A.97.2–4 K.

41 ποιῶν, ‘qualifieds’, is an originally Stoic so-called category (*Simp. in Cat.* 66.31–67 = *SVF* 2.369, cf. *in Cat.* 67.18, *Plot. Enn.* 6.1[42].25 = *SVF* 2.371); cf. Diels and Zeller, above n. 4.

42 With Qusṭā ibn Lūqā this section of the lemma is to be given to Herophilus, see above, n. 6.



'fleshy parts' consist of 'the four elements (*stoicheia*) equal in mixture', while other bodily parts are | mixed in other ways.<sup>43</sup> Of particular interest is 5.19.5,<sup>44</sup> τὰ δ' ἰσόμετρα τῇ κράσει: the living beings who are 'equally-sharing (*isomoiros*) as to mixture' are everywhere at home, in contrast to those in whom water or air or earth predominates (where of course predominance has nothing to do with abnormality).

## 4

It is far from certain that even a non-metaphorical use of the term *isonomia* can be as early as the end of the sixth century BCE.<sup>45</sup> On the one hand, one reads that its purported early use as a political warcry at Athens (the existence of which is attested by the *skolion* of uncertain date) is certain because of its occurrence in the Alcmaeon fragment.<sup>46</sup> On the other, one is told that its Alcmaeonian authenticity is vouched for by its prehistory in the context of Athenian politics, or even its conceptual antecedents in the thought of Anaximander.<sup>47</sup> In the Alcmaeon lemma *isonomia* would denote an equilibrium among opposites that echoes the cosmic equilibrium purportedly described in the difficult fragment about cosmic justice.<sup>48</sup> The first scholar

43 Chapter heading of Aët. 5.22: 'Out of what elements does each of the generic parts in us consist'; one lemma only (Empedocles).

44 Chapter heading of Aët. 5.19: 'On the generation of living beings, how they are born as the living beings, and whether they are perishable' (Empedocles lemma at 5.19.6).

45 Hansen (1991), 81–85, who however does not refer to the Alcmaeon text.

46 E.g. Burkert (1996) at (2007), 129 n. 7: 'ein alter, sicherer Beleg für ἰσονομία in verallgemeinerter, spekulativer Verwendung, im Kontrast mit μοναρχία, ist ALKMEON VS 24 B 4, aus der 1. Hälfte des 5. Jh'.

47 Vlastos 1953, taking his cue from the discussion in Herodotus, strongly argues in favour of the early occurrence and democratic connotation of ἰσονομία, and at (1995), 1.107–109, even argues that Anaximander had a 'notion which answers substantially to *isonomia*', though 'we cannot say' he had 'the word'. For *isonomia* as democratic see also Vlastos (1964). Pleket (1972), 69–71, convincingly rejects this backward projection of '5th cent. democratic ideology to the last quarter of the 6th century', and deplores 'the harm which a rather formal kind of philology can do to the study of historical problems'.

48 Anaximander 12A9/B1 DK. Thus Burnet (<sup>2</sup>1908), 225–226 = (<sup>4</sup>1930), 193–194; eloquently Vlastos (1947) at (1995), 1.57–59, 1.74–82; 1953 at 1995: 1.107–110; followed by many, among whom Vernant (1962), 120–125, Lloyd (1964), 100, Baltes (1972), 129 with n. 1, Cambiano (1983), 441–442, Gentili (1988), Longrigg (1993), 52 and (1998), 31 (Anaximander's 'cosmic theory is adopted by Alcmaeon as the basis of his theory of health'), and recently Huffman (2008), 10. Sassi (2007), 213–214 pertinently argues that the Anaximander fragment is about conflict rather than justice.

to propound the dependence of 'Alcmaeon, a contemporary [*sic*] of Anaximander' upon the Milesian was William A. Heidel. This scholar also, as far as I know, was the first to argue that the fragment of Anaximander is about the 'successive encroachment of elemental opposites | one on another in the seasonal changes of the year', and so about an everlasting cosmic equilibrium.<sup>49</sup>

A list of Alcmaeon's opposites is also given by Aristotle, who cites Alcmaeon not as a doctor but as a philosopher. In order to find out what is meant by the 'qualities' we should also look at this other testimony. Aristotle, who knew Alcmaeon's book,<sup>50</sup> says that according to Alcmaeon 'most human things come in twos', but that the contraries posited by him are 'haphazard, not determinate, such as white black, sweet bitter, good bad, large small'.<sup>51</sup> Apart from good/bad and large/small the examples given coincide with the 'affective qualities and affections' listed at Aristotle, *Categories* 8.9a28–31: 'sweetness and bitterness and sourness and all what is related to these, and further warmth and coldness and whiteness and blackness'.<sup>52</sup>

'Human things' are not the same as those that have to do with health and disease, but of course do not exclude them. The word *dynamēis* found in the Aëtius lemma, denoting constitutive properties, is abundantly paralleled in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*.<sup>53</sup> 'Sweet' and 'bitter', terms shared by Aristotle and Aëtius, do not make sense as cosmological or environmental factors. The presence 'in us' of 'the cold, the hot, the salty, the drinkable, the sweet, and the pungent' is attested for Anaxagoras.<sup>54</sup> We have seen above that Plato's Eryximachus lists as 'the things in the body cold and hot, bitter and sweet, and dry and wet, and so on'.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps such qualities plus 'the rest' in the Alcmaeon lemma are intended to pertain to an indefinite set of humours, as in *On Ancient Medicine*: 'In man

49 On Alcmaeon and Anaximander see Heidel (1913) in Tarán (1980), 684–686 (cf. below, n. 80 and text thereto); for the equilibrium Heidel (1908) 218–219, and (1912), 233–234; cf. Mansfeld (2009), 28–29 (= above, ch. 3, pp. 79–81).

50 For Aristotelian citations see Bonitz (1870), 33a15–21, ν. Ἀλκμαίων ὁ Κροτωνιάτης; a lost Πρὸς τὰ Ἀλκμαίωνος α' of uncertain authenticity is listed in the catalogue at D.L. 5.25.

51 *Met.* A.5 986a31–34 = 24A3 DK, φησι γὰρ εἶναι δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων [cited D.L. 8.83 with ἐστι, so as pseudo-quotation from the original], λέγων τὰς ἐναντιότητας οὐχ ... διωρισμένας ἀλλὰ τὰς τυχοῦσας, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, μέγα μικρόν. For the text see Primavesi (2011), 484.

52 Cf. the definition of *pathos* at *Met.* Δ.21 1022b15–19: 'black and white, bitter and sweet, heaviness and lightness, etc.' For sourness etc. see Arist. *de An.* 2.10.422b11–14.

53 See above, n. 9.

54 Thphr. *Sens.* 28 = 59A92 DK.

55 nn. 24–25 and text thereto; earlier editors wrongly bracketed πικρὸν γλυκεῖ.

are bitter and salty and sweet and sharp and sour and flat and countless others'. Wachtler at any rate believed that sweet and bitter referred to the humours in the body.<sup>56</sup>

5

88

We must go back to *isonomia*. Parallels for a metaphorical use of this term resembling that of the Alcmaeon lemma are late, though some of them are (a little) earlier than Aëtius. The earliest of these is Epicurean. At the end of Velleius' account of Epicurus' theology Cicero has him mention the view that in nature all things have their exactly commensurate counterpart. Epicurus calls this ἰσονομία (in Greek in the text), that is to say *aequabilis tributio*, 'distribution in equal proportions'. This entails that the numbers of immortals are equal to those of mortals, and the causes of conservation to those of destruction.<sup>57</sup> Cicero has Cotta refute this view; ἰσονομία is again in Greek in the text, this time translated as *aequabilitas*, 'equitableness'.<sup>58</sup> The question whether the term *isonomia* has to be attributed to Epicurus himself or to a later follower is irrelevant in our context.

The pre-Philonian treatise *On the Nature of the Cosmos and the Soul* signed Timaeus Locrus significantly modifies Plato's account of the production of the four elements at *Timaeus* 32a1–c3 according to proportion and harmony (so that there will be 'love' in the cosmos), by adding that 'because they are all equal in power, their proportions are in *isonomia*'.<sup>59</sup>

56 'quae sequuntur voces γλυκὺ πικρὸν quin de sucis corpori inclusis intelligendae sint dubitari nequit' Wachtler (1896), 78, adducing [Hipp.] *VM* 14, 1.602.9–11 L., ἐνὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ ἀλμυρὸν, καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ πλαδαρὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία κτλ. This passage is likened to the open-ended Alcmaeon list by Littré (1839), 14, 313, 562, then e.g. by Thivel (1981), 343, Vegetti (1984), 69, who calls attention to the Aëtian formula καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, and Jouanna (1990), 57–58, (1999), 328, who (1990) 58, of course also notes the difference: the author declines to attribute an important role to the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry.

57 Cic. *ND* 1.50 = *Epic.* fr. 352, p. 235 Usener.

58 Cic. *ND* 1.109 = *Epic.* p. 235 Usener in app.

59 Ti.Locr. 41, ἐπεὶ δυνάμει ἴσα ἐντὶ πάντα, τοὶ λόγοι αὐτῶν ἐν ἰσονομίᾳ ἐντί. Baltes (1972), 128, points out that Pl. *Ti.* 32a1–7 says the same thing in other words, adding (*ibid.*, 129) that, unlike Philo (see *Spec.* 1.208), Ti. Loc. does not speak of the *isonomia* of the elements. Also cf. Ti. Loc. 14, τὰ γὰρ καττὰν ἀρίστην ἀναλογίαν συντεθέντα ἐν ἰσοδυναμίᾳ οὕτε κρατεῖ ἀλλὰ λων ἐκ μέρους οὕτε κρατέεται, and Baltes *ad loc.*, (1972), 62: 'TL hat hier den platonischen Timaios eindeutig erweitert'.

The next parallels we can put a date to are in Philo of Alexandria. The first of these is constituted by the interpretation of the division of the limbs of the sacrificial animal by an earlier Jewish exegete,<sup>60</sup> in whose view this

89 indicates either that ‘all things are one’<sup>61</sup> or that they ‘come from and return to One’<sup>62</sup>—an alternation which is called by some ‘fullness and want’<sup>63</sup> by others ‘total conflagration’ and ‘ordering of the cosmos’, the conflagration being the state when the supremacy (*dynasteia*) of heat has prevailed over<sup>64</sup> | the rest, the ordering of the cosmos being the state according to the equity of the four elements (*isonomia tôn tettarôn stoicheiôn*), which they concede to each other.<sup>65</sup>

The opposition between *isonomia* and *dynasteia* recalls the wording of the two passages in Thucydides cited above,<sup>66</sup> but its metaphorical application to the domain of physics looks like a calque of the analogy of the Alcmaeon lemma. The elements, *stoicheia* (restricted, to be sure, to the usual four: fire, air, water and earth)<sup>67</sup> recall the ‘qualities’, *dynameis*, of wet, hot, dry and cold. The (Stoic) cosmic cycle adduced by this earlier biblical exegete of course excludes that the ordering of the cosmos lasts forever, as would be Philo’s own view. The presence of several Heraclitean reminiscences in the context of a précis of this cycle provides a link with the next Philonic text, where we find a slightly Stoicizing and rather more Platonizing interpretation of another Heraclitean fragment (of which the second half is lacking), cited as ‘for souls it is death to become water, for water death to become earth’.<sup>68</sup> A few paragraphs up Philo had said that we

60 Runia (1986), 411 n. 50.

61 The final formula of Heracl. 22B50 DK *ap. Hipp. Ref.* 9.9.1, ἐν πάντα εἶναι; Philonic parallels at *Leg.* 3.7 = Heracl. fr. 26 (a) Marc., and *Spec.* 1.208 = Heracl. fr. 26 (b) Marc.

62 A modified version of the final formula of Heracl. 22B10 DK fully quoted *ap. [Arist.] Mund.* 5 396b20, ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα, also quoted in Greek at Apul. *Mund.* 20 = Heracl. fr. 26 (a<sup>1</sup>) Marc.; applied to the cosmic cycle by Cleanthes according to Arius Didymus fr. 38 Diels = *SVF* 1.497.

63 Heracl. fr. 55 (b<sup>2</sup>) Marc., cf. 22B55 DK; the text of *SVF* 2.616 is defective.

64 For *epikratein* cf. above, text to n.19; for *stoicheia* cf. above, n. 26 and text thereto, n. 29, below, text to n. 67, to n. 75.

65 Philo *Spec.* 1.208 (tr. Colson (Loeb), slightly modified). Philo’s next words, ἐμοὶ δέ, indicate that the exegesis is not his own. Cited Marcovich (1978), 72 n. 1. Heidel (1912) in Tarán (1980), 684–685, quotes this passage in support of his interpretation of Alcmaeon and Anaximander (above, n. 49, below, n. 80 and text thereto).

66 n. 16 and text thereto.

67 Cf. Philo *Aet.* 108, also in the context of total conflagration and regeneration.

68 Heracl. 22B36 DK in the version cited by Marcovich as fr. 66 (b); the full version is cited

should 'understand the equity (*isonomia*) in the cosmos'.<sup>69</sup> He now tells us that the order of the world must last forever. The Heraclitean fragment is explained as follows:

for believing that *pneuma* is soul he [i.e., Heraclitus] intimates that the final end of air<sup>70</sup> is the coming to be (*genesis*) of water and that of water, in its turn, the coming to be (*genesis*) of earth, while by 'death' (*thanatos*) he does not mean complete annihilation but transmutation into another element (*stoicheion*). That this self-determined equity (*isonomia*) should be maintained forever inescapable and continuous is not only plausible, but necessary, because what is unequal is unjust (*to anison adikon*), what is unjust is productive of evil, and evil has been banished from the home of immortality.<sup>71</sup>

That this physicalist argument is not sufficient for Philo (for whom the indestructibility of the cosmos depends on God)<sup>72</sup> is not relevant in the context of the present paper. Philo and his exegetical predecessor depend on the philosophical *koinê* of their time. Relevant for our inquiry is the fact that a metaphorical use of the (Thucydidean) pair *isonomia* and *dynasteia* (though not one of a pair including the equivalent term *monarchia*) is found in a physicalist context in the first century BCE.<sup>73</sup> 90

A further parallel is provided by ps.Aristotle *On the Cosmos*, to be dated somewhere in the 1st century BC or AD. It is found immediately after the quotation of Heraclitus 22B10 DK.<sup>74</sup> The author argues for the eternal preservation of the cosmos:

The cause of this preservation is the agreement (*homologia*) of the elements (*stoicheia*), and the cause of the agreement is the equity of sharing (*isomoiria*) and the fact that none of them has more power (*pleon*

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Clem.Alex, *Strom.* 6.17.2. The emphasis on *genesis* in the exegesis of the fragment shows the influence of its absent second half. Sometimes translated as 'for souls it is death that water comes to be' etc., but this *genesis ex nihilo* seems unnecessarily complicated.

69 Philo *Aet.* 107, *χρῆ μέντοι καὶ τὴν ἐνυπάρχουσαν ἰσονομίαν τῷ κόσμῳ κατανοήσαντας κτλ.* (tr. Colson (Loeb), slightly modified).

70 Heraclitus' three elemental forces are replaced by the four Stoic elements, among which air (but see Betegh 2007, who argues that this 'air' is Heraclitean).

71 Philo *Aet.* 111–112 = Heracl. fr. 66 (*b*) Marc. (tr. Colson (Loeb), slightly modified).

72 Runia (1981), 135–137, and (1986), 180.

73 Both Philo texts are listed by Farquharson, cited above, n. 13.

74 Cf. above, n. 61. This passage (like those in Philo) is also influenced by Pl. *Smp.* 186c5–7a8,

*dynasthai*) than each of the others, for the heavy is in equipoise with the light, and the hot with its opposite.<sup>75</sup>

This agreement and equity of sharing of the elements, as opposed to one of them being more powerful than the others, vividly recall the metaphors of the Alcmaeon lemma. The picture is similar to Philo's at *De specialibus legibus* 1.208, where as we saw the 'equity of the four elements' (*isonomia tôn tettarôn stoiceiôn*) is contrasted with the supremacy (*dynasteia*) of a single element. The parallels for the Aetius lemma in Timaeus Locrus, Philo, and ps.Aristotle are not as far away in time as the late sixth century BCE: Timaeus Locrus is pre-Philonian; for Philo's exegetical predecessor we may think of the mid-first century BCE; and ps.Aristotle may be a contemporary of this predecessor or date to a century later. Parallels between Philo and the *Placita* are not uncommon.<sup>76</sup>

91 These passages convey a message that is rather different from that of Epicurus in Cicero.<sup>77</sup> Clearly, the term-and-concept may be used with a diversity of emphasis. Whether Epicurus also referred to its opposite (*dynasteia*, or *monarchia*, or *tyrannis*) we do not know. The Stoic cosmic cycle adduced by Philo's predecessor is compatible with both opposites, *isonomia* referring to the (temporarily, but at least ideally) balanced world | of our experience, *dynasteia* to the monopoly of Fire during total conflagration. The Heraclitean/Platonic cosmology that is closer to Philo's preferred view strongly emphasizes the everlastingness of elemental *isonomia*. The contrasting term here is *to anison*, the 'inequality', of the elements of course, which *ad sententiam* equals *dynasteia*, or *monarchia*, or *tyrannis*; and inequality, which equals evil, has been excluded right from the start. The author of *On the Cosmos*, strongly in favour of the eternity of the world, opposes *homonoia* and *isomoiria* of the elements to the *pleon dynasthai* of any of them.

These late accounts of a perpetual cosmic balance very much resemble the cyclical and stable equilibrium of elemental forces in an indestructible cosmos attributed by a majority of scholars to Anaximander, whose opposites are said to pass forever away into and come to be from each other, just as the Heraclitean elements cited by Philo. The interpretation of Anaximander that dominates

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see Strohm (1952), 147–158. Plato already refers to Heraclitus, cf. above, nn. 24–26 and text thereto.

75 [Arist.] *Mu.* 5 396b34–97a2. For the contrast between *isomoiria* and *pleon dynasthai* cf. above, text to n. 20. David Runia reminded me of this passage.

76 See Runia (2008) at (2010), 282–304.

77 Above, n. 57, n. 58.

today<sup>78</sup> is a combination of Zeller's belief that the Anaximandrian opposites change into each other (but Zeller did not exclude that the cosmos will in the end be destroyed),<sup>79</sup> and of Heidel's and Jaeger's conviction that this process of transformation lasts forever.<sup>80</sup> Elsewhere I argue against this interpretation, because there is no evidence that Anaximander spoke of a transformation of the elemental forces into each other, while the assumption of an unending equilibrium clashes with the doxographical evidence concerned with the beginning and end of the cosmos.<sup>81</sup>

Our earliest evidence relating to elemental transformation is about Heraclitus, as for instance in the fragment cited above from Philo.<sup>82</sup> And so, I believe, is the evidence for an everlasting balance in the cosmos because of this transformation, since according to Heraclitus 'the everliving fire is kindled in measures (μέτρα) and quenched in measures'.<sup>83</sup> That these 'measures' are equal follows from another verbatim Heraclitean fragment, which, in spite of being mutilated, tells us that 'fire', 'sea', and 'earth', when changing back into each other, are 'measured so as to form the same proportion (*ton auton logon*) as existed before'.<sup>84</sup> Heraclitus, moreover, speaking | of 'universal war', says that 'all things 92 come about through strife': eternal conflict.<sup>85</sup> The link of Alcmaeon's view of health with Anaximander's purported view of the justice (or, according to Vlastos, quasi-*isonomia*) obtaining in a perennial struggle between cosmic opposites as equals, itself connected in an influential modern exegetical tradition with the ideology constructed around the Greek polis as the wellspring of rational thought,<sup>86</sup> should be severed.

If one really wants to follow the doxographer and to attribute to Alcmaeon a doctrine of health as a balance between conflicting opposites and of disease as a disturbance of this balance, one should think for this balance-in-motion of the influence of Heraclitus rather than of Anaximander. Heraclitus, more-

78 Influentially argued by Kahn (1960).

79 Zeller (1892) at (1920), 305. Interpretations may outlive their original setting.

80 For Heidel see above, n. 49, n. 65 *ad finem*, and text thereto; Jaeger (1924), 227, speaks of an 'ewiger Ausgleich' according to the 'Rechtsnorm', thus emphasizing the juridical and normative aspect of the process and leaving to one side the possibility of a sequence of events that would allow for major disturbances, or for the disappearance of the cosmos. Cf. Jaeger (1934) at (1960), 90; and (1947), 34–36.

81 Mansfeld (2011) (= ch. 4 above), with references to the literature.

82 n. 69 and text thereto.

83 Heracl. 22B30 DK.

84 Heracl. 22B31 DK. In general see, for instance, Kirk, Raven and Schofield (1983), 192–200, Graham (2006), 122–127.

85 Heracl. 22B80 DK.

86 Most spectacularly Vernant (1962); for criticism see Sassi (2007), Laks (2008).

over, tends to present natural processes and situations by means of similes derived from the world of morality, human experience, and myth: Fire acts like a judge (Heraclitus 22B66 DK, κρίνει), lightning 'steers' (B64 DK, οἰακίζει), and the Erinyes, helpmates of Dikê, will arrest the sun if it transcends its measures (B94 DK).

This reception of the cosmological idea of balance, or equilibrium (assuming that this is what happened), is a creative one. Health can never be more than a temporary equilibrium. One could argue that this is one of the reasons why Alcmaeon is said to have believed that 'humans die because they are incapable of joining the beginning to the end'.<sup>87</sup> Health will be followed by disease (or worse), but the converse is not always true, and in the end not true at all.

A perhaps even better parallel for the doctrine ascribed to Alcmaeon is provided by the achievements of the contrasting forces of Love (or Harmony) and Strife in Empedocles. These effects do not pertain to health and disease, but to cosmology and, in one case, to the life and death, the coming to be and passing away of living beings:

This is very clear in the mass of mortal limbs: at one time they [i.e., the elements] come together into one in Love, limbs in possession of a body in the peak of a flourishing life; at another time, severed by evil Quarrels, each drifts apart in the breakers of life.<sup>88</sup>

93 I do not argue that Alcmaeon is influenced by Empedocles. For one thing, the conditions represented by the words *isonomia* and *monarchia* are not | hypostasized as separate qualities. But in view of the fact that, quite possibly, these men are contemporaries,<sup>89</sup> the parallel between the salutary versus the unpleasant results linked in the one case with contrasting qualities and with contrasting terms in the other may well be significant.

The ancient doxographical tradition and our own comparative methodology invite us to accept as well as to construct strong links among the ideas and words contained in the scarce *reliquiae* of early philosophy and medicine. This is unavoidable. Yet we tend to forget that there is so very much we do not know, and perhaps never will. The resemblance between the definition of health and disease of our Aëtian lemma and the notions of other physicians need not

87 Alc. 24B2 DK *ap.* [Arist.] *Probl.* 17.3 916a33–37.

88 Emped. 31B20.1–5 = *Pap. Strasb.* ens. c.2–6, following Simplicius and the second hand of the papyrus against the *συνερχόμεθ'* of the first hand, *pace* Primavesi who reads *συνερχόμεν'* in line 3. For the relation to living beings see Primavesi (2008), 37–39.

89 Above, n. 2.



imply descent of the views of the latter from a doctrine of the philosopher from Croton. It is quite possible that early doctors who saw health and disease in terms of equality and disturbance were influenced by philosophical ideas about natural processes independently. It is true that the combination of *lemmata* in Aëtius 5.30.1–3 seems to turn Alcmaeon into an archegete, a sort of Thales of medicine, in as far as the definition of health and disease by doctors is concerned. This, however, may be a matter of *interpretatio*. And Alcmaeon is conspicuously absent from the rich Aristotelian doxography in *Anonymus Londinensis*. In both Aristotle and Aëtius he is present as a *physikos*, just like Empedocles, not as a doctor.<sup>90</sup>

## 6

The use of *isonomia* in a physicalist context, most remarkable in the Aëtian lemma on Alcmaeon, is, as we have seen, not so very extraordinary in texts dating to the Hellenistic and Early Roman period. Its presence in the Aëtian lemma need not go back to the philosopher of Croton, although one cannot, of course, *prove* that the quotation is not verbatim. What made scholars attribute the term to Alcmaeon himself is its noteworthy combination, in the lemma, with *monarchia*—a combination which *ad litteram* is spectacularly paralleled in the famous passage in Herodotus. We have seen, however, that in contexts comparable to the Alcmaeon lemma a term that is more or less equivalent to *isonomia* may be combined with a term, or formula, that is more or less equal in force or meaning to *monarchia*, while in such contexts *isonomia* itself is late. What (perhaps paradoxically) has to be explained is the presence not of *isonomia*, but of *monarchia* instead of *dynasteia*, *vel. sim.*

I suggest that someone who, either at first hand or at one or more removes, knew the Herodotean discussion of the best constitution, replaced whatever term originally figured in the report about Alcmaeon with its perhaps more striking Herodotean equivalent. This suggestion is less hazardous than would seem at a first glance. The fact that the name-label Herodotus occurs in the *Placita*, viz. in the chapter on the Nile,<sup>91</sup> shows that his name, and a doctrine, were present in the doxographical tradition. His work was present in the rhetorical schools of antiquity until the very end. Some examples: Strabo quotes him thirty-three times by name, mostly at second hand.<sup>92</sup> For Cicero

90 See Runia (1999b) in Mansfeld and Runia (2010), 536–537.

91 'Ἡρόδοτος ὁ συγγραφεύς' ('Herodotus the historian'), Aëtius at ps.Plu. 4.1.5, 898A7–10.

92 For the reception of Herodotus in antiquity see Riemann (1967) e.g. 47–55 on Strabo.

he is 'the first who gave distinction to this genre', sc. to history (*De oratore* 2.55, *qui princeps genus hoc ornavit*).<sup>93</sup> Plutarch's essay *The Malice of Herodotus* shows him to be a living force around 100 AD, and he is also frequently cited by Plutarch elsewhere. The *De dea Syra* and *De astrologia* ascribed to Lucian emulate Herodotus' language and presentation. What may be equally or even more important is that the *Histories* are present in the *Anthology* of Stobaeus: no less than forty-two abstracts, plus one misattribution (*Anthology* 3.28) and two indirect quotations, one via Plutarch, one via Porphyry. 'Stobaeus' enormous work is in part based on [...] a tradition of accretion', and has absorbed earlier collections.<sup>94</sup>

Among these Stobaeian abstracts is the Herodotean discussion of *isonomia* versus *monarchia*, a purple passage edited and cut into two parts the better to suit the structure of the *Anthology*. First, at *Anthology* 4.6.24, the sentence which introduces the speech of Otanês plus the speech of Darius (Herodotus 3.80, 82)<sup>95</sup> in defense of *monarchia*; next, at *Anthology* 4.8.28, the greater part of the speech of Otanês (Herodotus 3.80)<sup>96</sup> in defense of *isonomia*. This inverted sequence depends on the order of Stobaeus' chapters.<sup>97</sup> Chapter 4.6 is entitled 'That monarchy is the best' (ὅτι κάλλιστον ἡ μοναρχία), chapter 4.8 'Censure of tyranny' (ψόγος τυραννίδος). We may note that the speech of Megabuzos in defense of oligarchy is absent. Herodotus was judged to be inferior to |  
95 Thucydides at public speeches (δημηγορίαι, *contiones*),<sup>98</sup> so the selection for the *Anthology* of precisely the speeches of Otanês and Darius as δημηγορίαι is significant. For the Herodotean terminology and contrast of *isonomia* and *monarchia* in later historians, see an earlier contemporary of Philo, Dionysius of Halicarnassus,<sup>99</sup> *Antiquitates Romanae* 10.1.2–3, *isonomia* versus *monarchoumenoi*,<sup>100</sup> and, much later, Cassius Dio, *Historiae Romanae* 44.2.1 and 47.42.4, *isonomia* versus *monarchia*. We must add that in the speech of Appius Claudius in reply

93 Cf. Cic. *Leg.* 1.5, 'the father of history', *patrem historiae*; *Orat.* 39.

94 Mansfeld and Runia (1997), 206, where also references to the literature; Searby (2011) 26.

95 Ἡροδότου Ἱστορίας τρίτης Δαρείου δημηγορίας, 306.9–10 + 308.2–22 Rosén; the last phrase has been omitted by the anthologist.

96 Ἡροδότου Ἱστορίας τρίτης δημηγορίας Ὀτάνου, beginning with the second sentence, 306.13–07.8 Rosén.

97 Cf. above, n. 3.

98 D.H. *Thuc.* 23, Quint. *Inst.* 10.73, Marcellin. *Vit. Thuc.* 38, see Riemann (1967), 81. These two abstracts are the only examples of δημηγορίαι from Herodotus in Stobaeus; there are no less than twenty-seven from Thucydides.

99 For Herodotus as household word and example see D.H. *Pomp.* 3, on which Riemann (1967), 70–80.

100 For a similar pair of opposites see above, n. 23.

to that of Marcus Valerius at Dionysius, *Antiquitates Romanae* 6.61.3, a part of the speech of Darius at Herodotus 3.81.1 is echoed:<sup>101</sup> a clear instance of the reception of Herodotus' δημηγορίαί.

The assumption of the influence of the Herodotean passage upon the wording of the doxographical *placitum*, either directly or via an anthology or later historians, and consequently of the presence of a Herodotism in Aëtius, is in my view to be preferred to speculations about the influence of a vocabulary connected with the democratic reforms of Cleisthenes on the physicist of Croton. The Aëtian lemma also belongs with the *Nachleben* of the Herodotean passage.

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101 One of the numerous Herodotisms collected by Ek; see (1942), 120.

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## Aristotle on Anaxagoras in Relation to Empedocles in *Metaphysics A*<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

Comparison of Aristotle's dating of Empedocles and Anaxagoras in *Metaphysics A* ch. 3, and of his systematic order of treatment of these two philosophers in *Met. A* ch. 8, with his dating and treatment of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras and Democritus in the discussion of earthquakes at *Meteorologica* 2.7 shows that ὕστερος in *Met. A*.3 984a13 means 'more advanced'. This is because Anaxagoras, when treated *more Aristotelico*, turns out to be closer to Plato than Empedocles. Therefore he may be discussed after Empedocles in *Met. A* ch. 8, though as to chronology he is earlier.

### Keywords

Progress – development – relative chronology – Alexander of Aphrodisias – discussion of earthquakes

A well-known and often discussed phrase in chapter 3 of Book A of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* sets off Anaxagoras against Empedocles:

Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὢν τούτου [sc. Ἐμπεδοκλέους] τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὕστερος ἀπείρους εἶναι φησι τὰς ἀρχάς·

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, earlier than him [sc. Empedocles] in date<sup>2</sup> but later in his works, declares that the principles are infinitely many ...<sup>3</sup>

1 Thanks for encouragement and criticism are due to Patricia Curd, Keimpe Algra, Oliver Primavesi, David T. Runia, and the anonymous referee of *Philologus*.

2 For this meaning of ἡλικία cf. Hdt. 2.53, Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὀμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μέο πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, 5.71; cf. also below, n. 22.

3 Arist. *Met. A*.3 984a11–13.



'Earlier but later ...'—a rather bizarre opposition. The problem is the meaning of ὕστερος, 'later'. Two main interpretations have been defended, viz. that 'later' means 'later in time', i.e. (perhaps) 'more advanced', or that it means 'inferior'.<sup>4</sup> These alternatives are already found in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the *Metaphysics*.<sup>5</sup> The meaning 'inferior' is justified here in a tortuous sentence:

Ἀναξαγόραν Ἐμπεδοκλέους πρότερον γενόμενον τοῖς ἔργοις φησὶ καὶ τῇ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δόξῃ ὕστερον εἶναι, οὐ προκρίνων αὐτοῦ πάντως τὴν δόξαν τῆς Ἐμπεδοκλέους ὡς συνετωτέραν καὶ πλέον τι ἔχουσαν, ἀλλ' ὕστεραν καὶ εὐτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος.

He says that Anaxagoras, born before Empedocles, is later in his works and his physical doctrine. He does not express preference for his doctrine over that of | Empedocles in every respect as being cleverer and having the advantage, but believes it [sc. Anaxagoras' doctrine] to be later and worth less.<sup>6</sup>

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But one should take the whole of Alexander's exegesis into account. He points out that, as there are passages where Aristotle prefers Empedocles to Anaxagoras in certain respects, so there are passages where he prefers Anaxagoras to Empedocles. According to Alexander Anaxagoras' inferiority is at stake here, in ch. 3, because a limited number of elements is better than an unlimited number.<sup>7</sup> Breier, who knew this evidence only from Brandis' anthology of so-called *Scholía* on Aristotle, argues against Brandis that the passage is confused ('indessen herrscht darin eine große Verwirrung'), because a little later its author propounds another and different interpretation.<sup>8</sup>

The first of Alexander's options, namely that Aristotle believed Anaxagoras to be inferior to Empedocles, has been argued for many years by Denis O'Brien,

4 See already Brandis (1835) 242 with n. *i*, Breier (1840) 85–86, Schwegler (1847) 34–36, Bonitz (1849) 67, Zeller (1892) 1023 n. 2, and e.g. Ross (1924) 1.132, Mansfeld (1980) 90–91.

5 Alex. in Met. 28.1–21.

6 Alex. in Met. 27.28–28.3, my trans. Dooley (1989) 51 n. 104 argues that 'Alexander understands *tois ergois* with both *proteros*, so that the phrase means "in his literary activity", and with *husteros* (28.1), where the phrase has the sense of "in the merit of his works" ...'. But in Alexander's sentence τοῖς ἔργοις, explained by τῇ περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δόξῃ, goes with ὕστερον only.

7 Alex. in Met. 28.3–6.

8 Breier (1840) 85–86 with n. *h*, citing Brandis (1836) 17 for the text and Brandis (1835) 242 n. *i* for the interpretation; note however that in the text Brandis assumes that Anaxagoras 'weitergering als Empedokles', and only in the footnote suggests that perhaps ὕστερος is 'tadelnd'.

who in the last of his many publications dealing with Empedocles I have seen appears to be satisfied that the question has been settled. Just like Alexander as cited above he argues that Aristotle believed Anaxagoras to be inferior to Empedocles because the hypothesis of the four elements is simpler than of infinitely many. He adds that Empedocles, adding earth to the water, air, and fire already introduced by others, made the set of four, also accepted by Aristotle himself, complete. Aristotle more than once expresses his preference for Empedocles. O'Brien further argues that Aristotle at the end of the same chapter points out that Anaxagoras was the first to speak of Intellect as moving and ordering cause, thus appearing like 'a sober man in contrast with the random talk of those before him'.<sup>9</sup> So he cannot have included Empedocles among these predecessors. One can hardly object to this last point (it repeats what Aristotle says: 'Anaxagoras is earlier in date'), but it is hard to see how this confirms the conclusion that Anaxagoras is inferior.<sup>10</sup>

As a matter of fact the statement that someone is 'earlier in date' but 'inferior in his works' is close to being a truism.<sup>11</sup> It is generally accepted that Aristotle, in the first book of *Metaphysics*, provides a descriptive and critical analysis of the develop|ment of philosophy from its first beginnings to its culmination in Plato. What is earlier is not as good as what is later. Progress exists.<sup>12</sup> The translation 'inferior' is therefore unsatisfactory.

In her book on Anaxagoras Patricia Curd admits that the phrase is ambiguous, but argues in favour of 'later' in a temporal sense. Aristotle 'seems to be explaining why, even though Anaxagoras was older than Empedocles, he mentions Anaxagoras *after* Empedocles'.<sup>13</sup> As a matter of fact Aristotle in ch. 3 lists in succession Thales and Hippo, Anaximenes and Diogenes, Hippasus and Heraclitus, and Empedocles.<sup>14</sup> Then comes 'Anaxagoras ..., earlier in date but later in his works'. Curd's argument, though on the right track, is not sufficient, because Hippo and Diogenes, mentioned as the secondary partners of the two pairs of physicists listed before the mention of Empedocles, are later

9 Arist. *Met.* A.3 984b15–18.

10 O'Brien (1968) 97–105, (2005) 319–321.

11 See already Schwegler (1847) 34–35, and Bonitz (1949) 67: 'si quis est ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος, εἰ non potest vitio dari quod non pariter elaboravit, sed ut [sc. membrum τοῖς δ' ἔργοις ὕστερος] recte opponi possit priori membro, laudem debet significari'.

12 Cf. Arist. *SE* 33 183b17–34, *Met.* A.1 981b13–22, 2 982b14 προϊόντες, 3 984a18 προϊόντων, *EN* 1.7 1098a21–25, and *Poet.* 4 1449a7–22. See, for instance, Aubenque (1962) 77–83, Edelstein (1967) 87–95, and Berti (1990) 33–34, who puts Aristotle's view of the development of philosophy in the context of his views on the development of civilization.

13 Curd (2007) 133 with n. 15; italics in the original.

14 Arist. *Met.* A.3 984a2–11.

than Anaxagoras and Empedocles. I submit that Aristotle is not looking back to the name of Empedocles he has just mentioned, but forward to what is still to come. He must have a motive for saying that Anaxagoras, though earlier chronologically, is 'later in his works'.

To understand this motive we must first look at a parallel. In ch. 7 of Book 2 of the *Meteorologica* Aristotle discusses earthquakes:

ἔστι δὲ τὰ παρειλημμένα μέχρι γε τοῦ νῦν χρόνου τρία καὶ παρὰ τριῶν. Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ ὁ Κλαζομένιος καὶ πρότερον Ἀναξιμένης ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀπεφάναντο, καὶ τούτων ὕστερον Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης.

Up to the present three theories have been put forward by three separate men. For Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and before him Anaximenes of Miletus both published views on the subjects, and after them Democritus of Abdera.<sup>15</sup>

The relative chronology, accordingly, is Anaximenes first (earlier than Anaxagoras), Anaxagoras second, Democritus third (later than Anaximenes and Anaxagoras). One may well wonder why Aristotle takes the trouble to be so unusually specific about dates. The answer is that in what follows he discusses the three theories concerned not in a chronological but a systematic order, namely first that of Anaxagoras, then that of Democritus, and, as last, that of Anaximenes.<sup>16</sup> No doubt it is above all the fact that | Anaximenes, the earliest chronologically (as everyone in Aristotle's audience knows, we may surmise), is treated last, which prompted the little chronological introduction; Aristotle wants us to be sure that he knows his dates.

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Going back to *Metaphysics* A, and to Curd's insight, we now begin to see why Aristotle points out that Anaxagoras is earlier in date than Empedocles but later in his works. For in ch. 8, where he criticizes the preplatonic thinkers, the order of treatment is (1) the Monists, (2) Empedocles, and (3) Anaxagoras. According to Aristotle's relative chronology one would have expected Anaxagoras to come before Empedocles. But this order has been reversed, and Aristotle now explains why. When one interprets Anaxagoras correctly, which means going

15 Arist. *Mete.* 2.7 365a16–19; trans. Lee (Loeb).

16 I note in passing that in the chapter 'On earthquakes' of the Aëtian *Placita*, for the most part extant only in [Plu.] 3.14, lemmata 1 to 4 list in succession the *doxai* of (Thales and) Democritus, (the Stoics), Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras in a systematic order that to some extent also takes the relative chronology into account (cf. e.g. Runia 1999, 40–41). The *doxai* of Democritus, Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras are clearly dependent on Arist. *Mete.* 2.7.

beyond his unarticulated statements, one finds that he recognized two principles, viz. (Intellect as) the One and (the Stuffs as) the Other, that is, as the In(de)finite.<sup>17</sup> This interpretation, already cited by Alexander as well, succeeds in placing his doctrine in the vicinity of Plato's two ultimate principles, the One and the In(de)finite Two,<sup>18</sup> critically described by Aristotle in ch. 6 and further criticized in ch. 9 of Book A. For Empedocles such a creative interpretation is impossible, because even Aristotle cannot reduce Love and Strife to a single principle, or the four elements to infinity.<sup>19</sup>

If Anaxagoras is 'later than Empedocles in his works' because he is closer to Plato, he is 'later' in the sense of being 'more modern', 'more advanced'. Therefore one need not be surprised when Aristotle tells us *disertis verbis* that he is more modern:

εἴ τις ἀκολουθήσειε συνδιαθρῶν ἃ βούλεται λέγειν, ἴσως ἂν φανείη καινοπρεπεστέως λέγων [...] βούλεται μέντοι τι παραπλήσιον τοῖς τε ὕστερον λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις μάλλον.

if one were to follow his doctrine carefully and interpret its meaning, it would presumably be seen to be more up-to-date [...] his meaning approximates to what later people say and resembles more what is believed today.<sup>20</sup>

These phrases are paraphrased, and even cited verbatim, by Alexander.<sup>21</sup> Commenting on the word καινοπρεπεστέως, he refers back to his earlier discussion

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and | says that the term may mean the same as Aristotle's earlier remark about

17 Arist. *Met.* A.8 989a30–b21, esp. b16–18, τὰς ἀρχὰς τό τε ἓν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀπλουν καὶ ἀμυγές) καὶ θάτερον, οἷον τίθεμεν τὸ ἀόριστον.

18 Alex. in *Met.* 28.9–10, 'later on, however, he shows that Anaxagoras' doctrine agrees with that of Plato, who was born later', προελθὼν μέντοι τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ σύμφωνον δείκνυσιν τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅς ὕστερος ἐγένετο. Alexander then paraphrases and cites Arist. *Met.* A.8 989a30–33 + b19–21. This second interpretation is accepted by Breier (1840) 85–86, Schweigler (1847) 34–36, and Bonitz (1849) 67. Also see Cherniss (1935) 237, and the detailed discussion of Primavesi (2012).

19 He reduces the four elements to two at *Met.* A.4 985a33–b1, and points out that Empedocles, the first to divide the moving cause into two contrary forces (A.4 985a29–31), did not argue entirely correctly or even reasonably as to the question whether one or two moving causes should be assumed (A.8 989a25–26).

20 Arist. *Met.* A.8 989b4–6 + b19–21 (trans. Tredennick (Loeb) and Dooley, slightly modified), see Breier, Schweigler, and Bonitz, above n. 18.

21 Above, n. 18.

Anaxagoras being earlier in date but later in his works. This is certainly inconsistent on Alexander's part.<sup>22</sup>

Aristotle is the first we know of to use the rather rare word *καινοπρεπέστερος*, which does not just mean 'novel', or 'up-to-date', but also 'stylish', 'sophisticated':<sup>23</sup> Anaxagoras as *esprit raffiné*. Cherniss' suggestion that the word *καινοπρεπεστέως* only means that Anaxagoras' doctrine as interpreted by Aristotle is more modern than as formulated by Anaxagoras himself, and not that it is more modern than that of Empedocles,<sup>24</sup> is unnecessarily brilliant, and fails to take the reversed order of treatment in ch. 8 of the two philosophers as announced in ch. 3 into account.

The ambiguous phrase in ch. 3 is meant to show that Aristotle is fully aware of the temporal sequence, but that as to doctrine the position of these two physicists on the developmental line from Thales to Plato in his view deviates from the chronological order.

The oxymoron consisting of the contrast between 'earlier in date' and 'more advanced in doctrine' is much better from a stylistic point of view, too, than the purported contrast between 'earlier in date' and 'inferior in doctrine'.

I have followed the standard translations in rendering τοῖς δ' ἔργοις as 'in his works', but the Greek expression also allows the meaning 'in fact', 'in reality', 'in his activity'.<sup>25</sup> According to Aristotle, in actual fact the doctrine of Anaxagoras concerning the principles as expressed in his work is more advanced than that of Empedocles, although Empedocles' work is more recent. We need not believe that Aristotle means that Anaxagoras, though born earlier, wrote his treatise later than Empedocles wrote his physical poem.<sup>26</sup> But his remark in *Met. A.3* is not incompatible with a date of publication (in whatever sense of the word) for Anaxagoras in the years of his stay at Athens, so between 456/5 and

22 See Dooley (1989) 51 n. 104, and already Breier, above n. 8 and text thereto. Also Aubenque (1962) 82, who usefully again adduces the parallel already cited by Schwegler (1847) 35, namely Arist. *Cael.* 4.2 308b30–32, καίπερ ὄντες ἀρχαιότεροι ταῖς ἡλικίαις [cf. above. n. 2] καινοτέρως ἐνόησαν περὶ τῶν νῦν λεχθέντων, 'although they were older in date their views on the present subject were more advanced' (trans. Guthrie (Loeb), modified). On this passage see Simp. in *Cael.* 684.18–27. καινοπρεπεστέως is not precisely the same as καινοτέρως, but comes close.

23 Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 2.6 1265a10–12, τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, 'The discourses of Socrates [in Plato's *Republic*] are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought' (trans. Barnes).

24 Cherniss (1935) 400.

25 See Schwegler (1847) 35, Bonitz (1870) 286a37–51 ('saepe ἔργον et ἔργα id significant, quod in re et veritate est').

26 For this view see e.g. Ross (1924) 1.132, Mansfeld (1980) 91–93, Rossitto (2009) 65.

427/8.<sup>27</sup> Because the ‘date’ (ἡλικία) of Empedocles and Anaxagoras can hardly pertain to anything else than the period of activity characterized by the writing and making publicly available by whatever means of their respective works, we may infer that Anaxagoras’ treatise was made available before | Empedocles’ physical poem—this, at any rate, is what Aristotle had reason to believe.<sup>28</sup>

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28 I am of course aware of the verbatim fragment Thphr. *Phys.Op.* fr. 9 Diels = 230 FHS&G *ap. Simp. in Phys.* 25.26–29, where πρότερος is used figuratively and ὕστερος literally, but wanted to explain *Aristotelem ex Aristotele* first.

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## »Das verteufelte Lastschiff«

*Philolaus 44B12 DK*

### Abstract

For the corrupt  $\delta$  τὰς σφαίρας ὀλκάς read  $\langle\tau\rangle\delta$  τὰς σφαίρας ὀλ{κ}ας.

### Keywords

*Timaeus* – forgery

In the proem of Stobaeus' *Anthology* Philolaus 44B12 DK has been transmitted as follows:

καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ σώματα πέντε ἐντί· τὰ ἐν τῇ σφαίρᾳ, πῦρ, ὕδωρ καὶ γᾶ καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ ὁ τὰς σφαίρας ὀλκάς πέμπτον.<sup>1</sup>

and the bodies in the sphere are five: those in the sphere, fire, water and earth and air, and the *holkas* of the sphere as fifth.

According to the dictionary a ὀλκάς is a 'ship that is towed', or 'merchant vessel'. Such a vessel, as has long been seen by most, can in no way be interpreted as characterizing a sphere; hence Wilamowitz' 'verteufelte(s) Lastschiff'. He proposed to read ὀλκός, which he argued means 'volumen', 'zusammengerollte Ballgestalt'.<sup>2</sup> But it has been pointed out that the substantive does not have this meaning, so Burkert suggested to emend the emendation and to read the adjective, ὀλκόν, meaning 'that which draws', sc. the sphere.<sup>3</sup> Huffman interprets this

<sup>1</sup> Stob. 1.3, 18.5–7 Wachsmuth.

<sup>2</sup> Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920), 91–92. Also note 'Und überhaupt ὀλκάς; das Wort, in diesem Dorisch, in einer Metapher anzutreffen, wie kann man's ertragen? Lastschiff der Kugel, das soll ein σῶμα sein'.

<sup>3</sup> Burkert (1972), 276 n. 183, accepted by Huffman 1993, 392 and 394–395.



drawing body as the aether that moves in a circle, and so draws the sphere around. This notion exposes the fragment as a ‘post-Aristotelian forgery’.<sup>4</sup>

The lesson to be derived from this overview is that according to a *communis opinio* this ὀλκός or ὀλκός or ὀλκόν pertains to, and in some way laboured way, describes the ‘sphere’, or its activity.

I believe that a much simpler emendation proposed long ago by Eduard Zeller may be offered for discussion: add a τ, delete the κ, change the accents, and read καὶ (τ)ὸ τᾶς σφαίρας ὀλ{κ}ας, πέμπτον, ‘and that of the whole sphere, as a fifth’.<sup>5</sup> The ‘four bodies’ are the standard four elements, the ‘fifth’ body the sphere as a whole. For the phrase τῆς ὅλης σφαίρας cf. Arist. | *Mete.* 2.7 365a23–24, Arius Didymus fr. 23 Diels ap. Stob. 1.19.4, 166.13 Wachsmuth; for the Doric genitive Archimedes *Fluit.* 3.10.6, 3.12.12, τις ἄλλας σφαίρας ἐπιφάνεια. That the word order in our fragment places ὀλ{κ}ας after σφαίρας is unproblematic.

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This reading places the fragment easily in the context of the reception and interpretation of Plato’s five regular bodies. The first four of these bodies correspond to the standard four elements. At *Tim.* 55b–c the dodecaedron is alluded to. But it is not constructed or very clearly explained by Plato, though he says that the Demiurge ‘decorated it with images’ (ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν). Later authors interpreted this figure with its decoration of images, presumably stellar constellations, as the heavenly sphere.<sup>6</sup>

My unsurprising conclusion is that the Philolaus fragment is a post-Platonic forgery.

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4 Huffman (1993), 395.

5 Zeller (1876), 376 n. 3: ‘vielleicht ist ὁ τ. σ. κύκλος, oder τὸ τ. σ. ὅλας zu lesen’.

6 See e.g. the overviews at Cornford 1937, 218–221, who also cites *Phd.* 110b, and Huffman 1993, 393–394 (with references to the secondary literature). As an example we may cite Ti.Locr. 216.20–21 Thesleff, τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τῷ παντός ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαίρα ἐόν.

## Democritus on Poetry

*Fragments 68B18 and B21 DK*

### Abstract

Democritus 68B18 DK, as cited by Clement of Alexandria, is a generalized reformulation or paraphrase of B21 DK, quoted at the beginning of his *On Homer* by Dio Chrysostomus.

### Keywords

Poetry – scripture – inspiration – Homer – Plato – Cicero – Horace

Democritus 68B18 DK, on poets in general, is cited by Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6.168.2. Democritus 68B21 DK, on Homer, is cited at the beginning of the *On Homer* of Dio Chrysostomus, *Or.* 53.1.

Thrasyllos' catalogue of Democritus' writings at D.L. 9.48 cites a work entitled *On Homer* (Περὶ Ὁμήρου ἢ ὀρθοεπειῆς, καὶ γλωσσέων), to which Dio's quotation has generally been attributed. As we shall see there is no reason to doubt its authenticity:

“Ὁμηρος φύσεως λαχὼν θεαζούσης ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτὴνατο παντοίων· ὥς οὐκ ἐνδὸν ἄνευ θείας καὶ δαιμονίας φύσεως οὕτως καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἔπη ἐργάσασθαι.

Democritus speaks as follows about Homer: ‘Homer, having been given a divine nature, built a beautiful structure of lines dealing with all sorts of subjects’, thus suggesting that without a divine and superhuman nature it is impossible to produce lines of such beauty and expertise.

The formula ἐπέων κόσμον is already found in Solon's elegy *Salamis* (fr. 1.2 West *ap. Plu. Sol.* 8) and in Parmenides' didactic epic (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων, 28B8.52 DK). It also occurs in epigrams of Philetas (ἐπέων εἰδῶς κόσμον, fr. 8.3 Diehl) and Antipater Thessalonicensis (ἐπέων κόσμον, *Anthologia Graeca* 11 20.3). In prose it occurs in Plutarch, who informs us that ‘Homer, who excelled in mar-

shalling lines in a beautiful way' ('Ομηρος ἐπέων κόσμῳ περιγενόμενος, *Pl.Qu.* 1010E), rarely used the article; and in Pausanias, | who posits that the hymns of Orpheus, because of the beautiful the arrangement of the lines (κόσμῳ μὲν δὴ τῶν ἐπῶν, 9.30.12), would get the second prize only because Homer gets the first. It is noteworthy that both Plutarch and Pausanias, just like Democritus, associate the formula with Homer.

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The word θεαζούσης is remarkable. The only parallel for a form of this verb is found in the *Etymologium Gudianum*: Θεαζόντων· μαινομένων. There is no need to emend to ((ἐν)θεαζούσης),<sup>1</sup> for where you have a compositum you may also have a simplex. The explanation provided seems apt enough; think of Heraclitus' Sibylla prophesying 'with raving mouth' (μαινομένῳ στόματι, 22B92 DK).

Dio's explanatory paraphrase is good. His quotation of Democritus sets the tone for his encomium of Homer, where he also cited and discusses a number of other (for the most part laudatory) views about the poet. But the Democritus quotation of Clement, though printed by Diels and Kranz as a verbatim fragment, could very well be no more than a paraphrase of the text quoted by Dio.

We should first look at the context in the final section of the sixth book of the *Stromata*. As so often Clement argues in favour of the superiority of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and teaching as compared with those of the pagan Greeks. Philosophy, he states, remained a local Greek phenomenon, whereas Christian doctrine spread over the whole world. Divine scripture is superior to Greek poetry. To prove the latter point Clement cites the judgments about poets and poetry by two great Greek philosophers. The second of these is the Democritus fragment. The first purports to be a (famous) utterance of Plato's (*Ion* 534b):

εἶτα περὶ μὲν ποιητικῆς Πλάτων 'κούφον γάρ τι χρῆμα καὶ ἱερὸν ποιητῆς' γράφει 'καὶ οὐχ οἷός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεός τε καὶ ἔκφρων γένηται'.

Next, Plato writes about poetry: 'For a poet is some sort of airy and holy thing, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind'.

I have picked out in bold Clement's τι, which is not in Plato. In Clement's quotation the word order has been changed,<sup>2</sup> and some words have been omitted.

1 Cf. Hdt. 1.63.1, ὁ μὲν δὴ οἱ ἐνθεάζων χρᾶ ταῦτα. The verb regularly occurs in later authors.

2 Noticed by Canivet (1958) *ad loc.* in the apparatus of his edition of the CAG.

This alteration and abridgement are immediately clear when we compare the original text (I have picked out in bold words in Plato which are lacking in Clement):

κούφον γάρ χρήμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων ...

This phrase is also cited by Proclus and Theodoret, as well as in Stobaeus anthology (here in a larger section of the dialogue). Proclus and Stobaeus quote verbatim,<sup>3</sup> Theodoret not (GAG 2.30):

καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν· ‘κούφον γάρ τι χρήμα καὶ ἱερὸν ποιητῆς καὶ οὐχ οἷός τε ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεος καὶ ἔκφρων γένηται’.

- 486 The context in Theodoret, just as Clement’s, is (of course) critical of the pagan Greek tradition. And Clement’s work is where Theodoret (also note the tell-tale τ!) found his Plato quotation:<sup>4</sup> the only difference is that he leaves out τε before καὶ at the end of the phrase.

After his Democritus quotation Clement states ἴσμεν δὲ οἷα ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, ‘we know what sort of things poets tell’. This scathing remark (which recalls the proverb πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοι quoted by Aristotle and others) nicely rounds off his critical account of the poetry of the Greeks. As already pointed out, this is precisely the background against which we should study his quotation of Democritus:

καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος ὁμοίως· ‘ποιητῆς δὲ ἅσσα μὲν ἂν γράφῃ μετ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος, καλὰ κάρτα ἐστίν’.

and Democritus (speaks) in a similar way [viz., similar to Plato]: ‘whatever a poet writes with enthousiasm and holy spirit is very beautiful’.

3 Procl. in R. 1.184.18–21, Stob. 2.5.3, 36.25–27 W.

4 It is not found in Theodoret’s favourite source Eusebius. A list of Theodoret’s quotations from the *Stromata* is found in Raeder (1904), 325–326; this is not complete (e.g. the passage from the *Ion* is lacking). See further Canivet’s study of Theodoret’s methods (1958), 257 ff., and his conspectus in parallel columns of the ‘ordre de succession des auteurs profanes’ quoted in the second book of the *CAG*, and in Clement, Eusebius, and others. Note that in the list of Plato quotations derived from Clement in Canivet’s study (1958), 261 the passage from the *Ion* is also lacking. But in his edition of the *GAG* (1958), 146 n. 4 he refers to the quotation in Clement.

I submit that this phrase is a generalized reformulation of the fragment quoted by Dio, and that its wording has to some extent been adapted to that of Clement's Plato quotation. Homer has become 'a poet' (ποιητής) in general, on a par with the ποιητής of Plato's text, and the odd 'writes' (γράφη) echoes Clement's own 'writes' (γράφη) which is found half-way his Plato quotation. The final section of the phrase, 'is very beautiful', is particularly jejune. Even so, the ingredients of Clement's quotation (to the right) one by one correspond to those of Dio's (to the left):

Ὅμηρος	ποιητής
φύσεως λαχῶν θεαζούσης	μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ ἱεροῦ πνεύματος
ἐπέων κόσμον ἐτεκτίναντο παντοίων·	ἅσσα μὲν ἂν γράφη
... καλὰ καὶ σοφὰ ἔπη	καλὰ κάρτα ἐστὶν

I have modified the word order in Clement's Democritus quotation the better to bring out the correspondences. Clement's phrase does not tell us anything we do not already find in Dio's. Because as far as we know Democritus wrote on Homer, not on poetry in general, Dio's quotation will indeed be genuine. It also has a more authentic ring than Clement's.

At first glance Clement's formula ἱεροῦ πνεύματος looks suspicious: he is, after all, a Christian author. But it also occurs elsewhere, though somewhat or even much later than Democritus' days. It is once found in Aristotle, who calls what one breathes out when sneezing (sneezing, as we know, being an omen) 'the only holy breath'.<sup>5</sup> This however is rather different. A passage in Plutarch comes closer, who says that 'the holy and daemonic breath among the Muses' caused Homer (him again) to be fought over by the cities who claimed him as their own.<sup>6</sup> And one should also cite Cassius Dio, who designates the hole in the ground in the sanctuary of Delphi through which, allegedly, inspiring fumes came to the Pythia, as the 'mouth from which the holy breath came forth'.<sup>7</sup> But these two parallels are too late; they help to explain and so to speak de-Christianize Clement's wording, but are not sufficient to authenticate his |

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5 Arist. *HA* 1.11 492b7–8, ἱερὸν μόνον τῶν πνευμάτων. At [Arist.] *Probl.* 33.9 962a32–38 one reason for believing sneezing to be sacred is that the head is believed to be the most divine and most sacred place in the body, and people revere the πνεῦμα that issues from there as ἱερὸν.

6 Plu. *Exil.* 605A, τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐν Μούσαις πνεῦμα.

7 Cass.D. 63.14.2, τὸ στόμιον ἐξ οὗ τὸ ἱερὸν πνεῦμα ἀνῆι.

time in Plato (once), in a sense that is not entirely in *bonam partem* (*Tim.* 71e6), then three times in Aristotle. The verb ἐνθουσιάζειν does occur in both Plato and Aristotle.

Parallels for Clement's version, however, are extant, namely in Cicero (twice) and Horace, and they are quoted at Democr. 68B17 DK.<sup>8</sup> We should note that Cicero both times links Plato and Democritus, just as Clement. At *Div.* 1.80, where he says *negat ... sine furore Democritus quemquam poetam magnum esse posse*, he for this furor refers to the *Phaedrus* (i.e. the μανία of 245a). At the earlier *de Orat.* 2.194 there is no reference to a specific dialogue; here he says *audivi poetam bonum neminem* ('as they say Democritus and Plato asserted in their writings') *sine inflammatione animorum existere posse, et sine quodam afflatu quasi furoris*. Horace *Ars* 296–297 *excludit sanos Helicone poetas / Democritus* does not include Plato and is less specific.

The parallels in Cicero prove that this linking of Plato and Democritus is much earlier than Clement, though Cicero (or the tradition he relies on) has the *Phaedrus* in mind, not the *Ion*. They also prove, as does the reference in Horace, that the generalization 'poet' instead of 'Homer' is earlier than Clement. What happened, or so I believe, is that Democritus so to speak was Platonized: his view of Homer was put on a par with Plato's thoughts on poets and poetry. We need not doubt that Clement found such views of Plato and Democritus on poetry in a source similar to the one Cicero knew, a source which indeed may already have contained a reference to the *Ion* instead of one to the *Phaedrus*, or may even have quoted from both dialogues. Clement brought the reference to Democritus in line with his (perhaps further) abridged version of Plato's words in the *Ion*, and made both quotations subservient to his polemical purpose. I therefore conclude that this quotation by Clement of Democritus is a paraphrase of the text that is extant in Dio Chrysostomus.

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<sup>8</sup> See Brink (1971), 329.

# Out of Touch

## *Philoponus as a Source for Democritus*

### Abstract

The evidence that according to Democritus atoms cannot touch each other or come into contact is found in Philoponus' Commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* and *On Generation and Corruption*. But he did not and presumably could not access Democritus' works, and depending on his exegetical context reports that the atoms touch each other as well as that they do not touch each other. This information offers insufficient grounds for the belief that according to Democritus atoms never touched each other.

### Keywords

continuous – touching – atomic shape – atomic size – commentary tradition – contextual exegesis – careless scholarship – Alexander of Aphrodisias – Ammonius – Simplicius

## 1 Introduction

The view that according to Democritus atoms cannot touch each other, or come into contact, has been argued by scholars, most recently and carefully by C.C.W. Taylor, especially in his very useful edition of the fragments of the early Atomists.<sup>1</sup> I am not concerned here with the theoretical aspect of this issue, that is to say with the view that the early Atomists *should* have argued (or posthumously admitted) that atoms cannot touch each other because only the void that separates them prevents fusion. I wish to focus on the ancient evidence for this interpretation. Our only ancient source for this view happens

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<sup>1</sup> Taylor (1997) 222, (1999) 186–188, 192–193, (1999a) 184, cf. the discussion in Kline and Matheson (1987) and Godfrey (1990). On the problems related to the assumption that attraction plays an important part see further the cautious remarks of Morel (1996) 422–424, who however does not take into account the passages in Philoponus which suggest that atoms cannot touch each other.

to be Philoponus; to be more precise, one brief passage in his *Commentary* on Aristotle's *Physics* (fr. 54c Taylor) and two brief passages in that on Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption* (67A7 DK, frs. 54d and 54e Taylor). These commentaries, as is well known, are notes of Ammonius' lectures, with additions by Philoponus himself.

278 Bodnár has argued that this evidence is not good enough, because all other ancient sources, in the first place Aristotle, are eloquently silent on a ban on contact; what we have here therefore are "guesses of Philoponus, which are solely based on the text of Aristotle".<sup>2</sup> Taylor admits the force of this objection, but sticks to his guns: "perhaps", he says, | the Atomists held that contact was impossible;<sup>3</sup> moreover the implication (!)<sup>4</sup> of Philoponus' contention, viz. that the "basic physical forces are attraction and repulsion", works quite well. There is also solid evidence that the principle of 'like to like' played an important part in Democritus' physics.<sup>5</sup> Atomic motion, such as the formation of compounds consisting of atoms of the same shape and more or less the same size, may therefore be explained by attraction, and attraction also explains why they stay together.<sup>6</sup>

But how reliable is Philoponus as a source for Democritus, that is to say: what were his sources for Democritus' doctrines, and how did he use them? I have looked at all the references to the early Atomists in his genuine works. The outcome of this inspection is that either he did not have Democritus' works in the field of physics or did not bother to look things up in those works that perhaps were still available.<sup>7</sup> The fact that Simplicius, who is fond of quoting from Presocratic texts, does not do so for Democritus and Leucippus makes the conclusion that by the time of these late commentators the *corpus Democriteum*

2 Bodnár (1998) 45–51, esp. 49–50. Cf. Tarán (1969) 12: 'many times what Asclepius and Philoponus [sc. in their commentaries on the *Introduction to Arithmetic*] quote or paraphrase from ancient authors is probably only based on the text of Nicomachus that Ammonius [cf. below, n. 8] must have had in front of him while he lectured'. Against Taylor see also Haspers (1999).

3 Taylor (1997) 222, (1999) 187, (1999a) 184.

4 Philoponus does not mention either attraction or repulsion.

5 Cf. also below, section 5.

6 Taylor (1999) 187 f., 193. That atoms when combined or entangled may stay together simply as long as no external force breaks up the combination is not taken into consideration. See the famous fragment from Aristotle's *On Democritus*, fr. 208<sup>3</sup>R (~ 68A37 DK, fr. 44a Taylor) *ap. Simp. in Cael.* 295.18–20: 'he thinks that the atoms hang on to one another and remain together for such an amount of time until some stronger necessity from the surroundings, shakes them and drives them apart (ἐπὶ τοσούτον οὖν χρόνον σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντέχεσθαι ... καὶ συμμείναι, ἕως ἰσχυροτέρα τις ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀνάγκη διασείσῃ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτὰς διασπείρῃ).

7 As well as his master Ammonius, to whom I shall refer no more: the name Philoponus is short for the commentaries on Aristotle that are at issue.



had been lost practically inescapable. The only kind of information on early Atomism used by Philoponus turns out to be what is found in the treatises of Aristotle, what (presumably, and as I shall argue) he was able to find in other commentaries on these treatises or what had percolated from these commentaries to his own days, and perhaps also what was to be found in the *Placita* literature. The unparalleled contention that atoms cannot touch each other is an exegetical manoeuvre, and one needs to look carefully at the contexts where it occurs. Most importantly, we shall find that elsewhere Philoponus also states that atoms *do* bump into each other.

Certain odd statements to be found in his commentaries occasionally reveal a lack of interest in other than purely exegetical matters.<sup>8</sup> Examples: at *in GC* 155.19–20 he has Parmenides introduce the Infinite (τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ ὁ Παρμενίδης καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον εἰσήγεν κτλ.) At *in de An.* 9.19–21 he quotes Empedocles' line that 'for humans the blood in the region of the heart is thought' (31 B 105.3 DK), attributing it to 'Critias, one of the Thirty' (~ 88A23 DK, 2nd text).<sup>9</sup> But at *in de An.* 89.9–13 (~ 88A22 DK) he tells us a little more; commenting on Aristotle's remark at *de An.* 1.2 405b5–8 (~ 88A22 DK, first text) that according to Critias the soul is blood, he states that Aristotle here refers either to 'one of the Thirty', or to another Critias, a sophist, but that this does not matter much. A commentary tradition must be behind the information about the two Critiases, for he adds 'they say there was also another Critias, who is the author of the writings that are available, as Alexander [sc. of Aphrodisias] says'. The tyrant only wrote 'constitutions in verse'. This man is the one who said the soul is blood, for he says 'for humans the blood in the region of the heart is thought'. Clearly the line is quoted merely to explain the content of Aristotle's note about Critias, the historical background being irrelevant to the exegetical purpose. Philoponus' note on Critias is paralleled at [Simp.] *in de An.* 32.22–23, commenting on the same passage in Aristotle: 'the man who posited that the soul is blood, Critias, either was one of the thirty tyrants or some sophist; this (alternative) will be irrelevant for us'.

The pseudo-precise confusion between Critias and Empedocles is probably due to the fact that in the doxographical tradition and elsewhere the tenet that the soul consists of blood is sometimes attributed to both.<sup>10</sup>

8 On the 'careless scholarship' of Ammonius and his pupils see Tarán (1981) 731–734 with n. 31 = (2001) 494–497.

9 'Irrtum d. Philop.' according to DK *ad loc.*

10 Macrob. *in Somn.* 1.14.20 (part of a long list), *Empedocles et Critias sanguinem*. Gal. *PHP* 2.8.48 says that Diogenes (*SVF* III fr. 30), 'forgetting about the doctrines of his own school, says the soul is blood, as Empedocles and Critias believed' (αἷμά φησιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥς

## 280 2 Atomic Shapes, and Sense Perception

We may next look at some representative passages dealing with Early Atomism. On the shape of the atoms: at *in Phys.* 228.28–229.2 (~ fr. 43c Taylor) Philoponus says that fire atoms are spherical, and that water happens to consist of cubical atoms. At *in GC* 12.31–13.2 (cf. *ad* fr. 43c Taylor) he again says that fire atoms are spherical, but now attributes the cubical atoms to earth. At *in Phys.* 162.26–27 he says that among the infinitely many atoms each shape is to be found, e.g. the spherical and the cubical and each of the other shapes. The point about fire derives from Aristotle and so apparently could not be modified,<sup>11</sup> but Philoponus naturally had no information on the atomic shape of the other traditional elements.<sup>12</sup> His exegetical improvisation about the cubical shape of water atoms is peculiar, especially when set off against his later explanation that it is earth that consists of cubelets, a view clearly indebted to Plato's account of the stereometric structure of earth corpuscles (*Ti.* 55d–56a).

Earlier in the *in Physica* we find a longer passage dealing with atomic shapes, *in Phys.* 26.1–6 (for understandable reasons not in our collections of Democritean fragments). Philoponus here explains the words 'or even contrary' (*Phys.* 1.2 184b22) in Aristotle's fundamental diaeretic account of the principles (*archai*) of his predecessors. He suggests that these may pertain to Democritus, who, he says, posited that the atoms were one in kind but different in shape, and not only different but 'even contrary'. Spherical atoms because of their swiftness are the cause of fire and of our perception of heat, whereas e.g. cubical atoms, because pushing and compressing, produce our perception of cold:

He [sc. Democritus] said that the same thing happens with colours; when for instance the points of pyramids bump into the eye [or: optic beam,

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Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Κριτίας ὑπέλαβον). These two texts are not in DK. See further Mansfeld (1990a) 3073 n. 48, 3077 n. 74, 3096 n. 149.

11 Arist. *de An.* 1.2 403b31–404a3 (~ 67A28 DK, fr. 106a Taylor; cf. also Arist. *de An.* 1.2 405a11–13 ~ 68A101 DK, fr. 107b Taylor), and Philoponus' comments, *in de An.* 67.11–14, 67.28, 68.13–14, 84.12–20. See e.g. Morel (1996) 137 ff., Salem (1996) 187 ff. Cf. next n.

12 Arist. *Cael.* 303a12–16 (~ 67A15 DK, fr. 54a Taylor) states that Leucippus and Democritus failed to define the shape of each element except that of fire, 'to which they assigned the sphere; air and water and the rest they distinguished by greatness and smallness'. Alexander, cited by Simplicius *ad loc.*, hypothesizes that air according to them consisted of smaller corpuscles of the same shape, water of bigger, and earth of even bigger corpuscles (Simp. *in Cael.* 610.24–28 ~ fr. 54b Taylor). Cf. *in Cael.* 617.22 ff., 625.1–3, where Simplicius himself says that according to Democritus air, water and earth differ in respect of the smallness of their elements, which are of the same shape.

προσβάλλωσι τῇ ὀψει] they produce a specific impression of colour; | e.g. of 281  
white, for what dilates the eye [or: optic beam] is white; and what is pierc-  
ing, such as the point of the pyramid, dilates as well. When the bases [of  
the pyramids—and the faces of the cubes (?)]—come into contact with  
the eye (or: optic beam), they produce the colour] of black; for black is  
contracting, and this nature belongs to the blunt too, for it contracts and  
by this contraction pushes what is distant [from each other] to the same  
[place].

Compare, later in the same work, in the comments on Aristotle's views about chance and spontaneity (*Phys.* 195b30–198a1) at *in Phys.* 262.15–19, the following statement:

in his account of particular processes (such as why warm things and white things dilate,<sup>13</sup> or why honey is sweet) he [sc. Democritus] posits as causes the position and arrangement and shape of the atoms.<sup>14</sup>

We happen to know, from a text either not available to or neglected by Philoponus, that Democritus' explanation of white and black was different. Theophrastus tells us, *Sens.* 73–74, that according to Democritus 'what is smooth is white', while 'black is composed of the very opposite shapes, namely rough, irregular and dissimilar shapes'.<sup>15</sup> Philoponus' account is entirely based on Plato's doctrine of perception, and in particular on that of the perception of colour at *Ti.* 67c–68b. The formula 'what dilates the eye [or: the optic beam] is white' (διακριτικὸν γὰρ τῆς ὀψεως τὸ λευκόν) for instance is a virtually verbatim quotation of *Ti.* 67e6, τὸ μὲν διακριτικὸν τῆς ὀψεως λευκόν. The 'sharpness' which 'dilates' (διαίρετικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀξύ) echoes Plato's ὀξύτεραν φορὰν [...] καὶ διακρίνουσαν, *Ti.* 67e6–7; for the sharpness of the pyramids of fire see *Ti.* 61e1–62a1. The compression by what is black is also precisely paralleled, viz. at *Ti.* 61e6–7, cf. 67d6.

Plato's theory is correctly reproduced Thphr. *Sens.* 86, 'what disintegrates (the organ) is white; what reintegrates it is black—a contrast analogous to hot and cold in the case of flesh, and to astringent and pungent in the case of the tongue.' See also Galen, *Synops.* xvi.8–9, *alba corpora visum disiungunt, nigra autem coniungunt.*

13 Wrong transl. Lacy (1993) 73; better at his footnote, p. 478.

14 For position, arrangement and shape see below, text to n. 19.

15 68A135 DK, fr. 113 Taylor (1999, 115–116).

Clearly, for Philoponus Plato's theory of colour is the only one. Yet his a-historic account serves its purpose rather well, viz. to explain Aristotle's formula 'or even contrary' as being about the atoms of Democritus.

282 We should however note that this interpretation of the formula is not original but indebted to the commentary tradition. Simplicius informs us, *in Phys.* 43.24 ff., about a traditional debate among exegetes: Porphyry and Themistius believed that the words 'or even contrary' are about Anaxagoras, while Alexander of Aphrodisias, who already knew this interpretation, believed that the whole phrase in Aristotle, and so this formula as well, pertains to Democritus. Accordingly, Philoponus, though he does not say so, sides with Alexander part of the way. Further evidence for his indebtedness to the tradition in this case is another passage in the same work of Simplicius, *in Phys.* 36.1–7 (~ Democr. fr. 247 Luria). Here we are told that Leucippus and Democritus held that the shapes, position and arrangement of atoms produce warm objects when these are composed of sharper and finer and equally arranged particles, and cold and watery objects when these are composed from contrary particles, and that—clearly for the same reasons—some compounds are radiant and clear, others dark and murky. This is rather close to Plato on black and white, and one is inclined to believe either that Philoponus made more explicit what he found in the commentary or commentaries that was/were his source, or came upon a more explicit account already in one of his predecessors. For the influence of the tradition compare for instance Simp. *in Cat.* 107.7–9 about contraries, with its echo of the *Timaeus* passage cited above as the ultimate source for Philoponus on colours: 'white and black are contraries; the one is a colour which dilates (or: segregates, dissociates) the eye (or: the optic beam: διακριτικὸν ὄψεως), the other a colour which compresses (or: aggregates, associates: συγκριτικόν)'. For this standard conception see also e.g. Phlp. *in Phys.* 92.13–14, on white as segregating (διακριτικόν) and black as aggregating (συγκριτικόν).

As to hot and cold, Thphr. *Sens.* 63 states that Democritus held that our perception 'changes according to a change of shape' (τὸ σχῆμα μεταπίπτον); in other words, he held that different shapes produce different sensations. Information about this view percolated to the commentary literature, for Simplicius quotes, not the *De sensibus*, but the *Physics*<sup>16</sup> (Thphr. fr. 238 FHS&G, ~ 68A120 DK, fr. 130 Taylor) for the view that hot and cold should be explained by having recourse to the atoms, *in Cael.* 564.24–26.<sup>17</sup> So Philoponus' various attempts to distribute  
283 dif | ferences of shape over the atoms of the traditional elements may have been

16 Yet the text was included by Diels among the remains of the *Physicorum Opiniones* (fr. 13).

17 Cf. Morel (1996) 209, 367.

inspired by the sort of information preserved by Simplicius in the passage cited, though Aristotle, as we have noticed, already remarked that Democritus did not posit differences of shape for the atoms of air, water and earth.<sup>18</sup>

Themistius' point of view at *in Phys.* 2.31–3.2, which is indeed clear from his paraphrase of this passage of Aristotle's *Physics* on the principles (*archai*), is also interesting in another respect. For the contraries Themistius attributes to Anaxagoras are roughly the same as those attributed to Democritus by Philoponus and Simplicius, namely 'hotnesses and coldnesses, whitenesses and blacknesses'. It is quite likely that these examples in our late sources are ultimately inspired by the section in the *Categories* dealing with contraries, for among the first examples of contrary qualities listed by Aristotle are the hot as one of a pair, and white and black (*Cat.* 10 13a20–21).

It is hard to believe that Philoponus could have believed that these interactions between sense organs (or instruments of sense perception) and objects as perceived were a matter not of contact but of attraction and repulsion.

### 3 Efficient (or 'Productive') and Motive Causes

Explaining Aristotle's remark (*GC* 1.6 322b6–8) about the use of aggregation (or association, compression) and segregation (or dissociation, dilation) and of action and passion by those philosophers who generate the elements, as well as by those who generate the things derived from the elements, Philoponus at *in GC* 127.17–22 briefly discusses Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus. The efficient causes of these processes according to Empedocles are Strife and Love, for Anaxagoras Intellect (note that this is a paraphrase of *Arist. Phys.* 8.9 265b19–22). I quote the section on Democritus:

And for that matter according to Democritus, too, shape, arrangement and position would be productive causes (ποιητικὰ αἴτια—Williams *Phlp.* translates 'efficient'), and in addition chance and spontaneity (ἡ τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον).

For shape, arrangement and position as causes according to Aristotle see *Met.* 284 A.4 985b14–15 (~ 67A6 DK, fr. 46a Taylor) on these differences in the atoms as the causes (αἰτίας) of all other qualities.<sup>19</sup> And for Aristotle's views on 'chance

<sup>18</sup> Above, n. 12.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. above, text to n. 14.

and spontaneity' see the long discussion at *Phys.* 2.4 195b31–5.197b37, with *inter alia* its references to what must be the views of the Atomists. According to Aristotle some people were mistaken in arguing that cosmogony is the outcome of chance and spontaneity, while processes in a cosmos such as those leading to the generation of living things are not fortuitous (*Phys.* 2.4 196a24–31, ~ 68A69 DK, fr. 71a Taylor). Philoponus elaborates on this view in his comments on this passage, see esp. in *Phys.* 261.31–263.2; he concludes by stating that by his wrong-headed approach Democritus in fact entirely fails to give us an explanation<sup>20</sup> of chance and spontaneity (οὐδένα λόγον ἡμῖν περὶ τύχης καὶ αὐτομάτου κατεβάλλετο).

It would seem that Philoponus in the other passage (in *GC* 127.17–22) cited above merely combines these two types of causes: first examples of necessary ones, then fortuitous ones. A comparison of these two passages betrays his exegetical opportunism, or ad-hoc-ism. We may further note that the attribution of chance and spontaneity as causes to Democritus is also found in the doxographical tradition. Aëtius 1.29.7 Diels (at both ps.Plutarch and Stobaeus) attributes to Anaxagoras and the Stoics the view that 'chance is a cause inscrutable to human reasoning; for some things are according to necessity, others according to fate, others according to choice, others according to chance, and others according to spontaneity' (τὸ αὐτόματον again). The paraphrase of Aëtius by Theodoret, *CAG* 6.15 (~ fr. 72 Taylor), adds the name-label Democritus to 'Anaxagoras and those from the Stoa' (at 59A66 DK these two versions have been coalesced). So Democritus already figured in the Aëtian lemma (unless one assumes that Theodoret added the name-label). This Theodorotean/Aëtian attribution to Democritus will in the final resort be an echo of Aristotle's discussion at *Phys.* 2.4 195b31 ff. cited above.<sup>21</sup>

285 It is neither possible nor very important to find out what precisely was Philoponus' source for the concluding section of his list, for the commentary tradition may have been influenced by the conveniently | short list in the lemma of the doxographical tradition already at an early stage, but it may equally well have arrived at the list of combined causes by combining the interpretation of various passages in Aristotle on its own and so have influenced the doxographical tradition. Or commentators and doxographers may have arrived at similar results independently.

That a commentary tradition is involved at Phlp. in *GC* 127.17–22 as well at any rate follows from Simplicius' comments on Arist. *Phys.* 8.9 265b19–22, the

20 Lacy (1993) 73 translates 'discussion'.

21 I hope it is clear that the above is not intended as a discussion of Democritus' views on chance and necessity.

lines paraphrased by Philoponus in this brief abstract (Philoponus' own comments on this passage from the *Physics* are no longer extant). For Simplicius at *in Phys.* 1318.22–34 too lists the triad Empedocles—Anaxagoras—Democritus. But he discusses in the first place the cause of motion. Empedocles' Love and Strife and Anaxagoras' Intellect are 'productive' as well as motive causes, but Democritus, Simplicius says, failed to refer to the 'productive cause' and only spoke of the motive cause.<sup>22</sup>

Accordingly, Philoponus and Simplicius find themselves on either side of a no doubt traditional difference of opinion.

#### 4 Contact; Acting and Being Affected

We may begin by quoting Arist. 1.8 *GC* 325a31–34 (cf. 67A7 DK, fr. 48a Taylor; trans. Williams Arist., slightly modified):

They [sc. the atoms] move in the void (for there is a void); and their coming together produces coming-to-be, their separating passing-away; and they act and are affected where they happen to touch [sc. each other—*ποιεῖν δὲ καὶ πάσχειν ἥ τυγάνουσιν ἀπτόμενα*], for they are not one here.<sup>23</sup> And being placed together and interlocking they generate.

Philoponus attempts to explain how this concept of 'touch' (Aristotle's *haptomena*)<sup>24</sup> is to be understood here, in *GC* 158.26–159.3 (67A7 DK *ad fin.*, 54d Taylor; trans. Williams Phlp., slightly modified):

22 For Aristotelian precedent that 'to move' is a wider concept than 'to produce' see *GC* 1.6 323a20 (but as a rule these terms are used interchangeably).

23 Cf. Arist. *Phys.* 6.1 231a22–23, 'continuous are things whose extremities [or: limits] are one, touching [or: contiguous, in contact] those of which they are together' (*συνεχῇ μὲν ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἓν, ἀπτόμενα δ' ὧν ἅμα*)—a general definition which includes mathematics. Cf. *ibid.* 5.3 226b18–24, 5.3 227a10–13; see also below, n. 26, text to n. 35. This discussion of *haphē* is taken up again at *GC* 1.6 322b21–323a31 and further specified for physical bodies, because the student of physics has to take the effects of touch into account; on this complicated passage see Natali (2004) 202–214, and on *haphē* in general according to Aristotle Burnyeat (2004) 16–17.

24 At Arist. fr. 208 <sup>3</sup>R (~ 68A37 DK, fr. 44a Taylor) *ap. Simp. in Cael.* 295.12, from the *On Democritus* (cf. above, n. 6) Aristotle uses *συμψάειν* for 'to touch' when speaking of the atoms; and Democritus (verbatim) uses *ψάσις* for the *sense* of touch, *ap. Sext. M.* 7.138 (~ 68B11 DK, fr. D22 Taylor). We do not know whether the alternative title 'On the Touching of Circle and Sphere' (*Περὶ ψάσιος κύκλου καὶ σφαίρης*) of the first treatise of the seventh tetralogy in Thrasyllus' catalogue is original (*ap. D.L.* 9.47 ~ 68A33 & B11 DK, fr. 40 Taylor).

‘touch’: i.e. by means of the void, for it is with this that they touch each other. For when Democritus<sup>25</sup> says that atoms touch each other he is not speaking of touch in the strict sense, which is what occurs when the surfaces of the things which touch fit over each other (τῶν ἐπιφανειῶν ἐφαρμοζουσῶν),<sup>26</sup> but what he calls ‘touch’ (*haphê*) is atoms being close to each other and at no great distance from each other; for they are at all events (παντῶς) kept apart by the void.

Surfaces fitting over each other according to Philoponus and others become one in the sense of being in the same place. Since according to his exegesis of the shapes of the atoms in both the *in Phys.* and the *in GC*, as we have seen in section 2 above, some atoms (of the elements water, or earth) are cubical, it is theoretically quite possible for faces of such cubelets to fit over each other. One cannot exclude that the wish to avoid this consequence is one of Philoponus’ reasons for positing that atoms do not touch in what he calls the strict sense. Various senses of *haphê*, ‘touch’ or ‘contact’, are discussed by Aristotle at *GC* 1.6 322b21–323a1,<sup>27</sup> but the strict sense distinguished by him is not the one posited by Philoponus in the passage just quoted.

287 This passage, as we have already seen above, is one of the three pieces of evidence in favour of the view that atoms can never touch because they are always kept apart by a bit of void. We should notice | that the immediate context in Aristotle is about atoms in a compound they have generated by coming together; clearly, the situation is what happens within a world-system, or in what may lead up to such a system. Later in the same commentary Philoponus refers back to this passage, saying, *in GC* 160.1–11 (partly at 67A7 DK *ad fin.* and fr. 54e Taylor) that Aristotle is right in claiming that Empedocles should have posited not only *poroi* (‘passages’, ‘ducts’) but also indivisible bodies between these *poroi*. Such corpuscles, he adds, were posited by Leucippus; these do

25 Note that Aristotle in the passage Philoponus comments on *disertis verbis* attributes this doctrine to *Leucippus* and does not mention Democritus, though a little earlier, at *GC* 1.8 325a1, he mentions them both.

26 The clause ‘which is what occurs when the surfaces of the things which touch fit over each other’ is lacking in Taylor’s translation. For the idea see Philoponus’ second comment on Arist. *Phys.* 5.3 226b18–24 (above, n. 23), *in Phys.* 791.24–26, ‘or by “the extremities” he means the surfaces, and says that they are “together” in the sense that they fit over each other; for the surfaces of things touching fit over each other’ (ἡ ἄκρα μὲν λέγει τὰς ἐπιφανείας, ἅμα δὲ αὐτὰς λέγει ὑπάρχειν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐφαρμόζειν· τῶν γὰρ ἀπτομένων ἐφαρμόζουσιν αἱ ἐπιφάνειαι). See further e.g. Alex. *in Met.* 232.7–8, Philp. *in Phys.* 545.25–546.7, 558.3–4, *in de An.* 162.19–20, Simp. *in Phys.* 581.16–18, etc.

27 Above, n. 23.



touch each other but are separated by the void, ‘through which acting and being affected take place—except that Leucippus did not speak of touch in the strict sense, as we have said above’.

The passage supporting this view quoted by scholars from the *Physics* commentary elucidates Aristotle’s account of the distinction between ‘touching and being limited’ at *Phys.* 3.8 208a11–14. Philoponus, in *Phys.* 494.18–25 (fr. 54c Taylor, not in DK), states that this distinction also follows from the hypotheses of Democritus: ‘for as the atoms move around in the void they are limited, but do not touch anything’. The backdrop here is clearly different from that in the passages from the *in GC* just quoted: we are not supposed to think of atoms forming a compound, but of (limited) individual particles being hurtled around in the extra-cosmic void. Philoponus’ account here of ‘being limited’ looks a shade captious, but this is by the way.

Taken au *pied de la lettre* the exegesis stated in these passages is odd—for how could an atom in any way influence another atom by means of the totally inert void? The explanation, I suggest, is to be sought in Philoponus’ literal understanding of acting and being affected according to the Atomists, that is to say of coming-to-be, passing-away, change, and growth and decay. Coming-to-be is the result of the association of atoms, passing-away of their separation, change of a difference in arrangement of atoms in a compound, or of the addition or loss<sup>28</sup> of even a single atom, decay of the loss of atoms from and growth of the addition of atoms to a compound body.<sup>29</sup> Change is a matter of difference in relative position etc., or in number, and for argument’s sake one may admit that the single atom, for instance, which is added to a configuration (as ‘*a*’ may be added at the beginning | of ‘*dunaton*’)<sup>30</sup> does not need to touch the first of the others to bring the change about. Letters of written Greek words normally do not touch each other.

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But Aristotle says that atoms when acting or being affected *do* make contact. This is why Philoponus explicitly says no more than that the atoms are not in touch in the way in which ‘surfaces that fit over each other’ (a part of the sentence which, as we have seen, is unfortunately missing at fr. 54d Taylor) do touch each other for a certain amount of time.

His way of expressing himself here may suggest that atoms can *never* come into contact *in any way*, or never can touch each other *at all*. But the remark about the *kind* of touch that is excluded, viz. that of surfaces of bodies being

28 E.g. in *GC* 23.29, ‘if from ‘*adunaton*’ you take away the ‘*a*’ only, you get ‘*dunaton*’.

29 On growth according to the Atomists see Philoponus’ argument against Alexander at in *GC* 23.21–30.

30 To turn around the example cited above, n. 28.

‘together’, leaves open the possibility that other forms of touch, or contact, may occur and do occur. Elsewhere Philoponus indeed talks about this less intimate form of contact. He knows that atoms can strike each other and in fact constantly do this, see for instance his explanation of Arist. *GC* 1.8 325b29–31 (‘for Leucippus there will be {two modes of}<sup>31</sup> comings-to-be and dissociation, viz. through the void and through contact (*haphê*), for it is at a point of contact that each compound is divisible’) at *in GC* 163.14–17:

the other way, by means of touch, (belongs to) change. For when the atoms come into contact with one another and *strike against each other* (προσκραύουσαι<sup>32</sup> ἀλλήλαις—my emphasis) their position and arrangement are modified, and in this way they produce change; and they obviously touch each other through the void.

Here he no longer appeals to the surfaces fitting over each other. ‘Touching each other *through the void*’ in this passage obviously means that *nothing prevents* this contact, for the void is what offers no resistance at all: *nihil obstat*. To strike against and bump into each other indeed is to be in contact and to touch, however briefly. Also see *in de An.* 167.24–26 (fr. 1178 Luria):

Democritus did not say that (the atoms) move because they are continuous bodies, but because of their multitude through their rebound against each other (τῇ ἀντωθήσει πρὸς ἀλλήλα).

289 There are so (infinitely) many atoms moving about that collisions are unavoidable. The word ἀντωθήσις (‘rebound’, ‘counter-thrust’), which does not refer to some sort of *actio in distans*, is late. For related terminology and the concept involved compare e.g. the word ἀντωσις (‘recoil’, ‘rebound’) at Arist. *PN* 20 480a14, and his formula τὸ ὠθοῦν ἀντωθεῖται (‘what impels is itself impelled again’) at *GA* 4.3 768b19.

A final point. As an explanation of what Aristotle means by atoms ‘touching’ each other (*haptomena*) when acting and being affected,<sup>33</sup> Philoponus’ suggestion (again, when taken *au pied de la lettre*) that ‘touching’ here means always

31 δύο τρόποι ἃν εἶεν bracketed by Joachim; athetesis not accepted by Tricot.

32 For this term cf. D.L. 9.31 (~ 67A1 DK, fr. 77a Taylor), Hippol. *Ref.* 1.12 (~ 67A10 DK, fr. 78 Taylor), Gal. *Elem. Hipp.* 1.418.11 K. (~ 68A49 DK, fr. 179d Taylor); Simp. *in Cael.* 242.23–26 (~ 67A14 DK, fr. 57 Taylor) has συγκρούεσθαι, and is explicit both about the rebound (ἀποπάλλεσθαι) and the entanglement (περιπλέκεσθαι).

33 Above, text to n. 23.

remaining at some distance from each other because separated by the void is puzzling also for another reason. At the opening of Book 6 of the *Physics*,<sup>34</sup> Aristotle begins by defining and distinguishing (once again) the ‘continuous’ (*suneches*), the ‘touching’ or ‘contiguous’ (*haptomenon*),<sup>35</sup> and ‘succession’ or the ‘next-in-succession’ (*ephexês*). Things which are *ephexês* are defined as having ‘nothing of the same nature as themselves between them’ (*Phys.* 6.1 231a23, ἐφεξῆς δ’ ὧν μηδὲν μεταξὺ συγγενές—cf. *ibid.* 5.3 227a1–8). Accordingly, the atoms between which, according to Philoponus, there is at all events something that is not of the same nature as themselves, should, one is inclined to think, have been qualified as being *ephexês*, not as *haptomena*. But in fact Philoponus cannot say they are *ephexês*, because atoms in a compound, or wherever, do not form an ordered series. So he has to invent a sub-species of *haptomenon*, which turns out to be rather different from what Aristotle means by this term.

At *Physics* Book 4 ch. 6 (*ad finem*) Aristotle briefly and famously refers to a Pythagorean theory, according to which the *pneuma*, or rather the void which is inhaled from outside the heavens, enters into the cosmos and limits and distinguishes ‘the natures’ (in the first place numbers), as if the void were a kind of separation and distinction of the *ephexês* (*Phys.* 4.6 213b22 ff. ~ 58b30 DK). This peculiar identification of *pneuma* and void looks like a conflation of Pythagoreanism and Atomism, for which there is also other evidence in Aristotle, as we shall see shortly. Philoponus ad loc., in *Phys.* 616.5–8, comments on this passage by referring forward to the definition of *ephexês* in *Phys.* Book V (i.e. 5.3 227a1 ff., see above). He adds that these *ephexês* items are not continuous but separate, and that the void is the cause of their separation and distinction. Simplicius ad loc., | in *Phys.* 651.25 ff., refers to Alexander’s interpretation 290 that not all bodies are continuous, but—citing (the Aristotelian) definition of *ephexês* and appealing to Aristotle’s reference not to bodies, but to the ordered series of numbers—prefers another, i.e. Neoplatonist interpretation of these ‘Pythagorean riddles’ which I cannot (and need not) enter into here.

Now Aristotle himself already said that ‘in a way’ the Atomists too—i.e., just as the Pythagoreans—‘are saying that everything there is is numbers, or evolved from numbers’ (*Cael.* 3.4 303a3 ff., ~ 67A15 DK, fr. 54a Taylor). Simplicius, in *Phys.* 610.3–12, explains that the atoms resemble the monads (sc. of the Pythagoreans), for the void, separating from each other the atoms of the Atomists as well as the monads of the Pythagoreans, prevents the existence of a continuum (*ti*

34 See e.g. Bostock (1991) 180–183.

35 Cf. above, n. 23.

*suneches*). Aristotle says ‘in a way’, he adds, because, naturally, numbers differ from atoms in being incorporeal.

Accordingly, Aristotle’s not always lucid exposition of the differences between ‘continuous’, ‘contiguous’ and ‘successive’, and his use of this terminology in various places, will in some way have contributed to Philoponus’ subtle interpretation of his account of atoms in contact.

## 5 Conclusion

A notorious fragment preserved by Sextus Empiricus, *M.* 7.117–118 (68B164 DK, fr. D6 Taylor) has been adduced in favour of the thesis that atomic motion, or at least “some atomic motions”, are to be explained by attraction.<sup>36</sup> (I do not think this passage is a verbatim quotation, as Diels-Kranz and others believe;<sup>37</sup> but  
291 this hardly affects the argument). | Democritus according to Sextus pointed out that animals flock together with animals of the same kind, that different kinds of seeds are sorted out by the sieve when this is twirled, and that the motion of the surf pushes oblong pebbles into the same place as oblong and round pebbles into the same place as round pebbles, ‘as if the similarity in things had something which brings them together (συναγγαγόν τι)’.<sup>38</sup> This final clause was (and is) believed by some scholars to be an addition by Sextus, or rather by Posidonius who has been assumed to be Sextus’ source here.<sup>39</sup> Carl-Werner Müller however argued almost forty years ago that there is no need to detach it from the abstract, and rightly insisted on the implication of the introductory words

36 Taylor (1999) 193.

37 Compare the sequel, *M.* 7.119, where Sextus gives a summary account of Plato’s doctrine of perception and cognition of like by like in the *Timaeus*, the first part of which as to content and part of its vocabulary is close to the first part of what is attributed to ‘Posidonius expounding Plato’s *Timaeus*’ at *M.* 7.93 (fr. 85 E.-K.); on Posidonius in relation to a large section of *M.* 7 see below, n. 39. The greater part of Sextus’ account of Democritus at *M.* 7.117–118 is not much different from the parallel Aëtian lemma (ps.Plutarch only), *Plac.* 4.19.3 Diels, generally cited among the testimonia not the verbatim fragments (~ 68A28 DK, fr. 124 Taylor). The *combined* quotation in Aëtius of the well-known proverb ‘crow settles next to crow’ and the often cited Homeric line ‘the god always draws like to like’ (*Od.* 17.218) is paralleled at Arist. *Rhet.* 1.11 1371b15–17, *EE* 1235a6–9, 7.1 and *MM* 2.11.2.3–4.

38 Taylor (1999) 5 translates ‘a kind of attractive force’.

39 For this discussion see Müller (1965) 77 f., Morel (1996) 409–411. For Posidonius as source of the whole section Sext. *M.* 7.89–140 see Kidd (1988) 340–343, *contra*, and Sedley (1992) 27–34, strongly in favour. Baltes (1978) argues that Posidonius here depends on the Early Academy.

‘as if’ (ὥς ἄν).<sup>40</sup> It is not really the case that the similarity in shape brings like things to like all by itself; for a specific impulse brought about by something else, such as the regular swirl of the sieve, or the ever repeated and regular movement of the waves, is an indispensable condition. These motions of the waves and the sieve are ultimately dependent on that of the cosmic revolution, the successor of the cosmogonic vortex;<sup>41</sup> and so, I suggest, are those of the animals of the same kind finding each other, though it is not clear what intermediary causes help to bring this about.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, the breaking-up of e.g. swarms of birds, which goes against the motion of like to like, also needs to be explained.

The analogy is obvious: think of the end of a cosmic system, or of an individual inner-cosmic compound.<sup>43</sup> 292

I conclude that a partial selection of passages from Philoponus’ commentaries is insufficient evidence in favour of the assumption that according to Democritus the atoms never touch each other at all. The testimonia conveniently printed in our fragment collections or otherwise available should not be put on the same level, “auf einer Fläche”, as Wilamowitz used to say, as if they had the same quality and were equally reliable.

In the present case, all we have to assume is that the early Atomists, perhaps naively, believed that the very small atoms are so hard that, when colliding and briefly striking each other with great force, they cannot fuse or disintegrate at the split second of physical contact because of this density and solidity and because of the great velocity of their movements. And of course even then they

40 Müller (1965) 77 f. A similar conclusion is reached along a different route by Salem (1996) 265–267.

41 For the revolution of the heavens as the successor of the vortex see e.g. Perilli (1996) 92–95. It is, I suggest, also ultimately responsible for the behaviour of the loadstone and the iron described [Alex.] *Qu.* 72.28 ff. (~ 68A165, fr. 160 Taylor).

42 In the ‘like to like’ *topos* lists of animal species are traditional, see Müller (1965) 152 f. with n. 6. Morel (1996) 413 f. hypothesizes that in 68A28 and B164 DK the souls of the animals are involved: like knows like. But this does not yet explain why like moves towards or stays with like. The alternative explanation of these references to animals, grains, and pebbles, viz. that truths about the behaviour of the atoms are made clear by examples from our daily experience, need not be ruled out and may indeed be subsidiary. According to a certain Diotimus cited by Sextus, *M.* 7.140 (~ 59B21a & 68A111 DK, fr. 179a Taylor), Democritus praised Anaxagoras highly for his thesis that the phenomena can be instrumental in revealing what is hidden. In the Aëtian passage (above, n. 37) the idea that sound consists of bodies of air of the same shape moving about together with corpuscles which come from the voice certainly pertains to what is hidden.

43 Cf. above, n. 6, and Hippol. *Ref.* 1.13 (~ 68A40 DK, fr. 78 Taylor), Aët. 2.4.9 Diels (~ 68A84 DK, fr. 82 Taylor).

are in touch only partially, for as to the greater part of their circumference when making contact they are still surrounded by void.

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# The Presocratic Philosophers

## *A Discussion of a New Handbook*

### Abstract

Discussion of the various approaches to the interpretation and presentation of Presocratic thought in these volumes. The information they provide is excellent and the level of discussion high. But original attempts at interpretation should perhaps be toned down a little in a work that claims to present the *status quaestionis* of the research in its field.

### Keywords

Presocratic philosophy – presentation – actuality – coverage – completeness – originality

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In view of the complexities of the subject and the overwhelming and continuing flood of publications to be taken into account the preparation of this work, understandably, has taken a long time, and one can only congratulate the editors for having brought off this enormous project, to which moreover they have massively contributed themselves.

With one exception (L. Zhmud, St. Petersburg) the cast of contributors consists exclusively of German scholars. The individual contributions treat, in succession, the transmission of the evidence and the *status quaestionis*, the oeuvre, doctrines, and reception, ending with a bibliography.

In the present review I cannot go into numerous points and issues I would like to discuss, but can only, so to speak, scratch the surface. Let me begin by saying that on the whole these two volumes, though not easy reading, are βιβλία ἀξιόκτητα, and that much is to be learned and appreciated even where one is unable to agree. But there is also room for criticism. Checking the useful and



rich bibliographies to the individual (sub-)chapters I noticed that for the most part the entries do not, or only sporadically, extend beyond the years 2006 or 2007 or even earlier, so peter out quite some time before 2013. This warrants the conclusion that these contributions have not been updated. In view of today's means for preparing a publication electronically this is hard to understand. Other difficulties I have are with editorial policy. A handbook of this nature should in the first place provide information about the scholarly discussion. Several contributors usefully do so, naturally without always hiding their preferences. But others indulge in more or less original interpretations that have not been divulged before, while others again come down perhaps too strongly in favour of their own particular view. Here the editors should have been more severe. One may also deplore the absence of cross-references. Varieties of opinion are of course as unavoidable as they are welcome, but readers should be alerted to downright contradictions (e.g. Hippo as an 'epigone of Thales' 1.253 or as a Pythagorean 1.418–420; undetermined *prima materia* for Aristotle 1.275 and 1.278, but denied 2.723). But perhaps the formula of the Ueberweg series fails to encourage this sort of helpful intervention. Finally, references to the numbering of Diels–Kranz should not be preferred to those to sources of the testimonia, for these will inform the reader about the degree of reliability of the information: the best, though cumbersome, solution, applied quite often here but not consistently, is to cite both.

The bookends have been taken care of very well by D. Br(emer). After the editors' preface and a meditation on philosophy and its history by Gadamer the first volume begins with two sub-chapters of ch. 1 ('overarching themes'). It is clear that he has thought about these issues for a long time. The first sub-chapter, 1.3–38, treats the preoccupation with the Presocratics from the 18th cent. onwards, with the presentation and principles of this study in the past, and with the difficult question of how one should proceed today. The emphasis is on the contributions of German philosophers and scholars. I, for one, would not have minded hearing less about Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Schadewaldt, and a bit more on early professional historians such as the critical Tennemann, and on Tiedemann, Brandis, Ritter and Preller, etc. Yet the account of tendencies and individuals in French and Anglophone scholarship is not unfair, and quite instructive. Some attention however should have been given to Simon Karsten, editor of Xenophanes Parmenides Empedocles 1835–1838 and of Simplicius in *De caelo* 1865, who figures rather prominently in the prolegomena of Diels' *Doxographi Graeci*. As to principles and presentation Br. cautiously argues for a narrative account according to strict philogico-historical guidelines, in which the protagonists are in dialogue with each other. However, it is difficult to gauge what extent this has been realized in the present

volumes. Dialogue moreover is not a fortunate term in the context of early Greek philosophy, and seems to be more apposite in that of rival schools, as in the Hellenistic period, unless one wants to follow the example of Lucian's *Νεκρικοὶ διάλογοι*.—The second sub-chapter, 1.61–96, deals with the origins of philosophy in Greece, learnedly and critically discussing the various proposals that have been, and are, current. Br.'s wise conclusion is that mono-causal explanations are not enough, that is to say that a multiplicity of causes and factors is at issue, and that one should be aware that elsewhere, too, some of these causes were operative without producing (proto-)philosophical thought. Thus, even a concatenation of (perhaps) necessary causes fails to amount to a sufficient cause. This paragraph also includes a useful discussion of wisdom literature, of the cosmogonical epics of Hesiod, 'Orpheus', and 'Musaeus' and the half-mythical prose account of Pherecydes, and of the relation of myth to *logos*, subjects to which (unlike at the beginning of Diels–Kranz or Kirk–Raven–Schofield) the editors have decided to accord only a minor role.—At the other end of the work, 2.949–970, Br. contributes a chapter on the early philosophers in relation to the sophists and conversely, on Plato's and Aristotle's resumption of the philosophical impetus, and on the consequences for the future of philosophy and rhetoric.

333 There follows a third sub-chapter in the first volume, 1.97–125, on Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient, by W. Bu(rkert). This provides a wonderful | overview of the circumstantial evidence (even from Iran) by the acknowledged master of the subject, who also briefly dwells on the ups and downs of the scholarly inquiry into the subject. Archaic Greece is part of, and to some extent dependent upon, a much larger environment, about which far more is known today than formerly (or than, one should add, is recognized in the Greek sources themselves). Dependence in the fields of mathematics and mathematical astronomy is as certain as in the case of the alphabet. Oriental cosmogonical tales contain clear parallels to Greek cosmogonical poetry (Hesiod, 'Orpheus'). It may well be the case that cosmological poetry and similar literature not only preceded but also to some extent inspired early scientific cosmology. But for this relationship only a derivation by proxy is gained in my view if passages in Hesiod (on whom see Br., 1.77 f.) and 'Orpheus' can be paralleled *ex oriente*. The fact that the oriental origin of the views that Water is first in the same sense as Hesiod's Chaos is first, and that the earth floats on water, can be made plausible for Thales, does not entail that in the case of other similarities similar conclusions can be postulated with equal plausibility. Certain doctrines can to some extent be paralleled; for instance, in an Iranian text and perhaps also in another one, the sequence of Anaximander's heavenly fires in the order (from inside to outside rings): stars—moon—sun. The question of dependence, how-

ever, remains to be looked at more critically. Even if one were to grant that this is not a case of independent development, one still can hardly deny that such an idea can only be accepted if it can be accommodated in a system. Anaximander's warring opposites must try to avoid each other, so the main mass of fire is the farthest away from earth and sea. And in Greece Oriental mathematics underwent a qualitative change, as is clear from the reports about Thales (if acceptable—see below), and from the use of numerical ratios by Anaximander (granted by Bu.).

The fourth sub-chapter, 1.126–149, by A. P(atzer), provides a rewarding and detailed overview of oral—Thales, Early Pythagoreans—and written forms of communication: the use of prose which got started under the influence, *inter alia*, of written laws (Anaximander), then Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, the Atomists, etc.; poetry (Parmenides, Empedocles) in the epic tradition because of the superior status of the message. His attribution of an epic poem ('Lehrgedicht') to Xenophanes (cf. 1.342 f.) must be considered doubtful. More than doubtful, however, is his claim that Solon's laws were provided with numbers and headings, and that Anaximander copied this system.<sup>1</sup> And he believes, like many others, that people like Anaximander and Anaxagoras and | Democritus dated themselves in their proems, for which there is no evidence beyond the Apollodoran dates (for which cf. S(chirren), 1.176 f.).

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The fifth sub-chapter, 1.150–174, by L. Z(hmud), deals with the genres of what, with some latitude, may be called ancient philosophical historiography: acceptably with biography, monographs e.g. by Aristotle and Theophrastus, Successions literature, and literature on the Schools, less acceptably with doxography and the past and present of the study of the main surviving doxographical handbook, the Aëtian *Placita*. He adequately summarizes and *disertis verbis* follows the account of Diels in the *Doxographi Graeci* of 1879, adding further information on the contents and style of Theophrastus lost purported doxographical treatise (there is no evidence for these inspired guesses). This is a case of scholarly regression: his present stance is still that of an article of 2001 (answered without delay by the present reviewer),<sup>2</sup> in which he attempted to refute the efforts of Baltussen, Runia and Mansfeld to revise Diels' doctrines. Throughout the present sub-chapter he again refers to these and some other opponents, but only to reject their views simply by saying no, without provid-

1  $\pi\rho\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma$  and  $\delta\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\varsigma$  in *IG* 31 104 (Solon *Laws* fr. 5a Ruschenbusch) pertain to the first and second  $\alpha\rho\chi\omicron\nu$  of Dracon's laws and should be compared to book numbers, not chapter headings. Headings are not found in Solon's laws. Patzer is led astray by  $\kappa\epsilon\phi\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\acute{\omega}\delta\eta$  at D.L. 2.2 (Anaximand. 12A1 DK), for which cf. D.L. 9.30 (Leuc. 67A1 DK), Arist. *Met.* A.7 988a18, etc.

2 Zhmud (2001), reply by Mansfeld (2002).

ing an argument. The crucial impact and contribution of Aristotle are again relegated to the wayside, and the obsolete hypothesis of Theophrastus as *fons et origo* is again triumphant. In line with this approach he has moreover failed to take our publication of 2009 (or four years before 2013) into account,<sup>3</sup> or even to include it in his bibliography, although it is briefly listed at no. \*80 in Re(chenauer)'s general bibliography at 1.42! These volumes are a continuation of our earlier studies, and a further exploitation and exemplification of the main issues. In particular Part 1 of Volume 2 of *Aëtiana* has been devoted to an analysis of the method and contents of the *Placita*, while Part 2 provides an argued new reconstruction *raisonnée* of the whole of its second Book, on cosmology. Accordingly those depending on the Ueberweg volumes alone will be poorly informed about the nature and methodology of the *Placita*, and of the importance of the correct interpretation of its contents for the study of Greek philosophy. To be sure, the Dielsian hypothesis often enough crops up in other contributions, cf., e.g., 1.264, 2.747. Even so, the editors should have done something.

335 The sixth subchapter of ch. 1, 1.173–233, is concerned with biography (Th. S(chirren) and Br.), and iconography (N.J. K(och), with nice pictures). S. first deals with chronography and chronology and with the biographical tradition, esp. Diogenes Laërtius and his predecessors. He correctly points out that our inquiries are faced with the inescapable system of Apollodorus of Athens. It has escaped his notice that an earlier example of a triad of significant ages is found at Plato *Parm.* 137b–c: Parmenides nearly sixty-five—Zeno nearly forty—Socrates very young. A generous account of the evidence for the lives of fifteen philosophers from Thales to Democritus follows, collected for the most part by S. and Br. together.

The remaining part of the work (before Br.'s concluding chapter) is devoted to the doctrines of these individual thinkers. The long ch. 2, 1.237–338, by N.S. Dü(hrsen), untranslatably entitled 'Ursprungsdenken und Weltmodelle', deals with the Milesians in three substantial sub-chapters. In order to arrive at the true fount of archaic thought Dü. works hard to get beyond Aristotle and his tradition, which means removing, if and wherever possible, the typically Peripatetic concepts and forms of argument, and fishing out the genuine bits and pieces.

For Thales this mainly amounts to emphasizing the connection with oriental thought and Greek cosmogonical literature (see above). Water should be the origin and not, *pace* Aristotle, the stuff of things. Though many have doubted

3 Mansfeld and Runia (2009).

Thales' contribution, a plausible and interesting reconstruction is provided of progress in the field of geometry. Less credible is Dü.'s hyper-interpretation: starting from an Aristotelian guess he interprets Water in a vitalistic and even psychic sense, has other things share in the 'soul' attributed to amber and the magnet, and believes that the apophthegm 'all things are full of gods' to mean 'full of immortal souls'. This takes hylozoism a bit far. And that Hippo according to Aristotle oddly believed water to be the soul's substance (1.253) in my view does not allow us to project this back on Thales. Further down Anaximenes' Air is believed to be inspired by these ideas of Thales: it would be psychic and alive (1.322).

Anaximander presents much more of a challenge. Dü. discusses the doxographical evidence and its interpretations at some length, but for the most part his argumentation moves towards conclusions rather than from the evidence. I concentrate on what to me appears to be mistaken.<sup>4</sup> He takes sides (1.270–271) in the controversy on the meaning of Theophrastus' remark that Anaximander ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο | τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς,<sup>5</sup> of which the second clause may mean both 'he was the first to introduce the name *apeiron* for the principle (*archê*)', and 'he was the first to introduce the name principle for the *apeiron*'. In the first place Dü. doubts that Anaximander spoke of a substantivated (τὸ) ἄπειρον, although he may have used the adjective—presumably to qualify ἀρχή, for if τὸ ἄπειρον is eliminated the name given must be ἀρχή. But in an archaic environment this word can only mean 'beginning', 'origin' (1.271, 298–299), for 'principle' is hopelessly Aristotelian. τὸ ἄπειρον, he believes (1.271–278), following Lebedev, is a Pythagorean, Platonic and Aristotelian term and concept, here representing the undetermined Aristotelian *prima materia*, and should not, therefore, be attributed to Anaximander (yet Dü. continues to refer to 'das Apeiron', e.g., 1.298). But one may object that matter, ὕλη, unlike for the Stoics (D.L. 7.139, *SVF* 2.300 τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην), is always already determined according to Aristotle.<sup>6</sup> As a matter of fact Aristotle argues (not altogether clearly) that those who posit a single corporeal and separable ὕλη besides the natural elements are mistaken, 'for this *apeiron*, which some say is the *archê* (!), cannot exist without perceptible contrariety'.<sup>7</sup> Dü. in fact accepts the further

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4 For what follows cf. Mansfeld (2011) (= ch. 4 above).

5 Anaxim. 12A9/B1 DK ap. Thphr. *Phys. Op.* fr. 2 Diels (fr. 226A FHS&G) ap. Simp. in *Phys.* 24.14–15.

6 See the literature cited 2.723.

7 Anaximand. fr. 11 Wöhrlé ap. Arist. *GC* 2.1 329a8–13, esp. τὸ ἄπειρον τοῦτο, ὃ λέγουσί τινες εἶναι τὴν ἀρχήν.

specification according to which the components of the cosmos are separated out from the *apeiron*,<sup>8</sup> which therefore is not pictured as undetermined. And what did Theophrastus' formula *πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς* really mean? In the fragments in Simplicius dealing with Aristotle's predecessors *ἀρχή* is invariably used in the Peripatetic sense of principle, just as in the foundational diaeresis according to number at Arist. *Phys.* 1.2, or in *Met.* A. At *Phys.* 3.4 203b3–15 (Anaximander 12A15/B3 DK) Aristotle says that all the physicists posited the *ἄπειρον* as principle (*ἀρχὴν αὐτὸ τιθέασι πάντες*)—note the singular *ἀρχήν* (*pace* Dü. 1.270). At the end of this passage he mentions and quotes Anaximander. Dü. argues (1.294–296) that what holds for the physicists in general need not apply to Anaximander in particular, but this exclusion goes too far. Theophrastus combines the revised general overview of the physicists of Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 and *Met.* A (revised *inter alia* by including 337 Anaximander) with Aristotle's point | about the *apeiron* qua *archê* of all the physicists, and specifies that it was Anaximander who was the first to posit this *archê*. And by telling us that Anaximander used the 'name' *τὸ ἄπειρον* for it he authenticates the substantivation for us, just as he preserves the poetic wording ('names') of the famous fragment—a substantivation which is as surprising and as authentic as *τὸ σαφές* at Xenophanes 21B34.1 DK, or *τὸ ἔον* at Parmenides 28B4.2 DK (cf. K(raus) 2.450). Dü. also tries (1.294–296) to eliminate an Anaximandean quotation at the end of *Phys.* 203b3–15. But the phrase *περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν*, with its anaphora of (*ἅ*)παντα<sup>9</sup> and its rare combination of *περιέχειν* and *κυβερνᾶν*, cannot be paralleled elsewhere, though its individual ingredients of course can. Finally, though aware (1.284–285, 287) of the fact that the word *κόσμος* in Aristotle and elsewhere may refer to a part, or zone (layer of fire, air, etc.), of the cosmos and that the word *οὐρανός* may denote the cosmos as a whole, he translates Theophrastus' formula *τοὺς οὐρανούς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους* as 'the heavens and the worlds within them', which hardly makes sense, instead of 'the cosmoi and the zones within them'.

Ch. 2, 1.339–438, with the sub-heading 'Weisheit und Wissenschaft' ('wisdom and science' sounds less impressive), concludes the first volume; this echoes

8 Which is why Theophrastus states that Anaxagoras' mixture of all things is equivalent to *τὴν ... τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν*, so his account of the material principles is similar to Anaximander's *Phys.Op.* fr. 4 Diels, 228A FHS&G, verbatim ap. Simp. in *Phys.* 27.19–23 (cf. in *Phys.* p. 153.19–23 = Thphr. fr. 228B FHS&G).

9 Cf. e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.287–289, Hes. *Th.* 121, Xenoph. 21B27 DK, Heracl. 22B53 DK. Cf. Jaeger (1953), 42.

the title of a still fundamental and famous book by Burkert.<sup>10</sup> The first sub-chapter, 1.339–374, on Xenophanes, by Th. S(chirren) again, provides a good and useful overview of the testimonia (in the end rejecting the evidence of ps.Arist. *MXG*), the verbatim fragments, and the various positions to be encountered in the learned literature, esp. concerning the definition of his theology as henotheism or pantheism or whatnot, as well as the issue of his proto-Skeptical stance.

I am a shade less happy with the second sub-chapter, on Pythagoras (1.375–401, reasonable and well informed) and the Pythagoreans (1.401–429, less reasonable), by L. Z(hmud) again, who for the most part reiterates a novel interpretation he put forward in a book of 1997.<sup>11</sup> To determine who and what is a Pythagorean we should largely reject the information of Aristotle so | 338 impressively interpreted and valorized by Burkert,<sup>12</sup> esp. concerning the philosophy of number and the *akousmata*. We should follow in the footsteps of the enlightened Aristoxenus, and further base ourselves on the enormous list of Pythagoreans at Iambl. *V.P.* 267 (1.403), which is believed to derive from Aristoxenus (fr. 19 Wehrli). But this list is rather a mixed bag; even Z. allows that some people are missing and other names mean nothing to us. Nevertheless it would follow according to Z. that no single hallmark can be valid for the Pythagoreans in general. This disputable move allows Z. to qualify as Pythagoreans people as diverse as Democedes (also because from Croton), and Alcmaeon (also because he dedicates his work to, maybe, Pythagoreans), and Iccus (also because from Tarentum), and Menestor (also because from Sybaris), and even Hippon and Theodorus of Cyrene (for no subsidiary reason). This argument is circular, because including Alcmaeon etc. prevents the identification of a common characteristic, and conversely. Z. furthermore fails to take into account that Pythagorically inclined authors, or authors dealing with Pythagoreanism, tend to cast their nets rather wide: people such as Hippocrates of Chios and Oenopides have been called Pythagorean because they dealt with mathematics, or astronomy. Alcmaeon and his colleagues are discussed in individual paragraphs in the final section of this sub-chapter together with others that have been generally accepted as Pythagoreans: Hippasus, Philolaus, Eurytus, Archytas, and Hicetas and Ecphantus. I wonder why the editors did accept this redistribution, which flies in the face of historiographical custom. Alcmaeon and Hippon perhaps are not very important early thinkers, but they gain nothing and lose quite a bit by being lassoed into Pythagorean service. One is grateful

10 Burkert (1962). See e.g. Huffman (1999) and now also McKirahan (2013).

11 Zhmud (2012). Bibliography for both the above sections at 1.429–438.

12 Above, n. 9.

that Empedocles and Parmenides were not conscripted, though they are occasionally associated with Pythagoreanism elsewhere and are on Aristoxenus' list.

Ch. 3, the first of the second volume, is headed 'Seinsbestimmungen'; it deals with the Eleatics in three separate sections. The first sub-chapter, 2.441–530, by M. K(raus), is on Parmenides. The herculean task accomplished by K. is already clear from his bibliography of a stunning 863 entries. The detailed presentation of the numerous *status quaestionum* is exemplary. K. lists the occasional uncertainties of the text, deals with the various interpretations of the proem, with the meaning of τὸ ἓν and εἶναι and ἔστιν in the first part of the Poem and the problem of the latter's subject, with the nature of the foundational argument of fr. 28B2 DK, with the issue of the number of 'ways' (three or two, with a preference for three), with the role of thought and language, with the various interpretations of the properties of | τὸ ἓν, with the issue of monism (cf. below on Ra(pp), 2.555), and so on. In a similar way he discusses the various issues concerned with the second part of the Poem. He rightly concludes (1.496) that, notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of the evidence, this part 'zweifellos die avanciertesten naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien seiner Zeit in den verschiedensten Disziplinen bot'. Little of interest has escaped him; but see 2.445, 484, where he has failed to note that 28B1.31 DK περὼντα instead of περ ὄντα is confirmed by Moerbeke's translation *per omne omnia terminantia*.<sup>13</sup>

The next sub-chapter, 2.532–572 on Zeno by Chr. Ra(pp), is a cautious and quite excellent account of the famous paradoxes, with apposite selective references to the learned discussion. Much is to be learned. The open-ended nature of the dialectical arguments pro and con does not entail that Zeno failed to have a definite aim, or to hold a definite position, though it is not so easy to find out what this was. Ra. points out on several occasions that the arguments against motion as well as those dealing with place and the falling millet seed may originally be part of an overall strategy concerned with the puzzles of plurality. He is very clear about the difficulty of relating the paradoxes about plurality to the ontological argument of Parmenides, whose monism according to Plato was defended by Zeno, while the term εἶν, occurring once only and only as an adjective, merely plays a subordinate part in the Poem. His elegant solution (2.555) is that Parmenides may well have been 'wahrgenommen' (perceived, interpreted) as a numerical monist. (He does not mention this point, however, in his interpretation of Melissus). I may perhaps add that this suggestion is supported by the fact that according to 28B8.12–13 DK there can be no other Being next to Being, while according to B8.42–49 there is only a single sphere of Being.

13 See Mansfeld (1995), 231 n. 33 (= ch. 2 above, p. 48 n. 34).



The third sub-chapter, 2.573–598 on Melissus, is again by Ra(pp); this cautious account, too, is very good, and again furnished with apposite references to the learned discussion. Ra. sets out the respects in which Melissus differs from Parmenides, however much he was indebted to him, and singles out his argument against motion, based on the assumption that motion presupposes the void and that the void does not exist—which may have been turned on its head by Leucippus. The famous point about the spatial infinity of Being is not, perhaps, based on a logical fallacy but on Being's properties of totality and completeness. His argument against the reliability of the reports of the senses, too, is different from Parmenides' and more detailed; I would like to add that it is not so much directed at sense-perception as against theories about sense-perception. The famous puzzle concerned with Being's not having a body, | σῶμα, is solved by assuming that a body has limits, which Melissus' Being has not. Ra. 2.594 mentions Melissus' compromise position between Eleatic and Ionian philosophy; he could have specified that Being's being ἄπειρον is a typical Milesian, i.e., Ionian, inheritance.

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Chapter 4, headed 'Unity of opposites', is dedicated to Heraclitus (1.602–656), by Br. and R. Di(lcher), and to Cratylus and the Heracliteans (2.657–664), by Br. The measured and reasonable account of Heraclitus provides an adequate overview of the mean points of the system and the discussions about them. Verbatim fragments are generously quoted and explained. Preferences are expressed: e.g. λόγος means 'exposition', 'account', and is not an active cosmic force *more stoico*; 'unity' of opposites is an overarching concept, since opposites belong together in a multiplicity of pairs (I believe that accordingly the law of contradiction is *de facto* circumvented rather than, *pace* Aristotle, denied, or, *pace* Di. and Br., not an issue); cosmogony is rejected; the innovative doctrine of soul as the centre of thought, sensation and feeling is the 'Angelpunkt' (2.621, 'key issue'); immortality is not personal. Other issues treated are *êthos*, *polis*, and wisdom. More recent arguments in favour of a final conflagration have not been incorporated.<sup>14</sup>

Chapter 5, the longest in the work, with the heading 'Unity and plurality', consists of five sub-chapters. The first of these, 1.667–739, on Empedocles, is by O. P(rimavesi). References to the fragments (including the *Papyrus de Strasbourg*) and testimonia are by the numbering of his chapter in the recently revised Reclam *Vorsokratiker*.<sup>15</sup> The interpretation, too, is at the cutting edge, while the learned literature is cited only to the extent that it is really unavoid-

14 E.g. Mouraviev (2008).

15 Mansfeld and Primavesi (2011), 392–563.

able. P. deals convincingly with the reconstruction of the double cosmic cycle (which I formerly did not believe in) and of the relative chronology of its four cosmic periods, and also with the four zoogonic phases. Creatively using the concept of *récit spéculaire* ('Spiegelerzählung') he defines the relation to each other of the two poems as one of reciprocal mirroring on different levels, the one more mythical and the other more physicist. And there must be two poems, namely *Katharmoi*, an open letter, and *Peri Physeôs*, a *privatissimum*, and not, as others have argued, a single one. The doctrines of both these poems are analyzed in detail with some original touches. I find little to criticize, though (as will hardly surprise P.) I still have not come round to the reading 31B17.7 DK συνερχόμεθ', 'we came together' (this 'we' pertaining to 'us' as the short-lived aggregate of the four elements, see 2.695, 2.718), | for which the first (not the second) hand of the papyrus differs from Simplicius' reading of the participle συνερχόμεν', likewise pertaining to the four elements, but as a 'they'. It is not easy to understand why this 'we' should be needed for the connection between the two poems now we have the idea of the *Spiegelerzählung*, and there is nothing in the preceding lines of the papyrus or Simplicius that prepares one for the switch from the 'I' lecturing his pupil Pausanias (cf. ἐρέω a few lines earlier at 31B17.1) to a sudden elemental 'we'.

The following four sub-chapters are all by G. Re(chenauer). We begin with his solid and detailed account of Anaxagoras, 2.740–796 with apposite references to the scholarly discussion. Anaxagoras' theory of material principles (χρήματα, or σπέρματα, or whatever they may have been called) is notoriously complicated and difficult, and cannot be discussed here. Fr. 59B10, on the eternally existing tissues etc. contained in our food, which used to play a substantial part (thus also 2.751–752), has to be discounted.<sup>16</sup> It is hard to understand in what way these principles get organized unless one allows for Intellect as moving and organizing cause. Re. admits that on this count Anaxagoras preaches more than he practises, as Plato's Socrates already argued, but at 2.776 tries to overcome this difficulty by arguing that the χρήματα in some way organize themselves (a purported Ionian inheritance).—A less important point: Re. interprets (2.785) Aristotle's puzzling phrase that Anaxagoras, though earlier as to his life, was τοῖς ἔργοις ὕστερος than Empedocles (*Met.* A 3.984a11–13), as meaning that Aristotle believed that he was 'later' in the sense of 'more advanced as to his works', and only refers to but fails to discuss the opposite view that translates ὕστερος as 'inferior' (see discussion at 1.206). He is con-

16 The scholium derives from the pseudo-quotation of Psellus *Theol. Opusc.* 61.52–78, see Anaxag. fr. 38E Gemelli Marciano, with comments.

vinced that Aristotle is right in believing that the so-called *homoiomere* are superior to Empedocles' four elements, and several times (2.750, 2.769, 2.772) has Anaxagoras revise an Empedoclean doctrine. But according to Aristotle Anaxagoras is more advanced in the sense that his thought is closer to Plato's, which is why at the end of *Met.* A he discusses his principles before those of Plato and after those of Empedocles, in spite of the relative chronology. Re. correctly points out (2.748–749) that Anaxagoras combines the ontology of Parmenides with a Ionian cosmological inheritance. I think that it is therefore preferable to situate his cosmic and individual mixtures in the context of Ionian cosmology (as in the doxographical tradition), and to situate Empedocles' four elements in that of Parmenides two 'forms'. There is no need to assume that Anaxagoras influenced Empedocles either. | I grant that Diels' inclusion of Anaxagoras as No. 59 in the second volume of the *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* instead of before Empedocles (who is No. 31) in the first has been a virtually inescapable influence (also for the present reviewer).

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Anaxagoras is followed, as on the Diadochai lists, by Archelaus, a brief account at 2.797–810. On this interesting minor figure see now a recent paper by Betegh.<sup>17</sup> Diogenes of Apollonia is next, 2.811–832, a detailed account of the system in its context of contributing influences, with particular attention to his critique of Melissus and to what, nevertheless, is the Eleatic colouring of the single principle, which on the other hand is made to behave as a material principle according to Ionian custom. The noteworthy reception, in esp. Aristophanes<sup>18</sup> and the *Derveni Papyrus*, of the notion of this principle as endowed with thought and forethought, and as responsible for thought in us, is discussed as well.

The final sub-chapter, on Leucippus and Democritus 2.832–946, is in effect an embedded monograph of 114 pages. The survey of the core atomic theory and its encyclopedic applications by Democritus is thorough, varied, and commendable, and the references to the learned literature are useful. I restrict my comments to a detail, and *ad finem* to what I believe to be an unfortunate thought. The detail is to do with Aët. 1.12.6 (68A47 DK), 'it is possible that an atom of cosmic proportions exists' (δυνατὸν εἶναι κοσμιαίαν ὑπάρχειν ἄτομον), which is absolutely incompatible with Aristotle's information that atoms are imperceptible. Yet Re. 2.858, like others, accepts Aëtius information because it is confirmed in a late source, which however may well be based on Aëtius. Now Epicurus, if we may believe Lucretius, said there can be no atoms of 'immense

17 Betegh (2013).

18 See Laks and Sætta-Cottone (2013).

magnitude', *immani maximitate*. I suggest that a mistake crept into the tradition Aëtius inherited, and that (understandably in view of the context) ἄτομον was written instead of ἄτοπον, a change of a single letter.—Re. 2.848 follows a recent trend by opposing the idea that ancient atomism is thoroughly materialistic and mechanistic. Aristotle, whose Unmoved Mover as cause of motion is in a way the successor of Hesiod's Eros and Anaxagoras' Intellect and Parmenides' Eros, complained that the Atomists failed to provide such an ultimate cause of motion. Re., 2.867–869, argues that this cause is to be located in the self-motion of the atoms, which would in some sense be alive ('lebendig'). But the proof-  
 343 texts he quotes fail to bear him out, because they do | not pertain to atomic motion alone, or do so to the motion of compounds instead of that of individual atoms in outer space. That the πλῆγῃ τις ('sort of blow') of fr. 68B32 causing ejaculation is internal to the ejaculated atoms seems to be against experience. Motion is something that is given, a fact of nature. What has to be explained and argued is its contrary, immobility, as Parmenides and Zeno and Melissus did.

### Note 2018

That the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus are alive was first argued by the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth. He strongly took the ancient Atomists to task for this idea and coined the term hylozoism in the process.

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# Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Persons<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

Reading Protagoras' *homo mensura* rule in the light of his statement regarding knowledge of the gods shows that it is not restricted to the here and now, or to sense perception, but pertains to personal experience and the development of the human person in interaction with others and with the world.

## Keywords

Argument – relativism – consistency – skepticism – consensus – politics – medicine – man – things – Plato – the *Protagoras* – the *Theaetetus*

## 1

The modern phrase 'epistemological obstacle' (*obstacle épistémologique*) appears to have been coined, or at least to have been made famous in some circles, by the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard. In his *La formation de l'esprit scientifique* (1938), he argues that the problem of the progress of scientific knowledge has to be put in terms of epistemological obstacles; by which he means prejudice; received opinions; philosophical concepts; the unconscious use of analogies and metaphors derived from sense-data, from every-day experience, from the language or jargon one speaks or is tempted to speak; and so on. Bachelard, had he written on subjects in the field of Greek philosophy, would without doubt have considered Anaxagoras' statement 'phenomena are a sight of what is obscure' (59B21a DK) not as the discovery of a scientific principle, but as the explicit introduction of an obstacle to the acquisition and progress of scientific knowledge. Generally speaking, however, epistemological

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1 Besides Guthrie (1969) the contributions on Protagoras proved most useful are Vlastos (1956), Versenyi (1962), Versenyi (1963), 8–39, Müller (1967), Kube (1969), 48–114, and Adkins (1973), 3 ff.

obstacles, *pace* Bachelard, are things those who suffer from them are unaware of; things which can only be discerned, or rather found out and thereby eliminated, by a sort of epistemological psycho-analysis.<sup>2</sup> Bachelard was an admirer of Freud. His epistemological obstacles are the conditioned and conditioning inhibitions of traumatized reason; he explicitly excludes from his field of vision such obstacles as are called, by him, external (he instances ‘the complexity and fugacity of phenomena’), and he deliberately refuses to blame either our senses or our intellect for their shortcomings.

Bachelard’s ideas have been used, with some measure of success,<sup>3</sup> by the Belgian scholar Robert Joly in a study of early Greek medicine (*Le niveau de la science hippocratique*, 1966). It cannot, indeed, be denied that Bachelard’s suggestion has a | certain heuristic and explaining force. Amusing instances of the impact of obstacles of this variety can be given, such as Aristotle’s statement that ‘males have more teeth than females, not only in men, but also in sheep, goats, pigs’ [*HA* 2.3 501b19–21],<sup>4</sup> or Joly’s favourite example<sup>5</sup> of the Hippocratic physician extolling the virtue of white wine as a diuretic [*Acut.* 56, *Vict.* 2.52].

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In the present paper I am not, however, concerned with the epistemological obstacle in the full and fascinating sense of Bachelard and Joly, but with the duller sort of which Bachelard declined to speak. I believe that the idea of such an obstacle, even if shorn of its Freudian associations and used in a non-Bachelardian sense, is an interesting one, and that its discovery is of some importance both to the history of thought and to that of the progress of science. I shall connect this discovery with Protagoras. Indeed, *obstacles épistémologiques* can without difficulty be translated into Greek: τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, words to be found in Protagoras’ statement about the gods (80B4 DK, D.L. 9.51; Bury’s Loeb transl. has: ‘obstacles that impede knowledge’). This fragment has elicited less comment than the man-the-measure principle. Various reasons for this comparative lack of interest can be suggested, one of them, presumably, being the spell of Plato’s *Theaetetus*, another, perhaps, that the fragment about the gods lacks the inspiring ambiguity of the *homo mensura* principle.

2 His study is sub-titled *Contribution à la psychanalyse de la connaissance objective*.

3 For partly pertinent criticism see Harig and Kollesch (1977), 121 ff.

4 Cf. Lenoble (1952), 97.

5 Joly (1980), 125, 146. Joly (1980), criticising the Harig and Kollesch criticism (above, n. 3), insisted on this point.

It would not, I suppose, be an exaggeration to say that most of Greek philosophy adopts an attitude of what I would like to call epistemological optimism: unchanging truth, the real condition and past, present and future state of things in general can be *known* beyond doubt, even if this knowledge has to be sought and is not immediately or even ultimately available to the common run of mankind,<sup>6</sup> but only to a happy minority, and even if some areas remain concerning which certainty, or certainty as to the details, is beyond our reach. Opposite to, though in part derived from this attitude of optimism is that of epistemological pessimism, of which several varieties exist: from a Cratylus who only did something with his finger (65.4 DK) to those late Skeptics who held that, even though the real nature of things cannot be either known or not known, the tentative investigation of phenomena is still a worth-while commitment.

Other attitudes, lying somewhere in between, are comparatively rare. Xenophanes 21B35 DK, 'let these things be believed as similar to what is true', is a case in point. But his position differs in one significant respect from that of Protagoras (at 80B 4 DK) in that he does *not* doubt the possibility of acquiring and formulating 'the precise and whole (truth) about the gods and all I say about all things', but only that '*of knowing for oneself*' that this, actually, is what  
 40 has happened (21B34 DK). Protagoras, on the other | hand, affirms: 'as to the gods' (note that he does not refer to *all* things) 'I cannot know whether they exist or not or what they look like', and he goes on to *justify* this agnostic position by pointing out that life is short and the subject obscure. Xenophanes had attempted to justify his position by adding that 'all things are a matter of opinion' only or, if we translate differently, that 'no one is able to transcend opinion'. But his argument turns out to be analytic, for the assertion that no one is able to transcend *opinion* (or else that all things are a matter of opinion only) can only be justified in a circular way; by returning, that is, to the assertion that, even if one spoke the truth, one would never *know* it was the *truth* one had been speaking. In Protagoras' argument the connection between the part about the gods and the part about the obstacles that impede knowledge is not circular. It would be absurd to claim that all of us have to die shortly because one of us is incapable of making up his mind about the gods' existence. Apart from this, the reference to the obstacles is not concerned with a logical impossibility—it is not the case that the gods cannot be thought—, but with actual and inde-

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6 Hence a revelation or becoming god-like is often necessary.



pendent factors which preclude that something occurs which normally would have occurred had there been no impediment.<sup>7</sup> In other words, what Protagoras claims is that he *cannot help* not knowing.

The force of this argument becomes even more striking if, for a moment, we consider what things can, and what cannot, be substituted for the 'gods'. Anaximander's *apeiron* with its divine attributes, Parmenides' revealing goddess or his rather god-like ball of 'what is', and Heraclitus' 'ever-living Fire' (to give some instances of 'shapes' attributed to divine entities that are assumed to exist) are among the things of which it makes sense to say that their obscurity and the brevity of human life preclude knowledge. On the other hand, if tomorrow there will be a sea battle and if one's colleagues possess the cooperative virtues are among those of which it does not.

I shall say something more about the obscurity (ἀδηλότης) presently, when discussing the 'new' fragment in section 8, and first turn to the second obstacle adduced, the *vita brevis*.

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### 3

Protagoras' seemingly trivial reference to the brevity of human life recovers some of its full significance as soon as one compares the point of view of a contemporary epistemological optimist. Empedocles (31B2 DK) describes the lack of knowledge typical of men, who are convinced of such things only as they have encountered; but *the span of human life is short*, and the experiences

7 πολλά τὰ κωλύοντα appears to have been an idiomatic expression (Hdt. 8.144.2, listing three factors; *de Vict.* 3.67, listing four), perhaps best rendered as 'there is more than one thing in the way'. For the verb—often + inf.—designating factors that actually prevent something from happening cf. Sappho fr. 137 Voigt; Pind. *Pyth.* 4.32; Anaxag. 59B12 DK (*Vors.* 2. 37.25); Hdt. 2.20.2; and numerous instances in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*: a selection (with grateful acknowledgements to Dr. A.A. Anastassiou and Dr. V. Schmidt, who sent me the full material of the Hamburg *Hippokrates-Index*), e.g. *de Art.* 4.100.7–8, 246.16–17; *Acut.* 2.352.7–9; *Aer.* 2.38.23; *de Art.* 6.20.12–13; *de Vict.* 6.560.2 Littré. For κωλύειν + 'cognitive' verb cf. *Prorrh.* 2.3.3, 9.10.16 Littré and Eur. *Ion* 390–391.—It will be clear that I accept the text as printed at 80B4 DK; for its attestation see Pease (1955) on Cic. *ND* 1.22 (p. 120 f.), 1.29 (p. 227 f.), and Müller at Classen (1971) 323 ff. For the problems of transmission and of the text see Müller, *loc. cit.*, and Dietz (1976), 132 ff. There are other Presocratic fragments (parts of) which are found in Diogenes Laertius only. To the attestations adduced by Pease, Müller, and Dietz, add Hdt. 2.53.1 (Burkert 1977, 463 and n. 17); for Xen. *Mem.* 4.3.13, which presupposes the complete DK fragment, see below, p. 337. Plat. *Crat.* 384b—cf. below, p. 337—also alludes to the fragment and provides us in any case with a parallel for κωλύειν + εἰδέναι. Protagoras may have intended a little joke; for the gods themselves as impediments or obstacles cf. e.g. Thuc. 5.301, Hdt. 8.144.2, Eur. *Ion* 390–391.

of human beings are far too limited to warrant that they acquire knowledge of what Empedocles calls 'the whole'. An example of this defect can be given, which has the additional advantage of showing that the words 'they are only convinced of what each has encountered' do not only pertain to the many different experiences people have, but also to cases where you have a *consensus omnium*. At 31B27.21–27 DK Empedocles speaks of divine cosmic Love and says that men habitually acknowledge love in as far as it is rooted in their own bodies and causes thoughts and works of harmony; they call it Joy and Aphrodite. Love, however, as it clings to the elements has not, so far, been grasped by any mortal man. We may infer that men only experience the lesser part of Love. Nevertheless, Empedocles is *certain that the whole truth can be known*; in principle, at any rate, by everybody, and actually, in any case, by a few privileged individuals. Truth can be revealed, and a special organ of cognition, *noûs* ('understanding', 'intellect', 'mind') as distinct from the eyes, can be used. Comparable statements could be quoted from the remains of the Ionian muse, although Heraclitus does not speak of *noûs*,<sup>8</sup> or of the brevity of human life as an epistemological factor. He too, however, speaks of the things people encounter, emphasizing that these confrontations do not promote insight into the true nature of things, but produce individual opinions, whereas it is characteristic of the truth to both explain and transcend the individual.<sup>9</sup> As is well known, the idea that people's thoughts depend upon the things they meet with—without excluding a margin for human decision and responsibility—had already been developed by others.<sup>10</sup>

Both Heraclitus and Empedocles, not heeding Xenophanes' warning, spoke of the gods, or at any rate of gods, in an original way that is both critical and positive, as if the subject itself were not, or did not thus *become*, problematical. Such a point of view is rejected, or in any case not shared, by Protagoras, to whose statement we should by now return.

## 4

- 42 There is a further point to be made about his reasoning from obstacles to knowledge. An obvious objection<sup>11</sup> for a non-agnostic person to make would

8 But he contrasts what can be found in the soul (Heracl. 22B45, B118 DK) to what eyes can see and ears can hear (B107 DK).

9 Heracl. 22B72, B17, B2, B1, B56 DK.

10 Hom. *Od.* 18.136–137, Archil. frs. 131 and 132 West. For the margin see e.g. Schwabl (1954), 9.

11 One inevitably thinks of the argument attributed to Pericles by Stesimbrotus (*FGH* 107

be: 'all men venerate gods, and there is such a thing as divination. As to our own gods, don't you accept the stories told about their encounters and dealings with human beings? Don't you believe that they were on our side when the Medes came, or that Athena favours Athens to this day?' Protagoras' doubt would not have been neutralized by such suggestions; he doesn't, to be sure, reject what is said about the gods, but he doesn't accept it either. I interpret his reference to the brevity of human life as constituting a definite obstacle to a decision which would be epistemologically justifiable, as entailing that the only criterion which would enable him to accept that there are gods would consist in a clear and distinct *personal experience*<sup>12</sup> confirming that what is asserted to be the case is, indeed, the case. I would say that it is against this argument or its immediate descendants that, in Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.3.13), Socrates' remark to Euthydemus is directed: 'that I am telling you the truth' [sc. as to that there are gods] 'you will *know for yourself* if you don't go on *waiting* until you have *seen* the *forms* of the gods'.<sup>13</sup> Socrates agrees that life is too short for this, but he refuses to follow Protagoras/Euthydemus all the way. The Platonic Socrates also once alludes to Protag. 80B4 DK, in an ironic comment on Protagoras' pupil Prodicus (*Crat.* 384b = 84A11 DK); although he successfully stands the Protagorean argument upon its head, he nevertheless takes its personal implication for granted: 'If *I had heard* Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture ... *nothing* would have *kept you from knowing* on the spot (οὐδὲν ἂν ἐώλυνεν σε ... εἰδέναι) the truth about the correct use of words'.

I do not believe that Protagoras, justifying his position, wants us to believe that there are other, more pressing issues to be settled during one's short life. These could never have been claimed as *epistemological* obstacles. The fact that life is short entails, rather, that it does not make sense to wait for a confirming personal experience; think of what Socrates said to Euthydemus. The poets maintain that the gods go on living for ever, but men definitely do not. This

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F 9 = Plu. *Per.* 8.9): 'we do not see the gods themselves, but we infer that they are immortal from the honours we pay them and the good things we receive from them'. Zeno (*SVF* 1.152) was not original.

12 The gods (in Homer and Hesiod, they usually go about clad in aēr) were believed to be notoriously hard to see, cf. e.g. *Il.* 20.131, and meeting them was not always a happy experience (cf. Pease 1942, 3, and Nisbet and Hubbard 1978 on Hor. *Carm.* 2.19.5). To Protag. 80B4 DK a fragment of Empedocles can be opposed, 31B133: the divine cannot be reached with the eyes or grasped (λαβείν) with the hands, which normally would convince men (cf. 31B2, cited p. above, p. 334). For this grasping with the hands as a criterium for the reality of what is grasped see also Plat. *Thet.* 155 e. Norden (1974), 14 ff. is still useful.

13 For Socrates' proof—*cognitio Dei ex operibus*—see Korteweg (1979), 60 ff.

43 makes it even more worthy of note that the fact that Protagoras has not, so far, had a clear confirming personal experience and that he is not confident it will be granted him in such years as may lie ahead, does not compel him to believe that the gods do not exist.

A further conclusion follows. It is an important one. According to Greek usage, the polar notions of gods and men are mutually defining: the immortal gods are or have what mortal men, typically, have not,<sup>14</sup> although there are of course also points of similarity. As soon as an important thinker says that the notion of 'gods' is epistemologically irrelevant as far as he is concerned, this cannot but have far-reaching consequences for his notion of 'man'.

## 5

The above interpretation of the statement concerned with the gods helps to explain the man-the-measure fragment.

I should begin by admitting that I accept the view that seems to be the prevailing one.<sup>15</sup> I translate *chremata* (χρήματα) as 'things',<sup>16</sup> *hōs* (ὥς) as 'that', and I accept that *anthrōpos* (ἄνθρωπος, 'man') denotes the individual rather than the species, inclusive of the proviso that the fragment is a universal statement.<sup>17</sup> 'The things that are' will refer not only to existing things, but also to such things as are the case.<sup>18</sup> I also believe that the exemplification twice added by Plato (*Crat.* 386a, *Tht.* 152a), namely that such things as are apparent to me are (the case) for me and such as are apparent to you are (the case) for you, should be accepted as a—non-literal—part of the quotation. According to this added explanation, personal experience has criterial value ... for the person concerned; just as is the case, or so I believe, when the gods are at issue. The nature of this experience, however, remains difficult. In the immediate sequel to the quotation in the *Theaetetus* Plato posits that the experiences involved

14 See Mansfeld (1964), 5f., 16, and ch. 1, *passim*, where references have been collected.

15 Cf. Guthrie (1969) 188f., Barnes (1979), 2.239f.

16 In the most extensive sense, i.e. including such things as exemplified by the idiom 'that was a nasty thing to do'. For *chrēma* meaning 'event' or 'experience' see the Solon–Croesus episode, *Hdt.* I 32.9, 33. For *chrēmata*, 'things', as opposed to persons (*sōmata*) cf. Hirzel (1976), 14 n. 5: numerous passages.

17 Kapp (1936), 71, Guthrie (1969) 188f. Classen (1971) 222 points out that (ὁ) ἄνθρωπος and (οἱ) ἄνθρωποι are used *promiscue* in the myth of the *Protagoras*; this also holds for *Ancient Medicine*. For the proviso see further below, sect. 10, p. 52.

18 Cf. Holland (1956), 217 n. 2, Kahn (1966), 250.

are sense-data (not, by the way, visual<sup>19</sup> sense-data), | known simultaneously by individuals  $X'$  and  $X''$  during sensation (at a time  $t$ ). I believe that we should not only—as has been pointed out often enough—emancipate ourselves from the suggestion that the *homo mensura* principle is about sense-perception only,<sup>20</sup> but also reject the implication that it is exclusively concerned with what occurs at a moment of time  $t$ , when the *sensa* are being sensed. (Without, of course, going to the opposite extreme of denying that such present *sensa* are part of the issue).

This is supported by what can be inferred from another reference to the principle in Plato, which as far as I am aware has been missed. It occurs *Prot.* 334 d–e, immediately after Protagoras' little speech<sup>21</sup> about the relativity of the good.

Socrates, who does not like this speechifying, asks Protagoras if he will do him the favour of giving short replies. Protagoras answers: how do you mean—'should they be shorter than would be required?' (βραχυτέρα σοι ... ἀποκρινώμαι ἢ δεῖ;). Socrates denies this; so, 'of such length as is required' (ὅσα δεῖ), concludes Protagoras, to which Socrates agrees. Then Protagoras asks: 'am I to answer you at such length as I *myself believe* to be required, or at such as you do?' (πότῃ οὖν ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτα σοι ἀποκρινώμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί;). After a few more words have been said, the discussion threatens to come to an untimely end; other people present have to pacify the opponents; and when the conversation is finally resumed, a compromise has been reached and it is Protagoras who puts the questions and Socrates who gives the answers. One of the con-

19 Winds are not seen. Socrates, in the passage already cited (*Mem.* 4.3.14), says: 'not even the winds are visible, yet what they bring about is visible, and we sense them as they come' (cf. Pease 1942, 3 n. 12), and uses this as part of his proof that the invisible god(s) can be known. I am no longer certain that the example of the wind is a Platonic concoction (so Mansfeld 1972, 128 ff., and Mejer 1972, 44 n. 10); however, if Plato really selected something resembling this example from Protagoras' exposition he exploited it to his convenience. Perhaps I should add at this point that I cannot accept the report of Sextus, *P.* 1.218 f. (80A 14 DK) that *pace* Protagoras the *logoi* of all things are in the *hylé* (most recently defended by Koch 1970, 11 ff. and 1971, 278 ff.). Cornford (1935), 32 f. believes that the *logoi* in Sextus Empiricus are opposites, and so have others, but the text does not support this (if they were, we would have an instance of the Aenesidemean Heracliteanism studied by Burkhardt 1973). If there are no opposites in Sextus, there is no longer a link with *Tht.* 152b, where moreover the idea that the opposites are in the thing is explicitly not attributed to Protagoras.

20 Protagoras is equally concerned with opinions or thoughts. Or, to be more precise: he does not distinguish between mind and the senses in the manner of later thinkers. The gods are out of the picture, and there is no dichotomy of the knowing subject. Barnes' suggestion (1979, 2. 240 f.) that Protagoras' 'seems' is 'judgemental' only is unnecessary.

21 See Guthrie (1969), 166–167.

sequences of this splendidly stage-managed development is that a discussion of the implications of the man-the-measure principle, which Protagoras evidently was on the brink of introducing into the verbal battle, is avoided.

I have cited this episode not merely in further support of the insight that not only 'is apparent, appears' (φαίνεται), but also 'seems, is believed' (δοκεῖ—cf. *Crat.* 386c) is used in the explanation, paraphrase, or use of the principle, but also because, in this passage, it is the *personal* factor which is of primary importance without, however, entailing that the 'opinion' held by *X* 'or *X*' has only come to him on the spur of the moment or is valid for him for the moment only. For it is a defining characteristic of Socrates' personal technique to proceed by means of short | questions and short answers, and it is equally characteristic of  
45 Protagoras that he often makes rather lengthy statements. These are habits of long standing. What is at issue here, although only in passing, is that 'brief' and 'lengthy' are *relative* concepts, and that what one thinks about them, i.e. their evaluation, is a strictly personal affair involving the whole person, without for that reason being in the least arbitrary.

I believe that a more cognitive interpretation of the *homo mensura* rule is possible, if we but liberate ourselves from the illusion that it is exclusively concerned with such certainty as is available, at the time of sensation, to abstract anybodies without a history. It should not be forgotten that the outlook of the fragment about the gods is much less limited, since it refers to human life, however short, *as a whole*. There is further evidence that this aspect of experience was important to Protagoras. The *Dissoi Logoi*, believed to be a rather faithful, if sometimes naive, reproduction of Protagorean arguments, once uses the statement [90.4.5 DK] 'just as a man is the same person as a boy, and a young man, and an adult, and an old man'<sup>22</sup> as the basis of a comparison. In *Prot.* 351 d, Protagoras once says that he wants to reply not only having regard 'to the answer to your present question', but also 'to all the rest of my life'.<sup>23</sup>

Consequently, I propose to translate *anthrôpos* in the man-the-measure statement by 'human being' in the sense (or, rather, in the serious sense) of what we would call a *person*.

I know that no satisfactory concept of a person has as yet been reached. All the same, there is such a thing as an untidy idea of a person: we all about know what we mean when we use this word seriously, and there is or has been a large measure of agreement as to those characteristics which can be and should be applied to 'persons', although the explanation of such characteristics is perhaps

22 Kent-Sprague (1972), 287 translates τὸ αὐτό as 'the same person'.

23 πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν—πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν.

still forthcoming.<sup>24</sup> The most important as well as the most difficult among these is, apparently, that of *personal identity*, the awareness one has of being the same person as, say, twenty years ago, like Odysseus returning.<sup>25</sup> We also assume that a plurality of persons, although each of them is a person with such characteristics as constitute a per|son, are still different *qua* persons, i.e. that such differences describe what it is to be a person. 46

What I wish to argue is that Protagoras meant 'man' in the sense of a person with a past and, presumably, a future. Someone to whom certain options are open and, simultaneously, someone whose present state of mind and outlook are to a large extent the outcome of his personal history. Someone who is responsible for what he does.<sup>26</sup> Someone who, whatever his natural endowments (and here *physis*<sup>27</sup> plays her part, although endowments, of course, differ), has been influenced to a large degree by what he has encountered in his environment, which above all means via other men—who, in their turn, have been battered into shape by others—, and who has been formed by his personal response to this 'conditioning'.<sup>28</sup>

It does not make much sense to speak of the opinions or convictions people have at a time *t* in the sense in which, according to some philosophers, it would be possible to assert that they have immediate awareness of sense-date or 'sense adverbially'. One's ideas and convictions have grown upon one in the course of one's life in a specific environment. One's possibilities of reacting, of getting hunches or jumping to conclusions to a considerable degree depend upon one's training and character.

24 The article *Person* in Eisler's *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe* contains a wealth of information; those on *Person* and *Personal Identity* in the Edwards' *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* have been particularly helpful.

25 For the idea of a person in Antiquity see Hirzel (above, n. 16), Lesky (1950), 97 f., and the splendid pages of Burkert (1955), 108 ff. See also Mondolfo (1958), who hardly ever uses the term 'person' but whose position is about the same as that of de Vogel (1963). On the passage in Cicero *De officiis* 1 see De Lacy (1977). The idea of *personal identity* is present in a few passages where its continuity is problematical because a *change of shape* has occurred (cf. Locke's cobbler and prince): *Od.* 10.239–240; Emped. 31B17, B137 DK. Cf. also Barnes (1979) 1.100 ff. Vlastos, in: Classen (1971), 281, paraphrasing Protag. 80B1 DK, uses the word 'person', but fails to follow this up, and so have others. Versenyi, in: Classen (1971), 296, speaks of the 'living human being': correct but not sufficient.

26 In Athens lifeless objects could be convicted of crimes (see Nestle 1942, 300). Protagoras' rejection of this atavism (Plu. *Per.* 36 = 80A10 DK) must have been based upon a distinction between *things* and *persons*. This should be linked up with the original penology of Plat. *Prot.* 324b: a thing cannot mend its ways. [Jacoby attributes more of *Per.* 36 to Stesimbrotus (*FGrH* 107 F 11) than is printed at 80A10 DK].

27 Protag. 80B3(a); Plat. *Prot.* 327b–c, 328a–d; *Dissoi Logoi* 90.6.11 f. DK.

28 Cf. Vlastos, *o. c.* 284.

## 6

In this light, it also becomes somewhat easier to understand why Protagoras could maintain that some people are more capable, or better at some things, than other people (*Tht.* 166d ff.). Persons differ as to their natural talents, and some people are more experienced or better trained than others. The expert is not possessed of ultimate truths, but he is capable of changing things which appear to be the case to people on the basis of what he knows as a person. I do not believe that Protagoras' relativism breaks down<sup>29</sup> as soon as ends—for instance, to become a good citizen or (again) a healthy man—are introduced into the treatment or the discussion. After all, the person one is arguing or dealing with is already possessed, not only of a physical body, but also of *value-judgements* and *ideas about ends*; a person, typically, is a 'zwecksetzend' entity: he has aims, goals, purposes. The social context in which ends and values function is analogous to the context of medical care.

Why a relativist such as Protagoras should be able to educate others with a definite purpose in view (cf. the *epaggelma* at *Prot.* 318d–319a = (partly) 80A5 DK), or to be a lawgiver, remains, after all, an inevitable *explanandum*. It is not sufficient to say that the anthropocentrism of man-the-measure paves the way for more practical matters, for it remains to be shown in what way this relativism is both compatible with and pertinent to practical matters.

Now, howevermuch it may be the case that the individual person is the measure of things, and howevermuch each of us is a free agent capable of saying either *sic* or *non*, it cannot be denied that different people may agree about something or that one person, once in a while, is capable of making someone else share his point of view.

How is this achieved (or explained in terms of *homo mensura*)? If you wish to or have to persuade someone else, you must appeal to those things of which the other person is the *measure*, which means to such experiences and ideas as the other already possesses (one is tempted to adapt for the occasion the opening statement of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, 1.71a1–2, 'all teaching and all learning involving the use of understanding come about from already existing knowledge'). Convincing someone is not so much a question of the instilling of totally new ideas (although it is, of course, possible that an idea new to him immediately appeals to someone and appears to him to be valid) as it is a reshuffling or further elaboration of ideas already held by him. In the course

29 So e. g. Guthrie (1969), 187.



of the argument one uses<sup>30</sup> what the other person affirms to be the case for him, and one goes on arguing until he admits that he has changed, that he sees things differently. If he does not, one has not convinced him. It goes without saying that some familiarity with the varieties of human experience comes in handy, as will, of course, the *art* of arguing in this way as taught by Protagoras.

Protagoras' technique of argument and discussion as grounded in his epistemology is a marvelous instrument for bringing about a *consensus*; and a *consensus*, after all, is what is necessary if a political body such as the Athenian democracy is to function, and the art of bringing it about is indispensable to any person with political ambitions. Consequently, I hesitate to use the term 'subjectivism' in respect of this epistemology, since it too easily brings in its wake the idea of an absolute subjectivism or a sort of solipsism. Subjective truth in the sense of truth as relative to an individual person or 'measure' is indeed what Protagoras is concerned with, but this does not entail that inter-subjective truth is impossible. Whenever a plurality of persons agree, a common measure has arisen. This inter|subjective truth is not independent of those who have agreed to it; it is only valid for them, i.e. only exists, as long as it is accepted.

48

Consequently, I find it impossible to attribute the maxim 'it is impossible to speak out against' (οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν) as a seriously held principle to the author of a work entitled *Antilogiai*, if, that is, it is taken to entail that interpersonal disputes would be impossible.<sup>31</sup> This would conflict with what is known about the great Sophist's activities as teacher and educator; besides, the attribution of the maxim at Plat. *Euth.* 286b–c, where it is said to have been held by 'Protagoras and his followers and even older thinkers' is hardly serious.<sup>32</sup> In this context, the definition of the four basic moods of speech<sup>33</sup> attributed to Protagoras is decisive: both 'command' and 'request' presuppose an interper-

30 For an analysis of Protagoras' antilogic art see de Romilly (1956), 180 ff., and now also Bodin (Paris 1975). Schian (1973) 13–43 is also useful.

31 This is the length to which Glidden (1975) 115 is prepared to go. The most that can be attributed to Protagoras is that absolute truth cannot be on the side of him who contradicts (cf. Barnes 1979, 2.246 f.).

32 Protag. 80A19. This is just as historical as Plat. *Th.* 152e (cf. Snell, in: Classen 1971, 481 f.) and *Sph.* 242d τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἑλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἔτι πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον. There are now serious reasons for attributing the maxim to Protagoras' pupil Prodicus (cf. Binder and Liesenborghs, in: Classen 1971, 452 ff.). Diogenes Laertius' authority at 9.53 is, explicitly, the *Euthydemus*.

33 D.L. 9.53–54 (80A1, II p. 254, 13–14a + 15b; what comes in between is a Diogenean 'Zettel', 'excerpt', just as what immediately follows). No question of attributing the discovery of the proposition and of truth-functions to Protagoras.

sonal context; ‘question’ and ‘answer’ are, moreover, especially pertinent to the context of interpersonal discussion.

## 7

What Protagoras, when teaching or discussing things, does is that he uses and further develops something which is already there. He further refines, both morally and formally, a process of personal development which began in our earliest infancy—when we were only very tiny measures of things—and which was continued in early and not so early youth by the application not only of verbal, but also of non-verbal means of persuasion (blows; cf. *Prot.* 325d). The education he provides links up with such education as each of us, inevitably, has already received, and his use of language and argument links up with and is a further refinement of the way each of us has already learned to communicate<sup>34</sup> with others by asking questions, giving answers, obeying or giving commands, and so on. In other words, his *technê* is a specialized form of normal *paideia*. There are no obstacles that impede one’s acquiring special knowledge of this sort, since it is grounded in and a continuation of the personal experience one cannot help acquiring in the course of one’s life: the things one cannot, normally, avoid learning. If further explanation of what makes this, ultimately, possible is wanted, recourse must be had to the history not of the individual person, but of human civilisation. Significantly, Protagoras’ views about | this history are evolutionist: the development of the species is analogous to that of the individual.

49

## 8

The importance of the concept of personal knowledge for the interpretation of Protagoras’ thought can be further illustrated. He is said to have argued that the geometers, who hold that the straight line touches the circle at one point only, can be contradicted (80B7 DK; presumably, a scrap from the work mentioned by Plat. *Soph.* 232d–e = 80B8<sup>35</sup>). At first sight, it would be possible to submit (a) that here a sort of protocol-status is claimed for sense-data, and (b) that recourse to the non-empirical objects of geometric study is rejected

34 For *paideia* and language cf. *Diss. Log.* 90.6.11–12 DK, Plat. *Prot.* 325c–326e, 328a.

35 This dealt with all the arts, sc. with ‘what one [αὐτόν, i.e. the arguing speaker] should argue against the professional expert on each point’: See further Heinemann (1961).

in favour of a return to the world of immediate experience;<sup>36</sup> but (a) and (b) are not the same thing. The members of the Vienna Circle, in their manifesto of 1929,<sup>37</sup> arguing for the rejection of metaphysics and our liberation from the ambiguity of natural language in favour of empirical science and a new symbolism, invoked the support of Protagoras: 'neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and unfathomable depths rejected ... Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all things. Here is affinity with the Sophists ...'.<sup>38</sup> It is, indeed, tempting to interpret Protagoras in this way; to do so, however, is to forget that modern empirical science is not relativist and that it is largely dependent upon non-empirical constructs of the sort Protagoras is reported to have argued against. The authors of the pamphlet should, rather, have referred to the treatise *On Ancient Medicine* and related early Hippocratic literature. It cannot be denied that the thought of Protagoras influenced the authors of these treatises to a degree;<sup>39</sup> however, also other influences are at work, and the empiricist attitude of these medical authors as a reaction against the claims of natural philosophy is largely independent.<sup>40</sup> And Protagoras wrote against all the arts, thus including medicine. There are treatises in the *Hippocratic Corpus* which explicitly defend the art of medicine against such attacks (e.g. the *De arte*). | Finally, Protagoras can hardly have argued that what the geome- 50ters say is false; it is true to them, and they have a *logos* (argument) in its favour. To this argument Protagoras opposes another *logos*—cf. 80B6a, A20 DK: on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other—, which is not concerned with 'empiricism' or with 'the senses' (it can never be said often enough that Protagoras does *not* distinguish between thinking and sensing), but with what one can *see for oneself*. Personal experience is at variance with mathematical theory, but it cannot, thereby, disprove this theory; the existence of gods cannot be disproved either. All Protagoras may be supposed to have claimed is that his own *logos* is *stronger* than that of the mathematicians (cf. 80B6a DK) in that, for him, it is better supported by the evidence, i.e. based

36 So e.g. von Fritz (1971), 222, 223; note that von Fritz accepts that Protagoras' argument against mathematics is incompatible with modern science. He expresses this evaluation even more strongly at (1961), 581–583, where he moreover comments upon the apparently paradoxical situation that modern epistemologists tend to rate the Sophists rather low. I believed this until my colleague Paul Lansdorp showed me the manifesto of the Vienna Circle when I had inflicted a version of this paper upon members of my department, Oct. 8th 1979.

37 *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*. Trans. included in Neurath (1973).

38 Neurath (1973), 306.

39 Kudlien (1967), 141 f.

40 See Mansfeld (1973), (1973) and (1980), though *Batava non leguntur*.

upon what he can experience and know.<sup>41</sup> Now it is up to the mathematicians to try and make their weaker *logos* again the stronger one. To hail Protagoras as an early member of the Vienna Circle is to credit him with a correspondence theory of truth which was very far from his mind indeed.

There is further evidence for this assertion. It is also reported that Protagoras argued that Homer had blundered when composing the opening lines of the *Iliad* (cf. 80A28, A29, against the background of 80A1, p. 254.13–14a + 15b, and 80A27.<sup>42</sup> This notion, too, may ultimately derive from the work on the arts). The poet uses the imperative instead of the praying mood when addressing the Muse, and he makes the word *menis* (μῆνις, ‘wrath’) feminine whereas it should be masculine, just as *pêlêx* (πῆληξ, ‘helmet’; not in the first lines of the *Iliad*, but possibly brought up through association with the word *Pêlêiadês*). Again, Protagoras cannot have meant that Homer’s usage is absolutely false; the most that he can have wanted to show is that the *logos* in favour of Homer’s practice is weaker than the *logos* against it. The greatest of poets may well have believed that he could order the Muse about. Against this imaginary defense Protagoras presumably argued that, if it is accepted that there is a distinction between ‘command’ and ‘prayer’ (‘any *logos* against?’), one’s use of these moods should be *consistent*. If a distinction is made between gods and men, one’s way of addressing the gods has to follow suit. As to | μῆνις and πῆληξ, Protagoras’ argument, as Theodor Gomperz suggested,<sup>43</sup> may have been that words pertaining to the male domain should themselves be male; again, not a criterium of correspondence—there are no recognizably male organs about a helmet—, but one of consistency.

A consistency theory of truth and a relativist theory of truth are perfectly compatible, while a correspondence theory of truth is incompatible with thoroughgoing relativism. The idea of relativist consistency, again, is perfectly com-

41 *Vors.* II, Nachtr., p. 425.16 f. quotes a passage from Philodemus after the ed. of Heidmann (1937). This is read as follows by Sbordone (1976) 241–243: πρ[ο][φέρω]ν κ[α]ὶ τὸ παρὰ τὰ πρ[άγματα] μ[ε]ν ἄγνωστα εἶναι[· τὰς δὲ] λέξεις οὐκ ἄρεστά[ς, ὅπερ] ἐπὶ τῆς μα[θηματικῆς] Πρωταγόρας μάλα. Trans.: ‘Suggesting also that the things (*pragmata*) cannot be known and the expressions are not acceptable, as Protagoras about mathematics (?)’. Sbordone’s facsimile shows only μ[ε]ν for the last word quoted; Heidmann and DK read λ[έγει]. It is not clear from *Vors.*, loc. cit., that the papyrus has ‘Protagoras’ and that Praxagoras is another possible emendation. If this rather extensively restored text is accepted (πρ[άγματα] is confirmed by p. 243.9) the reference to the ‘language’ used—which is why Philodemus quotes the text—shows that Protagoras argued *ad hominem*. οὐκ ἄρεστά[ς] for ‘expressions ... not acceptable’ cf. *Soph. Ant.* 499–501.

42 See Fehling, in: Classen (1971) 34 ff. Siebenborn (1976) 15–16 has failed to convince me.

43 Gomperz (1922) 1.368.

patible with a concept of personal identity; for this identity, revealing itself in a characteristic pattern of change, is grounded in consistency.

## 9

During World War II, a *vox clamantis* was liberated by a bulldozer in the Egyptian desert: the ‘new fragment’ of Protagoras preserved in a papyrus containing one of the works of Didymus the Blind.<sup>44</sup> I quote: ‘Protagoras says: φαίνομαι σοὶ τῷ παρόντι καθήμενος· τῷ δὲ ἀπόντι οὐ φαίνομαι καθήμενος· ἄδηλον εἰ κάθημαι ἢ οὐ κάθημαι’. As far as I am aware, this has been translated as follows: ‘to you, who are present, I appear as sitting; to one not present I do not appear as sitting; it is obscure whether I am sitting or not sitting’. This, again, has been interpreted as if the having or not-having of sense-impressions were indisputable, but what is the case in the real world cannot be said; ‘obscure’ meaning ‘what cannot be perceived by the senses’.<sup>45</sup> Can it, however, or should it be perceived by the mind? I fail to see in what way the ‘new’ argument refers to a supposed real world where things are as they are independently of our sense-impressions, where winds, for instance, have a definite temperature. The fragment is about the cognitive status of an experienced state of affairs: ‘I am sitting’. To someone present, to whom this appears to be the case, this fact is beyond possible doubt, just as it is to me; to someone absent, however, my sitting here does not appear. Does it follow that the question as to my sitting here or my not sitting here is completely beyond the possibility of being decided? To later Skeptics, this would indeed follow; significantly, Didymus quotes the fragment after ‘Protagoreans’ who are (in the manner of the Skeptic Academics) dogmatic about *akatalêpsia*.<sup>46</sup> But it would be grossly anachronistic to attribute this Skeptic theory that ‘nothing can be known at all’ to Protagoras. The Skeptics who are Didymus’ ultimate source interpret the fragment to suit their own convictions; *quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur*, to quote a scholastic form of *homo mensura*. We, however, are free to interpret differently. I suggest that we

52

44 Gronewald and Gesché (1969), cod. p. 222.20–22. Passage at issue first published by Gronewald (1968).

45 Thus Mejer, in: Classen (1971).

46 Barnes (1979), 2.315 n. 16 rightly says the fragment [sc. as transmitted] makes Protagoras a skeptic; he rejects it because it is ‘full of Stoic terminology and has no authority’, but—like Mejer, *loc. cit.*—he does not attempt to separate the Protagorean nut from its Skeptic (not: Stoic) shell.

replace the colon after the second καθήμενος by a comma.<sup>47</sup> The translation now runs: ‘to you, who are present, I appear as sitting; to one not present I do not appear as sitting, it is not clear [sc. to him] whether I am sitting or not sitting’. The fragment is concerned with personal knowledge—at a moment of time *t* this time, to be sure—and the critical value thereof, rather than with sense-data and the real world. Protagoras’ partner does not perceive him the way Price saw his tomato.<sup>48</sup>

I am not saying that I really know that the alleged new fragment is authentic, but only that I see no arguments in favour of its being spurious.<sup>49</sup> If genuine, it should be capable of being interpreted consistently with the other fragments: as being about personal experience as a condition of knowledge and, in this case, about not being present as an *obstacle to knowledge*. Perhaps Protagoras attempts to strike a blow against such statements as Parmenides’ ‘with the mind behold what is not present equally with what is firmly present’ (28B4.1 DK), perhaps he objects against Heraclitus’ use of the semi-proverbial ‘being present they are absent’ (22B34 DK). Whether or not he could have read Empedocles’ *Katharmoi* I do not know, but it is at any rate beyond doubt that he would have scorned the notion of a man who, by a special extension of the mind, was ‘easily capable of beholding each of all the things that are, within ten or twenty lifetimes of men’ (31B129 DK). He would in any case have doubted that there are persons such as the Homeric Muses (*Il.* 2.485, ‘you are goddesses and you are present and you know all things’). One not in the same room with Protagoras at time *t* has no more grounds for either affirming or denying that Protagoras is sitting than the great teacher himself, during his short life, had for either affirming or denying that there are gods.

# 10

I have argued that both the man-the-measure fragment (80B1 DK) and the fragment about the gods (80B4 DK) are concerned with *personal knowledge*. So far, I have deliberately ignored the fact that both are general statements which transcend the experience of the individual: B4 by its reference to human

47 This gives a better asyndeton, too (Kühner and Gerth 2.342, 5 a: colon as ‘Wirkung’ or ‘Folge’ of previous colon).

48 Price (1954), 3.

49 See n. 46. Two further considerations: (1) Didymus also gave us a ‘new’ fragment of Prodicus, cf. above, n. 32. (2) Plato’s choice and formulation of examples at *Soph.* 263a may have been influenced by the ‘new’ fragment.

life *in general*, B1 by claiming to be valid for *all* individual persons. The *homo mensura* statement is a second-order or meta-statement; at least one of the grounds adduced when the gods are at issue also is of a second-order nature. Protagorean relativism, however, entails that there *are no* second-order statements. However, as soon as this is pointed out one is no longer explaining Protagoras, but criticizing him. This criticism, which | was already adumbrated by Democritus and Plato, I believe to be perfectly legitimate,<sup>50</sup> but it should not be allowed to intrude upon the exegesis of Protagoras' own reasoning.

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<sup>50</sup> Democr. 68A114, B156 DK; Plat. *Th.* 171a–c. See further Burnyeat (1976).

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## Aristotle on Socrates' Contributions to Philosophy

### Abstract

More information about the history of dialectic and logic beyond what he wrote in the logical treatises is found in Aristotle's physical and ethical treatises, and also in the *Metaphysics*. The overview of the development of the definition of virtue at the beginning of the *Magna Moralia*, unique in the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, is not by Aristotle. It is based on what is found elsewhere in the *Corpus*.

### Keywords

parts of philosophy – logic – ethics – *episteme* – *phronêsis* – *aretê* – Pythagoreans – Socrates – Democritus – progress – priority – diaeresis

In the third section of the first volume of his indispensable *opus magnum* Gabriele Giannantoni has collected the passages on Socrates to be found in Aristotle's works.<sup>1</sup> A volume in memory of this great scholar and inspiring friend offers a welcome opportunity to discuss some of these passages in their wider micro-context—that is to say in the first place those passages where Socrates' contribution to logic and ethics is set off against that of other thinkers. As is of course well known Aristotle is concerned with the development and progress of the various disciplines which constitute philosophy. In some of these genealogical accounts Socrates plays an important part. An interesting passage of this nature is found at the beginning of the *Magna Moralia*, of dubious authenticity. I argue that it is based on passages in the genuine treatises. Some of these passages moreover provide information on Aristotle's evaluation by hindsight of the discovery of important parts of logical and ethical enquiry.

In the centuries after Aristotle the distinction between the three main parts of philosophy, viz. logic, physics, and ethics, became a standard ingredient of philosophical theory and the philosophical curriculum. In Aristotle this division is, so to speak, still in its infancy. But we may attempt to distribute (parts

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<sup>1</sup> Giannantoni (1990a), 21–33.

of) his oeuvre over these fields without becoming guilty of a too gross anachronism.<sup>2</sup> A helpful passage in ch. 14 of the first Book of the *Topics*<sup>3</sup> provides a tripartition comparable to that of Caesar's Gaul by distinguishing, 'roughly',<sup>4</sup> between three classes of propositions and problems, that is to say between  
 338 'physical', 'ethical', and 'logical' propositions | and problems.<sup>5</sup> What is neither 'physical' nor 'ethical' is 'logical', in Aristotle's sense of the word 'logical' ('general', 'abstract').<sup>6</sup> Distinguished 'roughly', namely by example rather than definition, because this is all we need in this setting.<sup>7</sup>

μέρη τρία, Aristotle writes, literally 'three *parts*'. Each of these parts represents what we may call a *genos*.<sup>8</sup> As instances he cites 'the good' (naturally, a subdivision or species of ethics) and 'the living being' (one of physics); and 'the good' should be dealt with 'as a whole, beginning with the essence', *Top.*  
 1.14 105b14–15. Generalizing this prescription, we may assume that from a theoretical point of view genera in each of these three 'parts' are to be investigated  
 339 according to the categories of essence, quantity, etc.<sup>9</sup> Aristotle provides examples of problems belonging to each of these three main genera.

2 Pace e.g. Dirlmeier (1958), 154–155, and Smith (1997), 91–92.

3 I discuss *Top.* 1.14 105a34–b25.

4 E.g. Pacius (1597), 361, 'ut typo complectar, id est rudi et pingui Minerva explicem'.

5 Arist. *Top.* 1.14 105b19–25. See *Rhet.* 1.2 1358a19–20: there are propositions about physics (περί φυσικῶν εἰσι προτάσεις) from which one cannot argue about ethics (περί τῶν ἠθικῶν), and conversely. At the end of a discussion of cognition from what we may call a 'logical' point of view, Arist. *APo.* 1.33 89b7–9 refers for further treatment of intellect and *technê* etc. to physical theory on the one hand and ethical theory on the other (τὰ μὲν φυσικῆς τὰ δὲ ἠθικῆς μάλλον ἐστίν). See already *Protr.* fr. 32 Düring *ap. Iambl. Protr.* 37.26–38.3. Distinction between ethics and the study of nature at *Met.* A.6 987b1–2 (T 2 below; famously influential passage, see e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.10, D.L. 2.16), see also *PA* 1.1 642a28–31 (below T 4); further *EN* 8.2 1155b8–9, *EN* 8.9 1159b23–24. The adjectives φυσικός ἠθικός λογικός do not occur in Plato; φυσικός once in Xenophon, but in a different sense (*Mem.* 3.9.1); with a different sense too [Hipp.] *Mul.* 230.68 and the later *Hebd.* 50.8 (Greek text *Aph.* 8.2). Smith (1997) 12 and 90–91 on Arist. *Top.* 1.14 105b12–26 unnecessarily translates φυσικός as 'scientific'.

6 On the Aristotelian sense of λογικός and its difference from φυσικός see Algra (1995), 160–170, who however does not deal with ἠθικός.

7 See Alex.Aphrod. in *Top.* 94.10, and Zadro (1974), 343–344. Naturally other divisions and further subdivisions were and can be made as well.

8 Alex.Aphrod. in *Top.* 93.27 says μέρη γὰρ ἀντί τοῦ "εἶδη". At *Met.* Γ.2 1004a3–9 Aristotle distinguishes between 'parts of philosophy', μέρη φιλοσοφίας (viz., first philosophy, physics, etc.), on the analogy of the 'parts' of mathematics (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει μέρη), i.e. different mathematical disciplines. Such μέρη are about equivalent to γένη, see *ibid.* 1004a6.

9 See Moraux (1951), 71–72, Smith (1993), 347–348, Smith (1994), 145–146, Smith (1997), 90; more in Mansfeld (1986), 4–5, Mansfeld (1990), 3201, 3204, Mansfeld (1992), 70–76 and Mansfeld (1999), 28–30. For the 'good' in the categories of quality, time, and quantity see Arist. *Top.* 1.15

The introduction to the treatment of virtue (περί ἀρετῆς, a *genos* in the sense of *Top.* 1.14) in the first chapter of the *Magna Moralia* is the only genealogical account of an issue in ethics to be found in the *corpus Aristotelicum*.<sup>10</sup> Scholarly opinion as to whether this treatise is genuine or not is divided.<sup>11</sup> Some defenders of its authenticity argue that the text we have is the result of someone's revision of an early draft of Aristotle's, or somebody's notes of early lectures by Aristotle subsequently edited and made available. For reasons which hopefully will become clear I find it hard to believe that the dialectical introduction can be by Aristotle himself, an attitude which may please both schools of interpretation. First, the text:<sup>12</sup>

**T 1:** We ought to be aware also of what others have said before us on this topic [viz., what virtue is, from what it is and how it comes about]:

The *first* who attempted to speak about virtue was Pythagoras; not correctly, however, for by reducing the virtues to numbers he submitted the virtues to a treatment which was not related to them. Justice after all is not a 'square number'. *After him* came Socrates, who spoke better and in more detail on this subject, but not correctly either. For he used to make *the virtues forms of knowledge*, and this is impossible. For the forms of knowledge all involve reason, and reason is to be found in the intellectual part of the soul. So that | *all the virtues*, according to him, are to be found in the reasoning part of the soul. The result is that in making *the virtues forms of knowledge* he is doing away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also with emotion and character; so he has not been correct in approaching the virtues in this way. *The next step* was taken by Plato, who divided the soul into the rational and the irrational part—and in this he was correct—and assigned the appropriate virtues to each. So far so good. But after this he no longer (argued) correctly. For he mixed up and linked virtue with the treatment of the Good, which cannot be cor-

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107a5–10; in the categories of essence as well as quality and relative, *qua* ingredient of the critique of the Idea of the Good *EN* 1.4 1096a19–20.

10 Walzer (1929), 79 with n. 3 postulated an Early Peripatetic treatise entitled Ἡθικῶν δόξαι as the source of this passage, a title analogous to the title Φυσικῶν δόξαι (*Opinions of the Physicists*) constructed by Usener and Diels from the entry in the Theophrastean catalogue at D.L. 5.48 (Φυσικαὶ δόξαι—*Physical Opinions* would be correct). There is no evidence that such a treatise ever existed.

11 See e.g. Natali (2003), 181, Bobonich (2006), 15–16.

12 *MM* I.i.5–8 (the section on Socrates, i.7, is fr. I B 31 Giann.). Translations here and below have been lifted from several available versions (mostly from Barnes, 1984) and adapted where this seemed called for.

rect, not being related. For in speaking about things as they are and their truth he ought not to have discoursed upon virtue; for there is nothing common to the two. The above-mentioned, then, have touched upon the subject so far and in the way above described. The next thing will be to see what we ought to say ourselves on the subject.

Note the relative chronology,<sup>13</sup> a feature also found for instance in the largely chronological history of the four causes in Book A of *Metaphysics* already briefly mentioned above.

The first thing to be pointed out is that the *Magna Moralia* passage is not explicit about the concept of definition, though this is clearly presupposed. Furthermore, elsewhere in the extant treatises Aristotle invariably speaks of the doctrines of ‘the Pythagoreans’, never of those of Pythagoras.<sup>14</sup> In those passages where he attributes attempts at definition (explicitly: the term is used) to the Pythagoreans<sup>15</sup> he moreover only instantiates particular virtues, and never speaks of ‘the’ virtues in general. The example provided in T 1 is that of an individual virtue, one actually attributed to ‘the Pythagoreans’ by Aristotle.<sup>16</sup> But the search for *general* definitions is attributed *disertis verbis* to Socrates by Aristotle (see below). And it is a shade awkward to encounter Pythagoras as the first individual to | speak of virtue at all, for in the present context this attempt can only have been a ‘first’ one to *define* virtue.

The next observation to be made is that the attribution of this bipartition of soul into a rational and an irrational part to Plato is unparalleled in the corpus. It is of course possible for us, as it was for some people in antiquity,<sup>17</sup> to interpret the two nether parts of Plato’s tripartite soul in such a way as to reduce them to a single entity, but that is a different matter. In a chapter of *On Soul* Aristotle argues for a division of soul into four main parts.<sup>18</sup> But according to the final

13 On the relation between time and progress in the arts and philosophy see *EN* 1.7 1098a22–26 and *Met.* A.2 982b13–15 (note *πρoιόντες*), *Met.* A.3 984a18–19 (*πρoιόντων*); see e.g. Berti (1990), 33–34.

14 Burkert (1972), 29–30. Emphasis on *doctrines*, for *Met.* A.4 985a29–30 need not have been interpolated, *pace* Burkert *ibid.* n. 6 and others. Huffman (2005), 590–591 argues that Πυθαγόρας at *MM* I i.5 may be a corruption of the usual οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι (cf. *MM* I xxxiii.13), but then also the singular πρῶτος [...] ἐνεχείρησεν would have been deliberately changed, and the reference to a purported πρῶτος εὐρετής lost.

15 Below, text to n. 24, and T 3. See Burkert (1972), 40.

16 Arist. *Met.* A.5 985b29, *Met.* N6. 1093b8–14, and below, T 3. At *Met.* A.9 990a24 ἀδικία is listed.

17 See already e.g. Dirlmeier (1956), 292–293, Dirlmeier (1958), 160–161, and esp. Tieleman (2003), 64–88.

18 Arist. *de An.* 3.9.

chapter of Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, a division into two main parts is sufficient in ethical theory, where one has no use for soul parts irrelevant to conduct.<sup>19</sup> (Yet Aristotle discusses other sub-parts in what follows in this same chapter). Plato's standard tripartition he of course knew well. We note that in the *On Soul* it is *distinguished* from bipartition into a rational and an irrational part.<sup>20</sup>

So it is quite unlikely that Aristotle himself should attribute this bipartition to Plato—as an improvement, moreover, of the striking view attributed to Socrates that the soul only has a rational and lacks a non-rational part (so in fact has no parts at all)—a view which according to our author is entailed by the intellectualistic view that all virtues are forms of knowledge. Obviously, it is a backward construct with bipartition as its starting point. Note moreover that the formula 'things as they are and their truth', denoting the discipline beyond natural philosophy Plato should not have mixed up with ethics, is used by Aristotle several times in a different sense, viz. to denote the efforts of the natural philosophers.<sup>21</sup> But the use of the formula by the author of T 1 comes close to Plato's usage.<sup>22</sup>

Accordingly, there are several odd and difficult features here as | long as one assumes the passage to be genuinely Aristotelian. These difficulties disappear when one assumes it was composed by a disciple who wanted the argument of *Magna Moralia* to start off with the kind of overview of previous positions found elsewhere in the corpus.

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We may cite several passages which will have inspired the author of T 1: two in the *Metaphysics*, one in the *Parts of Animals*, two in the *Eudemian Ethics*, and two in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The passages from the *Metaphysics* and the *Parts of Animals* present Socrates' view in a dialectical-genealogical context, but not one that provides a genealogy of views concerning *virtue* in the manner of T 1. The second *Metaphysics* passage is a revised version of the first; both times a view of Socrates is compared with and sandwiched between views of the Pythagoreans and Plato, or the Platonists. The *Ethics* passages are concerned with Socrates' concept of virtue. I argue that T 1 is a blend of the

19 See Arist. *EN* 1.13, with reference to the *exoterikoi logoi* 1.13 1102a26–27. Backward reference to this passage, and bisection of the rational part at *EN* 1139a1–15. Same theory at *EE* 2.4 1221b27–31. *MM* I v.1 too uses the main bipartition, and I xxxiv.3 adds a subdivision of the rational part.

20 At *de An.* 3.9 432a24–27 Plato's division is attributed to τινες (cf. the anonymous reference *Top.* 5.4 133a30–31), that into λόγον ἔχον and ἄλογον τοῖς δέ. No names.

21 Arist. *Phys.* 1.8 191a24–25, *Met.* A.3 983b1–3, Γ.5 1010a1–3; physicists included A.7 988a18–19. In a more neutral sense already *Protr.* fr. 44 Düring ap. Iambl. *Protr.* 54.4.

22 Pl. *Men.* 86b; *Phd.* 66a, 90d, esp. 99e. See *Phd.* 66a, 90d; *Crat.* 438d; *Rep.* 501d.

genealogical approach of the former (including the comparison of Socrates with the Pythagoreans and Plato) with the contents of the latter.

I begin with the first *Metaphysics* passage.

The Pythagoreans and Socrates are mentioned next to each other in the course of Aristotle's critical evaluation, in *Met. A*, of the attempts of the Pythagoreans (in ch. 5) and Plato (in ch. 6) to deal with the formal cause. This comparison of their respective philosophies focuses on the relation between numbers or Forms on one side and things on the other. The Pythagoreans did not attribute separate existence to numbers, while Plato, who had been taught by Heraclitus' follower Cratylus that sensible things are in constant flux, attributed separate existence to the Forms which he derived from the general definitions of his master Socrates.<sup>23</sup>

Aristotle tells us that the Pythagoreans 'began' (chronological priority again) to *define* the essence of things, e.g. of the 'double' and of 'justice', but did so very superficially.<sup>24</sup> But

T 2:<sup>25</sup> Socrates, who occupied himself with ethical matters and wholly neglected the study of nature, sought the *universal* in connection with these ethical matters and became the first to *fix thought* on *definitions*; [...] [Plato's] divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and the numbers separate from things, and his introduction of the Forms, were due to his | inquiries in the region of statements<sup>26</sup>—for the *earlier* thinkers<sup>27</sup> did not share in *dialectic*.

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Aristotle emphasizes that Socrates, like the Pythagoreans, did not attribute separate existence to what he attempted to define.

Thus, we are not only informed about the history of earlier attempts to find out about the four causes. A bonus is included, for these passages in chapters 5 and 6 of the first Book of the *Metaphysics* turn out to be explicitly, *inter*

23 For Aristotle's standard comparison of the Pythagoreans and Plato (and his followers) see Burkert (1972), 28, 31.

24 Arist. *Met. A*.5 987a19–25.

25 Arist. *Met. A*.6 987b1–4 + 987b29–32 (987b1–6 is fr. I B 24 Giann., 1st text).

26 Identified as based on Pl. *Phd.* 99e, where the Platonic Socrates takes refuge in the study of 'statements' (λόγοι— or: 'definitions', 'theories') as opposed to that of the 'things' around us (πράγματα). See *Ap.* 38a, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι κτλ., Xen. *Mem.* I 2.17, Σωκράτην [...] διαλεγόμενον κάλλιστα περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρωπίνων. Interesting and perhaps unconscious echo at Edelstein (1967), 93 n. 81: 'Plato, [...] turning away from the direct study of phenomena to the scrutiny of human opinions'.

27 See below, n. 37 and text thereto.



*alia*, about the history of *definition*. As to relative chronology the Pythagoreans (ch. 5) come before Socrates (ch. 6), just as Pythagoras comes before Socrates in T 1. But in T 2 Socrates, not (Pythagoras or) the Pythagoreans, is 'first' as to what really matters, viz. concentrating on *universal* definitions. Ethics has only become part of the picture because, after all, Socrates had given up natural philosophy in favour of e.g. the inquiries we see him making in Plato's so-called early dialogues: what is (the essence of) courage etc., what (of) virtue.

Aristotle notes that the efforts of the Pythagoreans to formulate definitions were much more modest than those of Socrates. They were not restricted to ethical concepts, though it is of some interest that in their idiosyncratic way these people attempted to include the virtue of 'justice'. Aristotle adds that (unlike Socrates<sup>28</sup> and Plato, naturally) the Pythagoreans were innocent of dialectic.<sup>29</sup> So the concept of dialectic is added to that of definition. Though attempts at definition on the one hand and at dialectical reasoning on the other were made by the same individual, e.g. Socrates, or by the same | people, history of definition is not the same as history of dialectic—definition and dialectic, we may say, are different genera of 'logic'.

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The history of logic has more than one beginning: that of definition here begins with the Pythagoreans (below, T 3, we shall find an alternative discoverer), that of dialectic with Socrates. According to Aristotle's lost *Sophist* there is an alternative discoverer of dialectic as well, viz. Zeno of Elea. One can only hypothesize about the lost context; Zeno may have been mentioned as the first to practise a form of *dialectica utens* strong enough to argue both sides of a case, as in Plato's *Parmenides*. Empedocles may have been mentioned in the same breath because he tries to persuade a particular person, or a particular audience.<sup>30</sup>

A revised version of the account in T 2 is found in ch. 4 of the penultimate Book of the *Metaphysics*.<sup>31</sup> The content is, again, a critique of the Theory of Forms and Numbers (this time including further developments due to Plato's immediate followers). We learn again that the influence of the arguments of the

28 See Arist. *SE* 33 183b7–8, the final chapter, on Socrates practising so to speak one half of dialectic, i.e. the questioning part (cf. 11 172a17–18). See e.g. Berti (1986), and Fait (2002), 460–462.

29 See Burkert (1972), 46.

30 Testimonia for Aristotle's lost *Sophist* (fr. 1 Ross *ap.* D.L. 8.57, 9.25, S.E. *M.* 7.6–7) tell us that according to this work the inventor of dialectic was Zeno, as Empedocles of rhetoric. Informative discussions by Berti (1988), Brunschwig (1994), Dorion (2002). Dorion argues that in view of what is in the final chapter of *Sophistical Refutations* the testimony for *Sophist* should be rejected, which goes a bit far.

31 See Jaeger's note to his text *ad loc.*

Heracliteans motivated Plato's attribution of separate existence to the Forms. Again the views of Socrates and the Pythagoreans are canvassed, but the contribution of another authority is taken into account as well:<sup>32</sup>

345 T 3: Socrates occupied himself with the *ethical* virtues, and in connection with them became the *first* to raise the problem of universal *definitions*—for of the *natural philosophers* Democritus touched on the matter to a limited extent only<sup>33</sup> by defining, after a fashion, the hot and the cold; while the Pythagoreans had *before this* (πρότερον) treated of a few things, whose formul|as they connected with numbers, e.g. opportunity, justice, or marriage—but it was natural that Socrates should seek the essence. For he was seeking to deduce, and the essence is the starting-point of deductions. For there was as yet none of the *dialectical* strength [i.e. capability] which enables people, even without knowledge of the essence, to study opposites, and (to consider) whether the knowledge of opposites is the same (knowledge). Anyway, two things may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting point of science. But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; this is what the others [sc. Plato etc.] did.

Like its predecessor in Book A of the *Metaphysics*, this excursus in one of Aristotle's major critical accounts of the Theory of Forms includes remarks on the history of *definition* and *dialectic*. With regard to relative chronology (the actual presentation is the other way round) the Pythagoreans again come before Socrates, whose doctrine is once again sandwiched between those of the Pythagoreans and Plato. Democritus seems to figure here as a contemporary of Socrates.

Perhaps even more clearly than in T 2 Socrates is now 'first' as to what really matters, namely the search for universal definitions. And this Socrates may even be credited with the deliberate use of inductive arguments. The efforts of the Pythagoreans to formulate definitions, Aristotle notes again, were much less confident than those of Socrates. Nonetheless, while in their idiosyncratic way these people attempted to include 'justice', their efforts (unlike Socrates') were not restricted to ethical concepts.

32 Arist. *Met.* M.4 1078b17–30 (1078b17–32 is fr. I B 26 Giann., 1st text).

33 ἐπὶ μικρόν. See Arist. *Phys.* 2.2 194a20–21, 'Empedocles and Democritus touched for a small part (ἐπὶ μικρόν [...]) τὴν μέρῳς) on form and the essence'; for Empedocles see also *Met.* A.10

Democritus, from the category of the philosophers of nature (φυσικοί), is added to the list we know from Book A—Democritus, who is said to have dabbled in definition to the extent that he determined the *physical* concepts hot and cold, though after a fashion and only slightly. No reference is made to his attempts to define ethical notions, be it 'after a fashion and only slightly'!

As indicated above our present passage, like its predecessor, is not about definition only: it also contains an observation (this time more specific) pertaining to the history of *dialectic*. Aristotle tells us that Socrates did not yet 'possess the *dialectical* strength which enables people, even without knowledge of the essence, to study opposites, and (to consider) whether the knowledge of opposites is the same'. So a weaker form of dialectic is explicitly said to have already been available to him. The phrase 'the knowledge of opposites is the same' is often presented as an example of a common view, or dialectical proposition, in the *Topics* and elsewhere, and of a | 'logical' proposition on (only) one occasion if I am not mistaken, namely in *Top.* I 14.<sup>34</sup>

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Accordingly, T 3 too is concerned with the history of 'logic' rather than ethics. 'Definition', we have already noticed, may be considered a genus in the sense of the *Topics* passage discussed in section 1 above. By selecting and commenting upon (some of) the *doxai*, inclusive of name-labels, which come under this head of 'definition' Aristotle follows his own rule.<sup>35</sup>

The urge to try and formulate definitions according to Aristotle thus came about in a quasi-spontaneous way in the context of Pythagorean numerology and Democritean physics, and, indeed, in the course of Socrates' ethical inquiries.

One should not conclude that Aristotle means that the Pythagoreans influenced Democritus or Socrates, or that Democritus influenced Socrates. No: he is arguing at appropriate length against the *separate* existence of Forms and Principles and Ideal Numbers or Mathematical Numbers posited by Plato and his followers, and he emphasizes (again) that Socrates cannot be saddled with this mistake. Hence his insistence that Socrates' definitions did not involve a meta-physical follow-up—one not to be attributed to Democritus, or the Pythagoreans, either, whose primitive definitions are not even universal.

993a17–24. For this Democritean attempt at definition see Thphr. *Sens.* 68 θερμὸν δὲ καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τοῖς σχήμασιν.

34 Arist. *Top.* 1.14 105b24. I cannot enter here into the scope of the difficult phrase 'to study opposites ... without knowledge of the essence.' For various suggestions see Evans (1977), 18–30, Berti (1996), and Rossitto (2000). For the relative 'strength' (capability) of Socrates' dialectic cf. Arist. *Met.* Γ.2 1004b22–25, on the difference in the 'type of its force' (τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως) by which philosophy is distinguished from dialectic.

35 See above, n. 5, text to n. 9.

A further at first sight genealogical passage may also be quoted in this context, this time from the first chapter of Book I of the *Parts of Animals*. It is about definition too; not, however, about dialectic. It omits the Pythagoreans, but the presence of Democritus (as well as that of Socrates' name) provides a link with T 3:

347 T 4:<sup>36</sup> 'The reason why *our predecessors*<sup>37</sup> failed to hit on this method of treatment [i.e. explanation by means not only of the material but also of the formal/final cause], was that they were not in possession of (the notion of) essence, nor of any definition of substance. The *first* who came near it [sc. such a definition] was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary method in natural science, but was merely brought to it by constraint of facts. *In the time* of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men gave up inquiring into nature, and people doing philosophy diverted their attention to useful virtue and political (virtue).'

The Pythagoreans, as noted, are not mentioned. We may recall that Aristotle at *Top.* I 14 spoke of selecting views that are to be dealt with. Selection implies omission; examples from two different fields of philosophical inquiry are sufficient in the present context.

Democritus the natural philosopher is mentioned again, but the result of his attempts is not specified the way it is in T 3. According to Aristotle he failed to realize that explanation by means of the formal/final cause is indispensable in physics. That he only came somewhere near the definition of essence, because this is where the nature of his inquiries willy-nilly brought him, is a general observation also applied to other physicists, in similar contexts.<sup>38</sup> Oddly, Aristotle fails to indicate that Democritus is a (younger) contemporary of Socrates; it is also puzzling that he says Democritus, not Empedocles, was the first physicist to come thus close. Empedocles, who 'stumbled' upon the notion that it is 'the ratio [sc. of elementary ingredients in an organic compound] which is a thing's essence or nature', is in fact mentioned a few lines

36 Arist. *PA* 1.1 642a24–31 (= fr. I B 27 Giann.); see Düring (1943), 94–95.

37 τοὺς προγενεστέρους. See above, text to n. 27.

38 E.g. Arist. *PA* 1.1 642a19–20 (immediately before the passage quoted above), *Phys.* 2.2 194a20–21, *Met.* A.3 984a19–20, A.3 984b10. The catalogue of Democritus' works at D.L. 9.47 contains the titles of nine treatises beginning with the word 'causes', one of them a treatise in three Books entitled Αἰτίαι περὶ ζώων α' β' γ' (Democr. 68B1a DK). References to the latter work in Aristotle are collected Democr. 68A146–150 DK.

earlier in the same chapter.<sup>39</sup> One may surmise that Democritus is preferred here because his mechanistic explanation of causality in biology makes him an ideal opponent, to be criticized as a backdrop to Aristotle's own teleological approach.<sup>40</sup>

Ethical inquiry is opposed to the study of nature, just as in T 2; it is mentioned because the search for definitions is said to have been ingrained in it. The search for essence and substance is linked with Socrates' name and time, but in more general terms this time. His contemporaries, practitioners of philosophy who like him gave up the | study of nature in favour of that of 'useful 348 virtue and political virtue', are Sophists, I suppose.

T 4 differs from T 3 in that it focuses on a two-pronged diairesis pertaining on the one hand to logic (the use of definition), and to the study of nature on the other. This diairesis is disguised as a genealogy, inclusive of a relative chronology. In the context of physics Democritus by no means went far enough, while those who made some progress in the right direction abandoned physics altogether. The implication is that one has to be concerned with *both* physics *and* definition, and to know how to define essence and substance as a necessary condition of causal explanation in physics, if one wishes to practise biology as it should be practised.

We should, however, realize that texts T 2 to T 4, focusing on physics and logic, do not contain anything comparable to the reference in T 1 to Socrates' famous ethical paradox that virtue is knowledge *ἐπιστήμη*; or (practical) wisdom, *φρόνησις*—terms Aristotle seems to use interchangeably in this context. To find parallels we must look at the genuine ethical treatises.

The *Eudemian Ethics* contains five references to this doctrine with Socrates' name added. The most relevant of these (here quoted only in part), the first one from the first and the second from the last Book of the treatise, are:<sup>41</sup>

T 5a: Socrates [...] thought that the end is to know virtue, and used to inquire what is justice, what bravery and each of the (other) parts of virtue; and this conduct was reasonable, for he thought *all the virtues to be forms of knowledge*,<sup>42</sup> so that to know justice and to be just come to be

39 Arist. *PA* 1.1 642a18–23.

40 See Arist. *GA* 5.8 788b9–89b15 (with Cherniss, 1935, 256–257), *Met.* A.4 985b4–20.

41 Arist. *EE* 1.5 1216b3–10 (T 5a, = fr. I B 28 Giann.), 3.1 1229a14–15 (= fr. I B 34 Giann., presupposes we know the wider context), 3.1 1230a7–8 (= fr. I B 35 Giann., 'courage is knowledge'), 7.13 1246b33–34 (T 5b, = fr. I B 29 Giann.).

42 'All the virtues' (cf. below, text to n. 47), i.e. like 'the virtues' and 'all the virtues' in T 1 or

simultaneously. [...] So he inquired what virtue is, but not how it comes to be and from what.

**T 5b:** the Socratic (view) that there is nothing stronger than practical wisdom is correct. But that he said that it [sc. the virtue of *phronêsis*] is knowledge, that is not correct.

349 **T 5a** is the beginning of the account of virtue and *phronêsis* in the *Eudemean Ethics*,<sup>43</sup> so deals with the same topic (*genos*) as **T 1**. Aris|totle says that Socrates failed to state how virtue comes to be and from what; the author of the *Magna Moralia*, just before his genealogical account of the concept of virtue, emphasizes that this is exactly what one should do.<sup>44</sup>

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Socrates' name occurs for the first time as far down as Book 3. While the other *Ethics* gives a brief outline of his whole theory of virtue the first time the name occurs, the *Nicomachean Ethics* on this first occasion only tells us that he believed that 'courage is knowledge',<sup>45</sup> so supposedly his overall theory is familiar. We hear more in the final chapter of Book 6, one of the five named references in this treatise involving the famous paradox:

**T 5c:**<sup>46</sup> 'Socrates was in part on the right track and in part mistaken. In believing that *all the virtues*<sup>47</sup> are forms of practical wisdom he was mistaken, but he was right in saying that they are not [i.e. cannot exist] without practical wisdom. [...] Socrates, then, thought the virtues are forms of reason (for he believed that they were, *all of them, forms of knowledge*), while we hold that they are (merely) accompanied by reason'.

Unsurprisingly, in the ethical treatises the details and practical implications of Socrates' ethical theory are of primary importance. In the *Metaphysics* and *Parts of Animals*, as we have seen, they are not. But unlike these other works the genuine ethical treatises do not provide genealogies of concepts with name-labels attached. Though Socrates' name and ethical doctrine are presented

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the vague 'ethical matters' in **T 2**, not merely 'the ethical virtues' as in the more precise account of **T 3**, or mere 'useful and political virtue' as in **T 4**.

43 Announced shortly before, *EE* 1.5 1216a38.

44 *MM* I i.4, δεῖ ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, πρῶτον περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, τί τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται.

45 *EN* 2.5 116b4–5, see *Pl. Prt.* 360b.

46 *EN* 6.13 1144b17–30 (= fr. I B 30 Giann.). See Giannantoni (1990b), 312.

47 See above, n. 42.

quite early in the *Eudemian Ethics*, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* only a part of the doctrine appears when the name is mentioned for the first time, and rather late at that.

I therefore believe that one may indeed posit (as already intimated above) that the Socratic section of the introductory genealogy of the concept of virtue in *Magna Moralia* has been fabricated on the basis of (selections from) genealogical accounts which include Socrates' attempts at (ethical) definition in other treatises (T 2–T 4), and the fuller discussion of his moral doctrine in the genuine ethical treatises (T 5a–c).

### Note 2018

On Aristotle's attitude to the past see now also my paper 'Aristotle's disciplines', in: Liebersohn, Y.Z. & alii eds., *For a Skeptical Peripatetic*. FS. Glucker, Sankt Augustin 2017, 101–121.

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## Hermann Diels (1848–1922)

### Abstract

Diels put the study of the Presocratics on a new basis, both by reconstructing the tradition of the transmission and by his editions of their remains. These works still to a large extent dominate the scene today. Though first and foremost an editor of texts, Diels also held views concerned with the relation between religious and rational thought that influenced his interpretation. I attempt to follow (not slavishly) his career as a student of the Presocratics, though to do justice to the richness and importance of his contributions one would at least need a full-length monograph.

### Keywords

Bywater – Bernays – Diels – Usener – Zeller – early reviews – correspondence – *Physicorum historia* – doxography – editing fragments – mysticism – rationalism – pessimism – religion – Anaximander – Heraclitus – Empedocles – chapter sequence

### 1 Four Reviews

In 1877 Ingram Bywater published an edition of the *Reliquiae*, the ‘Remains’, or fragments and testimonia, of Heraclitus. Bywater had made a name for himself even in Germany by his discovery of remains of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus, published eight years before in the *Journal of Philology*.<sup>1</sup> In the edition of the Heraclitean remains he among other things generously appended the *vita* from Diogenes Laërtius, selections from the first book of the Hippocratic treatise *Regimen*, and the so-called *Heraclitean Letters*. The little book (xiv + 89 pp., preface and annotation in Latin; no translation of the fragments) was reviewed by Diels in the *Jenaer Literaturzeitung* of the same year. Diels was not yet thirty, still living as a schoolteacher in Hamburg, and so far had published his dissertation and a few articles, among which the seminal paper on Apollodorus’ *Chronika* in 1876. A preliminary but otherwise complete

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1 Bywater 1869.

version of the *opus mirandum* entitled *Doxographi Graeci* was finished in the same year as the review was published, and sent to Berlin as response to the ‘Preisfrage’ of the Berlin Academy.

The detailed and laudatory review of Bywater’s book (almost four long columns of small print) is remarkable from several points of view, not least because it reveals to us the *editor futurus* of the *Parmenides* (hereinafter *Parm*) of 1897, the *Herakleitos* | (hereinafter *Her*) of 1901 and 1909, and especially the *Poetae Philosophi* of 1901 and the *Vorsokratiker* of 1903 (hereinafter respectively *PPF* and *VS*). 390

Diels, like Bywater in his preface, briefly refers to Heraclitean studies in the 19th century beginning with Schleiermacher. He alludes to the discovery and publication in 1850, 1851 and 1860 of the later books of Hippolytus’ *Refutatio*, which added a number of verbatim fragments,<sup>2</sup> states that much has been written of which perhaps one had better not speak, and concludes that a satisfactory collection of Heraclitean fragments had not been available, for the ‘stimulating’ work of Paul Schuster is not adequate. In Schuster’s study the badly translated Greek texts have been tucked away in the footnotes, and are hard to find because an *index locorum* is lacking. The author’s ambitious attempt to arrange the fragments according to their original position has failed.<sup>3</sup> These criticisms show what demands should in Diels’ view be satisfied by an edition of fragments: the ancient texts are of primary importance and should be presented as completely, clearly, and objectively as possible (one is tempted to say: with as little interpretation as one can get away with), with references to and quotations of the context in the source authors, and they should be easily accessible (via an *index locorum* of source authors, one presumes). The translation should be without pretensions and as close as possible to the original. In the case of Heraclitus, moreover, the attempt to reconstruct the sequence of the fragments on the original scroll is doomed.

Part of this much-needed editorial work has now been done, by an Englishman. The readers of the *Jenaer Literaturzeitung* need not worry. The author, known to the German public because of his paper on the *Protrepticus*, is fully aware of ‘our’ methodology and literature, e.g. the fundamental contributions to Heraclitean studies of Jacob Bernays.<sup>4</sup> Bywater refers to Johannes Vahlen’s

2 Discussed Bernays 1854a and 1854b.

3 The subtitle of Schuster 1873 is ‘Ein Versuch, dessen [sc. Heraclitus’] Fragmente in ihrer ursprünglichen Ordnung wiederherzustellen’. The review of Rohde 1873 is also very critical, e.g. on Schuster’s bizarre rejection of Sextus’ testimony about the position of two fragments at the beginning (in one case confirmed by Aristotle).

4 See above n. 2, and below text to n. 7. Bernays 1869 also was the first to study the echoes of the fragments in the pseudo-Heraclitean letters.

edition of the *Reliquiae* of Ennius (Vahlen 1854) and Otto Ribbeck's edition of the *Fragmenta* of the Roman writers for the stage (Ribbeck 21871–1873) as his models,<sup>5</sup> and he has been influenced by Cobet as well. His account of the Heraclitean tradition is noteworthy because of the attention bestowed on the various receptions by Stoics, Skeptics, and Christians. The ordering of the fragments is Bywater's, and is not explained by him—this is not so important, because Schuster's attempt is anyhow wrong. For each fragment the testimonia have been diligently collected, and where different ancient versions of the same fragment are available these are printed. A selection of *variae lectiones* and of critical remarks by scholars is also provided. It is not to be expected that this collection of 130 genuine and 8 false fragments will be increased in the future.<sup>6</sup> As to the textual appendix, he praises Bywater's attempt, on the basis  
 391 of four manuscripts | and the first Stephanus edition, to provide a better text than Cobet's of the *vita* (and suggests a few improvements). For the chapters from *Regimen* too Bywater provides a better text.<sup>7</sup> Diels notes that the aphorisms and playful and obfuscating style of the Hippocratic author show what the model may have looked like.

We notice the further demands an edition of fragments according to young Diels should meet. It is of primary importance to establish a *recensio* of the texts included on the basis of a collation of the manuscripts that are (or seem to be) relevant. Different versions of the same texts in various authors and *variae lectiones* in, or pertaining to, one and the same text should be noted, printed, and explained. The apparatus should be critical also in the sense of including the more important emendations and interpretative proposals of scholars. And where ancient evidence for a sequential ordering of the fragmentary material is lacking, one should not try to impose a semblance of order.

In sum, the principal tasks of an editor of fragments according to Diels are to collect, study, and critically evaluate the sources, and to present the evidence in as objective a way as possible. The edition of the ancient texts themselves has to meet the editorial standards of the textual criticism and stemmatology of the nineteenth century which have become associated with the names of Hermann and Lachmann.

One may feel some surprise that Diels referred to the great editions of fragments by Vahlen and Ribbeck, while omitting to speak of his Doktorvater Usener's dissertation *Analecta Theophrastea* of 1858. For it is this careful,

<sup>5</sup> Bywater 1877, v.

<sup>6</sup> This was written before our knowledge of Greek literature began to be broadened by the papyri.

<sup>7</sup> Bywater 1877, vii refers to Bernays 1854a and 1854b and 1869.

and carefully argued, edition, including critical apparatus and annotation, of the *pinax* of Theophrastus' works in Diogenes Laërtius plus the fragmentary remains in Simplicius and elsewhere which Usener (and in some cases some others) attributed to a lost treatise, which became the model, or at least a very important model, for Diels' own editorial practice.<sup>8</sup> The excuse for this silence, presumably, is that Usener's work is not mentioned by Bywater. Even so, we may believe that Diels' evaluation of the latter's edition was strongly influenced by his familiarity with the *Analecta Theophrastea*. The Theophrastus fragments collected by Usener were incorporated with some modifications in Diels' *Doxographi Graeci* of 1879; naturally, they will have been included already in the large manuscript (now lost), sent, as we have seen, to Berlin in the year the Bywater review was published.

Another review, published the next year in the same periodical, confirms these impressions.<sup>9</sup> It is a devastating short critique of Emminger 1878, an unfortunate attempt to establish the contribution of Aristotle's writings to our knowledge of the Presocratics—the first part, and the only published, of a prize-winning essay (Würzburg) dealing with Aristotle's treatment of the philosophers from Thales to Plato. Diels scathingly says that the author should have practised the same moderation concerning the first part of his study as he has demonstrated about the second. Only a selection of passages is provided, part in the text, part in the footnotes, so | the work is even useless for a quick check. Emminger merely paraphrases, often incorrectly, what is in Aristotle, follows the excellent Zeller slavishly for which he is not to be reproved but which makes his work less urgent, and where he tries to contribute something new he makes horrible mistakes. 'Die Fragmente sind fast gar nicht berücksichtigt' (Diels 1878, 9). Diels acutely observes that differences between treatises should have been taken into account: there is a distinction to be made between an anecdote in *On the Parts of Animals* and the accounts of the essence of Heraclitus' doctrine in *Physics* or *Metaphysics*. He ends by expressing the hope that a more competent person ('ein Berufener') will not be deterred by Emminger's failure to take upon himself this important research as extensively and thoroughly as is required. One wonders whom he had in mind. What is anyhow clear is that he claims again that the evidence should be presented in as critical and full a way as is necessary, and be as clear and easily accessible as possible.

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8 The dissertation is dedicated to Usener's Doktorvater Ritschl, and to Brandis, who (see Bremmer 1990, 464) aroused his interest in the problems connected with the transmission of ancient philosophy.

9 Diels 1878.

One also notes that he insists on the importance of the fragments meaning, I suppose, both the verbatim fragments and the attestations (in other sources than Aristotle) for the interpretation of Aristotle's reports.

These early reviews of Bywater (plus Schuster) and Emmerdinger demonstrate Diels' editorial stance. Some of his preferred interpretative positions are briefly formulated in two other reviews, published several years later in his *Book Notes on the Presocratics* in the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*. The first of these deals with Pfeleiderer 1886, an inquiry into the relation between Heraclitus' thought and the mysticism of the mystery religions (the 'Mysterienidee').<sup>10</sup> This work, Diels states, is an utter failure, since its author lacks the required historical and philological expertise, and knows little or nothing about source-criticism ('Quellenkritik'). The subject itself is of great interest, but the important and productive study and exposition of the influence of the mysticism of the 7th and 6th centuries on the thinkers of the 6th to 4th centuries should not be undertaken out of the blue, and requires that one has familiarized oneself with the historical development and the (local) varieties of this religious reformation ('religiöse Reformation'). One must have thoroughly studied the connections of this movement with philosophy, that is to say its links with 'Anaximander, Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Empedocles, then with Plato, and the Aristotle of the *Protrepticus*' (Diels 1888, 108f.). As a matter of fact, the influence of the 'Mysterienidee' on Heraclitus, who criticizes the mysteries (B14 D.-K.), is much less pronounced than on those other philosophers.

Thus, Diels is convinced that the influence of the so-called mystery religions is of crucial importance, but he rejects superficial speculation and insists on a thorough and responsible philological approach and sifting of the evidence. This is also clear from his critical note on Gruppe 1887, a study of Greek cults and myths in connection with the Oriental religions, which contains a section on the Orphic theogonical poems in relation to early Greek philosophy, especially Heraclitus.<sup>11</sup> Gruppe is learned and knows his sources, but his results as well as his method are the opposite of inspiring, even though it should be recognized that nowadays few | people believe in 'die völlige Autochthonie der griechischen Spekulation' (Diels 1889a, 89). Diels admits that the original form of the Orphic *Rhapsodies* may go back to the 6th century, and believes that Orphic eschatological mysticism (by which he means the view that the immortal soul returns to its divine origin) is even older. But this

10 Diels 1888, 105–110.

11 Diels 1889a, 88–93.

main Orphic idea, viz. the ‘Grundgedanke des wechselnden Entstehens und Vergehens im einheitlichen Prinzip’ (Diels 1889a, 91), is valid for the hylozoistic philosophical movement in general rather than for Heraclitus in particular. As to other so-called Orphic evidence one has to be extremely careful. Gruppe thinks the purported correspondence of Greek cults with ancient Oriental wisdom proves this literature to be early. But Diels cannot follow, for (Diels 1889a, 92f.)

der kaleidoskopische Wirbel aller möglichen ägyptischen, phönikischen, assyrischen, indischen Philosopheme verwirrt den klaren Blick nicht minder als die verblüffende Methode, diese orientalische Urphilosophie nicht aus den alten ächten Quellen, sondern oft aus den trübsten Lachen spätesten Griechentums zu schöpfen [...]. Orientalische Phantasmagorien umgaukeln das Auge und aus den wunderlichen Fratzen paradiesischer Urweisheit sieht man die Schatten von Creuzer, Röth und Gladisch auftauchen, die ihrem jungen Adepten freundlich grüssend zuwinken.<sup>12</sup>

Diels against Gruppe makes it very clear that he is on the side of rationalism and scholarship, that is to say of Voss and Hermann against Creuzer, who believed the evidence of the late Neoplatonists, and of Zeller against Röth (a serious scholar, who knew both Sanscrit and Egyptian) as well as against the grotesque ideas of Gladisch.<sup>13</sup> In his still very readable paper on the study of Greek philosophy from the 1790s to the 1840s, young Zeller had already argued against followers of Creuzer’s friend Schelling, scholars like Ast, Rixner, and Windischmann, who (like others then and later) had argued the influence of Oriental wisdom upon early Greek philosophy.<sup>14</sup>

Nevertheless Diels shares with these opponents the view that a significant relation has to be assumed between the ‘Grundgedanke’ of Orphic mysticism and early Greek philosophy. I cannot here go into the fascinating history of the discussion of these issues in the 19th century, and shall do so elsewhere. We may also note that an influence of early Orphism on early philosophy finds defend-

12 This criticism was grist to Zeller’s mill, see Zeller 1892, 25 n. 1. Lortzing 1903, 153–156, says it is not correct.

13 For Creuzer see the documents collected in Howald 1926. The views of Gladisch e.g. 1841–1844, 1859, and of Röth 1846–1858, are argued against e.g. at Zeller 1892, 29–44. See also Lortzing 1903, 143–146.

14 Zeller 1844 (quoted from 1910), 24–29. *Ibid.* 45 Ritter 1829 is praised for his thorough and far-reaching researches resulting in the rejection of the ‘angebliche Priorität der Orientalen’.

ers even today.<sup>15</sup> I find it difficult to agree, but cannot deal with this question in the present context either.

## 394 2      **Physicorum Historia**

Diels' name has become indissolubly linked with 'the' Presocratics. In the course of his long career he provided new and solid foundations for the study of the Presocratics and created a new approach, though one should realize that his methods and techniques are those of nineteenth century classical philology. Most of the editions of works and fragments published by him are still in daily use after a hundred years or more. It is therefore at first sight quite astonishing that his interest in and his work on the Presocratics were in a way a product of circumstance.

Diels' Doktorvater Usener had been studying the ancient traditions concerned with the historiography of philosophy since his dissertation of 1858, and young Diels was one of the promising Bonn students he wished to involve in this project. Diels' first published result was his dissertation of 1870, part of the researches on the doxographical tradition which were to result in the magisterial *Doxographi Graeci* (hereinafter *DG*) of 1879.<sup>16</sup> One of Usener's aims was the reconstruction of a lost work by Theophrastus. The title of this work he (and, following him, Diels) believed to be *Physikôn Doxai*, 'Tenets of the Philosophers of Nature'—not as I believe (and I am by no means alone) *Physikai Doxai*, 'Physicist Tenets': tenets in the field of physics. This difference in the interpretation of the first genitive in the title seems insignificant, but the consequences are large.<sup>17</sup> Theophrastus' work according to Diels, *DG* 103–106, consists of systematic chapters, treating the material topic by topic or rather problem by

15 For Creuzer see below n. 65 and text thereto. Finkelberg 1986 and 1989 is a modern supporter, while a more balanced view is found Betegh 2002, 175–176. For a discussion of Orphic and oriental ideas in the nineteenth century see now above, ch. 3.

16 For what follows see the first two chapters of Mansfeld and Runia 1997 plus *ibid.* 329–332, and Mansfeld 1999.

17 That reading *Physikôn* instead of *Physikai Doxai* would exclude the tenets of doctors and others possibly escaped Usener and Diels. The latter's pupil Heidel 1933, 27–28, perhaps put on the wrong track by the argument of Diels *DG* 102, and the subsequent discovery of *Anonymus Londinensis*, at any rate argues explicitly that the purported division of labour between Theophrastus, Eudemos (mathematics), and Menon (medicine) caused 'the doxographic tradition, which derives from Theophrastus' to ignore data proper to the others. This is not true; for doctors in Aëtius see Runia 1999, and there are also about 20 tenets of astronomers.



problem, such as the discussion of the principles from Thales to Plato cited by Simplicius in his commentary on the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*, or of sense-perception and its objects extant as the opusculum *De sensibus* which he believed to be a fragment of the so-called *Physikôn Doxai*. The title Φυσικὴ ἱστορία cited Simp. *Phys.* 115.11 would refer to this treatise as well (*DG* 102), which consequently would be a historical work in the manner of, say, Diogenes Laertius—a suggestion which sits rather uneasily with the evidence concerning its systematic nature, duly listed by him as we have seen.

Diels further argued that fragments of Theophrastus' account of the tenets of the early philosophers can also be found outside Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, viz. in the systematic, problem-oriented handbook of a certain Aëtius he cobbled together from, in the main, the (tradition of the) epitome of this handbook by a ps.Plutarch entitled *On the Physical Tenets Accepted by the Philosophers* on the one hand, and parallel and often richer abstracts from the same source in the first book of Stobaeus' *Anthology* on the other, while complementary evidence was found in Theodoret's *Therapy of Greek Diseases*. This Theophrastean tradition could also be recuperated from, among others, Hippolytus, another ps.Plutarch, and Dio|genes Laërtius. In this way, access was had to what was believed to be an objective source close to the originals. The wonderful conspectus in five parallel columns of the remains of 'Theophrastus apud excerptores',<sup>18</sup> the first column of which consists of material from the chapters dealing with one philosopher after another in Hippolytus, underpins this historicizing view, for the material in these other sources, including abstracts from the systematic account of Theophrastus, is made to follow Hippolytus' prosopographical treatment. I do not suggest this result was intended: starting from Hippolytus and making the other sources comply with his order no doubt was the easiest and perhaps even best way of demonstrating the harmony of the various strands of the tradition. Nevertheless the consequence of Diels' inquiries is a *physicorum* rather than a *physica historia*.

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Whereas Theophrastus discussed physical doctrines from Thales to Plato, and the Pyrrhonist Timon of Phlius *ap.* D.L. 10.3 called Epicurus the 'last of the physicists', in the *VS* Diels' *physikoi* were eventually restricted to the philoso-

18 *DG* 133–144: quotations from Hippolytus *Elenchus* 1, ps.Plutarch *Stromateis*, Diogenes Laërtius, Aëtius, and Theophrastus (for the most part an empty column) about Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leucippus and Democritus, and Diogenes. No Empedocles and Heraclitus, presumably because in Hippolytus these philosophers are discussed in a way which according to Diels cannot be linked with Theophrastus.

phers of nature from Thales to Democritus familiar from Aristotle, though he included Democritus' successors. No Plato (we still have the *Timaeus*), no Epicurus. He also added the Sophists, thus completing his collection of 'Presocratics', as they had come to be called from the late 18th century. We may attribute this restriction to the force of the historiographical tradition, no doubt mediated especially by Zeller's great work, the first volume(s) of which had displayed the formula 'Vorsokratische Philosophie' in the title from the first edition of 1844.

The purported Theophrastean excerpts in Aëtius and other sources were eventually to take pride of place, on an equal footing with quotations of passages in Plato and Aristotle, in the sections devoted to testimonia in the individual chapters of *PPF* and *VS*.<sup>19</sup> Diels literally believed that Aëtian lemmata concerned with Presocratic philosophers contain virtually unalloyed abstracts from Theophrastus' lost work. This can for instance be illustrated from an important monograph published 20 years after the *DG*, viz. the *Parmenides* of 1897 (a pilot study for the *PPF* of 1901), where Aët. 2.7.1 on the cosmic rings (a lemma best preserved in Stobaeus) is attributed to Theophrastus, and used to construct a complicated explanation<sup>20</sup> of the verbatim fragment dealing with these phenomena (no. 12 both here and in *PPF* and *VS*): 'die Paraphrase deckt sich so weit mit diesem Fr. und ist namentlich in der seltsamen Einfügung der δαίμων vollkommen übereinstimmend, so dass die Aëtiosstelle nur als Theophrasts Paraphrase dieser Stelle angesehen werden kann'.<sup>21</sup> | But this abstract is 'offenbar stark verkürzt [...]';<sup>22</sup> a supposition which provides elbow room for the interpreter. Admittedly, it is the (difficult) verbatim fragment which lends additional credibility to the Aëtian lemma. But this is not so in other cases: the attribution to Theophrastus of the word ψευδοφανῆ (or rather of ψευδοφάνη, as Meineke conjectured) at Aët. 2.30.4 (on the moon) is merely strengthened by purported Theophrastean parallels from Hippolytus and Diogenes Laërtius.<sup>23</sup> In the paper on Anaximander's cosmos also published in 1897 Diels writes that the excerpts from the *Physikôn Doxai* (i.e. what is in Aëtius,

19 Summaries of (parts of) this reconstruction of the Theophrastean tradition e.g. at Diels 1887, 7–8, 1893, 409, 415, 1898b, 401 = *KS* 132, *VS* 1903, v–vi, repr. in the later editions.

20 Retracted *PPF* 70 *ad loc.*: 'fragmentum nondum prorsus explicatum'.

21 *Parm* 104, cf. 107: 'Theophrast paraphrasiert'. The text of the lemma is printed at the foot of the page, *ibid.* 43. Another example is the quotation of the half-line Xenophanes B30.1 *D.-K.* at Aët. 3.4.4: 'auch Theophrast, auf den die doxographische Notiz bei Aëtios 371<sup>b</sup> zurückgeht, hatte jene Verse zitiert,' Diels 1891b, 652.

22 *Parm* 106.

23 *Parm* 110–112. Also cf. *ibid.* 113 on Aët. 2.30.2 and 30.4, and 2.28.

Hippolytus etc.) are the only source next to Aristotle.<sup>24</sup> And so on. The derivational hypothesis of the *DG* tends to confirm itself.

### 3 Editing Fragments

Another important external stimulus contributing to Diels' lifelong study of the Presocratics was Zeller's request to edit the Greek text of Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (hereinafter *Phys*) for the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, the series which from December 1877 Diels was to direct under the aegis of the Berlin Academy.<sup>25</sup> One may suppose that it was precisely the wonderful editorial ability demonstrated by the *DG* (the manuscript of which Zeller had seen) that got him this other assignment. Simplicius, unique in this respect among ancient commentators on Aristotle, quotes large chunks of text by Presocratic philosophers verbatim, that is to say of those still available to him—Heraclitus and Democritus were not. Usener was not slow to realize and point out in a letter to Diels that critically editing this work of Simplicius entailed critically editing these fragments.<sup>26</sup> Diels of course knew. In the preface of the edition of books I–IV of the *Commentary* published in 1882 he says that he intends to publish an edition of the Presocratic fragments, *Philosophorum ante Socratem reliquias recensere*.<sup>27</sup> In this future work annotation will be more copious than here. In the edition of the *Commentary* Diels' aim is not the reconstruction of the original text and dialect of the fragments but of the form in which the texts were reported by Simplicius, including traces of dialect.<sup>28</sup>

In the letters exchanged by Diels with Usener, Zeller, Gomperz, and Wilamowitz we can follow the slow preparation and gestation of *PPF* and *VS*. We can also follow this progress by going through Diels' bibliography. A number of papers deal | with individual philosophers or even individual fragments. In

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24 Diels 1897b, 228 = *KS* 13, published in the same year as *Parm*.

25 Diels writes to Usener 22.3.1877 that the three volumes of manuscript of *DG* have been sent to Berlin, *DUZ* 1.121. The *Preisfrage* of the Academy of 2.7.1874 had been formulated by Zeller, presumably with an eye towards Diels' work in progress; for more details see Mansfeld and Runia 1997, 15–18. In a postcard of 12.4.1877 sent from Hamburg to his mother in Wiesbaden, Diels writes 'Gestern abend war Professor Zeller hier, um mir die Beteiligung an den Arbeiten der Akademie anzubieten. Natürlich dankbar angenommen. Es wird gleich angefangen'. Quoted Kern 1927, 53, printed *DUZ* 2.17–18.

26 *DUZ* 1.188, 30.10.1879.

27 *Phys* ix n. 2.

28 *Phys* ix–x.

the years 1888 and 1889 Diels published, as a regular feature, a *Bericht über die deutsche Litteratur der Vorsokratiker*: a review of books, chapters, and papers from 1886 to 1888 in volumes 1, 2, and 4 of the new *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*.<sup>29</sup> This seems to have been done to provide copy for the journal. It is a pity that after only five instalments this feature was discontinued. Diels can be extremely sharp and funny as well as very fair, and the overview of what was going on is interesting, perhaps mostly for the fashions of yesteryear.

After the publication of *VS* there are very few pieces dealing with Presocratic philosophers or Presocratic themes. Corrections, second thoughts, additions, and new information could all be accommodated in the revised versions of *VS* which were to appear in 1906, 1912, and 1922. The essay on the beginnings of philology among the Greeks is a lecture, delivered before a mixed audience of philologists and schoolteachers in 1909.<sup>30</sup> The short paper on Antiphon of 1916 was written because of new evidence on an Oxyrrynchus papyrus, and contains little or no interpretation. The post-war pamphlet on ancient pessimism of 1921 is quite general,<sup>31</sup> and the posthumously published essay on Anaximander which comes first in the *Kleine Schriften* published by Walter Burkert is a popular lecture.<sup>32</sup>

To return to the correspondence: Time and again Usener in his letters to Diels, from the late seventies onwards, inquires how the Presocratics are doing. Diels, working on Simplicius, writes that he is working his way through Parmenides, and hopes to have Xenophanes and Empedocles ready as well before the first volume of the *Simplicius Commentary* is printed. He intends at the very least to scim off the cream ('den Rahm abschöpfen'),<sup>33</sup> but—an at first sight unDielsian avowal—to do so more by reasoning than on the basis of the manuscripts. In Diels' published works the approaches *ratione* and *ope codicum* are much more balanced, provided *codices* are available. What is true is that his knowledge of Greek and his gift for emendation are astounding; one can understand that (as is for instance already clear from his edition of Aëtius) he was often tempted to do better than scribes, or even later sources, in his (Cobetian) view perhaps as often corrupt as not. It is therefore all the more remarkable

29 Diels 1888–1889b, 1891a. Cf. above section 1.

30 Diels 1910.

31 Diels 1921.

32 Diels 1923.

33 No wonder Usener asks whether Diels intends to publish separate editions of Parmenides and Empedocles, *DUZ* 1.221, 11.7.1880. Diels replies he has not yet decided, *DUZ* 1.225, 30.7.1880.

that, according to his own words in the *praefatio* cited above, he resisted temptation when editing Simplicius.

The manuscript of *Phys* is finished in 1881. Diels writes to Usener that it is now the turn of the Presocratics.<sup>34</sup> It was to take him much longer than he had expected. The Bernays *Nachlass*, put at his disposal by Usener, proves disappointing. The Pythagoreans present an immense problem. Diels thinks of including only the material that is earlier than Aristotle plus the Philolaus fragments, perhaps also Archytas, but | it is difficult to see which texts are pseudepi- 398  
graphical and which are not.<sup>35</sup> In the VS of 1903 there will eventually be separate chapters for Pythagoras (brief), Philolaus, the Pythagorean school, and Archytas.

But there are also happier moments. Diels' labours on behalf of the corpus of ancient physicians and his reading of the literature for instance allow him to discover Presocratic fragments not listed in Daremberg's index to Oribasius.<sup>36</sup>

In a letter of 20 May 1902 Diels tells Usener that he has come to a decision: he will throw out everything Pythagorean later than the Early Peripatos. He adds that he has now finished Anaxagoras and reached Diogenes of Apollonia, but the manuscript of the greatest and most difficult chunk ('Brocken'), viz. Leucippus and Democritus, has still to be prepared.<sup>37</sup> There will be more than 60 chapters, and the material presented (including not only numerous minor figures but also physicians and mathematicians, and even the canon of Polycletus) will demonstrate already at a first glance that Presocratic philosophy is far less metaphysical than is commonly assumed.<sup>38</sup>

34 *DUZ* 1.239, 14.8.1881.

35 *DUZ* 1.375, 10.10.1888. In his review of Windelband 1888 at 1889b, 654 Diels seems to approve of the author's decision to treat Pythagoras not in the company of the philosophers but in that of religious reformers such as the Orphics, Epimenides, etc.

36 *DUZ* 1.450, 27.12.1892.

37 *DUZ* 1.575.

38 In part repeated in the preface of VS 1903, v, reprinted in the later editions: the exact sciences especially ancient mathematics have been included, medicine too but only insofar as connected with ancient physiology. As to the sciences the example of Tannery 1887 may have played a part, though the scarce references of Diels and Zeller to the great French scholar are sadly disparaging, see *DUZ* 1.567 (Diels) and 2.104 (Zeller). The medical evidence Diels believed could be limited with regard to Wellmann's *Fragmentsammlung der griechischen Ärzte*, first volume published in 1901 with some help from Diels and others. It remained the only one. Wellmann's presentation does not distinguish between *verbatim* fragments and other testimony; he provides an arrangement that is systematic, and attributes fragments to specific works. According to the 'Vorwort', p. vii, four more volumes were planned. The planned second volume (the oldest physicians, from different schools) would certainly have contained material of interest in the context of VS.

Usener himself had long been working on the remains of Epicurus, the still indispensable edition of which he was to publish in 1887. Without mentioning his own work he ventilated a bright idea in a letter to Diels of 12 March 1886.<sup>39</sup> Diels is to direct a corpus of fragments of Greek philosophers in several volumes. Diels himself is to do the Presocratics, the Socratics will be taken care of (*Preisauflage*), for the Peripatetics someone has to be found, while a certain doctor von Arnim, a pupil of Wilamowitz, has already decided to collect the remains of the Stoics.<sup>40</sup> This ambitious project was not realized, though vols. II and III of Hans von Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* were published seventeen years later, in 1903, in the same year as the *VS*, and Vol. I in 1905. In his reply to Usener Diels writes that he has also often thought of a larger corpus himself, but that he is not yet certain how to arrange even his own collection of Presocratic remains: should one restrict oneself | to the (verbatim) fragments? If not, should one include all the available reports, or only a selection? Perhaps one should begin with the verbatim fragments plus *variae lectiones*.<sup>41</sup> We may note that in the end Diels opted for a restriction to verbatim fragments in his *Parmenides*, for exhaustive inclusion of testimonia in the *PPF*, and for selection in the *Herakleitos* and the *VS*.

*PPF*, though favouring Presocratic poetry and poetry relevant to Presocratic philosophy, also contains the remains of a few post-Socratic philosophical poets (though no Cleanthes).<sup>42</sup> The main chapters are those containing the fragments of Parmenides and Empedocles.

The layout of von Arnim's volumes of 1903–1905 resembles that of Usener's edition of the *Epicuri perditorum librorum reliquiae* of 1887, i.e. of the fragments and testimonia as distinguished from the *Epistulae* and *Ratae sententiae*,<sup>43</sup> though his apparatus criticus is very poor in comparison with Usener's. Differences of typeface serve to register the relative reliability of a fragment. The layout of Diels' volume of 1903 is very much different, as we know. Again, the stimulus came from elsewhere, or so at least Diels argued. In the *PPF* of 1901, as he tells us in the funeral oration on Kaibel figuring as the preface of this work, he followed the division of texts used by his late friend for his con-

39 *DUZ* 1.331.

40 In the first sentence of the preface of *SVF* (vol. I p. iii) von Arnim acknowledges Usener's influence: *Chrysippi Stoici fragmenta colligendi auctor mihi exstitit Usener [...] anno 1886; idemque qua via ac ratione arduum opus aggredi oporteret, docuit.*

41 *DUZ* 1.332, 9.4.1886.

42 *PPF* vii: among the fragments that are excluded are *quae inter elegiacos lyricos tragicos* [sc. of the corpus of *Poetarum Graecorum Fragmenta*] *distribuenda sint ut Cleanthi hymnus et cetera eiusmodi.*

43 Usener 1887, 83–358.

tribution to the planned series of volumes dedicated to the fragments of the individual Greek poets.<sup>44</sup> This epochal division: first testimonia, then verbatim fragments, was then also used for the edition in one large volume of VS published two years later, and of course maintained in the revised editions that were to follow. It was also applied, so to speak retroactively, to the *Herakleitos* in the second edition of 1909.

The reference to the model provided by Kaibel however is not entirely accurate (in a funeral oration one need not tell nothing but the truth), for Diels is more original than he gives out. Kaibel's edition of comic fragments begins with *De comoedia graeca commentaria vetera*, ancient accounts of comedy in both Greek (e.g. *Tractatus Coislinianus*, Tzetzes) and Latin (e.g. Diomedes, Donatus).<sup>45</sup> This substantial section, understandably, has no counterpart in either PPF or VS. In the chapters devoted to individual poets Kaibel prints the numbered *testimonia* (thus designated *disertis verbis*), most of which are biographical, before the fragments. To be sure, Bywater had printed the Laërtian *vita* of Heraclitus and Usener that of Epicurus *after* the fragments. But in the often reprinted and revised collection of philosophical fragments pioneered by Ritter & Preller the doctrines follow the biographies. Zeller in his great work begins his treatment of individual philosophers with a section 'Leben' or 'Leben und Schriften'. Tannery 1887 at the end of each chapter devoted to an individual Presocratic first has a 'Doxographie de ...' (from | DG), then 'Fragments de ...' (from Mullach). And so on. In fact, the widely popular sequence *bios-dogmata* is already Laërtian.

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In Kaibel's edition sections containing *testimonia* are followed by others containing numbered fragments of lost works. But these verbatim fragments are not called 'fragments'; they are listed under headings such as *dramata*, *poemata*, or *mimoi*. More importantly, these first and second sections are *not* distinguished from each other by the capital letters A and B which are so familiar to us from DK and the literature on the Presocratics, and which with this application are first found in PPF.

In the first edition of Diels' *Herakleitos*, on the other hand, published in the same year 1901 as PPF, this other material, viz. the testimonia pertaining to life, works, and doctrine is collected in an 'Anhang' and still printed *after* the verbatim fragments, exactly as in Bywater 1877. Diels uses the capital letters A, B, and C, but A and B are *not yet* used in the same way as in PPF and VS. A pertains to 'Leben' and 'Schrift', B not to verbatim fragments but to testimonies

44 Kaibel 1899, see Diels' account in the preface of PPF and Burkert 1999, 172.

45 Kaibel 1899, 1–83.

on 'Lehre', or 'Doxographie', and C to 'Imitation' (abstracts from *Regimen* only). These capitals, clearly, are number symbols.

In the preface to *PPF* Diels further tells us that in the course of his work on this edition of philosophical poetry he came to realize that the poetical fragments would remain incomprehensible if no information on the philosophical theories of the poets were forthcoming. Therefore he has decided to add information of doxographical provenance to the biographical data in the first section of each chapter.<sup>46</sup> But we know he had been collecting and ordering this material and thinking about it for years, in view of his planned edition of the fragments of all the Presocratics. And the doxographical tradition of course was his turf. The final layout of the two major text editions is the one we have become accustomed to: in each chapter of *PPF* and, subsequently, *VS* devoted to an individual philosopher (or school) numbered biographical and doxographical testimonia come first, and these texts are labeled A. Then, in a section B, the numbered verbatim fragments (in bigger typeface) plus bits of context from quoting authors (smaller typeface again), with references to the editions of these authors; this presentation of texts with verbatim fragments is the same as Kaibel's. In *VS* these verbatim fragments are translated into German. In several important cases, Diels tells us, it is possible to present the verbatim fragments in a sequence which comes close to that of the original, viz. when the doxography and the quoting authors provide sufficient clues.<sup>47</sup> Finally, in a section C not in Kaibel, not in *PPF*, and by no means practicable for all chapters of *VS*,<sup>48</sup> 'imitations' such as the chapters from *Regimen* where others had already seen the impact of Heraclitus' style and thought. In these C-sections Diels seems to follow the example set by Bywater.<sup>49</sup>

401 Von Arnim has been criticized for failing to adopt this to many of us self-evident and important division, and so for failing to achieve a consistent and immediately perceived distinction between the primary evidence of the verbatim fragments and other attestations; but chronology shows that he could not have profited from Diels' example. Stoic studies to some extent are still handicapped by his presentation—but this is by the way.<sup>50</sup>

46 He already tells us that this is what he will do in the preface to *Parm* of 1897.

47 *PPF* vi–vii, on Parmenides and Empedocles.

48 Already because some Presocratics 'imitate' other Presocratics.

49 Bywater 1877, vii in this context had spoken of the *imitatores* of Heraclitus, and as we have seen the abstracts from *Regimen* etc. were printed as an appendix to his edition of the verbatim fragments.

50 *SVF* is sharply and in fact appositely criticized by Diels in a letter to Wilamowitz of 27.12.1905, *DWM* 222: a 'Fragmentsammlung, die schon äusserlich unpraktisch eingerichtet ist'; failure to use the *apparatus criticus* which has been prepared by Hense for



We must also note that the references to source-authors and quotations of context in *PPF* are far more complete than in *VS* and therefore superior, though later editions of *VS* to some extent make amends.

When the one-volume edition of *VS* was published in 1903, Diels wrote in the *Vorrede* that it had proved impossible to realize the project announced in the preface of volume I of his Simplicius edition twenty years ago. His hope that critical editions of Plutarch, Galen, Clement of Alexandria, Diogenes Laërtius, Stobaeus (which he was afraid would remain a torso),<sup>51</sup> and Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica* would be published has not been fulfilled.<sup>52</sup> Scholars fail to do their duty towards scholarship! That it is impossible to produce a reliable edition of abstracts from the main source authors on the basis of such editions as are available had been Diels' sad experience while composing the *Poetae Philosophi*. This experience is one he has no wish to live through again.<sup>53</sup>

*VS* as published in 1903 is what we would call a 'reader'. It was intended for undergraduate philologists and philosophers lacking the funds to buy expensive source authors.<sup>54</sup> One moreover did not want to leave the young dependent on such selections of material as were current, as these are limited in a quantitative and even, in one case, a qualitative respect.<sup>55</sup> The material from *PPF* that could be used for *VS* had been used, even reprinted, though of necessity much pared down. In a letter to Zeller Diels refers to the book as a 'Volksausgabe', in one to Usener as a book that in spite of 'horrible compression' is far too thick.<sup>56</sup>

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Stobaeus ('mir ist ein solches Arbeiten [...] unverständlich'); too restricted *apparatus criticus* for the Laërtian texts prepared at the last minute at Diels' prompting, etc. Clearly von Arnim had failed to live up to Usener's suggestions (above n. 40).

51 Vol. IV of Hense's edition of Stobaeus was published six years later than the first edition of *VS*.

52 Noticed Praechter 1905, 128, who says Diels' project of a critical edition of all the Presocratics could not be realized because reliable editions of sources are lacking, while (*ibid.* 94) he had said only better source texts and 'Neufunde' would be able to improve a collection now available 'in einer Form [...], die [...] abschliessend genannt werden darf.'

53 See the 'Vorrede' of *VS*, 1903, vi–vii. This acerbic complaint (cited Hamelin 1978, 20–21) was not reprinted in later editions. Diels e.g. got assistance for the text of Sextus from Mutschmann and for that of Diogenes Laërtius from von der Mühl.

54 Possibly Diels follows the example of Ritter & Preller. See their preface, *RP* 1838, iii: *speravimus etiam in praelectionibus academicis hoc compendium utile futurum*.

55 Diels thinks of the unoriginal Mullach (see also Kern 1927, 106), and of Ritter & Preller, much better, see e.g. Boeckh 1877, 585, who calls its first edition a 'vorzügliches Hilfsmittel zur weitem Orientierung in den Quellen'. *RP* 71886 had been updated: readers are informed by its editor, Schultess, in the comments and footnotes in the *Prolegomena* and the section on Thales, about the argument and contents of the *DG*. This edition is favourably reviewed Diels 1898, 95–96. Burnet 41930 still uses *RP* numbering.

56 *DUZ* 2.285, 5.4.1901, '(Volks-)Ausgabe der Vorsokratiker, von denen Heraklit eine Druck-

The translations of the verbatim fragments among this compressed material are in German, as in *Parm* and *Her*; no Latin at all—hence, presumably, ‘Volksausgabe’. Clearly, Diels was not at all happy about the first edition of the work that, more than any other, would make his name into a byword. Compared with his original ambition it had turned out a shade disappointing. He said he hoped to be able to do better in the future, and as we know largely did. He also argued, apologetically, that it had been more difficult to make a selection from the available material than it would have been to print everything collected.

The book lacked an *apparatus criticus* (!) but had an *index locorum*. In the second and subsequent editions medleys of critical and exegetical annotation were added, as well as a copious *index verborum* by Walther Kranz. A marvelously detailed critical account of *VS/D.-K.* in its final and often reprinted form has been written by Walter Burkert, who briefly and usefully indicates where there is some room for improvement and additional information, but who also argues that the work of Diels and Kranz is *de facto* irreplaceable.<sup>57</sup>

#### 4      **The *Parmenides* and the *Herakleitos*. Mysticism, Rationalism, and Pessimism**

The verbatim fragments of Parmenides (no *vita* or doxography) were published separately in the pilot monograph of 1897.<sup>58</sup> In the preface Diels tells us that in the thirty years he has been studying the poet he has often had occasion to revise his views. The fragments are extremely difficult. Therefore he has added a translation as well as a very concise commentary, to show the reader how he has come to believe the lines should be understood. Not entirely accurately he adds that the comments pertain to the poetry, not the philosophy. He promises that the larger collection of philosophical poetry (i.e. *PPF*) and the even more complete collection of Presocratic philosophers (i.e. *VS*), which are being prepared, will focus on the philosophical coherency.

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probe war’; *DUZ* 1.578, 7.1.1903, “Die Vorsokratiker’, die trotz abscheulicher Kompression ein Wälzer geworden sind’.

57 Burkert 1999.

58 Originally Diels intended to present this preliminary edition at a meeting of the Berlin Academy, but the added translation and commentary made the text too long for this purpose. So he decided to publish it as a book, and added the famous ‘Anhang’ on Greek doors and locks to increase its bulk. See *DUZ* 1.529, 29.12.1896. On Parmenides’ Poem, system, and school see also Diels 1887, 249–256.

Parmenides is not a good poet<sup>59</sup>—Diels among other ancient judgements adduces Aristotle's comparison between Homer and Empedocles: the latter only shares the metre with the former. Because Aristotle must be right Diels rather surprisingly | points out that one of the best Roman poets wasted his talent on a philosophical subject, and is at his most compelling where he is disloyal to his own system, as in the sections on Venus or the Magna Mater.<sup>60</sup> Parmenides' proem is particularly bad: much remains vague; we are not told but have to figure out whether the trip goes up or down, or what is the nature of the divine figure who welcomes the poet, while banausic details concerning the means of transportation, or the doors which have to be passed, are depicted with painful accuracy. The explanation is that the transcendental counterpart of the world has vanished, since for Parmenides the world itself is unreal. In his tiresome description of the One the name of God is avoided. 403

But the image of the celestial voyage, so flat and pale and insipid in Parmenides, is in itself wonderful.<sup>61</sup> He cannot have invented it. In fact, it derives from the numerous Orphic and similar spiritual currents to be found anywhere in the Greek sixth century, the period of religious reform. One may for instance mention Epimenides and the (spurious) *Epimenedea*, or the Orphic *Rhapsody* attributed to the circle of Onomacritus (correctly, Diels says). He uses the ominous words 'mysticism' and 'pessimism',<sup>62</sup> suggesting that the phenomena these terms refer to go back much further in time. In the mid-sixth century pessimism even found its way into the rationalism of Ionian philosophy, he tells us (more on this in next the section).

This variety of mysticism is perhaps not what we would understand by this term today, but means a doctrine according to which some of the following beliefs are true: 1) the position of the soul in the body is inferior to its position when free from the body; 2) being in a body is a form of punishment; 3) eventually souls return to their origin: a divinity, or divine principle. The discovery of this mystical religious tradition next to the religious tradition of Homer and Hesiod has sometimes been attributed to Nietzsche's friend Erwin Rohde, the first volume of whose *opus magnum* was published in 1892.<sup>63</sup> Rohde's view has certainly been influential. But we have seen that Diels, in a review published

59 *Parm* 7–9. *Ibid.* 79 he speaks of Parmenides' 'staubgeborenen Poesie'.

60 The poet in question is of course one of Diels' favourites, see Kern 1927, 112–113, Rösler 1999.

61 For what follows see *Parm* 9–24.

62 See also e.g. Diels 1921, 10, 'Reformation der griechischen Religion auf pessimistischer Grundlage'.

63 Thus Lortzing 1919, 80–88, who usefully and at some length discusses most of the literature published from 1892, the year of publication of the 5th edition of the first volume

four years before *Psyche*, already insists on the importance of studying the influence of the mysticism of the 7th and 6th centuries on the philosophers of the 6th to 4th centuries BCE,<sup>64</sup> so is not dependent on Rohde's account. In fact, the idea that Orphism influenced early philosophy goes back a long way. It was for instance already argued by Creuzer, *damnatae memoriae*,<sup>65</sup> and believed by quite a few nineteenth-century scholars.

404 Parmenides' voyage to the heavens, according to Diels' innovative argument, is to be compared with the trip of the shaman's soul to the heavens, or the nether world. This is not Eleatic rationalism but Orphic mysticism, and has its roots in the | ecstatic poetry of the period of religious reform.<sup>66</sup> Empedocles imitates Parmenides, and becomes a repulsive charlatan. In his *On Nature* he begins with modestly restricting himself to human understanding,<sup>67</sup> but he ends up as a god,<sup>68</sup> and dispenses to his pupil power over winds and weather, over life and death.<sup>69</sup> The only one to bring off a successful combination of Orphic apocalypticism and Eleatic dialectic is the philosopher-poet ('Dichter-Philosoph') who in his *Phaedrus* so majestically described the voyage of the soul-carriages of gods and humans.<sup>70</sup> Note both halves of the combination philosopher-poet: Parmenides and Empedocles are philosophers who avail themselves of metre, Plato a philosopher who is at the same time a 'Dichter' ('poet', 'writer'—the semantic range of the German word is wide), and one, I may add, who does not need to use metre.

As to Parmenides' exposition Diels says that one should take into account that he differs from e.g. Empedocles in the *Purifications* in that he does not address the public, but lectures before an audience consisting of his pupils, just as Aristotle in his school writings.<sup>71</sup> This is the reason why his style is both allusive and repetitive. In Parmenides' case (apparently not in that of Aristotle, one notes) this repetitiousness symptomizes a lack of professionalism, just as in another early writer, Anaxagoras. It clearly has a didactic purpose here, but

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of Zeller's *Geschichte*. Lortzing added these pages because he believed Zeller's skeptical stance towards Orphism needed to be qualified. He does not say much about Diels, however.

64 Diels 1888, 108–109, on Pfeleiderer 1886. See above, section 1 *ad finem*.

65 Creuzer 1843, 4.661–664.

66 *Parm* 16, 21.

67 Empedocles B3 *D.-K* (B4 in *PPF*). In *Parm* Diels of course refers to Stein's numbering, given in parentheses in *PPF* and *VS*.

68 Empedocles B23.11 *D.-K*.

69 Empedocles B111 *D.-K*.

70 On Empedocles and Plato see *Parm* 22–23.

71 *Parm* 23–25.

is also an original feature of primitive literature. Diels explains it as deriving from the tradition of oral recitation: the Finns, for instance, want to hear each line of the *Kalevala* twice. Empedocles is even explicit about the usefulness of repetition!<sup>72</sup> So a genuine and traditional feature has been converted into an instructor's tool. One is a bit amazed at Diels' lack of appreciation for archaic rhetoric and indeed for the repetitive procedures of rhetoric *tout court*.

In Diels' summing-up the Poem of Parmenides is said to be a bizarre combination of the old and the new, looking, like a Janus herm, both backward and forward<sup>73</sup>—the old being the stylistic and so-called mystical features discussed above, the new the deep and difficult dialectic,<sup>74</sup> containing *in nuce* what will eventually be worked out by later generations.<sup>75</sup>

A selection of particular points of interpretation which are noteworthy: the second part of the Poem is a doxography,<sup>76</sup> and has a propaedeutic and didactic function | in the context of his school.<sup>77</sup> This view need not come as a surprise from the author of *DG*; what is interesting is that it tells us what he believed one of the purposes of doxography to be.—Parmenides B6 is aimed at Heraclitus,<sup>78</sup> for biased polemics is fatally typical of the way in which each philosopher uses to criticize his predecessor.<sup>79</sup> Note that Diels then *defends* Heraclitus against this criticism, and adds that Aristotle has been even more unjust towards the Ephesian. For Diels, the greatest ancient philosophers are Heraclitus and Plato.<sup>80</sup>—Parmenides B 8.54 τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεῶν ἐστίν is difficult

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72 Empedocles B25 *D.-K.*

73 *Parm* 25.

74 Also characterized as 'der dürre Sandboden seiner Dialektik', *Parm* 79.

75 See e.g. *Parm* 85 on the *orthoepia* of the Sophists and Socratic *logos* and *horos*. More at Diels 1910, 7–14 = *KS* 74–81.

76 *Parm* 63. At Diels 1898b, 408–409 = *KS* 129–140 n. 2 he says he did not mean a complete doxography in the Theophrastean manner, but a listing of main issues. In a paper written in Italian, not listed in the bibliography of *KS*, Diels 1899, 4–5, exemplifying Parmenides' 'tecnica scolastica', he lists the philosophers that are criticized in a way which enables one to recognize them. In *VS* he changed his mind: the second part of the Poem is the expression of Parmenides own experience and research.

77 When Diels says 'school' he does not mean a simple master-pupils relationship but (a bit anachronistically) a 'feste Schule [...], welche mit Lehrsätzen auch die Erinnerung an den Erfinder, mit der Organisation auch die Feier des stiftenden Heros der Nachwelt fromm überliefert', 1887, 246; cf. 1906, 593 on the pioneering role of Miletus. For the 'Schule' of Anaximander see also Diels 1923, 74 = *KS* 10.

78 *Parm* 68–72. Cf. Diels 1910, 7 = *KS* 74.

79 *Parm* 70, see also 1887, 250–252, where he moreover points out (following Zeller 1892, 1.553 = 1.1, 61919, 725) that Plato, too, often improves theories he wishes to refute.

80 Diels 1910, 2 = *KS* 69, '[...] Heraklit, neben Platon der tiefste Denker des Altertums'; cf. *ibid.* 13 = *KS* 80.

(the interpretation is still disputed today, and one doubts that agreement will ever be reached). Diels cleverly assumes aposiopesis of ‘only’ (‘nur’), and argues that the falseness of mortal opinion consists in the conviction that it is wrong to accept and posit as existing only a single one of these two opposites.<sup>81</sup>

A wonderfully rich book, and still most stimulating. It is a shame that the reprint published a few years ago is so shoddy. The figures pertaining to doors and locks have been reproduced in such dark grays that it is impossible to figure out what is being illustrated.<sup>82</sup>

In the second edition of the *Herakleitos* (1909) the introduction is virtually the same as in the first.<sup>83</sup> It is an improved Bywater as well as an improved Diels. The critical and exegetical comments have been amplified, and the presentation of the texts been made to conform to that of VS, as we have seen. This careful presentation and explanation of the evidence, with its enthousiastic ‘Einleitung’ providing a good and laudably brief picture of Heraclitus’ system, is still a book worth having and consulting, just as *Parm.* Even so, Diels emphasizes that he has no desire to provide an exhaustive interpretation of the philosophy; for this, readers are referred to Messrs. Zeller and Gomperz. His book is meant to serve as a first introduction, presenting the essential portions of the evidence in the form that has the greatest chance of being authentic, although it is impossible to reconstruct Heraclitus’ dialect. | Attempts to distinguish the verbatim words from those of the source authors have been made throughout, but the decision often remains difficult, because Heraclitus may be the first person to use certain words, e.g. B35 φιλοσόφους. The German translation of the verbatim fragments (think of that of Parmenides) merely shows how he has read the text.<sup>84</sup>

Diels also makes the important point (one not always heeded by subsequent scholars) that Heraclitus’ obscurity has been exaggerated.<sup>85</sup> It is not a matter of content but of form, whereas for Parmenides the opposite is true: Parmenides becomes more difficult the longer one attempts to understand what he means.

81 *Parm* 93. As good a suggestion as any that has been made. He then argues *ibid.* 93, 95, a bit cavalierly, that the single opposite that has to be assumed is identical with Being. At Diels 1910, 75 he interestingly adds that the fall of man begins with language, ‘Der Sündenfall der Menschheit beginnt mit der Sprache’. Note the term ‘Sündenfall’; Diels probably did not know what role this notion played in the philosophies of Schelling and Schopenhauer.

82 And the bibliographical appendix explaining Diels’ short references is incomplete. I should have been more severe at Mansfeld 2005, 335.

83 Occasionally a short paragraph has been added, and the gist of the pages on the ‘Titelvi-gnette’, 1901, xi–xii, has been replaced to 1909, 83. I shall refer to this second edition.

84 *Her* xv–xvi.

85 For what follows see *Her* v–xiv.

In his study of the philosopher from Elea Diels had spoken of mysticism and rationalism. He does so also in relation to Heraclitus, referring to the mystical Orphic and Pythagorean movements of the West.<sup>86</sup> In the East, in Ionia, ‘rationalism, the brother of mysticism’, produces the first beginnings of the historical and physical sciences. But in the greater personalities (‘Anaximander, Pythagoras, even Xenophanes’) scientific inquiry and mystical contemplation are linked in an astonishing way. Hence, Diels believes, the secretive and solemn language of Pindar, Aeschylus,<sup>87</sup> and Heraclitus. And the Ephesian is a prophet as well.

The text on the scroll presumably began with the words ‘Thus spoke Heraclitus’. The latest representative of the genre, one intimately related to pessimism (pessimism again, as in *Parm*), is a book entitled *Also sprach Zarathustra*.<sup>88</sup> This reference to Nietzsche,<sup>89</sup> whose book he clearly found both fascinating and repulsive, helps Diels to formulate once again one of his favourite views about Heraclitus, namely that the fragments (‘the pebbles of the mosaic’) cannot be arranged into a consistent pattern resembling the original sequence.<sup>90</sup> The ancients, he says, already noticed that Heraclitus jumps from one idea to another, and Theophrastus attributed this lack of cohesion to the philosopher’s melancholy.<sup>91</sup> This is why Diels, notoriously, prints the B-fragments in an alphabetical order according to the names of the quoting authors—with the exception of B1 and B2, quoted by Sextus Empiricus whose name does not begin with the first letter of the alphabet, because Sextus, confirmed, it is true, by Aristotle (whose name does) explicitly says that the book began with these words. Unavoidably, and as has often been pointed out, this quasi-rational procedure enhances the melancholic disorder of Heraclitus’ philosophy. And it is not |  
entirely consistent either with Diels’ pronouncement that Heraclitus’ thought is not what is difficult about him. Surely, if this is so, a responsible system-

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86 See also Diels 1910, 2–4 = *KS* 69–71, on the connexions between Heraclitus and Orphism, illustrated by his etymologizing wordplay and focusing on the soul. We note that he implicitly retracts part of his criticism of Pfeleiderer’s study of Heraclitus (for which see above, section 1).

87 On the pessimism of Pindar and Aeschylus see also Diels 1921, 16–18.

88 <sup>2</sup>*Her.* xiv. Before reading this observation I had not realized that Nietzsche’s title derives from the early Greek paratextual formulas contained in the text.

89 Diels’ attitude towards Nietzsche is ambiguous. In the letters one finds disparaging remarks, e.g. *DUZ* 2.285, 5.4.1901 Diels writes to Zeller that he is reading Nietzsche (no title cited), but ‘nicht zur Erbauung’, while in Diels 1902 Nietzsche is praised as a writer and only criticized as a failed scholar.

90 See already Diels 1877, the review of Bywater discussed above, section 1.

91 Fr. 233 *FHS&G ap. D.L.* 9.6, Heraclitus A1 *D.-K.*, I.141.4–5.

atic arrangement is preferable to one according to an alphabetical sequence of source authors, especially as long as one carefully avoids the pretense that this comes close to the original sequence.

## 5 Anaximander the Mystical Rationalist

In his footnoteless lecture on Anaximander, posthumously published in 1923, Diels at some length discusses the famous fragment, which according to him describes the coming-to-be of the universe and its parts from the One and its return to this source, so that all things that are born are destroyed again.<sup>92</sup> He points out that for us it is strange to find physical events expressed and understood in moral terms: for Anaximander it is an 'injustice', an ἀδικία, when an individual separates itself off from the infinite Whole, and this morally wrong courage is paid for with death. One being's birth is connected with another being's demise. This pessimism ('pessimistische Auffassung des Lebens') is also found, in an even more profound form he says, with Anaximander's contemporaries Mimnermus and Semonides. For comparison Diels also adduces contemporary Orphism and Pythagoreanism (just as for Parmenides and Heraclitus, as we have seen), mysticizing currents which prized the divine and immortal soul away from the mortal and sinful body.<sup>93</sup> Similarly, Anaximander summarizes the whole world in the opposition of unlimited to limited. Just as according to the secret doctrines of these sects the human soul, after endless sufferings, may in the end be united with divine Nature, so according to Anaximander one creature after another and one cosmos after another falls back into the divine, eternal, infinite Alone. Cosmological speculation blends with moral and religious thinking. In this way Greek idealism is born, Diels says, which contrasts the lowly and fleeting world and the body with eternity, and sees life down here as merely a transition towards this other life, and as a punishment for the injustice consisting in separating off from the divine *Apeiron*.<sup>94</sup>

This rather unpleasant interpretation is perhaps best known as being that of Rohde 1892–1894 and Nietzsche 1872–1873, the latter published for the first time in 1896. It is shared by Gomperz,<sup>95</sup> as well as by numerous other scholars both before and after Diels. It is tempting to trace the history of the text

92 Diels 1923, 68–70 = *KS* 4–6, Anaximander B1 *D.-K.*

93 See also Diels 1910, 2 = *KS* 69; and *ibid.* 12 = *KS* 79, where mysticism is opposed to the rationalism demonstrated by Xenophanes' criticism of traditional religion.

94 Exactly the same interpretation, including the reference to Orphism, in Diels 1921, 11–12.

95 Gomperz 1896, 46 = <sup>4</sup>1922, 47.



and interpretation of the Anaximander fragment in the 19th and 20th centuries in fuller detail, as a contribution to the history of scholarship, but here I can only briefly cite a few typical cases.<sup>96</sup> Neither can I go into the difficult question of whether Anaximander's fragment is about an eternal cosmic equilibrium of warring opposites, or allows for a final disappearance of things into the Unbounded.<sup>97</sup>

The names of Rohde and Nietzsche may have remained attached to the interpretation also supported by Diels because Jaeger (who argued contra) credited them with this interpretation in his well-known book of 1947, and refrained from mentioning others, e.g. Diels, whose student he had been.<sup>98</sup> Rohde refers to fr. 2 Mullach [~ fr. B1 D.-K.], where the word ἀλλήλοισις is lacking in Simplicius' text.<sup>99</sup> Diels himself had put back this crucial word in his edition of Simplicius' *Commentary* of 1882, noting in the apparatus that it is not found in the Aldina.<sup>100</sup> In his dissertation on Theophrastus of 1858, with an edition of the fragments he attributed to the *Physikôn Doxai* (as, as we have seen, he called the work), Usener had already restored ἀλλήλοισις to the text of Simplicius.<sup>101</sup> Diels, who (with some additions and modifications) had reprinted Usener's fragments of Theophrastus in the *DG* of 1879, followed his master's example for the second time in his edition of Simplicius.<sup>102</sup> Usener tells us that he was only able to provide a better text of Simplicius thanks to the collations generously provided by Brandis.<sup>103</sup> In a footnote in the *DG* and in one to his introduction of the edition of 1882 Diels somewhat disparagingly refers to these collations, and tells us that they are to be found in Brandis' personal copy of the *Aldina*, preserved in the library of the Berlin Academy.<sup>104</sup>

Usener was not the only one to have profited from Brandis' erudition. The Simplicius abstract printed in the first edition of Ritter & Preller (1838) has

96 \* *Additional note 2018*: I have abridged the present section. For more information see above ch. 3, 'Bothering the Infinite: Anaximander in the Nineteenth Century and Beyond'.

97 \*\* *Additional note 2018*: See now above ch. 4, 'Anaximander's Fragment: Another Attempt'.

98 Jaeger 1947, 34–36 with notes, cf. Jaeger 1953, 240 n. 54.

99 Rohde 1894, 412 with n. 3.

100 Simp. in *Phys.* 24.19–20 = Ald. f 6a.40–41.

101 Usener 1858 = 1912, 76.

102 Thphr. *Phys.op.* fr. 2 (226A FHS&G), *DG* 476.10.

103 Usener 1858 = 1912, 74, *quod Simplicii in phys. locos aliquanto emendatiores quam quales in exemplo Aldino feruntur edere licuit, id totum debetur Chr. A. Brandisii viri celeberrimi singulari liberalitate*.

104 *Phys* vi n. 2; cf. already *DG* 104, n. 1, where Diels says better collations are at his disposal, made by Torstrik, recently deceased. Usener refers to this copy of the Aldina 1858 = 1912, 74.

ἀλλήλοις; a note tells us that it has been ‘added by Brandis from the codices’.<sup>105</sup> And Brandis himself had published the correct reading in the first volume of his *Handbuch* published in 1835, and in the first edition of the first volume of his *Philosophie der Griechen* of 1844 Zeller too prints the correct text.<sup>106</sup> Oddly enough the word is omitted in the second to fourth editions of Zeller’s great work, as well as in the Simplicius abstract in the fourth edition of Ritter & Preller.<sup>107</sup> Even Diels’ text in the *DG*, followed by that in the Simplicius edition and in *VS*, did not prevent scholars from citing Mullach’s defective text of 1860. We have seen Rohde | did. As late as 1911 Paul Deussen,<sup>108</sup> a lifelong friend of Nietzsche, quotes ‘Simp. phys. f 6a’, presumably from Mullach, so without ἀλλήλοις, while Ziegler 1888, in the very first issue of the *Archiv*, had argued that ἀλλήλοις should be deleted, viz. on the far from cogent ground that scholars as a rule did not (wish to) take its presence into account.

But it is much easier to believe and defend this interpretation when ἀλλήλοις is absent than when it is present. For their injustice things make amends, and give reparation, *to each other*, not to the *Apeiron*. Indeed, it has been generally admitted for quite a long time now, and is cryptically recorded already at the bottom of the page and more openly in the ‘Nachtrag’ to this page at the end of volume I in the fifth edition of *D.-K.*, that the Nietzsche–Rohde interpretation is difficult to uphold.<sup>109</sup> Charles Kahn for instance, in his influential study of Anaximander, calmly states that ‘there is no place, either in the wording of the fragment or in the immediate context, for any penalty or wrongdoing which could involve the Boundless’.<sup>110</sup>

105 *RP* 1836, 30, no. 57, *hanc vocem Brandis addidit ex codicibus*.

106 Brandis 1835, 126; 129 n. f.: ‘τε ἀλλήλοις aus den Handschriften hinzugefügt’. Cf. also Brandis 1862, 50 with n. 18.

107 Zeller <sup>2</sup>1856, 163 n. 2 (quotation of Greek text), 172 (interpretation, see below); *RP* <sup>4</sup>1869, edited by Teichmüller, 10 at no. 18. I have not seen the second and third editions of *RP*.

108 Deussen 1911, 44.

109 *D.-K.* I ad 89.10, with some references to the literature; also see the ‘Nachtrag’, 487–488. Diels’ note at 89.10 (present from the second edition) explains ἀλλήλοις as ‘das Untergehende dem Überlebenden und dieses wieder untergehend dem künftig Entstehenden’. See further again Jaeger 1953, 46–48, with references *ibid.* 239–240 (not to Zeller). Burnet <sup>4</sup>1930, 54 n. 1 refers to the first edition of his own book 1892, 60–62, where he cited the correct reading from Diels’ edition, and points out that there he argued that the omission of ἀλλήλοις ‘made the sentence appear to mean that the existence of individual things (ὄντα) was somehow a wrong for which they must be punished. With ἀλλήλοις restored, this fanciful interpretation disappears’. Burnet also refers to Heidel 1912, 233–234, who says few scholars bothered to acknowledge the better text of Usener and Diels (see already Heidel 1908, 218–219).

110 Kahn 1960, 167. See now also Graham 2006, 34–38.

Diels' support of the pessimistic interpretation has been forgotten. What interests me is that he stuck to it in the face of the textual evidence accepted and confirmed by himself more than forty years before. His belief in a key rôle of mysticism and pessimism, penetrating the heart of rationalist Presocratic thought virtually right from the beginning and so launching idealist Greek philosophy, really must have been very dear to him.

On the last page of Diels 1923 he calls in the help of Friedrich Schleiermacher, summarizing a bit tendentiously between suggestive quotation marks the famous finale of the second *Rede über die Religion* of 1799, where Schleiermacher, much influenced by Spinoza, argues against personal immortality and recommends contemplating the universe and losing oneself in the Infinite.<sup>111</sup> 'Solche erhabene Klänge vernahm Schleiermacher in Anaximander's Lehre', says Diels. But Schleiermacher's own doctrine in this *Rede*, even as rendered by Diels, is far from being about life on earth as a punishment, 'das Leben hienieden nur als einen Durchgang zum jenseitigen betrachtet, als eine Strafe für das Unrecht der Absonderung aus dem göttlichen *Apeiron*' (Diels 1923, KS 5). Actually, according to Schleiermacher's interpretation in the *Akademievortrag* of 1811 it is good to be alive, however briefly, in Anaximander's universe, even though the *Apeiron* is represented as punishing things for their desertion: 'was aus der ewigen Einheit heraustritt in die kurze Freude des für sich bestehenden Lebens durch den Untergang wieder strafend, jedes zu seiner Zeit, nach den Ordnungen des ewigen Rechts'.<sup>112</sup> I believe we need not see this as too sad or dramatic; all that is meant is that death is inevitable. So unlike the Anaximander of Diels and others | that of Schleiermacher does not have a pessimistic view of life, for it is there to be enjoyed: 'Freude des Daseins'! And according to Schleiermacher it is excluded that things in the end return to the Infinite: in our world each cosmogony etc. is followed by a destructive process which is again followed by a cosmogony, this destructive process being pictured as a sort of 'Weltzerstörung', or else, assuming a plurality of worlds, the cosmogony occurring in one of them is balanced by the destruction taking place in another one.<sup>113</sup>

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111 Schleiermacher 1799b, 130–133 = *KGA* I/2, 246–247. In 1799a, letters to Henriette Herz of 22.2 and 1.3.1799 = *KGA* V/3, 15, 23–24, he worries whether this argument will pass the censor. Virtually no changes of the text of this passage of the *Reden* in the later editions, see Meckenstock in Schleiermacher 1806–1821 at *KGA* I/12, Berlin/New York 1995, xxi. In the third edition of 1821 he added 'Erläuterungen'; those to the finale of second *Rede* are reprinted 1806–1821 at *KGA* I/12, 147–149. See further Dilthey 1870 = 1970, 408–410, Nowak 1986, 171–176, Wenz 1999, 45–46.

112 Schleiermacher 1815 = *KGA* I.11, 2002, 51. 'Kurze Freude des Lebens' perhaps echoes Eur. *Alc.* 693.

113 Schleiermacher 1815 = *KGA* I.11, 2002, 58–60.

In the voluminous first volume of his *History of Ancient Philosophy* published in 1921 Karl Joël (a follower of Nietzsche), discussing Anaximander, appeals to the paper on this philosopher published by Diels in 1897,<sup>114</sup> the year that also saw the publication of *Parm.* We should point out that as to the interpretation of Anaximander's thought there is virtually no difference between the lecture published in 1923 and this *Archiv* paper of twenty-six years earlier. The multiples of the venerable numbers three which determine the distances in Anaximander's cosmic system, he argues in the earlier paper, demonstrate to what extent young Ionian science was still captivated by mystico-poetic incantation, 'mystisch-poetische Zauber'.<sup>115</sup> In | the 'century of mysticism' a visionary form of shamanism flourished in Hellas<sup>116</sup>—not only Diels' Parmenides, we realize, but also his Anaximander is influenced by shamanism, the one describing a voyage to the heavens, the other drawing its visionary map. Simplicius, calling Anaximander's style poetical, according to Diels thinks of the Orphic doctrine of the individual's being punished for his selfish desertion from the Whole. And this poetic view is valid for the speculative thought of this whole period. Diels gratefully refers to his friend and colleague the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey,<sup>117</sup> who, in his *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* p. 184, had characterized this penetration of mystical notions into the principles of the ancient physicists by saying that these so to speak still showed the footprints of the gods in their manifestations.<sup>118</sup>

An offprint of the paper of 1897 must have been sent to Theodor Gomperz. Gomperz' letter is lost, but Diels' reply is extant.<sup>119</sup> The paper, he writes, was written only to give Stein, its editor, something for the *Archiv*. He has attempted to understand Anaximander without appealing to Oriental influences, though he is not against such an approach on principle. His argument is not really involved with the interpretations of Gomperz and others. Diels has been think-

114 Joël 1921, 257 n. 1: 'Wie stark bei A. auch sonst poetische Phantasie und *Mystik* mitsprechen zeigt Diels, Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosoph. X 228ff. an ausserhellenische Parallelen' (my emphasis). Diels 1897b is reprinted *KS* 13–22.

115 Diels 1897b, 230 = *KS* 15, interpretation already promised *DG* 25. Diels' pronouncements on the number three were published before the appearance of Usener 1903. One is sorry to note that he calls the tradition concerning the number nine 'Aryan'.

116 Diels 1897b, 235 = *KS* 20.

117 Six years later the dedicatee of *VS*.

118 Diels 1897b, 235 = *KS* 20. Dilthey 1922, text reprinted without change from 1883, says that the principle (singular) of the early philosophers 'enthielt in sich [...] gleichsam die Fußspuren der Götter in seinem Wirken'. Note that Dilthey *ibid.* 146–149 speaks of myth, not mysticism.

119 *DGG* 135–137, 4.2.1897.

ing more of issues in the history of religion, a field in which he has been doing some work lately.<sup>120</sup> This confidential explanation confirms how important the religious reformation, mysticism, shamanism, and pessimism he attributed to the 6th cent. BCE were for him. Diels in this letter uses the convenient term ‘religionsgeschichtlich’ which we have come to associate with Usener and the ‘religionsgeschichtliche Schule’.<sup>121</sup> It is tempting to connect Diels’ interest in history of religion with the influence of his Doktorvater, whose example may of course have played its part. But we have seen that the antecedents of his belief in the impact of mysticism on philosophy (think of his remarks on Orphism) go back a long way, as by his curious appeal to Schleiermacher even Diels himself did not fail to recognize. The use of ‘ausserhellenische Parallelen’ (Joël), as in Diels’ case Siberian shamanism to explain Parmenides and Anaximander, had been made presentable again by for instance James George Frazer, the first edition of whose *Golden Bough* had been published in 1890.

## 6 Empedocles, from Reason to Religion

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In *PPF* and *VS* the fragments of Empedocles are distributed over two poems, in what Diels believes to be their chronological order: the *On Nature* followed by the *Purifications*. An important piece of groundwork for this editorial decision is to be found in a paper published in 1898, three years before *PPF*.<sup>122</sup> The title of this paper may be translated as *On the Poems of Empedocles* (note the plural). I do not wish to go into the details here, but Diels of course refers to the detailed and apparently reliable bibliographical information to be found in Diogenes Laërtius, and on the difference between speaking to one’s addressee in the singular and one’s addressees in the plural. Others before Diels had distinguished the two poems, although differences of opinion as to what fragments in some cases are to be attributed to which poem obviously existed. So in this respect he merely links up with the traditional approach. Rejecting the testimony of Tzetzes and emending the numbers (of the totals of lines of the poems) in Diogenes Laërtius he argues that the *On Nature* consisted of two books<sup>123</sup> and the

120 *DGG* 136, ‘ich dachte vielmehr meinen jetzigen Studien entsprechend mehr an religionsgeschichtliche Probleme’. The memorial lecture of 1923 of his pupil Samter provides an overview of Diels’ contributions to this field of study.

121 The word ‘religionsgeschichtlich’ already occurs in the subtitle of Bernays 1869.

122 Diels 1898b. Also see 1898a.

123 Stein 1852, 13, 74–75 had attributed Empedocles B<sub>131</sub>, B<sub>132</sub>, and B<sub>133–134</sub> D.-K. to the third book of *On Nature*.

*Purifications* of one only, each individual book numbering about a thousand lines. The lines on the god who, with his thought, traverses the whole cosmos, and other fragments of a similar kind,<sup>124</sup> are removed from the *On Nature* and firmly attributed to the other poem.

Empedocles according to Diels began his publishing career as a physicist (first poem) and ended it as a Pythagoreanizing religious reformer (second poem). The distinctions between the rationalism of the first and the religious atmosphere of the second poem are emphasized again and again. Diels squarely faces a possible objection: a fragment addressing a single person and so in his view necessarily to be attributed to the *On Nature* promises the pupil power over winds and weather, over life and death—is this not magic rather than rationalism? No, Diels argues: the pupil is given a scientific education, he is being given instruction in the laws of nature, and the line about bringing back someone from among the dead applies to recognizing the case of suspended animation attested elsewhere for Empedocles.<sup>125</sup> This is special pleading. Apparently, he has momentarily forgotten that in the *Parm* published only one year before, interpreting the same Empedocles fragment, he had, on the contrary, argued that Empedocles in his *On Nature* went from sober recognition of the limits of human understanding to being a god, and to sharing out his magical powers.<sup>126</sup>

414 The traditional issue Diels inherited, viz. the question of what fragments to attribute to each of two diametrically opposed poems, and how to explain the transition from rationalism to religious thought or conversely, stimulated him in producing one of his most brilliant and influential papers. But in fact this sharp distinction between | religious thought and rationalism is most unDielsian and therefore very surprising.<sup>127</sup> His notion, discussed in the previous sections, that the thought of early philosophers is significantly and in various ways influenced by mysticism, is not applicable to the same extent to Empedocles, or so it appears. Yet it would have been far more in line with his general attitude over the years, with his deep-seated convictions, and with the reach of his exegetic tools, if he had insisted that the distinction between the worlds of the two poems is far less sharp than had been imagined by, for instance, Zeller or Bidez. Today a majority of scholars would at the very least agree that no such sharp distinction needs to be assumed. What is also most surprising is that, in

124 Cited n. 131.

125 Empedocles B111 D.-K. Similar arguments at Stein 1852, 7–12, 16–32.

126 Above, text to nn. 66–68.

127 The distinction is maintained Diels 1921, 14; here the pessimistic world of the *Purifications* is no longer Pythagorean but based on Orphic mysticism.

contrast to his view of the overall trend, he has Empedocles evolve from philosophy to religion rather than the other way round.

Diels tries hard to find extra-psychological evidence for his ordering, e.g. the distinction between the laborious explanation of the concept of Strife in the *On Nature* and its use as common coin in the other poem—hard to gauge, I should say, in the case of fragments.

## 7 Changing the Chapter Sequence

The earlier editions of *VS* began with Thales in chapter 1 and ended with chapters on the Sophists. Before the Sophists at the end a series of chapters was placed devoted to Orpheus, Musaeus, Epimenides, astrological poetry, and early cosmological and gnomical prose: Pherecydes, Acusilaus, the seven Wise Men. We have seen above that *VS* is in part an abridged edition of *PPF*; the earlier collection begins with Thales because a *Nautikê Astrologia* in verse was ascribed to him. In the preface to *PPF* Diels tells us why the Orphic fragments have not been included: they are to appear in another volume of the series *Poetarum Graecarum Fragmenta*.<sup>128</sup> However selected Orphic and similar texts were, as we have noticed, incorporated in the ‘Volksausgabe’ of 1903.

In the preface to the fourth edition of *VS* in 1922<sup>129</sup> Diels tells us that he had planned to modify the order of the chapters, and to put the theologians, cosmologists, and gnomologists first, according to the chronological order. But this was not to be, because too expensive. In the next edition (1934–1937) Kranz however managed to execute what so to speak was one of Diels’ last wishes. I used to believe that Kranz was responsible for the fact that in later source-books depending on *VS* and *D.-K.* we sometimes learn more about *ursnakes* than atoms, but this is false. Having now gone systematically through virtually all of Diels’ papers and books dealing in some way or other with the Presocratics, I have begun to understand why in the end he was in favour of this drastic surgery. Chronology will have been a reason; think of the *sobre* | presentation of Zeller and the even more *sobre* one of Gomperz, etc., who merely present a standard sequence, but can hardly have been the only one. Surely, his so-called ‘religionsgeschichtliche Interessen’ must have played their part. The

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128 *PPF* vii, *Hesioidea et Orphica aliis huius Corporis partibus reservantur*. As we know this other volume was not published; presumably, Kern’s *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, dedicated ‘D.M. Hermann Diels’ and published in the year of his death, was meant to take its place.

129 Reprinted *D.-K.* <sup>5</sup>1934–1937, x.

new presentation moreover perfectly fits the from-*mythos*-to-*logos* ideology, an important ingredient of the study of early Greek philosophy. Although my impression is that the early chapters of *VS* are not often visited by scholars, the great work has remained up-to-date also in this respect.

### Addendum

At the end of November 2009 I received a copy of H. Diels, *Griechische Philosophie. Vorlesungsmitschrift aus dem Wintersemester 1997/98*, Stuttgart 2010, as the wonderful gift of its editor, Dr. Johannes Saltzwedel. As this was only a few days before print-out of the book of which this chapter is the last was sent to the publisher, it was impossible to work this new evidence, consisting of 91 pages of lecture notes, into the text. The notes, which stop halfway through the Aristotle chapter, consist of dry passages dealing with the tradition ('die Überlieferung'), important concepts, cosmogonic poetry, and a series of individual thinkers from Thales to Aristotle including the Sophists. Some references to the learned literature are given. Ritter and Preller numbering is as a rule included (the editor adds *D.-K.* numbers). Apart from the material on the Sophists there is not much that is new compared with what we already knew from Diels' published writings. Nietzsche is mentioned twice: p. 33 Heraclitus is a pessimist, just as Nietzsche, and p. 59 Nietzsche proves that Plato's portraits of Callicles and Thrasymachus are true. Oriental parallels only occasionally play a part—a very minor one. Anaximander is admired as a scientific genius, but is still a mystic and a pessimist especially in his verbatim fragment, and therefore unable to resist Orphism. Xenophanes' monotheism too is close to Orphism. Heraclitus shares Anaximander's view that existence is guilt. Parmenides is not treated in the same way as in the published work, for his poem is said to be grandiose. Empedocles is said to be inconsistent, because the two poems cannot be made to chime in with each other ('Seine Theologie und seine Physik haben innerlich nichts gemein, heben einander auf', p. 54). In the physical poem Empedocles is a physicist, in the other one not only a mystic but also a charlatan: 'es ist wunderbar, diese 2 personen in einer', p. 51. Surprisingly, nothing was said in 1897–1898 (or at least not noted down by the student) about the chronological sequence of the two epics.



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